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Abstract 
Liu Shaoqi, the Chairman of the People's Republic from 1959 to 1968. had a 
coherent set of theories of transition which was distinctive from Maoism. Liu's theory 
resembled state capitalism, and the theory of transition of Nikolai Bukharin and Lenin, 
who believed that as long as the major industries were in the hands of the proletariat, 
the existence of a limited market economy and the retention of private ownership 
would not hinder a nation's progress towards socialism. Expanding from this principle, 
Liu believed that if the proletariat were in a ruling position, the purge of the 
bourgeoisie was not necessary as they could be educated and transformed into 
socialists. Therefore, Liu disliked class struggle, and did not see the ideological 
fractions within the Party as a threat to the central authority. The bottom line is that if 
the Communists' grip on power had not been challenged, a certain level of 
multiplicity should be tolerated. He distrusted mass mobilisation, and believed that 
transition to socialism could only be successful if it was under the guidance of the 
Party. As the nation's Chairman who carried out hisjob as Mao's front man, Liu had 
still managed to insert his line of thoughts into mainstream politics in disguised form, 
though from time to time he had to succumb to Mao's political power. Most writers 
from the West would regard Liu as Mao's puppet, particularly in view of his 
involvement in the Great Leap; whereas most Chinese writers from the PRC would 
try to portray him as the pioneer of market economy in support of China's economic 
policy. This study aims to show that beneath the fa<;ade of Mao's faithful lieutenant, 
Liu had been applying his own thoughts of transition in a coherent and defiant manner. 
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Note on Text 
Unless otherwise stated, all Chinese pronunciation has been translated to 
English via the Pinyin method. All Chinese terms and jargons have been converted 
into English and additional descriptions are presented in the form of footnotes. 
Therefore there is no glossary section in this thesis. Where references are concerned, 
if the titles are not stated in Chinese Pinyin, the English translations are original. No 
Chinese characters are used in this thesis. The original English translations of specific 
words have been typed within inverted commas and in italics, as these may not 
conform entirely to conventions of English usage. The examples are Bukharin's idea 
of 'grow-into socialism', and Liu's idea of business conglomerate, 'the Trust'. Full 
descriptions of all these terms have been provided in the thesis. Besides, the titles of 
books, articles and speeches are also typed within inverted commas and in italics. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Hypothesis 
This research attempts to prove that Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), the then 
Chairman of the People's Republic of China (1959-1966), had a set of coherent 
theories of transition for the transformation of post-revolution China into a socialist 
nation. 
My research is not intended to draw a separating line between Liu Shaoqi and 
the mainstream theories of Chinese Communism, but to prove that Liu had a set of 
theories of transition, which were, however, not entirely invented by him. This 
research will identify the core elements that consistently underline all his writings, 
speeches, as well as his revolutionary practices and domestic policies. The element of 
thought that is evidently coherent throughout Liu's practices and ideologies, and 
consistently influenced Liu's formulation of domestic policy as well as his strategy of 
organisation, is interpreted from two aspects in this research. One is from the aspect 
of party and organisation, in which Liu's thought emphasised the primacy of central 
authority, encouraging the self-cultivation of party members, and the toleration of 
multiplicity and contradiction within the party. The other aspect is economy, where 
Liu advocated the model of a mixed economy resembling some elements of state 
capitalism. His thought advocated the control of major industries by the state and the 
tolerance of the continuation of private businesses in minor industries; a more 
effective distribution of wealth by the rural cooperative and the establishment of 'the 
Trust 1 to have more effective control of heavy industry. 
The essence of Liu's theory of transition is the primacy of central control, as 
he relied very little on the initiative and organisational skills of the masses. He 
preferred to implement a policy via well regulated central guidelines rather than 
through the mobilisation of masses. The adherence to central rules and regulations 
were the prerequisites for Liu's tolerance of contradictory ideas and class enemies. He 
did not favour accomplishing goals through class struggle, but believed that as long as 
the proletariat ruled, capitalism could be transformed into socialism and private 
businesses could be squeezed out of the market by state enterprises. Liu also believed 
1 For definition and discussion of the industrial conglomerate in socialist world, 'the Trust", see 
footnote 5 of chapter 3 and chapter 5 
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that the development of productive forces must not be disrupted, meaning China's 
economy must be fully developed before the transition to socialism, and the 
collectivisation of the peasantry must not precede the mechanisation of farming-all 
these must be carried out in accordance with a central plan. This research attempts to 
prove that, despite some common perceptions that indicate otherwise, the above 
elements remained consistent in his thoughts throughout his political career. 
1.2 Background & Objectives 
. Two of the countries that claimed to have put Marxism into practice, the 
former Soviet Union and China; had made full use of the Marxist theory to underline 
their revolutionary slogans. V. I. Lenin, particularly, was a remarkable theoretician as 
by himself he reinterpreted Marxist theories in his enormous volume of writings in 
support of his revolutionary movement and post-revolution domestic policy. Mao, on 
the other hand, did not have the intellectual background of Lenin in applying Marxist 
theory to his revolutionary goals. Mao actually paved a new path by inventing his 
own set of revolutionary theories along with a theory of transition, which was loosely 
based on Marxism but with more emphasis on nationalism. Ironically, the discussion 
of Marx's theory of transition, the historical materialism, which states the 
evolutionary transformation of the form of human society in the sequence of slavery, 
feudalism, capitalism, socialism and communism, had stirred controversy and even 
triggered political struggle in these socialist states during the aftermath of their 
revolution. The reason for this was that most of the countries that had successfully 
gone through the socialist revolution were arguably not economically developed; 
hence theoretically the authentication of the revolution would be in doubt if anyone 
persisted with the application of the theory of historical materialism. The significance 
of the period of transition in socialist countries is not confined to the existence of 
market and private ownership, which are generally perceived as capitalist in nature. It 
actually raises an important question for academic studies and social analysis with its 
implications on the development of Marxist theory: Does it prove Marx right, or 
wrong, that transition to socialism must be preceded by a capitalist society? Or, was it 
a new contribution to the development of Marx's theory that even a backward or 
undeveloped country may be transformed into a socialist state? These questions still 
remain unanswered and it will be beyond the scope of this research to look into the 
issue, though the practice of Marxism by the major revolutionaries will be discussed 
in chapter 3, the theory chapter. 
Mao's figure has been so prominent in Chinese studies that most research has 
centred on him. Studies of Mao's involvement in political and economic development 
in China's contemporary history are frequently undertaken by Western scholars. Even 
theoretical studies of Maoist thought (Schram, 1989, 1974. 1963; Harris, 1978; Dirlik 
et aI, 1997) are not uncommon. Contrastingly, Western academic studies of Liu have 
remained scarce. We can only extract Liu's involvement in China's political history 
from the study of China's politics or the studies of Mao. Jack Gray does write briefly 
about Liu's idea of economic development as an 'alternative line' to Mao, but does 
not give detailed elaboration and discussion of the two (Gray, 1973). That makes 
Dittmer stand out as the only Western scholar who has done an exclusive study of 
Liu. But even Dittmer does not dig deep into Liu's ideologies to work out whether Liu 
had a coherent set of theories of transition of his own, bearing in mind the fact that 
Liu was a well-regarded theoretician within the Party? The reason for such significant 
omissions (by Western Scholars) could be the perception that the mainstream 
ideology of the CCP during Maoist era was Mao's ideology. This is understandable as 
Mao's influence over his nation was so overwhelming that his ideology in fact 
represented the mainstream ideology of Chinese Communism. Nevertheless, what 
was imposed by Mao was virtually totally accepted by the Chinese leadership, which 
meant it represented the party instead of Mao alone, (Knight in Dirlik et aI., 1997, 4--
5) albeit Mao was the cult figure in China and opposition to him was rare. Therefore, 
the study of other leaders' ideologies would definitely broaden the scope of Chinese 
Studies, as it is indeed a wrong conception to view the pre-Deng China from only 
Mao's point of view. 
Studies of the writings of Liu by Chinese scholars on the other hand, have 
been dominated by 'mainstream writers', who are not independent of any state-
sponsored institution (like universities, the Party, or the CCP related publishers). 
Furthermore, like Western studies of Liu, there has been no Chinese publication of 
academic studies of Liu's theory of transition, though some short articles are 
available.3 Most important of all, like their Western counterparts, many Chinese still 
2 We will have detailed discussion of this in Chapter 2, the literature review 
3 This is referred to academic study in compliance with Western research standards. It means no book 
has been written by an independent academic researcher on Liu in China, though some short articles 
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regard Maoist theory as the representative ideology of Maoist China. In his 
interpretation of Marxism, Liu Shaoqi had kept to the simplest form of historical 
materialism that advocated the primacy of productive forces, and was regarded as a 
good theoretician because of his ability to reinterpret Marxist theory to facilitate his 
support for a more market based economic policy during the transitional period. The 
objectives of this research are thus, first of all, to fill up part of the vacuum left over 
by Dittmer and other Western scholars-in this case to provide a specific study of 
Liu's theory as a coherent theory of transition; and secondly, to provide an alternative 
view of Maoist China from the perspective of the period of transition-there was 
indeed an alternative path for the post-revolution China to take, should Mao's 
overwhelming political power not have prevailed. 
1.3 Summary of the Approach 
This research focuses on the study of Liu's speeches, writings, revolutionary 
practices and economic policies as well as his involvement in major political events. 
Due to the scarcity of research on Liu, the extraction of Liu-related materials from 
other studies has become one of the core methods of data collection. These materials 
are analysed and categorised into three key chapters (4, 5 and 6) in the thesis: Firstly, 
regarding Party and Organisation (Chapter 4), which comprises Liu's idea of party 
discipline, his conception of organisation and inner party struggle, his belief in the 
possible cultivation of good party members, and how his theory of contradiction was 
applied; Secondly, Economic Development and Cooperatives (Chapter 5), which 
examines his ideologies and economic practices during the period of transition-his 
advocacy for the consolidation of New Democracy, the establishment of the SMC 
(Supply and Marketing Cooperative) and 'the Trust', the reform of the educational 
system, the introduction of workers incentives, the abolishment of permanent 
employment schemes, etc. However, to prove that Liu was 'coherent' in his 
approaches to the development of China's political economy during the transitional 
period, the final part of the core content (Chapter 6) is crucial, as it discusses Liu's 
involvement in the Great Leap, and puts forward an argument that Liu' s high profile 
are published by the mainstream writers. The Chinese writers who have been educated abroad and 
publish their books in English are classified as Western scholars. The independent writers who have 
fled China and written in Chinese have not come out with a book on Liu's theory. For further 
discussion, see Chapter 2, the literature review. 
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involvement in the launch of the Great Leap was due to his position as one of the 
Republic's top men and his concession to Mao's power politics, as he had never 
supported the Leap wholeheartedly. The chapter argues that in fact Liu had been 
trying to neutralise the effect of the Leap by highlighting his views that bore 
significant differences from Mao's. While Chapter 4 and 5 are the study of Liu's 
theory and practice, Chapter 6 adds a conclusion to the first two by showing Liu's 
persistence with his line of thought, that Liu had never abandoned his belief, despite 
the political pressure he had to bear. These three chapters coordinate to form an 
assertion that Liu did have a set of coherent theories of transition. in which he 
articulated. 
The research involves the interpretation of three major types of references. 
First is the collection of Liu's works (writings and speeches), which were published 
by the CCP in the 1960s (Maoist era) and 1980s, (after the rehabilitation) and Hong 
Kong and Taiwan's independent publishers in the 1960s and 1970s. The selection of 
Liu's works published under different categories of study-economic development 
(1993), party (1991), and cooperative (1987) are new additions to the series of 
collections of Liu's works, some of which have not been quoted by Dittmer. The 
second type of material that will be referenced is the biography of Liu. Besides the 
official biography published by the CCP and a biography written by a Taiwanese 
scholar in the 1970s (in English), Dittmer's political biography seems to be the only 
Western biography of Liu (though strictly speaking Dittmer's work is not a 
biography, see note 4). However, the emergence of new publications like the 
chronological analysis of Liu's life published in China in 1996 (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 
Vol. 1 & 2,) has provided useful material for cross-referencing. The third major type 
of material used is the political and historical studies of China that do not centre upon 
Liu. These sources have never been in short supply, though the best and most 
comprehensive studies of Maoist China are still those written by established scholars 
like Macfarquhar, Teiwes, Fairbank, Saich, and Schram in the late 1970s, 1980s and 
early 1990s. In addition to that, the publication of many new Chinese articles and the 
memoirs of former members of the politburo since the 1990s have facilitated the 
research with new materials. (For more details of the literature. the evaluation of the 
references, the availability of resources and the application of materials, refer to 
chapter 2) 
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1.4Summary of Contents 
The literature reVIew m Chapter 2 consists of three mam sections: the 
evaluation of references, the study of Lowell Dittmer and the discussion of Liu's 
theory as a theory of transition. The chapter firstly evaluates the existing literature on 
Liu in terms of their political bias and the availability of important materials. The 
references evaluated have been classified into three categories: first, the biography of 
Liu, which discusses biographies of Liu that have been available so far, both in China 
and the West4; secondly, primary references, which discuss the collections of original 
writings and speeches of Liu published in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the West, 
and whether there have been any alterations in the original content of any editions. 
The approach to extracting information from these different editions of Liu's works is 
also discussed; and finally secondary references which mainly discuss the secondary 
sources published by China's scholars and retired politburo members. It looks into the 
differences among different categories of materials published in China and their 
respective advantages and weaknesses as references for this thesis. The evaluation 
section is then followed by an exclusive discussion of Lowell Dittmer, which 
critically assesses the only Western comprehensive writing on Liu to date. The section 
highlights the contribution of Dittmer to the study of Liu and the shortcomings of his 
works from the perspective of this thesis, which concludes that besides the absence of 
discussion of Liu's theory of transition, Dittmer should have focused on fewer topics 
of discussion and may have spent too much effort in evaluating the evidence for Liu's 
conviction during the Cultural Revolution. The final part of the literature review is the 
discussion of Liu's theory from the perspective of the research based on existing 
materials, from both China and the West. As there has not been any comprehensive 
study of Liu's theory to date, the discussion is based on the extraction of relevant 
statements from the writings of other studies, from which these writers' opinions on 
Liu's ideology as a coherent set of theory of transition are constructed and interpreted 
for review purposes. 
Chapter 3 is a discussion of the theoretical references that underline Liu's 
theory. The chapter begins with a discussion of the basis of Marxist historical 
materialism and all its major elements, which basically forms the theoretical 
4 Dittmer's work, which is claimed as 'political biography', only comprises a short chapter on Liu's 
life. It is not treated as biography and will be discussed in different sections. 
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framework of Liu's theory of transition. The chapter does not carry out a 
comprehensive discussion of Marxist Leninism, as only the theories relevant to the 
research will be discussed. It then discusses the theories of transition by the major 
socialist revolutionaries-Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin, and Mao, all of whom had 
improvised Marxist theory to suit their political agenda, and put their theory of 
transition into practice. As Marx was just a theoretician rather a practitioner of his 
own theory, the study of the application of Marxist theory as theory of transition by 
these revolutionaries provides crucial references to the theory chapter. The discussion 
of Lenin focuses firstly on, his belief in the initiative of the masses to launch 
revolution ('voluntary' revolution) in an economically backward country, and 
secondly, his advocacy for state capitalism during the post-revolution era. He 
launched the NEP 5 (New Economic Policy) as the policy of transition, which 
emphasised the control of major industries by the state and the tolerance of private 
business and ownership during the period of transition. He stressed the importance of 
discipline and the dictatorship of the proletariat but reminded his colleagues that the 
time for a full-scale socialist state was yet to arrive. 
Bukharin is seen as the successor to Lenin in terms of economic development 
during the period of transition, as he became the most vigorous supporter of the NEP 
after Lenin's death. He did not favour class struggle, as he believed in the 
evolutionary transformation of class enemies under the rule of the proletariat (he 
called it the 'grow-in' model of transition), which reflects Liu's idea of self-
cultivation of party members. Bukharin also talked about the retention of the function 
of the market and squeezing the capitalist out of the market via state controlled 
enterprise. He saw wealth accumulation in rural Russia as a prerequisite to 
development of Soviet industries. Liu's theory seems to have resembled many of the 
elements of Bukharin's ideology, as' both of them advocated the gradual 
transformation of capitalists instead of class struggle, and believed in the ultimate 
socialisation of the economy as long as the major industries were in the hands of the 
proletariat. On the other hand, the discussion of Stalin is focused on his advocacy for 
'socialism in one country', which believed that post-revolution Russia should go for 
socialist development without waiting for other developed nations to become 
socialist, as even an economically backward nation can become socialist. The failure 
5 For detailed discussion ofNEP, see section 3.3.1 
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of the NEP to meet grain production targets and the grain shortage in urban areas 
prompted him to believe that the only way to improve efficiency and productivity in 
farming is to collectivise the peasantry. Stalin was a staunch believer in vast scale 
collective farming with high levels of mechanisation. 
Mao's view on the economic construction of post-revolution China was not 
significantly different from Liu's during the early 1950s. During the aftermath of the 
revolution, the CCP leadership as a whole basically supported a policy called New 
Democracy (xinminzhuzhuyi) , a model of mixed economy meant for the period of 
transition. But Mao lost his patience in 1953 and started to call for the shortening of 
the period of transition and the rapid collectivisation of the peasantry. Dramatically, 
his plan was halted by the Eighth Congress in 1956 due to the Anti-Rash Advance 
Campaign led by Premier Zhou Enlai. But Mao managed to tum the tables around via 
the Anti-Rightist6 campaign and resumed the collectivisation plan in 1957. Though 
both of them advocated rapid collectivisation of the peasantry, the principle difference 
between Mao and Stalin was that Mao was not particularly concerned about 
mechanisation, as he had faith in the combination of massive labour power and 
primitive tools in the peasantry. For Mao, the initiative and determination of the 
masses was the most vital determinant of success. In addition, Mao believed that 
contradictions with the enemy would always exist even when the revolution had been 
successful, as class enemies were defeated, the 'people's enemy' continued to exist. 
This conception contrasted sharply with Liu's belief that the contradiction with the 
enemy had ceased to exist since the victory of the proletariat in the revolution. 
The discussion of Liu's theory begins with Chapter 4, which discusses Liu's 
conception of party and organisation. The chapter points out that Liu's common 
image as the party's disciplinary master is not entirely correct. Liu's emphasis on 
discipline was rooted in his preference for the adherence to a set of well-regulated 
central guidelines in the implementation of his policy. From Liu's perspective, right 
or wrong was a clear-cut and straightforward matter, as it should be judged by a set of 
rules or policies, not personal feelings or political bias. The best example was his 
handling of the SEM (Social Educational Movement, or the Four Clean Movement7), 
6 Both Anti-Rash Advance and Anti-Rightist Movement will be discussed in detail in Chapters 3 . ..f. 
and 6 
7 SEM, Social Educational Movement, or siqingyundong-the Four Clean Movement, by which Mao 
intended to clean up the irregularities in four aspects: organisation, thought, economy, and politics. See 
Chapter ..f for more discussion 
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where he only purged those who wronged by the standard of 'Four Clean'. My 
research sees Liu's advocacy of the Maoist cult as his attempt to replace the 
Comintem ideology as the central ideological guideline with a more peculiar image 
for China's masses whose level of literacy could not appreciate orthodox Marxism. 
Liu's advocacy for the self-cultivation of communist members stressed the possibility 
and potential of people from all classes to become good communists. With the 
primacy of the central authority secured, he was willing to tolerate differences within 
the party. He described the inner party differences as a 'contradiction among people'. 
which was supposedly a minor contradiction; as Liu saw the major contradiction, the 
contradiction with enemies, as becoming extinct upon the seizure of power by the 
proletariat. Liu believed in the evolutionary transformation of class enemies via re-
education, inner party influences, and self cultivation. For Liu, all these could be 
achieved as long as the power was firmly in the hands of the proletariat, and a set of 
central ideological guidelines existed. 
Chapter 5 discusses Liu's theory of economy and his VISIOn of post-
revolutionary China's economic construction. Liu's call for the consolidation of New 
Democracy not only highlighted the differences between him and Mao, but also the 
political inclinations of a 1950s China that did not favour a mixed economic model. 
His conception of the structure of China's economy during the period of transition 
almost resembled Lenin's model, which comprised five major types of economy that 
co-existed with each other. Liu stressed that the leading role assumed by the 
nationalised industries and the control of major and heavy industries by the state were 
vital in guiding the national economy to socialism during the period of transition. He 
advocated the tolerance and retention of the market and private businesses, and 
believed that these private enterprises could be squeezed out of the market by the 
more competitive state-owned enterprises in time. He planned to make the state-
owned enterprises more competitive via state subsidies so that they could sell at lower 
prices. Liu also attempted to merge heavy industries into conglomerates called 'the 
Trust' for more efficient administration and cost effectiveness; and building Supply 
and Marketing Cooperatives (SMCs) in rural areas to deliver household goods to the 
peasantry at the lowest price possible. The cooperative played a significant role in 
Liu's economic model, as he regarded cooperatives as institutions for wealth 
redistribution and a medium to channel goods between urban and rural areas. The 
establishment of the SMC also reflected Liu' s preference for commercial activities as 
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a mechanism to lift rural living standards during the period of transition. The SMC 
was meant to purchase agricultural handicrafts at high prices and sell household goods 
at low prices to the peasantry. However, in spite of his tolerance of private business, 
Liu had never been in favour of a free economic model, as the adherence to central 
guidelines was prerequisite for his economic development plan. Liu would never 
envisage an economic development model based on mass mobilisation and the 
initiative of the peasantry, without the guidance of the Party's Centre. 
Liu's participation in the Great Leap is evidence of his support for Mao's 
collectivisation plan, and as a result, his persistence with his model of economic 
construction has been questionable. Chapter 6 discusses the issue via an in depth 
study of Liu's involvement in the process leading to the Great Leap, and asserts that 
Liu had never supported the Leap wholeheartedly. He was on Zhou's (the Premier) 
side when the latter opposed the rapid collectivisation plan favoured by Mao. But he 
refrained from further action when Mao was angered by the campaign and remained 
silent when Zhou was punished. The inauguration of the Leap by Liu was more a 
formality than the reflection of his real intention, as he was merely reading the script 
that had been vetted by Mao. Liu had been putting on two faces during the Leap. On 
one hand, like other leading members of the leadership, Liu toured the country to 
demonstrate his support and his appreciation of the Leap. On the other, Liu also tried 
to put forward his views that contradicted Mao's collectivisation plan and showed his 
rationale in the interpretation of the cadres' report. Behind Mao's back, Liu even tried 
to remind his colleagues that the outcome of the Leap was not what they saw. Liu's 
involvement in the Lushan Conference and the purge of Peng Dehuai as well as his 
assistance in launching the second wave of the Leap were other key issues that 
appeared to have undermined the consistency in his economic practice. My research 
points out that Liu indeed succumbed to Mao's political power in launching the 
second Leap and second wave of Maoist cult in 1959. Moreover, contrary to some 
studies that Liu was mainly responsible for the purge of Marshall Peng, I found that 
Liu's criticism of Peng during the conference was insignificant and he had indeed 
tried to minimise the damage of the purge at Lushan and to rehabilitate Peng in 1962. 
The chapter concludes that Liu showed his persistency in his practice of his theory of 
transition during the Leap, but his role as the republic's chairman put him in the 
limelight. 
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Although Liu did have a set of coherent theories of transition, he was not 
consistent in his politics. His inclination towards pleasing Mao had seen him 
abandoning his policies on many occasions. Interestingly, he tended to try to reverse 
what he had done or to rectify the consequences of his actions after his concession to 
Mao and those were the times he unveiled his ideas and personality. It must be noted 
that opposing Mao in that era was not an easy task, which could mean ending one's 
political career. The similarity of the major elements of the theory of transition 
between Liu and Bukharin was interesting, though as suggested by section 3.7, there 
has been no official record to suggest that the two had met. The fate of the two was 
tragically similar as well, since both Bukharin and Liu were purged and killed by their 
colleagues who preferred rapid collectivisation. Should they have succeeded, the 
history of the two nations may have been rewritten. Therefore to view history from an 
alternative angle is always important. This brings me to one of the objectives of my 
research, to show that besides 'Mao's way', 'Liu's way' did exist in Maoist China. 
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Chapter 2: The Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction: 
One of the objectives of this research is to provide an alternative view to the 
existing perspectives of the discussions of Liu Shaoqi, in which the Western scholars 
have centred on the political development underlining the Cultural Revolution and the 
political struggle between Liu and Mao, rather than a thorough study of Liu's 
thoughts as a whole. Some believe Liu was merely an interpreter of Maoist ideology 
and that, although he had occasionally interpreted the Party's central policies in his 
own way, he had not gone beyond the framework set by Mao. While many see Liu as 
one of the pioneers in the formulation of a more market-based economic policy, some 
also regard him as an orthodox Leninist advocating strict inner party discipline. None 
of these views are wrong, but they are merely part and parcel of his thought. Dittmer 
has given so far the most illustrative interpretation of Liu's character and ideology in 
his 1998 publication, and Frederick Teiwes (1979, 1988; with Warren Sun 1993, 
1999) has provided a comprehensive study of Liu's involvement in all the 
rectification campaigns, ranging from the Yan'an (1943) period to the Four Clean 
Movement (1964). A series of detailed studies of Yan'an as the root of the Cultural 
Revolution, and the Four Clean Movement as the cause of conflicts between Liu and 
Mao by Roderick MacFarquhar (1974,1983,1987,1997), and the pioneering research 
on various aspects of the politics of Maoist China by Franz Schurmann (1968), H.F. 
Schurmann (1960), James Hsiung (1970), Jing Huang (2000), Tony Saich (1981, 
1995, 1996) and many others, have also provided very good references, guidance and 
inspiration for this research. 
Nevertheless, due to perceptions among Western scholars that Liu was merely, 
most of the time, a Maoist and Leninist interpreter, few studies have been made to 
establish Liu's theory of transition, or to extract the essence of his thought that had 
traversed the Maoist era for more than a decade. Furthermore, the predominant 
perceptions of Communism mean Western researchers, particularly Americans, would 
hardly view Liu as a genuine reformer of the Chinese system, as they might regard 
any alternative ideology or reformative policies as political manoeuvre or gesture. 
Jack Gray could be one of the exceptions, as he rightly points out that Liu's line of 
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thought was an alternative to Mao. Gray believes Liu was in favour of assimilating 
policies adopted in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Gray, 1973, 62). Though 
not actually correct, Gray has stated that there is clear division between Liu ~ s line and 
Mao's line, which was the mainstream ideology. His brief accounts on Liu's ideas 
will be discussed in Chapter 5. Dittmer, the only Western scholar who writes 
extensively on Liu, has gone a step further, as he seems to be the antithesis of other 
researchers by showing his trust in Liu's personality. However, his omission of Liu~s 
major faults, lack of theoretical discussion, and the lengthy and unnecessary 
validation of Liu's conviction, have undermined an otherwise comprehensive study of 
Liu. 
Chinese scholars, on the other hand, have overwhelmingly indicated that Liu 
developed a set of coherent theories, particUlarly after his rehabilitation in 1980. 
Dittmer has pointed out that the scope of study of Chinese publications after Liu's 
rehabilitation is a highly politicised matter, as these publications have been the 
endorsement to Deng's economic reform as well as the legitimisation of the current 
CCP institution (Dittmer, 1998, 278-291). Most of these publications see Liu as the 
'correct' interpreter of Marxism, who advocated the development of productive 
forces, which is vital to legitimise the prevalence of the capitalist route in today's 
China. These publications also highlight the connection between Liu's idea of 
"seeking truth from facts" and today's "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" as 
well as the notion of "application of Marxism with China's peculiarity." These 
statements that have been frequently used by the writers are significantly in tune with 
contemporary China's political climate. However, their political motives aside, these 
Chinese writers have apparently done extensive reading of Liu's works, as they show 
a good understanding of Liu's thought, and manage to provide original interpretations 
of it, which adds valuable assistance to the writing of the thesis. Moreover, Chinese 
materials written independently of the CCP could also be found in sources published 
in Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, none of this Chinese literature, regardless of 
whether it was published in China, attempts to study the thoughts underlining Liu's 
theories and practices in a rigorous academic manner. 
In fact, if we were to be precisely in line with the research topic in writing the 
literature review, there would be hardly any Western literature to be reviewed. The 
approach taken is thus to examine the comments and interpretation of Liu and his 
ideologies extracted from the writings of Mao's and pre-Deng's China, in \\'hich Liu 
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was not the major subject. That also explains why some of the references quoted in 
the thesis are quite dated, as the popular subjects of Chinese study in post-Mao China 
are Deng and Tiananmen Square, not Mao; let alone Liu who has been considered as 
playing second fiddle to Mao. 
The first part of the literature discussion, section 2.2, evaluates the references 
used in this research via three categories: firstly, the biography of Liu, secondly, the 
primary references; and lastly the secondary references. Also included in the 
discussion are the evaluations of the credibility of some materials that were published 
by the CCP-controlled publisher or the works from writers with a political 
background. There will also be a section (2.3) to discuss Dittmer's work from the 
perspective of the research, and to show how my research can contribute to the study 
of Liu, in addition to what Dittmer has done. Section 2.4 will discuss the extraction of 
the studies of Liu in line with the research from resources other than Dittmer. These 
include the Chinese or English interpretation of Liu by established scholars, whose 
research interests are mostly Mao or China's politics rather than Liu. 
2.2 The Evaluation of References 
2.2.1 The Biography of Liu 
There is very little specific writing on Liu's life by Western researchers and 
Lowell Dittmer seems to provide the most prominent of such studies. But strictly 
speaking, Dittmer's work is too comprehensive to be categorised as biography, as he 
tries to cover too many aspects in one publication. A biography of Liu should 
comprise a detailed illustration of his life, family background, his upbringing, detailed 
accounts of his participation in the revolution, his role in the crucial events (like the 
Long March) of the CCP history, how the partnership with Mao was formed, Liu's 
involvement in policymaking after liberation, how he stood against Mao before 
changing his stance in the case of collectivisation, his role in the Great Leap. the 
'period of recovery 8 " the Four Clean Movement and finally his purge during the 
Cultural revolution. But instead, Dittmer's illustration of Liu' s life (Dittmer, 1998, 
8 It basically refers to the period from 1962 to 1965, where the "large scale retreat from the radicalism 
of the Great Leap Forward" took place. Liu was in charge of formulating policies to deal with the 
economic crisis and famine. As a result, private ownership was extended to involve the individual 
peasant household; while profitability and material incentive were emphasised over communist 
ideology-in an attempt to revive the economy 
Source: (Meisner. 1999, 162-262) 
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Chapter 2), which constitutes less than one fifth of his 1998 publication, was too brief; 
moreover, his focus was actually on the validation of Liu's conviction and the 
development of the Cultural Revolution. Dittmer's discussion of Liu as a subject of 
the Cultural Revolution is to see Liu from the perspective of the unfolding of events, 
and take Liu as subject matter for discussion of the theory of mass criticism. 
Therefore I find it difficult to regard the book as a biography of Liu; though Dittmer 
calls his work "political biography" (Dittmer, 1998, 7) (We will have full discussion 
of Dittmer's works in the next section). 
The other Biography of Liu is 'Liu Shaoqi zhuan' (ZYWXYJS. 1998a, Vol. 1 
& 2), which was published by the CCP-controlled Central Literature Publisher 
(Zhong yang wenxian chubanshe).9 This 'official' biography of Liu published in 
Beijing has been written carefully to present Liu's image as that of an economic 
reformer and a moderate socialist with a pragmatic approach. It can be regarded as a 
vast improvement for China's official publications as many sensitive issues have not 
been omitted, like Mao's purge of Peng Dehuai at Lushan and his insistence on the 
Rash Advance in the face of Zhou' s opposition. Comment such as "the Great Leap 
originated from the wrongful accusation of Anti-Rash Advance ... " shows that Mao is 
no longer untouchable (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 827-828, 842-844). The biography 
also gives a detailed illustration of the development of the Four Clean Movement in 
1964 and the rift between Mao and Liu has been implicitly indicated as well 
(ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 944--973). However, some controversial issues, though stated, 
have been depicted in a milder manner. Liu's involvement in the purge of Peng 
Dehuai at Lushan is stated as "Liu chaired the meeting on 13th and 15th August," and 
his launch of the second wave of Maoist cult at the conclusion of Lushan Conference 
has only been recorded as "Liu delivered the speech regarding personal cult ... " 
(ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 843) 
Like many CCP publications, the biography tries to highlight the shared 
opinions between the two leaders. Liu's initiative to investigate the livelihood of the 
peasantry during the Great Leap was described as in response to the Chairman' s 
suggestion of "leaving the office for fact finding;" as Liu observed that the local cadre 
had exaggerated the production report, "Mao too, had noticed the problem." 
(ZYWXYJS, 1998a. 2: 833, 835) However, the shortfall is minor and it is indeed a 
<) The book was written by a group of editors from the Central Literature Publisher 
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very useful secondary reference, as most of the maj or events are well elaborated and 
chronologically listed, though it tries to blur some issues with tactful description, such 
as calling the purge at Lushan Conference a '"tragedy" rather than another political 
catastrophe of Mao's dictatorship. Moreover, the 2-volume 'Chronological Record of 
Liu's Life (Liu Shaoqi nianpu)' published in 1996 by the same publisher has 
significantly supplemented the official biography of Liu. Both the credibility and the 
usefulness of 'Liu Shaoqi zhuan' and 'nianpu' will be discussed again later. It must be 
noted that the Chinese resources will not be solely relied upon in compiling Liu's 
history. 
As I do not consider Dittmer's works as biography, the only non-Mainland 
biographer of Liu is Li Tien-Min from Taiwan, who wrote a book specifically about 
Liu's life and political career in English. The book, published in 1975, seems to be the 
only book published outside of China that matches the criteria of a biography that I 
mentioned in the previous paragraph. However, this book also seems to be the product 
of an 'enemy survey', as Li was sponsored by the Institute of International Relations 
of the Republic of China, an institution unofficially functioning as think-tank for the 
KMT (Kuo Min Tang or guomindang, the Nationalist Party of the Republic of China) 
government. As Taiwan was still under the governance of martial law in the 1970s, it 
was virtually impossible for an independent academician to have access to so much 
personal detail regarding a communist leader and avoid being arrested. From my point 
of view, Li's book lacks theoretical and ideological analysis of Liu, an area in which 
Dittmer's book has done slightly better. However, its emphasis on the political 
struggle within the CCP should be seen as perfect material for cross-referencing with 
the official biography published in Beijing 23 years later. But on the other hand, its 
KMT background has surely biased its writing against the CCP, though it does not 
mean the facts stated are faulty. For instance, Li states that the CCP, in the name of 
fighting the Japanese, was hiding under the wings of KMT to nurture their growth, 
and armed by the Soviet Union with Japanese weapons (Li, 1975, 69, 95). This would 
never be mentioned by any of the Mainland-published materials, though nobody can 
prove otherwise. But surely any KMT -committed crime would have been omitted in 
this book as well. The separation of the two governments and the isolation of the 
KMT from the CCP had sometimes blinded them to important happenings. By the 
time of publication in 1975, Li was not even sure whether Liu had died, although Liu 
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had indeed already died in 1969. So by today's standards. the book is outdated, 
though it still has some insights to provide. 
2.2.2 Primary References 
The most fundamental of all the primary references for this research are the 
original writings and speeches of Liu. Besides the publication of those single articles 
(like 'How to be a Good Communist') in the 1960s, collections of Liu's works (not 
necessarily complete) have been published a couple of times since the 1950s. The 
earliest version of Liu's 'Selected Works' was a Japanese version published in 1952, 
which comprised only a few articles. Then there is a Chinese I-volume version of 
'Selected Works' published in 1962, by the People's Publishing House (Renmin 
chubanshe), seemingly with Mao's approval. lO It was understood that the Japanese did 
publish a few more editions of Liu's collections in the late 1950s and the 1960s. 
However, the 3-volume English version of 'Collected Works of Liu Shao-Ch'i' 
(1968-1969) published in Hong Kong, and 'The Special Collection of Materials on 
Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shaoqi wenti ziliao zhuanji)' written by the editorial body of the CCP 
Studies Journal and published in Taiwan (ZGYJZZS, 1970), are by far the two most 
comprehensive single publications so far, in that they have comprised all those 
articles published earlier, either by the Japanese (1952) or the Chinese (1962). These 
two publications are the most original and unedited collections of Liu's works, and 
they comprise the majority of the important works of Liu. 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that these books collected and published Liu's 
works after his fall, and arguably with the intention to denounce Mao (or the Red 
Guard), or to demonstrate Liu's true character by unveiling the 'genuine and 
complete' set ofLiu's works. Supposedly, they obtained the information through their 
Mainland contacts which were sympathetic towards Liu. Strangely, for unknown 
reasons, Liu's writings or speeches regarding economic reform were hardly quoted by 
the 'Collected Works', which was published by the Union Research Institute of Hong 
Kongll. Of course, the reason for the omission could be that the articles were not 
10 This was the only version ofLiu's 'Selected Works' published (in China) during Mao's era. 
11 Nonnally those materials were handed over to Hong Kong publishers by their mainland contacts. 
Union Research Institute was one of the most important publishers and infonnation providers in the 
late 1960s for Hong Kong and Taiwanese scholars and it stored up to 1000 Red Guard Newspapers in 
1967. Its close working partnership with the US Consulate-General in the translation of the material 
might have depicted its political connection. But Hong Kong was still the place to gather unbiased 
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available in Hong Kong in the late 1960s. 'The Special Collection of Materials', on 
the other hand, is another product of 'enemy survey'. Published by the CCP Studies 
Journal (Zhonggong yanjiu zazhishe) of Taiwan, 'The Special Collection of 
Materials' does not comprise the volume of Liu's works that could match the three-
volume 'Collected Works'. However, it does consist of important speeches that the 
'Collected Works' omitted, like the speech Liu made to Tianjin entrepreneurs in 1949; 
and more importantly, it also includes a good collection of press articles written by 
the Red Guard for the condemnation of Liu. 
Today, the 'Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi' normally refers to the version 
published by the Central Literature Publisher (Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe) in 
1981 after Liu's rehabilitation. The 2-volume 'Liu Shaoqi xuanji' (1981) are edited 
and designed to serve political objectives. As pointed out by Dittmer, these 2 volumes 
of Liu' s writings and speeches have been filtered in such a way that they could 
portray the essential character of Liu as "circumspect, paternalistic, rigidly disciplined, 
and intelligent Leninist," in order to promote the supremacy of party discipline. From 
these two books that were published in coherence with the economic reform, Dittmer 
sees Liu's image presented as, "consistently moderate", and "defined in formal and 
procedural rather substantive terms, with an instinctive recourse to the middle of the 
road," and the main purpose of such filtering is to rectify a "Cultural Revolution-
vintage impression of divergence of opinion," namely between Mao and Liu (Dittmer, 
1984, 126-128). 
The rehabilitation of Mao's opponents such as Chen Yun, Liu, and Deng has 
brought forward a new unwritten rule-the CCP has to ensure that Mao is shielded 
from harsh criticism for his major errors. For example, the exclusion of certain 
articles like 'Pingshan sets an example in Land Reform and Party rectification' 
(February, 1948), which condemned the extreme leftist measures of subjecting 
peasants to mass struggle, was to avoid highlighting the rift between the two leaders 
(Dittmer, 1984, 131). But the article can be found in the Hong Kong-published 3-
volume 'Collected Works' (Liu, 1969, 2: 119-122). Having known this, it is not 
surprising at all that Liu's celebrated series of speeches in Tianjin (April-May 1949) 
where he encouraged the capitalists to persist with exploitation so as to foster wealth 
accumulation have not been included at all. The speeches were briefly and selectively 
sources for research in the 1960s. See Gordon Bennett, 'Hong Kong & Taiwan Sources into Research 
a/Cultural Revolution', in The China Quarterly, No.36, Oct-Dec 1968, 133-137 
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quoted in the 'Chronological Record of Liu 's life (Liu Shaoqi Nianpu)' (ZYWXYJS. 
1996, Vol. 2) that was published 15 years later in Beijing. Besides the omission of 
articles, publication of articles does happen as well. Liu' s comment on Peng Dehuai 
during the speech at the 7000-cadres conference in January 1962 has been omitted in 
the 'Selected Works', though most parts of the speech are published (Liu, 1981. 2: 
349--443). 
However, such filtering and exclusions do not pose an obstacle to the research, 
as cross-referencing can solve most of the problems. For example, Liu's articles 
'Internationalism and Nationalism' (November 1948) and 'On the expansion of 
Democracy' (1944), though missing in the 'Selected Works', could be found in the 
'Collected Works' and 'The Special Collection of Materials'. On the other hand. the 
'Selected Works' have included some unpublished accounts that the 'Collected 
Works' and 'Collection of Materials' do not print. For example, an unpublished 
manuscript of Liu's regarding the industrialisation of China: 'The Industrialisation 
and the Improvement of the Living Standard of the Nation' (1950), the report urging 
for self-improvement of Party members: 'To Struggle for Higher Standard as Party 
Members' (April 1951); and important speeches regarding economic reform like 
'Regarding Some Issues of Cooperation' (1951); are all printed in the 'Selected 
Works' but missing in the 'Collected Works'. In a way, the two publications could 
compensate for each other. 
In addition to that, new books are published-the publication of many 
collections of 'new' (meaning previously unpublished) writings by Liu on different 
subjects like 'The Development of the New Chinese Economy (Lun xinzhongguo de 
jingji jianshe, 1993)" 'The Workers Movement (Lun gongren yundong, 1988)" 'The 
Cooperative Economy (Lun hezuoshe jingji, 1987)' and 'The Construction of the 
Party (Lun dang de jianshe, 1991)" most of which were published by Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe (The Central Literature Publisher), has provided a wider range of 
references for this research. These new books, most of which contain good coverage 
of Liu' s economic writings, have also not been quoted by Dittmer. The biggest 
advantage of these books is that they are subject-focused and well categorised. 'The 
Cooperative Economy' (1987) for example, has compiled a series of speeches and 
writings of Liu regarding his idea of using cooperatives as the institutions to re-
channel the wealth of the nation. Many of these articles are in fact unpublished 
manuscripts of Liu, short speeches delivered by Liu \,-hile he was touring the 
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peasantry and his comments during meetings with his ministers. Although not lengthy 
ideological writings, these speeches or meeting minutes show the consistency of Liu's 
thought, in that he had actually been talking about his ideas since the early days by 
making use of every opportunity he had. His unpublished manuscript • To Realise the 
Organisation and Planning of the Nation's Economy' (1948), his speech during the 
North East cadre meeting 'How to form a Cooperative,' (1949) and his comment 
during his meeting with the then Commerce Minister Yao Yilin 'Some Questions 
Regarding Commercial Work' (1956) are all valuable materials to determine the 
coherence ofLiu's economic theory. 
So generally, as far as the pnmary sources are concerned, those works 
published in the 1960s and 1970s have the advantage over unedited political 
discussion, but include only a few economics-related articles; whilst those published 
after 1979 and Liu's rehabilitation have their focus on Liu's economic theories, but 
tend to disregard Liu's political comments that might reflect explicit ideological rift 
with Mao. Combinations of both would make good references. Although nobody can 
be sure if there are still any omissions from the major writings or speeches, the 
existing primary sources are sufficient to assist the construction of a coherent set of 
Liu's theories, and they do assist the appreciation of such a collection. It must be 
noted that the compilation of data and formation of conclusions do not solely rely on 
the primary sources, but also the secondary sources, particularly the historical studies 
by established scholars or reputable institutions. 
2.2.3 Secondary References 
As far as the secondary references are concerned, first of all, we look at a 
range of vital references that I consider fairly important as they contain information 
primary to the research, or some insights that Westerners could not access; yet they 
were published in China, and some even by the Party-controlled publishers like The 
Central Literature Publisher and The Central Party School Publisher, which might 
raise the question of whether they have been edited, or written in accordance with a 
constrained scope. These include the memoir or personal notes by former Politburo 
members like Bo Yibo (1993, Vol. 1 & 2), Hu Qiaomu (1994), Li Rui (1993. 1996, 
1998), Peng Dehuai (1981), and the former Renmin ribao (The People's Daily) chief 
editor Wu Lengxi (1995); as well as the 'Chronological Record of Liu's l(fe' 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996, Vol. 1 & 2), and the biography of Liu, 'Liu Shaoqi d1Uan' 
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(ZYWXYJS, 1998a, Vol. 1 & 2). Generally, direct or harsh criticism of Mao has been 
avoided in these publications (with the exception of Li Rui), though restrained 
comments on Mao's errors are common. This could be due to the fact that these 
retired leaders had, in their time, worked closely with Mao. HoweveL these writings 
provide good references for historical events, in which new revelations could have 
compensated for what the studies in the 1970s missed. Bo Yibo's (1993, Vol.l & 2) 
illustration of the series of incidents such as Rash Advance, Anti-Rash Advance, and 
the culmination of political struggle prior to the Great Leap, have, for instance, been 
extensively quoted by established researchers like Frederick Teiwes (1999). 
Moreover, these authors manage to write tactfully and thus balance revelation 
of facts and criticism of Mao. 'Liu Shaoqi zhuan' has stated implicitly that Liu made a 
concession to Rash Advance under Mao's pressure, '" ... Liu changed his mind after he 
had seen Zhou (the Premier) condemned by the Chairman ... " (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 
792) In Bo Yibo's comments on the Lushan Conference, the criticism of Mao almost 
went unnoticed, "The Lushan incident has indicated that though Chairman Mao would 
talk about his mistake, he could not take it when others talked about it, especially 
those who were not on good terms with him." (Bo, 1993, 2: 876) Besides Bo Yibo, 
the most quoted writer is Li Rui, whose writing of the Lushan conference has been 
regarded as the core reference by many researchers in this respect. There are reasons 
why Li Rui enjoys the perception of being 'reliable': first, he was the only one who 
took meeting minutes in Lushan (which are also the only written meeting minutes of 
Lushan); second, he rebelled against Mao during the Great Leap, challenged Mao's 
view and was subsequently purged as a member of Peng Dehuai' s military clique in 
Lushan; and thirdly, neither the surviving Lushan witnesses (like Bo Yibo) nor the 
current Chinese leadership dispute his view, despite his plain revelation of Mao's 
conspiracy against Pengo After all, via cross-referencing with Maoist or Chinese 
studies in the West, these writings would provide credible and valid references. 
However, the most prominent problem of them is not the background of their authors. 
but that their focus is not on Liu, as they mostly write about Chinese politics and Mao. 
Therefore extraction of the right information is vital. 
References like 'The Final Years of Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shaoqi de ~liihou suiyue. 
1996)'; 'The Life of Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shaoqi de yisheng, 1995)" . The Great Man Liu 
Shaoqi (Lishi ll'eiren Liu Shaoqi, 1998)", and 'The Collection of Essays: The Studies 
of Liu Shaoqi (Lilt Shaoqi yanjiu lunll'enji, 1989)" have all been written in accordance 
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with a particular framework. A standard pattern of omission and inclusion can be 
observed among the books, even when they are written by different authors, and 
published by different publishers. For example, if you cannot find the missing part of 
Liu's speech of January 1962 in one of them, you would not find it in another. By the 
way, the usefulness of these references is that, years after Liu' s rehabilitation, more 
stories about Liu, which could still be unknown, are allowed to be published, even 
though they might reflect the rift between Mao and Liu. This is also made possible by 
the gradual loosening of control on the criticism of Mao, as it seems indirect criticism 
(of Mao) is now permissible, although some of these books still try their best to avoid 
portraying direct confrontation between the two leaders, and play down the 
significance of Mao's role in launching and directing the Great Leap by making it 
look like a group decision. 
Another category of secondary references in Chinese that is gradually gaining 
popularity among the Western scholars is the works of those Chinese writers who 
appear to be independent and have access to confidential information either due to 
their previous engagement with the CCP or their special channel of communication. 
Their writings seem to be independent of any political constraint. The authors in this 
category come from various backgrounds, as some still maintain good relationships 
with the authorities, while some have retired, and a few are in exile. This category 
consists of writers like Gu Longsheng (1993, 1996) who writes extensively about 
economic development and is a more 'status quo' figure where criticism of the CCP is 
concerned; Cong Jin (1989), the researcher from the University of Defence who digs 
deep to discover the statistical truth of the Great Leap famine; Su Xiaokang (1989) 
and Ding Shu (1991), the established writers and political exiles who now live in the 
US; and Feng Zhijun (1998), a Hong Kong based writer who writes about the working 
relationship between Mao and his four lieutenants, Liu, Zhou Enlai, Deng and Lin 
Biao. What makes these books stand out is that they venture beyond the boundaries of 
mainstream publications, making interesting revelations as well as critical comments 
on Mao and Liu, providing useful insights into political affairs during the major 
events like the Eighth Congress, Rash Advance, and the Great Leap. However. few of 
the books are properly referenced, as these writings were not written in adherence to a 
proper academic framework, but with the intention to tell a story. Hence it is not 
surprising at all that the referencing is not neatly monitored. Furthermore, apart from 
Feng. who wrote 'Mao Zedong and Liu Shaoqi' (1998), none of them has particular 
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interest in Liu, as Mao has always been their focus. However, these books all make 
decent secondary references, and they are definitely a useful supplement to the 
established studies of China by the Western researchers. 
The other useful sources are the articles from the academic journals published 
by China's higher educational institutions. One of the most common characteristics of 
pieces from academic journals is their undisguised rhetoric-styled statements in the 
introductory section, which try to link Marxism to the current reform, or to vindicate 
Deng's policies by paralleling them to Liu's ideologies. For example, "To do it our 
way and to establish socialism with Chinese characteristics" was the basic concept 
Deng stressed in the 1ih Congress, and also the idea championed by Liu; (Fei, 2003, 
28) and the comment from Liu's secretary, Liu Zhengde, "Liu's idea of transforming 
a country to socialism via New Democracy was directly rooted in Marxism ... " (Liu, 
2002, 8) The other tendency of these academic journals is the depiction of the close 
working relationship between Liu and Mao, as well as playing down the differences 
between the two leaders. Wang from Shanxi Teacher College, for instance, reminded 
us that Mao was the founder of New Democracy, although he later "had a drastic 
change of mind" (Wang, 2004, 70, 75); while Cui Xiaolin from Guangxi believes that 
"Mao and Liu share the fundamental principles of New Democracy, though there are 
also some minor differences between them ... " (Cui, 2000, 53) Not all the writings 
uphold the status quo, as there are also some very straightforward comments, such as 
"Liu's and Mao's opinions are significantly divergent from each other. Normally, Liu 
would finally give up his own view and accept Mao's ... " (Liu, 2002, 5) 
The distinct advantage of these academic journals over other references is that 
they focus exclusively on Liu. By referring directly to the original writing of Liu as 
well as the Party's records and meeting minutes, these writings categorise and 
summarise Liu's ideologies via systematic interpretation, in accordance with the 
subject they discuss. In addition to that, they are all contemporary writing, which 
means their references reflect the most updated sources you can find in China-
especially in the 21 st century, when it is hard to find any Western publication about 
Liu. Moreover, these writings give effective assistance in focusing into different 
subject matter in Liu's theories, which provide the research with a wider scope of 
structures to refer to. Therefore the use of our common sense and personal judgement 
is crucial, and cross-referencing is important. These articles provide effective 
assistance in assessing and analysing the primary references of this research. As long 
23 
as we disregard the political rhetoric and concentrate on the main content of the 
writings, we should be able to articulate them to the main theme of the research. 
My research will also discuss some 'dated pUblications'. The referencing of 
Western publications in the 1960s or 1970s is to demonstrate the possible differences 
between them and contemporary studies. We must bear in mind that Liu was 
rehabilitated at the time of China's 'opening-up', and also at the time when the 
tension of the Cold War had started to fade. Therefore the comparison of the 
information obtained when Liu was in power with that obtained in the post-1980 
period could mark significant differences. If still, similar conclusions were drawn, 
then it means that particular points are worthy quotes. Secondly, the writings of those 
veteran China researchers like Edgar Snow or Han Suyin are still good supporting 
references even just for comparison purposes, as these authors were among those few 
researchers who had ever compared Mao and Liu personally. Thirdly, as stated in the 
Introduction, while the pre-Deng studies were mostly Mao-focused, the post-Mao 
studies tend to be Deng-focused, with Liu hardly being mentioned. Comparatively, 
Liu played a more significant role in the 1970s-1980s academic writings than in the 
contemporary 21 st century study of China's politics, which might not even mention 
Liu at all. 
2.3 The Accounts of Lowell Dittmer 
Dittmer's studies ofLiu Shaoqi (1974, 1981, 1984, and 1998) focus mainly on 
the political career of Liu; Liu's fall amid the development of the Cultural Revolution; 
the major differences between Liu and Mao, as well as the impact of Liu's legacy in 
Chinese politics. Besides, Dittmer devotes significant portions of his studies to the 
theory of mass criticism and mass line, and the application of such theory to the 
Cultural Revolution and the case of Liu Shaoqi. 
Dittmer's study of Liu has been characterised by his unusual, thorough and 
systematic evaluation of the validity ofLiu's conviction via his own set of criteria that 
consists of "Confessed" (which refers to whether Liu admitted committing the error); 
"Accurate" (that looks into the fact of whether the accusation is verifiable on the basis 
of reliable independent evidence); "Valid" (which assess the accusation's yariance 
from Mao's thought as it was understood at the time): and "Sincere" (which sees 
whether there has been a good faith attempt in the post-Liu period to rectify the 
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'erroneous' policies). Liu's conviction was then categorised into four groups: 
philosophical themes, political themes, economic themes, and cultural themes. For 
each group of accusations Dittmer outlines the detail of an accusation under the sub-
title of "Critique", and does the evaluation via the four criteria under the section of 
"Analysis." (Dittmer, 1998, 176-221) It is indeed uncommon to evaluate the 
evidence of the Red Guard's accusations with such significant amounts of effort and 
painstaking detail, having known that most of the Red Guard's accusations were 
fabricated. Most important of all, is it necessary to carry out such a validation? This 
could be due to his distrust of the CCP, as Dittmer sees political motive as the 
rationale behind Liu's rehabilitation, that Deng was making use of Liu's theories to 
legitimise his economic reform (Dittmer, 1981,466---467,477---478). So that could 
be the reason Dittmer evaluates Liu's conviction academically: so as to give Liu a 
'real rehabilitation', instead of a political one. 
However, Dittmer's studies of Liu have fallen short in several aspects. First of 
all, Dittmer's assessment of Liu's ideology lacks theoretical discussion. It is a 
significant omission, particularly in view of the fact that he has discussed Liu's life, 
conviction, and fall as a leader as well as Liu as a theoretician to supplement Deng's 
reform. Dittmer even devotes a chapter to discussing Liu's conviction for being a 
capitalist (Dittmer, 1998, Chapter 7) and another chapter to compare Mao and Liu in 
terms of their Display, Contact, Interest, Reality, Evaluation, and Work (Dittmer, 
1998, Chapter 6), which are relatively unimportant in comparison with their 
ideological differences in economic policy and inner-party rectification. Dittmer's 
appreciation of Liu's capability to "incorporate other hierarchies and become inter-
differentiated and multi-value," his emphasis on law and order, as well as his 
preference for institutionalisation ("sought to combine elements of revolution and 
order, quality and efficiency") (Dittmer, 1998, 23, 157); have all pointed to the fact 
that he has had a good understanding of Liu's ideology. But he does not support his 
verdict with theoretical discussion, though his statements show that he has made a 
thorough study of Liu' s works. In view of the scope of his writings, a section of 
theoretical discussion would make his work look more complete. 
The other obvious flaw of Dittmer's studies is his lack of direction and 
cohesiveness, particularly in his 1998 publication, the latest study of Liu by Dittmer. 
Among all his writings, the 1974 publication could be ignored for being virtually the 
same as his 1998 writings, with the latter as the updated version. The 1984 writing 
evaluates the validity of references he quotes in his future publication, something 
similar to Section 2.2 of this thesis.-Dittmer's work in 1981 is a preface to the book of 
1998, the most representative and comprehensive of all in terms of his studies of Liu. 
He first discusses Liu's life, the development of the Cultural Revolution and Liu's 
purge as a result of it. Then Dittmer evaluates Liu's conviction by validating the 
evidence supporting the accusation via the criteria and methods mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. This portion is significantly long, and could not link conceptually 
with the earlier chapters, particularly one might always wonder whether it is 
necessary to carry out such an evaluation. The verdicts of the evaluation such as: 
"criticism of Liu's liberal party-building policies are only partially accurate and 
largely invalid but seem to be sincere," "the criticism of Liu's nationality and 
religions policy are accurate, invalid and sincere;" "The accusation that Liu 
'shielded' capitalists ... was accurate but invalid," and " ... the first two treason charges 
are inaccurate, the third is essentially accurate but invalid ... " (Dittmer, 1981, 471; 
1998, 189,203) do not connect well with other sections. 
Dittmer then proceeds with the comparison of Liu and Mao in terms of their 
contact with people, display of personal characters, attitudes to works, appreciation of 
reality, evaluation method, and interests (Dittmer, 1998, Chapter 6). He claims that 
his objective is to compare the personalities and political styles of Liu and Mao 
(Dittmer, 1998, 6). But he does not expand from there to continue to discuss the 
ideological differences between Mao and Liu as well as the political developments 
surrounding them. Instead, in the following chapter he shifts to the discussion of the 
theory of mass criticism and the model of mass critique. As a result, the chapter 
concerning the validation of Liu 's accusation does not link well with the chapters 
discussing Liu's life and Cultural Revolution, neither is the theory of mass criticism 
relevant to Mao-Liu comparison. It is obvious that each and every chapter of his book 
can be expanded to a new book or an independent subject of study. Dittmer does write 
a comprehensive study of Liu, but it lacks depth in every subject. A very good 
example is that, in his discussion of the Red Guard's accusation of Liu's 'capitalist 
road', Dittmer does not discuss Liu's economic thought objectively but only validates 
the evidence ofLiu's conviction. Therefore he has omitted one of the most vital parts 
of Liu's ideologies-the use of cooperatives as a means of wealth distribution (see 
chapter 5b of the thesis). Nevertheless, Dittmer's comprehensive coverage of topics 
does give me valuable assistance in locating various types of references. 
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In the discussion of Liu's political errors, Dittmer has made some significant 
omissions. While he does discuss Liu' s advocacy of Maoist cult at the Seventh 
Congress (1945); his support for the launch of the Leap; and his support of Mao at 
Lushan in purging Peng Dehuai (Dittmer, 1998, 18, 32-33), Dittmer does not 
mention Liu's silence over Mao's attack of Zhou for his Anti-Rash Advance 
campaign in 195712, which Liu had earlier supported. Moreover, he did not discuss 
the most serious fault Liu was supposed to have been guilty of-his support for the 
launch of the second wave of the Maoist cult at Lushan (1959) after the condemnation 
of Peng Dehuai, which actually prolonged the Great Leap while framing Peng as 
'revisionist' in the face of the Soviet hostility, at a time when Khrushchev accused 
Mao of being "petty bourgeois" for advocating utopianism (See Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 6). Surprisingly, Dittmer attributes Liu's earlier advocacy of the Maoist cult 
to his "mutually beneficial" alliance with Mao, with his sources mainly based on the 
statement of Zhang Guotao, Liu's former ally and Mao's rival. (Dittmer, 1998, 18-
19; Liu, 1969, 1: viii) As an apologist for Liu, Dittmer should not have neglected the 
fact that Liu was making Maoist thought a central ideology for Party members, whose 
literacy levels were low, (see Chapter 4); or as Phillip Short suggests, following the 
dissolution of the Comintem in 1943 by Stalin, China needed a new figure to look up 
to as they were no longer under the direct command of the Soviet Union (Short, 1999, 
392). 
Furthermore, Dittmer only mentions Liu's official launch of the Leap as his 
involvement in the Great Leap, while omitting the details of the build up of the 
Leap--Liu's support for the Anti-Rash Advances in 1957, and his shift of stance after 
Zhou had been attacked by Mao. Most important of all, we must bear in mind that Liu 
launched the Leap as the Chairman of the state, not as a genuine supporter of the Leap, 
(see discussion in Chapter 6), and Dittmer misses that. In coherence with his writings, 
Dittmer should come to Liu's defence on these critical issues by providing a detailed 
elaboration of the events. But instead, he just gives a brief illustration of Liu's 
involvement in promoting Maoist Cult (1945) and the launch of the Great Leap in 
1958 (Dittmer, 1998, 18-32) before moving on to the next chapter for the discussion 
of the development of the Cultural Revolution. This discrepancy could be due to his 
lack of cohesive direction in writing; as discussed in the previous paragraph Dittmer 
I~ See the discussion in Chapter 6 
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attempts to include a fair bit of everything. But the main reason for this omission, as I 
believe, is the lack of theoretical study ofLiu's ideas by Dittmer. As a result, he could 
not defend Liu effectively. 
In addition, Dittmer's belief that Liu had never had any tendency to incline 
towards agreeing with Mao or pleasing Mao (Dittmer, 1998, 172) seems 
unconvincing as well, in view of the support Liu gave to promoting Mao's image. His 
quotation of the statement of the then Politburo member Zhang Guotao, who believed 
that "Liu was never much of an admirer of Mao's ... " (Liu, 1969, 1: ix) is not good 
enough to support his claim, as Zhang was generally known as Mao's enemy. 
Actually it was obvious that even Liu was not a Mao admirer at heart, "Liu supported 
Mao most of the time in policymaking ... " (Huang, 2000, 4) And Liu was also known 
to be so afraid of Mao that he was willing to adjust his timetable to work and rest in 
accordance with Mao's, ready to be called on day and night (Chang & Halliday, 2005, 
401). In my opinion, seeing Liu inclined towards pleasing Mao at certain stages of 
his political life does not prevent the formation of positive conclusions on Liu, just as 
even the inclusion of all Liu's errors does not preclude argument in Liu's favour, in 
view of Mao's overwhelming influence and political power at that period of time. 
In line with Dittmer's omission of Liu's 'political errors' is his praise of Liu's 
personal qualities. Dittmer believes Liu surrendered himself without a fight during his 
purge for his principles as a good communist and party member. He attributes Liu's 
final defeat at Mao's hand to his inclination to play the game by the rules, while Mao 
used to bend the rules to his advantage (Dittmer, 1998, 173-174). After his demotion, 
when Liu chose not to disobey the Party but to face trial passively, Dittmer sees Liu 
put himself on record in favour of "civility, rationality and reasoned argument". 
Dittmer observes that the function of Liu's civility was to "protect the structural 
integrity of the existing party state and its incumbent officer." In other words, even 
after his fall, he still expected the Party to playa leading role, and he still believed the 
Party would give him justice. So his position on public civility was, in Dittmer's 
opinion, "all together consistent with his previous talks and writing on inner-party 
struggle ... and so forth. "(Dittmer, 1998, 286-287) I agree with Dittmer that Liu was 
a principled, rule-abiding person who tended to put forward his policy. via 
institutionalisation. But I would definitely be unsure whether his passive response 
during the Great Leap was due to his belief in his principles or merely because of his 
haplessness. Unwittingly, Dittmer's description of Liu seems to make him a martyr of 
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socialist reformation, as he finds that "Liu loomed as the great but unsung founder of 
reformist communism in China."(Dittmer, 1998, 227) Nevertheless, I surely agree that 
Liu had laid down the fundamental ideas of China's economic reform, before Deng 
took them to another level. 
Besides the above shortfalls, Dittmer's writings do provide valuable references 
for my research. From my point of view, many of his verdicts on Liu are accurate. 
Dittmer acknowledges that Liu's pragmatism and willingness to work with non-
revolutionaries or non-proletarians was due to his advocacy for a "moral efficiency"' 
that tended to "incorporate other hierarchies and become inter-differentiated and 
multi-value," as long as they adhere to certain formal values of meritocracy (Dittmer, 
1998,154,157-159). This is indeed in line with Liu's notion that "everyone can be a 
good communist", as long as he is willing to be nurtured to become one. Dittmer also 
points out that Liu was more willing to work with "evil" while preserving "moral 
ambiguity", but Mao simply eliminated the enemies (Dittmer, 1998, 165-166). He 
finds that Liu showed apparent preference for routine and technical tasks, which is 
true, as concluded by the study of Liu's ideologies. And I also agree with Dittmer's 
personal view that Liu "was more orthodox than the liberal he was accused of being, 
but more pragmatic and flexible than the iron-Bolshevik depicted in pre-Cultural 
Revolution and post-1980 China." (Dittmer, 1998, 289) However, my conclusion will 
be formed on the premise of theoretical and historical studies of Liu' s advocacies. In 
addition, my research aims to prove that Liu has a set of theories of transition that are 
coherent and consistent, and thus I hope to enhance the scope of the study of Liu that 
Dittmer has already undertaken. 
2.4 Liu Shaoqi as a Theoretician 
Regarding Liu as a theoretician is not a notion without support. Liu's 
reputation as the theoretician of the CCP was recognised long before he was 
rehabilitated. In a biographical dictionary of the PRC's leaders published in the 1960s. 
Liu Shaoqi was described as "the party's foremost expert on the theory and practice of 
organisation and party structure." (Boorman, 1968,405) Liu's Taiwanese biographer 
has a bigger claim, as he believes that Liu was not only a Party theoretician, but he 
was also a strategic theoretician like Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and Mao. who were 
flexible enough to accommodate time and space problems. Furthermore, Liu's ability 
29 
to marry Marxism with the CCP~ s rhetoric was remarkable (Li~ 197 5 ~ 181). The 
veteran China writer, Han Suyin (her real name was Elizabeth Comber)~ who is well 
known for her pro-Mao stance, described Liu as a Marxist theoretician whose work 
helped to establish Mao~s supremacy and Mao~s thought (Han~ 1994, 314). Teiwes 
believes that Liu~s status as remarkable theoretician could be one of the reasons for 
his fall. He sees that Liu had to go ultimately because not only were his ideas 
regarding the Four Clean Movement at odds with Mao, but also his "capacity to 
systemise them theoretically." (Teiwes, 1988,63) While most of the Chinese writers 
call Mao and Liu 'the great revolutionaries~, they tend to position Liu as 'the 
outstanding Marxist theoretician of the Party.' (Lu in Lu et aI., 1998, 39; Wu, 1998, 
14) Regardless of whether his capability in theorising the policies was a threat to Mao, 
it seems clear that the studies ranging from the 1960s to the post-Cold War era have 
all pointed to the fact that Liu was a decent theoretician. 
Ironically, recognition of Liu as a theoretician aside, there have been very few 
studies of Liu's theories; even those who regard him as a theoretician do not quote 
Liu's speeches or writings as their supporting references. However, the lack of 
theoretical study of Liu's thought does not prevent the researchers from forming 
conclusions on Liu based on their own criteria. As a result, we notice many subjective 
interpretations ofLiu's ideology. One of the general impressions ofLiu was his image 
as a disciplinary master of the Party or an orthodox Leninist, who advocates strong 
party discipline. In fact, this could be due to Liu's preference for the adherence to a 
central line, and his emphasis of the supremacy of the Party over individuals. But 
without detailed study of Liu's ideologies, labelling Liu as an orthodox left-wing 
revolutionary with an obsession for discipline seems inappropriate. In his discussion 
of the different treatment of the Four Clean Movement by Mao and Liu, Franz 
Schurmann even labels Liu as orthodox communist (Schurmann, 1968, 544). An 
American scholar writing of the Cold War era, Schurmann's verdict is hardly 
surprising at all. But some newer writing seems to be still occupied with similar 
perceptions, calling Liu an "orthodox communist and organisation person:' (Terrill, 
2003, 174) Schram attributes Liu's preference for straight discipline and party-centred 
policy to his background as ex-clandestine worker in the late 1920s. But his 
description of Liu as a revolutionary favouring "orthodox Leninism and party 
discipline" (Schram in Lewis ed., 1970, 170-173) is once again, a judgement that 
does not reflect the whole picture. But it seems Liu's image as "an organisation man 
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and a disciplinarian," (Hutchings, 2000, 283) looks certain to stay. Having said that, 
the line separating the two notions, "Liu as advocate for a centrally-based Party line," 
and "Liu as advocate for strict Party discipline," is actually quite thin. It is also 
controversial to relate the advocacy of party discipline with the orthodoxy of 
communism, unless we see communism from the perspective of Stalinism. Similarly, 
it is equally inappropriate to regard the concept of centralism of Liu as . Leninisf, 
while ignoring the fact that Lenin was the inventor of the relatively moderate New 
Economic Policy of the Soviet Union, before Bukharin continued to advocate for the 
policy after Lenin's death. In short, such labelling is pure generalisation. 
Meisner believes that the difference between Mao and Liu was more III 
methods employed than goals to be achieved. He sees that Liu was inclined to use the 
the Party and state apparatus to rectify the rural situation, whilst Mao would rather 
stimulate a popular movement based on the ideological mobilisation of the peasantry 
(Meisner, 1999, 264). On the other hand, Saich sees Liu interpreting Democratic 
Centralism, the so called 'democratic policy' propagandised by the CCP, differently 
in comparison with Mao in that he preferred not to use the mass line too much (Saich, 
1981, 42). These are more reasonable arguments, but although it is not wrong to assert 
Liu's preference for using "state apparatus to rectify the rural situation", Liu's 
concern for the rural well-being and material incentive should not be ignored (see 
Chapter 5). However, it is correct that democratic centralism, the highly ambiguous 
notion of "Chinese democracy" (which in fact did not have any substance of real 
democracy), had indeed been interpreted in a different way to serve a political 
purpose. For Womack, while Mao emphasised the interactive relationship between the 
masses and the party, Liu stressed the importance of "the correctness of the party and 
the party's bureaucratic responsibilities to administer the revolution on the people's 
behalf." But his view that the difference between the two leaders is the inherent 
conflict of "Left Leninism" and "Right Leninism" (Womack in Womack ed., 1991, 
74-75) is quite shallow, as to define "interactive relationship with the masses" as 
"Left" and "correctness of the Party" as "Right" is debatable; and not least, labelling 
both Mao and Liu as Leninist is unconvincing. 
The common example quoted to portray Liu' s "hardliner" image was his 
preference for a thorough purge of the corrupt cadres during the Four Clean 
Movement. in comparison with Mao's leniency to the masses (Short, 1999. 522: 
Harris, 1978, 57; Hsiung, 1970. 195: Shue, 1980. 342; Baum, 1975, 449). Ho\\-e\'er. 
Teiwes believes that this common perception could be wrong. As he rejects the notion 
that Liu was an advocate of rigid discipline, Teiwes instead sees Mao's and Liu's 
views as complementary during the Y an' an period 13, as well as during the land reform 
from 1947 to 1949. For Teiwes, any differences between them were simply '"the 
matters of nuance or the degree of attention each gave to specific problem". So any 
subsequent divergence of Liu from Mao was due to the "difficulties in applying the 
ambiguities of the doctrine to new circumstances, rather than to any standing 
difference in emphasis." (Teiwes, 1976, 47; 1979, 16) But some researchers are more 
accurate than Teiwes', as they think that Liu's notion was so straightforward that he 
believed "the main contradiction of the movement is between Four Clean and Four 
Unclean, not the contradiction between enemy and friend. We should solve the 
problem as it is, and rectify the wrong as it is ... " (Wang, 1999, 54-60; Liu, 2002, 
20-21; Jie, 1996,64-66; Feng, 1998,501-503) However, such literature does not 
discuss Liu's thought that underlined his support for massive political purge, which is 
his belief in a central policy, and his insistence that any deviation from the central 
policy should be 'corrected'. 
The claim that Liu was a disciplinary man is not actually incorrect, but it lacks 
theoretical backing, as the formation of conclusions was either based on observation 
or general perception, since most of these writings have their focus on Mao. Study of 
Liu's theories would unveil the centre of his thought was indeed 'organisation' and 
not 'discipline', and the two could be mixed up easily without in-depth study of Liu's 
thought and political practice. Teiwes has never doubted that Liu's priority after the 
liberation was to consolidate the party organisation, in comparison with the Premier, 
Zhou Enlai, whose main concern was to develop the roles and power of the 
government apparatus (Teiwes in MacFarquhar et aI, 1987,59). Han Suyin, who has 
met Mao and Liu personally, sees Liu as "a competent organiser," as he was a "very 
efficient Party man, a seasoned veteran of trade unionism ... " (Han, 1994, 116, 314) 
Hutching believes that experience and instinct made Liu a very different communist 
from Mao. "He was an organisation man and a disciplinarian, not a Marxist dreamer 
desperate to make a mark on history." (Hutching, 2000, 283) Note that all the above 
13 Yan'an period refers to the periods in between the late 1930s and the 1940s, where the CCP took a 
much needed rest after surviving the ferocious pursuit of the Nationalist Army during the Long March 
(1934-1935). In the newly founded base, the CCP consolidated its power and grip, rebuilt and 
reshaped its military forces, and purged the dissidents. 
Source: (Hutching, 2000, 476--477) 
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studies are Mao-centred, even if they had come to the same conclusion as my research, 
the findings would have been based on different foundations. Only systematic study 
ofLiu's thought could unveil the rationale behind Liu's emphasis on organisation. 
The root of Liu's particular preferences or inclinations was his belief in a 
central policy that superseded everything, particularly when he was in charge of any 
revolutionary campaign, where any divergence from the central guide line was 
deemed intolerable (see discussion in Chapter 4). Such tendencies, however, could 
lead to some drastic action, like his alleged execution of a KMT union 
representative 14 (Li, 1975, 28-29). However, there is an increasingly popular 
alternative view to look in Liu's conception of party and organisation. Some Chinese 
scholars have begun to discuss Liu's famous article 'How to be a Good Communist' 
from softer angles. Zhang Jinrong of Central South University in Changsha sees Liu's 
ideology on party construction as the inheritance and development of Confucianism. 
He believes that Liu's idea of self-cultivation of the CCP member was in fact rooted 
in the traditional Confucian teaching (Zhang, 2003, 173). Even someone with political 
background like Professor Ouyang of Fujian Provincial Centre of Party History 
Studies shares Zhang's view in believing that Liu has absorbed the 'good' elements of 
Confucianism into his theory of self-cultivation (Ouyang, 1999, 19). This is an ironic 
development, as first of all, Confucianism had been a 'feudalist ideology' that was 
condemned by the CCP; and secondly, one could hardly relate Liu's ideology to 
Confucian teaching. 
Surprisingly, the Chinese are not alone in seeing this. Mitter also sees the 
elements of Confucianism in 'How to be a Good Communist'. (Mitter, 2004, 114) 
Dittmer, too, has joined the pack, as he points out straightforwardly that "from 
. Confucianism Liu borrowed the notion of self-cultivation to define the ethical self-
realisation of the model party member, attempting to broaden the term from its 
original hermetic idealism to include revolutionary praxis and class consciousness." 
(Dittmer, 1998, 286) There is, however, no evidence to suggest that a communist 
revolutionary like Liu was Confucian-minded. Liu's main purpose of writing the 
article ('How to be a Good Communist ') was to foster greater loyalty from Party 
14 Liu's Taiwanese biographer exposes the relatively dark side of Liu's firm grip on Party discipline. 
According to Li, the Wuhan Union, which was under Liu's control, had arrested and executed the then 
KMT Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of Canton-Hank ow Railway Workers, Lu 
Shiying, through the "Regulation Enforcement Detachment", an Union enforcement unit that was 
directly under Liu's control. 
Source: (Li, 1975, 28-29) 
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members. A Confucian-minded leader would not order harsh purges during the Four 
Clean Movement, or the arrest and execution of a KMT union member. The Chinese 
writers' assertions aim to legitimise Liu's ideology as "Chinese-based communism~'; 
while the Westerners could be preoccupied with the notion that Confucianism is a 
deeply rooted Chinese tradition, and Liu applied the ideology as a native Chinese 
The price to pay for being seen as a disciplinary man means bearing the image 
of a dull character. Therefore it is not surprising at all that Liu was to some, a less 
prominent figure, or in Macfarquhar's term, "the least colourful" of all the principal 
characters, as he was "grey in eminence" even in comparison with Deng Xiaoping, 
Peng Zhen, and Zhou Enlai (Macfarquhar, 1974, 5). Similarly, Phillip Short's 
impression of Liu is in no way more colourful, namely that "Liu was organisation 
personified, a remote, intimidating man, with no real friend, no outside interest and 
little sense of humour, whose phenomenal energy was channelled in its entirety into 
the service of the party." (Short, 1999, 519) It seems the notion that a 'disciplinary 
man' and 'organisation man' equals a 'dull man' is popular among the researchers 
who write about Liu. But I am always unsure about how the conclusion of Liu as dull 
and "least colourful" was formed. First of all, since these studies are centred on Mao, 
Liu's character has always been compared with that of Mao, who was definitely more 
colourful, aggressive and sometimes flamboyant. Secondly, we must bear in mind that 
a dull man would not be able to lead underground work teams and trade unions so 
successfully, as the work definitely involved winning people over via good inter-
personal skills and making appealing speeches. A "remote and intimidating man" was 
unlikely to have succeeded in completing such daunting tasks. The impression was 
therefore subjective, and should be rooted in Liu's low-profile appearance and 
inclination to behave like Mao's assistant. 
Liu Yuan is one of the few who points out Mao's hesitation to reorganise the 
low ranking cadre with strict discipline and Liu's drastic action during the Four Clean 
Movement as the result of ideological difference. Liu Shaoqi always believed that the 
contradiction existed between the 'clean' and the 'not clean' (which means the corrupt 
and the non-corrupt, the right and the wrong), and the solution was to sort out the 'not 
clean' (a grand scale rectification campaign). Comparatively, Mao sees a much more 
complex picture, that the rectification of the corrupt cadre would not solve the 
problem as the "root of the problem is at the top". because "some high-ranking 
officials have surrendered to capitalism". (Liu, 2002, 16-21; see also Wang, 1999. 
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54-60) However, as Liu's son, Liu Yuan does omit the fact that Liu had made a 
serious mistake during the Four Clean Movement. With reference to his wife's (Mdm. 
Wang Guangmei) investigation report of Taoyuan County (in Hebei Province), Liu 
drafted a guideline for rectification, which was too strict and rigid. The work teams 
(gongzuodui) who carried out the rectification campaign based on Liu ~ s guidelines 
had finally gone too far and got carried away, so that the outcome was beyond Liu's 
control (Jie, 1996, 64-66). As a result, almost no rich peasant was spared during the 
rectification, as thousands were killed in the brutal and violent purges, which had 
been expanded to include ideological, political and economic offences. As one lowly 
cadre described, "all hell broke loose". (Siu, 1989, 201-202) Regardless of whether 
this was Liu's mistake; the scenario reflects Liu's Party-centred tendency, and his 
distrust of decentralised operations and mass movement. But most Western 
researchers see that as Liu's preference for discipline (for detailed discussion of Four 
Clean Movement, see Chapter 4), which might not be an accurate interpretation. 
However, some simply disregard any possibility of ideological complement or 
conflict among the CCP leadership, and study Liu's behaviour from the perspectives 
of political expediency and power struggle. Hence, they see Liu and Mao's co-
operation during the Yan'an period as a sort of shot-gun marriage, as both of them 
were fighting the returned students led by the Comintern appointed Wang Ming (also 
named Chen Shaoyu), a Soviet-influenced figure whose loyalty was with the Stalinist 
regime (Saich in Saich et al ed., 1995, 311-313). Liu's orchestration of the 
construction of Maoist cult in Yan' an has been seen as part of a political deal, which 
would promote Liu to second in command (Gupta, 1982,50; Dittmer, 1998, 18-19). 
But from the Chinese perspective, the rationale behind the cooperation of the two 
leaders is much more straightforward, as they believe those sceptics could have 
overlooked China's major problems during the Second World War: Liu believed that 
if the Soviet-backed Wang Ming prevailed, the CCP's cooperation with the 
Nationalists in fighting the Japanese would have been undermined (Zhang, 1995, 
36-38; Zhou, 1998, 11-15). From the perspective of political studies, and in the 
absence of solid evidence, neither assertion is wrong. But we must face the fact that 
we not only lack exclusive studies on Liu, we are also short of studies discussing the 
two leaders, not least the absence of the ideological discussion ofLiu's thought. There 
is never any comprehensive illustration of Liu in Mao's study, as the conclusions are 
always drawn from Mao' s perspective, which could be inaccurate. 
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Parallel with the image of disciplinarian is Liu' s 'Russianness'. which 
normally refers to his centrally controlled economic plan and his emphasis on party 
discipline. Schram believes that Liu's educational background had deep influence on 
him (Schram in Lewis ed., 1970, 173-174). Koschmann sees Liu's economic 
policies as the same as the Russians', forging new modes of production by breaking 
the divisions under capitalism between mental labour and manual labour, and between 
city and countryside (Koschmann, in Dirlik et al ed., 1997, 359). The veteran China 
writer, Edgar Snow, believed that though Liu was not pro-Russian, his early years in 
Russia did influence him, as he tended to see results less from zeal and exhortation 
but more from the effort of a professional human machine (Snow, 1971. 70). Li shares 
the view, and believes that Liu's Russian education had "turned him into an orthodox 
communist in whom the qualities of dogmatist and practical administrator were 
combined." But he also categorised Liu apart from those Russian-supported CCP 
members, "Liu was never one of the clique of the 28 Bolsheviks headed by Chen 
Shaoyu, Zhang Wentian, and Qin Bangxian." (Li, 1975, iii, iv, 8) Another veteran 
researcher finds that Liu's "Russianness" was obvious, as his policy of contracting 
production to individual households in 1962 resembled what Lenin did in the early 
1920s under the NEp 15 . "The similarities are too striking to be ignored," Richard 
Baum says, "as both profoundly distrusted the peasantry, which they considered 
stupid, brutish, and hopelessly petty bourgeois. Both were strict advocates of party 
discipline and centralised authority, both permitted tactical concession to peasant self 
interest in the face of severe economic crisis." (Baum, 1975, 164) Similarity aside, the 
question is, was Liu really Russian-influenced? 
Ironically, Liu's educational background was not in line with the image of a 
Russian-influenced Chinese revolutionary. The only thing that comes close was his 
short period of study in Moscow (August 1921-March 1922). Liu was one of the 
first Hunanese to go to Moscow under a Russian work-study scheme after he 
graduated from the First Teacher Training School 5 years after Mao's graduation. He 
was sent to the University of Toilers of the Far East in Moscow. However, Liu did not 
15 NEP stands for New Economic Policy, a mixed economy model introduced by the former Soviet in 
the 1920s after the civil war. It is well summarised by Moshe Lewin as "coexistence of a centrally 
planned sector with several cooperatives and private concerns. A mixed economy with 'market 
categories accepted as tools in economic life'; significant decentralisation inside the state sector; 
relatively free interplay of social factors and interests of a party with different groups of intelligentsia 
and experts; curtailment of the terror apparatus," as he called the system "a liberal dictatorship" 
Source: (Lewin, 1974. 96) 
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complete his study as he stayed there only for 8 months. Due to the language barrier 
(he was not fluent in Russian) and shortage of resources (Russia was suffering from 
the consequence of War Communism), he seemed to spend most of his time reading 
'The Communist Manifesto', 'The ABC of Communism', and 'The History of 
International Labour', some relatively short writings of Marx and Lenin (ZYWXYJS, 
1998a, 1: 35-37; 1996, 1: 19-21; Terrill, 1980, 52n). The details of his stay in the 
former Soviet Union have been elaborated clearly in his Chinese biography, which 
was published by the Party-controlled publisher. Should they have had more positive 
information that could enhance Liu's image as a "university graduate" they would not 
have hesitated to state it, so as to portray Liu as a university graduate. So Liu could 
have done most of his Marxist reading on his own after his return from Moscow, in 
view of his fine appreciation of Marxist theory. The notion that Liu was Russian-
influenced or Lenin-influenced is rather subjective, but it does not mean that Liu was 
never attracted to any of the Russian models at all. Instead, he openly praised Russian 
economic models on a few occasions; for instance, he quoted the Russian mass-scale 
mechanised farming as the pre-requisite for China's collectivisation of agricultural 
land (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 365; for further discussion see chapter 5). Economic 
development aside, Liu had seldom passed positive comments on Russian political 
thought or models, but this fact has generally been ignored by those who label him as 
"orthodox Leninist." 
According to James Hsiung, the emphasis on cost conSCIOusness and 
profitability, workers' material incentives, more independent managerial authority, 
tolerance of an open market, and the subordination of leftist bureaucracy to expertise 
have placed Liu's policy in line with the NEP (Hsiung, 1970, 194-195). And Hsiung 
is not alone in seeing that, as one could easily relate Liu's policy during the recovery 
period (1962-1965) to Lenin's NEP. Meisner believes Liu's policy from 1961 to 
1965 resembled the 'NEP'. But he points out that it was improper to brand Liu's 
policy 'capitalist' since Liu "walked a far more narrow and cautious path in the early 
1960s than Lenin did in the 1920s." Comparing the Chinese economy in the 1960s 
with NEP, Meisner found that "the agricultural production remained basically 
collectivised, no more than 12% of the tillable land was allowed to be restored as 
private plots; industries mainly remained under state ownership; commerce generally 
remained under strict government control; and there was no invitation of foreign 
capitalist investment." (Meisner. 1999, 261-262) Wang Lirong from Guangdong 
Zhongnan University sees in Liu's theory of transition four core elements that 
resembled Lenin's NEP: the emphasis on the construction of heavy industry during 
the transitional period; the advocacy of rural market economy to generate 
accumulation as the major resource for industrialisation; acceptance of the continuous 
existence of capitalism as part of the transitional process, and finally~ the assertion of 
the necessity of going through the stage of state capitalism during the transition to 
socialism (Wang, 2004, 104-105). In fact, Liu did praise NEP in his report on the 
future development of China's economy during the aftermath of the liberation. But 
the centre of his thought was state capitalism, so he quoted NEP as an example to 
reflect his preference, " ... we should orgamse the economy VIa state 
capitalism ... allow the development of private capitalism, nationalise the major 
industries ... this sort of transition has to see us through a long period of painful 
struggle, this is what Lenin called 'who defeats who' during the era of NEP." (Liu, 
1981, 1: 428) The elements underlining Liu's "Russianness" were just Liu's 
appreciation of some Russian economic policies that he believed could lift China out 
of poverty. 
But relating Chinese economic policy to NEP is not something new, though 
accrediting the policy during the recovery period (1962-65) to Liu is not incorrect. 
In the early 1950s, Robert North had seen in the first five-year plan the policies that 
were reminiscent of the NEP. "Like the NEP," North says, "current Chinese 
Communist policy calls for important concessions to the peasantry and for moderation 
in other spheres of political and economic activity .. .like Lenin in 1921, the CCP 
leaders of today are using certain capitalist incentives and institutions in order to 
move towards the eventual destruction of all capitalist institutions." (North, 1951, 52) 
In the mid 1960s, Schurmann came to the same conclusion for the period of 
adjustment, " ... the Ninth Plenum halted the Great Leap and launched a programme 
that bears strong similarity to the Russian NEP". (Schurmann in MacFarquhar ed, 
1966, 211) Peter Nolan also refers to the early 1950s as a "briefNEP" period in China, 
and Mao was regarded as the chief architect of these market-oriented economic 
policies (Nolan, 1988, 27). Wang of Shaanxi University believes that Mao had copied 
some of the policies ofNEP during the formulation of the first five-year plan (Wang, 
2004, 70). Similarly, Chen of Fuzhou University classifies Mao's policy in the 1950s 
as state capitalism, a transitional stage in the route to socialism adyocated by Lenin in 
implementing his NEP (Chen, 2004, 89-94). Howeyer, the obyious shortcomings of 
38 
these findings are that most of the discussion of 'China's NEP' refers to Mao as the 
mastermind, though it is understandable. So it could be difficult to relate Liu with 
NEP from these studies because first of all, none of these studies was centred on Liu. 
Secondly, since the economic policies had always been officiated by the Central 
Office; Liu's role was thus ignored. 
However, we must also note that Mao, until 1955, had in fact been in favour of 
a model of mixed economic policy.16 So if we were to draw a line separating Liu's 
theory, we must be aware of the fact that, while Liu was the strongest advocate of 
New Democracy: a policy of mixed economy, and had been lobbying for its 
persistence, it was indeed Mao who first talked about New Democracy publicly, or at 
least it was the CCP who originated it. As a result, Liu's role in policymaking has 
always been understated; moreover, there has been hardly any effort to relate his 
advocacy to his ideology. That is why this research places its focus on Liu's centre of 
thought and the coherence of his theory of transition rather than looking for a set of 
his original theories. Some of Liu's ideas are no doubt original. His speeches like 
'How to be a Good Communist' (1939), 'Inner Party Struggle' (1941), 'On Party' 
(1945) and his interpretation of Mao's theory of contradiction were new and inventive 
even from the perspective of Marxist theory. These theories of party and organisation 
contribute significantly to the Communist Party as organisational and disciplinary 
guidelines. However, as some ideologies, particularly of economic development, were 
not originally his, Liu's centre of thought has thus been ignored; in particular, it was 
Mao who had been seen as the representative of China's government. The point I 
would like to stress is that it is his advocacies that matter, not his invention. Study of 
his advocacies could help in the identification of his centre of thought, which had 
been consistent throughout his political life. 
On the other hand, relating Liu to NEP as well as China's economic reforms 
has been popular among Chinese scholars. As Dittmer reminded us, Deng's reform 
needs theoretical and ideological endorsement, so Liu's theories and policies are just 
right for the purpose. Xi Wenqi, a standing committee member of the People's 
Congress of Beijing Dongcheng District, positions Liu in between Lenin and Deng in 
terms of economic ideology. He believes that Lenin's NEP and Liu's advocacy of 
New Democracy were the two sources that had inspired Deng Xiaoping for his 
16 See the discussion regarding Mao's theory of transition in the theory chapter, Chapter 3. 
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economIC reform. He summanses Liu's economic ideas into eight points: the 
consolidation of New Democracy, the development of productive forces, gradual 
transition to socialism, respect for the rules of economics, administration of the 
economy via relevant measures, adjusting production relations to suit the productive 
forces, institutional reform, and constructing socialist society via capitalist methods 
(Xi, 2002, 10-15). Many Chinese writings do suggest that Liu had a coherent set of 
theories, but their discussions were mostly restricted to the economy, for obvious 
reasons. Chen Yongchang, the principal of Heilongjiang Provincial Cadre College of 
Economic Management, sees the accusations made against Liu during the Cultural 
Revolution, the so-called "eight points of revisionism" as the reflection of Liu's 
theory. These accusations comprise Liu's theories of exploitation 17 to boost 
accumulation, the CCP as a party for all rather than a proletariat party, the primacy of 
productive forces, the priority of economic development, responsibility system for 
rural private farming, the demise of class struggle after the success of the revolution, 
material incentives for workers and the abolition of permanent employment, and New 
Democracy as the preliminary stage of communism (Chen, 2004, 5-9). It looks like 
another piece of writing that tries to echo Deng's reform with Liu's conviction. 
However, this also seems to support my suggestion that the Red Guard's accusations 
have to a certain extent, though not very accurately, summarised and highlighted 
Liu's ideology for us. 
As the atmosphere of social studies relaxed, not only would the Chinese 
scholars have more freedom to discuss the mistakes committed by the leaders in 
building the People's Commune, they could also highlight the differences between 
Mao and Liu, although they would still avoid critical comment against Mao. Ma 
Yunfei believes that Liu had been consistent in his economic thought even before 
1962, the aftermath of the Great Leap when he shouldered the task of reviving 
China's economy. According to Ma, Liu resisted the rapid cooperativisation in the 
early 1950s and condemned the process as practicing the ideology of "Utopian 
Agrarian Socialism" (kongxiang nongye shehuizhuyi). Ma also reminds us that Liu did 
express his dissatisfaction over the collectivisation in 1957, stressing the inability of 
17 This refers to Liu's Tianjin speeches, when he assured the factories' landlords in Tianjin of the 
continuance of their business operations after the liberation. Liu stressed that in order to accumulate 
wealth for the development of productive forces, exploitation was inevitable. However, he points out 
there were two types of exploitation, one is feudalist, which should have been eliminated by then; the 
other is capitalist, which was to stay for a while. 
Source: (ZYWXCBS, 1996, 2: 209; Han, 1978, 27) 
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undeveloped productive forces to cope with an oversized production unit (Ma in Lii 
ed., 1991,392-399). Ma has apparently ignored the fact that Liu did not do enough 
to stop the collectivisation process even though he was dissatisfied with Mao. But it is 
interesting to see the use of terms like Utopian Agrarian Socialism, which had been a 
sensitive term in China for decades as it reflects Mao's catastrophic economic policies 
like the Great Leap. It was first used by Khrushchev in his description of the People's 
Commune as "the product of utopianism", which Mao attributed to Peng Dehuai's 
"petty bourgeois fanaticism" in his 'Letter of Opinion' at Lushan (Lieberthal in 
Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 313; Macfarquhar, 1983, 225-228; see the complete 
'Letter of Opinion' in Ding, 1969a, 7). It shows that the control on criticism against 
Mao had been loosened in order to legitimise Deng's policy. 
Liu Chongwen summarises Liu's idea of transition as: "Collectivisation is 
only viable when the nation's productive forces has grown strong, or else we would 
be heading towards Egalitarianism (pingjunzhuyi), which does not help to increase the 
productive forces." For him, some of Liu's ideas were new in Maoist China, like the 
reform of the educational system (dual system of education) to tackle the shortage of 
labour and rural illiteracy concurrently; the reform of labour law that proposed to 
abolish permanent employment; and the reform of labour accommodation to deduct 
mortgage instalments from wages. Liu Chongwen believes that the theme of Liu's 
thought is "to seek truth from facts" (shishiqiushi). (Liu in Lii ed., 1991, 449---452) 
"To seek truth from facts" was one of the two most popular terms the CCP has been 
promoting since 1979's economic reform, while the other one is "building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics". So it is really obvious that Chinese writers try to 
assimilate Liu's and Deng's ideologies and policies. In attempting to reinstate Liu as a 
predecessor of Deng, Fei Juying of Zhejiang University is even more straightforward, 
in that she believes Liu's thoughts on the economy during the early 1950s were 
entirely in line with Deng's ideology of "constructing socialism with Chinese 
characteristics." (Fei, 2003, 28) It must be noted that though it is not wrong to relate 
Liu's policies to Deng's, there are still differences between them. Liu might have 
advocated rural material incentives as the driving force of productivity, but he had 
never envisaged a possible vast scale privatisation of industries, as Deng did. In short. 
what Deng had done was much more "capitalist" than Liu. Of course, Liu was 
definitely constrained by the political climate of his time. But to say the two were 
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"entirely in line" is surely an overstatement. Rana Mitter's description of Liu as a 
"pragmatic" leader seems to be more in tune with Deng's practices. (Mitter, 2004, 212) 
However, economic theory aside, has Liu Shaoqi impressed the Western 
researcher as an outstanding economic planner in his own right with his practices and 
policies, like Nikolai Bukharin, or was he just another different voice in the Maoist 
camp? Many manage to position Liu distinctively in terms of economic policy, 
though they have never made an in-depth study of his ideology as a whole. Carl 
Riskin finds that three factions of leadership arose during the adjustment period: the 
Mao-led group that still championed the fundamental communist ideology. the group 
consisting of Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen who favoured reform in the direction of 
market socialism, and Liu Shaoqi and Bo Yibo who advocated the professionalization 
of economic management and its separation from local political control (Riskin, 1987, 
179). The separation of Deng from Liu's group is uncommon, as this is the result of a 
classification not based on ideology, but economic concepts; however, it could also be 
due to Liu's insistence that he wanted the management of 'The Trust' to be 
independent of the state (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 583). The other view is to separate 
them based on working relations instead of ideology. Despite the rhetoric of the 
Cultural Revolution that referred to Liu as the No.1 and Deng as the No.2 person in 
authority taking the capitalist road, "Deng's closest working relationship at this time 
appears not to have been with Liu Shaoqi, to whom he had not been particularly close, 
nor with Zhou Enlai, whom he looked up to as (in his own words of 1980) an elder 
brother rather than a co-equal, but with Peng Zhen." (Goodman, 1990, 77) Similarly, 
while Dittmer places Deng and Liu in one camp, he also stresses that the "purpose-
rational relationship" of elite politics did help to shape an alliance among the 
leadership. The truth is, they might never have supported each other wholeheartedly, 
though Deng pushed hard to rehabilitate Liu as soon as he was in power (Dittmer in 
Unger ed., 2002, 13). The above opinions all lack theoretical studies of Liu as their 
foundation. They are not all wrong from their own perspectives. But making 
jUdgements based on working relationships, policies or political alliance is not 
sufficient to appreciate Liu's economic strategies. 
Some regard Liu, Chen Yun and Yang Yanzhen as advocating a policy of 
mixed economy with continuing centralised control, while Mao, Ai Siqi and Chen 
Boda opted for an accelerated programme of collectivisation (Hamrin in Hamrin et al 
ed., 1986,71-73: Goldman, 1981,99-101). Bo Yibo. the Finance minister in theJi\!/v. 
Of: Sit ~r:tSI 
" ~f:'t:-. 
. , C) '.... I;::: 
....... /1 < .. 
. '1") .. 
. I') V 
1950s and semor member of Deng ~ s state council, believes that the differences 
between Mao and Liu in terms of economic development were clear: while Liu 
wanted to establish a system based on the policy of New Democracy in which private 
ownership had to be sustained, Mao regarded New Democracy as a policy of 
expediency during the transitional period (Bo, 1993, 1: 60). For some researchers, all 
these could mean a philosophical dispute between the subjective and objective factors, 
and the conflict of 'ideology and practice'. Misra jumps to the conclusion of a clean-
cut two-tier comparison, believing that "both sides in the argument selectively drew 
their legitimacy from the writing of Marx and Engels, which emphasised both 
revolutionary critical praxis and a deterministic historical materialism." As a result, 
she sees a dilemma of dialectical combination posed for Marxists that was "exhibited 
repeatedly in the history of the international communist movement ... " Hence the 
conflict of ideologies and practices between, as she sees it, "Kautsky and Plekahnov 
vs Lenin, Stalin vs Bukharin, and Mao vs Liu and Chen Yun." (Misra, 1998, 69) 
Nevertheless, this conflict of "ideology and practice" in the application of Marxist 
theory could be dated back to much earlier times. The conflict of ideology and 
physical reality had been openly discussed in official journals of the CCP such as The 
Red Flag (Hongqi) in 1960, though no leader's name was quoted (Wang, 1960, 16-
29; Guan, 1960, 33--41). Some of these accounts are interesting, and Misra, for 
example, has actually come close to pointing out the ideological difference dividing 
Liu and Mao. However, there is no theoretical study to vindicate whether Liu actually 
represented "deterministic historical materialism" or Mao was in the group of 
"revolutionary critical praxis". This sort of comparison represents simplicity of 
thought. It helps to appreciate the basic difference between Mao and Liu, but it does 
not help to understand Liu further. 
For some Chinese scholars, however, the difference in economIC policy 
between the two leaders is less contradictory. Unlike the Western scholars, they 
seldom look at the philosophical conception of Liu and Mao as a whole (like Womack, 
Misra, and Dittmer), or categorise the leaders by differentiating their economic policy 
(like Riskin, Hamrin, Bo Yibo). They normally place their emphasis on the analysis of 
individual policy, rather than the distinctive character of their ideologies. This will 
make life easier for them as critical comments on Mao could be avoided. Xu Luoqing 
from Guilin College of Technology sees both Liu and Mao as two remarkable 
theoreticians, and '"they shared most of their thoughts and ideas" as there were only 
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'minor differences' between them. For example, both of them agreed on the 
implementation of New Democracy, but Mao wanted to replace it with the General 
Line of Transition in 1953 while Liu believed it should be continued for at least a few 
decades; both of them saw cooperative economy as the ultimate solution for rural 
China, but Liu favoured the precedence of industrialisation over cooperativisation, 
while Mao preferred full cooperativisation before mechanised farming was 
introduced, in order to have maximal exploitation of rural resources for 
industrialisation. Mao favoured economic development prioritising heavy industries, 
by channelling resources from agriculture, while Liu preferred the construction of 
economy in the sequence of agriculture, light industry and heavy industry (Xu, 2003, 
15-18). 
Some might question: how could these mean 'minor differences'? But there 
are Chinese scholars who share Xu's view; and the structures in which they put 
forward their assertions, the facts referred to, as well as the points stressed are 
astonishingly similar (Peng, 2003, 34-35; Wang, 1995,34-37; Cui, 2000, 53-56; 
Ouyang, 2000, 88-92). This remarkable characteristic of the Chinese writing could 
be rooted in their notions that if Mao had not changed his mind at several crucial 
moments, it would be difficult to tell the difference between Mao and Liu. In other 
words, a faction of Chinese scholars would not regard Liu as a thinker, a Marxist 
theoretician, an economist with original ideas, or a revolutionary who was entirely 
independent of Mao. They position him as a pragmatic reformer who laid down the 
'blueprints' for 1979 reform, but they seldom discuss his ideology without attaching 
him to Mao. They see Liu merely as an interpreter of Mao in an alternative form. 
This could be due to Liu's inability to express views opposing Mao explicitly, and 
that provides the Chinese writers with the best proof of little difference between the 
two great leaders. 
Nevertheless, there is another branch of Chinese scholars who differentiate 
between Mao and Liu distinctly, but only in terms of individual policy. Generally_ 
besides the most talked about New Democracy, cooperative farms had been regarded 
as the best economic topic that could illustrate the difference between the two leaders. 
Professor Qing Hongyi from Guilin Technological College believes that Liu and Mao 
had entirely different views on cooperativisation, and the differences had never been 
resolved even after Liu conceded to Mao's idea. First of all, Mao believed that the 
mobilisation of the masses was the key to the construction of cooperatives (as "some 
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Jom, others would follow") and favoured rapid institutional change (Mutual Aid 
Group-----cooperative--collective fann); while Liu believed in the pre-eminence of 
central planning, and the priority of linking the rural economy with the nationalised 
industries before the mass construction of cooperative fanns. Secondly, Liu advocated 
the co-existence of private and state-owned enterprises for a longer time, while Mao 
believed the persistence of private fanning would sharpen the contradictions between 
the rich and poor peasantry. Thirdly, Liu insisted on the precedence of the 
mechanisation of agriculture before the replacement of private fanning by mass-scale 
cooperative fanning; and Mao preferred otherwise; and finally, in tenns of the 
application of Russian experience, Mao preferred the Stalinist model of collective 
fann while Liu favoured Leninist rural economic policy (Qing, 2004, 119-123). 
Qing has a good understanding of Liu's policies on cooperatives, and has given a 
concise interpretation of it. But it is still simplistic to relate Mao's model to • Stalinist 
collective' and Liu's to 'Leninism', which could, however, be too complex an issue 
for such a short article to discuss. Liu's core idea in cooperativisation, regarding 
cooperatives as the medium to channel wealth to countryside, has been surprisingly 
ignored by most Chinese writers. 
The fonner Head of the National Administration of the SMC (Supply and 
Marketing Cooperatives), Cheng Zihua, believes that not only is Liu distinctive in his 
concept of cooperativisation, but more significantly, Liu had laid down the foundation 
of today's SMC, which has better commercial links, and functions effectively as the 
medium between rural and urban commerce (Cheng in ZYW:XCBS ed., 1989,307-
315). But unlike Cheng's opinions, most of the discussions on cooperatives are 
framed by political constraints, which try to play down the contradictory nature of Liu 
and Mao's view of cooperativisation. For example, Sun Yali believes that Liu had 
indeed never opposed any collectivisation before the mechanisation of agriculture, but 
only resisted a full socialist refonn of peasantry before the successful mechanisation 
of fanning (Sun, 1994, 58). Li Boren relates SMC to the development of a productive 
forces, the key element ofDeng's refonn propaganda; and summarises Liu's core idea 
of the construction of cooperatives as '"transiting the peasantry to cooperative fanning 
via market economy". According to Li, Liu sees the development of a rural market 
economy, mainly assisted by the SMC, as the only way to develop the productive 
forces as well as improving living standards before the peasantry could be transported 
to collective fanns (Li in ZYW:XCBS ed., 1989, 317). Liu's advocacy for the 
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construction of SMC is indeed more appreciated today than in the mid-1960s, since 
his main concern was, undeniably, the development of productive forces. However, 
these writers still neglect the fact that Liu believed the SMC should function as an 
interchange to market rural products and to purchase from the urban industries the 
products that the peasantry needed. We will discuss this in Chapter 5b. 
One incident was detrimental to Liu's image as an economic reformer: his 
involvement in the Great Leap. Some Chinese scholars believe that Liu had been 
keeping his mind clear and had never ceased applying his philosophy of' seeking truth 
from facts' even during the Great Leap. They believe Liu had been opposed to the 
plan of Leap Forward as early as 1958 (Li, 1996, 16; Tan, 2000, 47). This is 
supported by Edward Rice, who sees Liu being forced to revoke his initial script of 
the second five-year plan and rewrite it in accordance with Mao's plan-an extremely 
optimistic growth projection, before he read it out in the second session of the Eighth 
Congress (Rice, 1972, 161). But Huang Lingjun from Wuhan University of 
Technology believes they are wrong. "In fact," Huang says, "Liu had been giving his 
endorsement to the construction of Public Kitchens, People's Communes, and the 
backyard steel furnace, as well as showing great enthusiasm in the development of the 
Great Leap." Huang has no doubt that Liu was one of those who should be 
responsible for the Great Leap. Liu had indeed defended the Great Leap during the 
Lushan conference in July 1959. Moreover, he advanced the propaganda of the 
Maoist cult again during the conference, thus making it impossible for any proposed 
rectification to succeed (Huang, 2003,120-121; Li, 1993,318). Lieberthal points out 
that both Deng and Liu had much to gain from the Great Leap, in view of their 
political careers. While Deng was managing the Great Leap via his position as the 
head of the CCP secretariat, Liu Shaoqi refrained from opposing Mao in the interests 
of his security and legitimacy of succession to Ma (Lieberthal in Macfarquhar et al ed, 
1987, 307). Phillip Short has the same view as well, "if Liu had doubts about the 
Great Leap-and there is no evidence he did-the prospect of achieving assumption 
of the highest office of state through a dramatic upsurge of economic growth was 
evidently enough to make him close his eyes to them." (Short, 1999, 483) This issue 
is the most vital to this research. If Liu did support the Leap genuinely and 
wholeheartedly, the formation of the conclusion would be affected. In this section we 
will not discuss the above comments as we will have full discussion on this issue in 
Chapter 6. 
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2.5 Afterwards 
Basically, this research involves the reading and sorting of two types of 
materials: first, Liu's role in the party's history and the nation's economic 
development, particularly some crucial periods in China's history, like the aftermath 
of the liberation, the first five year plan, collectivisation, the Great Leap, the SEM. 
etc; secondly, Liu's policies and original texts, which include his speeches and 
writings, published by both the CCP and foreign publishers, ranging from the period 
of the 1960s to the 1980s. Regarding the former, there have been few new discoveries 
or revelations of historical development in the Maoist era, as most of the recent 
studies have focused on post-Mao periods, where Deng is the prominent figure. 
Similarly, the writing of a literature review for 'Liu's theory in transition' is virtually 
impossible, as it seems nobody in the West besides Dittmer has undertaken specific 
discussion of Liu. On the other hand, there are so many Chinese writings about Liu, of 
mixed quality, that careful filtering is necessary. Nevertheless, the comments against 
the Chinese references in section 2.1 do not mean to understate the credibility of these 
references, but to show my appreciation of the references and the intended approach 
to utilising them. In sum, while some of them must be treated with caution, they 
should not be written off just because they were written by scholars from state-
sponsored institutions. Some of these writers do have a very good understanding of 
Liu's ideologies, which would give significant assistance to my thesis. 
The references to Liu's role in the party and nation's history have to be 
extracted from the writings about Mao, but that does not always work well. The 
extraction of information from the latest publications is particularly difficult, as Liu is 
no longer within the scope of the latest trend of Chinese studies. Judith Shapiro writes 
about Mao's legacy on China's environment (2001), which is new, but is not relevant 
to the research. Michael Lynch of Leicester University has written a good summary of 
Mao's role in the building of the Republic (2004) but no new revelation could be 
found. Arif Dirlik edits and writes about Marxism and Mao, but Liu Shaoqi was 
hardly mentioned (1997, 2005). Michael Schoenhals' edition, 'China's Cultural 
Revolution-Not a Dinner Party' (1996), seems to be a relevant reference, but it 
appears to be a compilation of the trial records of the Cultural Revolution, and the 
collection of personal notes of the victims as well as the Red Guard. Little 
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information about Liu could be found. A new political biography of Mao from 1949 
to 1976 was published in 2004 by the Central Literature Publisher (ZYWX:CBS), but 
the content simply resembles the stereotypical Communist writing about Mao, though 
more details of party conferences and the process of decision making are now 
unveiled. Phillip Short's book in 1999 has been translated into Chinese and was 
published in 2004 (China Youth Press), but there is no additional material and some 
contents are removed. However, the unorthodox biography of Mao, newly written and 
published by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, provides the researchers with some 
insights into the relationship between Mao and Liu. Despite its controversy (for being 
not well referenced and disputed by some of the claimed interviewees for statements 
misquoted) and its Mao-focused nature, 'Mao, the Unknown Story' (2005), is still a 
helpful guide in facilitating the formation of an alternative view. 
The review of literature also found that the enormous writings of Marfarquhar, 
Teiwes, Schram, Schurmann, Fairbannk and Saich are still by far the most 
comprehensive studies of the political development of Maoist China; or in sum, the 
'core story line' that we already knew about Liu and Mao is almost unchanged. 
Though new revelations of facts do emerge from time to time, they do not have 
significant impact on the mainstream studies and conclusions. Where the primary 
sources are concerned, more original writings of Liu have emerged since the 
publication of his 'Selected Works'. Publications like 'The Development of New 
China's Economy' (1993), 'The Workers' Movement' (1988), 'The Cooperative 
Economy' (1987), and 'The Construction of the Party' (1991) have not all been 
quoted by Dittmer or other Western writers. These writings, which have been 
categorised into various topics before being published, do help to structure my 
assertions. However, as I have stressed, cross-referencing with secondary references, 
particularly those written by the Western scholars, is vital to the thesis. Most 
important of all, the available materials are sufficient for the writing of this thesis. 
The general conclusion of the review of the literature is that the principle to 
understanding the rationale underlining Liu's policy is to study his ideology, which 
could only be done via a detailed interpretation of his original writings, speeches, 
advocacies, etc. Forming conclusions on Liu's political inclination or economic 
ideology based on the history of political struggle would be inappropriate, as it might 
not enable the writer to see the overall picture, or the 'true Liu'. Furthermore, 
comments on Liu made by authors of various studies of Mao could be deriyed through 
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an interpretation from Mao's perspective. To understand Liu fully. we must have an 
exclusive study of Liu, so that every interpretation of Liu is made from the 
perspective of that particular 'Liu study'. For example, in my study of Liu. his 
consistency in advocating his ideas is the perspective I adopt to select references and 
make interpretations. My approach is to establish the characteristics of Liu's theories 
by studying his writings and speeches (primary sources) as well as his attitude, 
reaction, and involvement in policy and decision making '(secondary sources). In this 
thesis Liu's theories will be discussed in two major aspects, organisation and party, 
and economy, which I believe will underline Liu's preference for the existence of 
limited freedom and multiplicity under the predominance of the Centre, namely the 
Party. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical References 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a discussion of the Marxist theory that underlines Liu's 
thought. The chapter does not intend to put forward a comprehensive discussion of 
Marxist-Leninism, as its objective is to discuss the interpretation of Marxist historical 
materialism, or the theory of history as many Marxists call it, in a newly 'liberated' 
nation (or a nation that had just gone through the socialist revolution), by 
revolutionaries like Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin and Mao, as their theory of transition to 
socialism, to which Liu's theory of transition was theoretically relevant. In other 
words, this is not only the outline of the backbone of Liu's theory of transition; but 
also a discussion of the theory of transition of revolutionaries who interpreted Marxist 
theory otherwise, or who, in the name of Marxism, had indeed invented their own set 
of theories of transition in order to suit the peculiarity of the domestic revolution. It 
must be noted that it is post-revolutionary transition that we discuss, as the research 
deals with transition from developing countries to socialist nations where the 
revolution had already happened. 
Contrary to Liu's practice of always mentioning Marx in his speeches or 
writings, this chapter only treats Marx as the founder of the theory, not the core figure 
that put the theory into practice. It must be noted that Liu's frequent quotation of 
Marx was an exercise of legitimisation of doctrines, which was common for a 
communist leader. Marx was more a theoretician than a revolutionary, and his theory 
had been significantly improvised for the purpose of waging revolution or economic 
planning by the revolutionaries. In addition, Marx's writings have been criticised for 
lack of coherence, as his massive volume of works that spanned a period of more than 
20 years, do not always have neat connections with each other. Some believe that he 
suffered from "severe lack of intellectual control" (Elster, 1986, 105), but some still 
see lines of consistency between his earlier writings and the later works18,claiming 
18 There is no general agreement on how to define early or mature writing of Marx. But 'German 
Ideology', which was written in 1845, was the first to discuss historical materialism systematically. 
Hence some tend to take 'German Ideology' as the mark of division in Marx's writings, although most 
would only regard his later writings like' The Capital', 'Theory of Surplus Value' as the works of 
'mature Marx'. Sources: (Giddens, 1971, 18-19; Wood, 1981, xiii) 
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that he "did not abandon the perspective that guided him in his earlier writings, ,. even 
in one of his most representative 'mature works', 'The Capital' (Giddens, 1971, ix). 
The focus of the discussion will be on historical materialism as Marx' s theory 
of transition. In consistence with the theories of other revolutionaries that were meant 
to transform an economically backward nation to a socialist state, the centre of 
discussion will be the constitution of the prerequisites of pre-socialist society and its 
transformation to socialism. Section 3.2 will discuss Marx's view on socialist 
revolution in a backward state like Russia, and show that Marx did, for once, agree 
that direct transition to socialism could happen in a backward country. This section 
outlines the origins of historical materialism, the concept of dialectics he inherited 
from Hegel, and Marx's notion of historical transformation. As the introductory 
session to the discussion of Lenin, Bukharin, Stalin and Mao, the section will also 
discuss the process of Marxist historical transformation; namely the breaking of old 
production relations by the expanding new productive forces, the deepening of the 
contradictions between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the alienation of the working class 
and finally the emergence of the inevitable, the revolution. In short, the section deals 
with 'the basis of Marx's historical materialism that underlines the theories of Liu and 
others. Ironically, the revolutionaries are adapting Marxist theory of how a revolution 
would happen in the scenarios regarding the transition to socialism in a post-
revolutionary world. 
Lenin's interpretation of Marx will then follow in section 3.3. Besides being a 
theoretician, Lenin was also a revolutionary who managed to improvise Marx's theory 
to suit domestic political campaigns. It was his theory that provided the foundation 
supporting the launch of NEP (New Economic Policy)19 after the devastation of the 
Soviet economy by the civil war20. However, we must also note that Lenin after the 
launch ofNEP was more reform-minded21 than before. At the same time, his ambition 
to fully impose NEP was somewhat hindered by his ill health. Bukharin emerged at 
this very moment as the saviour of the campaign while Lenin was struggling to rally 
19 For definition and elaboration ofNEP, please see section 3.3.1 of this chapter 
20 The civil war was rooted in the conflict between the Red Army (Bolshevik) and the White Anny 
(Menshevik), among them fonner Tsarist anny officers and moderate socialists who were against 
Lenin's leadership and did not see the necessity of the October Revolution. The White Anny combined 
force with international interventionists. The civil war lasted for 21h years and devastated the economy. 
Lenin's government imposed war communism, a militarization of the economy by strict control over 
goods supplied. The method brought catastrophic consequences, Lenin then replaced it with a 
pragmatic NEP to revive the economy. Sources: (Lewin, 1964, 7-8; Kenez. 1999,33-34) 
21 I mean seemingly more willing to impose a model of mixed economy with elements of market in it. 
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support for the policy from his Bolshevik counterparts. As a former opponent of the 
policy, Bukharin appeared to be convinced by Lenin that the NEP was the only way 
forward, and took over the promotion of the NEP vigorously after Lenin's death. In 
section 3.4 we will discuss the inventive interpretation by Nikolai Bukharin of 
historical materialism and the formation of his 'grow in' model of transition that was 
evolutionary in nature, as well as his differences with Lenin. There were actually 
certain aspects of similarity between Bukharin's, Lenin's and Liu's ideologies. From 
Lenin's voluntary revolution, to Bukharin's evolutionary transition, and Liu's theory 
of self-cultivation, we seem to see a line connecting their ideologies; similarly, 
Lenin's state capitalism seemed to collaborate well with Bukharin's notion of 
imperialist state, and with Liu's conception of state-controlled gigantic corporations 
like 'The Trust' 22. But besides the 'ideological inheritance' from Lenin, Bukharin had 
also shown the originality of his theory of transition. I surely feel the legacy of Lenin 
is significant in the appreciation of Bukharin' s line. 
Section 3.5 will see the discussion of Stalin's theory of transition, 'socialism 
in one country,' which advocated for Russia to go alone in its transition to socialism 
without having to wait for the victory of the proletarian revolution in the developed 
Western countries. Stalin first incorporated his model of economic development with 
the NEP, which he hoped would really revive Russia's economy. However, crisis 
mounted when the rich peasantry stockpiled grain and refused to sell to the 
government at a lower price and the production levels fell below Stalin's 
expectations. The grain shortage in urban areas had consolidated Stalin's belief that 
private farming was the root of inefficiency and low productivity, and prompted him 
to part with Bukharin, denounce the NEP and push for rapid collectivisation. Stalin's 
collectivisation of the peasantry in an economically backward country and his 
advocacy for 'socialism in One Country' indicated a significant deviation from 
Marxist theory of transition that requires a fully developed capitalist economy as the 
prerequisite for the socialist transition. This is in line with Mao's conception, which 
gave little consideration to the development of socialism in other countries, while 
22 'Trust' means industrial conglomerate, a term regularly used by Russian and Chinese communists. 
The original documents call it 'tuolasi', a Chinese translation. It is more likely to be the Chinese 
translation of the Russian word, Tpecr. In China, 'the Trust' also referred to amalgamated business 
corporations in the capitalist world, or the way the communists understood the accumulation of capital 
on the biggest scale. 
Sources: (Zhu, 2001,88; Liu, 1981,2: 506). 
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focusing on transforming a backward nation by adapting his theory of transition to the 
peculiarity of his country. 
As we see in section 3.6, Mao's experience in implementing the policy of 
transition for post-revolutionary China almost assimilated Stalin's, as he first and 
foremost imposed a model of mixed economy, New Democracy, for his first five year 
plan, then ran out of patience in 1955 and began to push for full-scale collectivisation. 
Dramatically, he was overwhelmed by his colleagues who denounced the 
collectivisation plan as Rash Advance and called for a more moderate development 
model that included the retention of private ownership and the delay of rural 
collectivisation. Mao endorsed the conception of New Democracy at the Eighth 
Congress in 1956 via the speech 'On the Ten Major Relationships' and a resolution 
had been passed to impose the speech as policy. However, Mao turned the tables in 
1957 via the Anti-Rightist Campaign, and the Anti-Rash Advance campaign led by 
the Premier Zhou Enlai was defeated. The resolution of the Eighth Congress was 
overturned and Mao pushed for a more radical development plan, the Great Leap 
Forward, in 1958. The detail of the political events like the Rash Advance, Anti-Rash 
Advance, Anti-Rightist campaign and Liu's involvement in the Great Leap will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. Finally, we will also discuss Mao's conception of 
contradiction and have a brief comparison of his notion of Uninterrupted Revolution 
with Trotsky's Permanent Revolution. In spite of his background as a prominent 
revolutionary in Russian history, there will be no separate chapter for the discussion 
of Trotsky in my thesis, as he had never ruled a country or been given the opportunity 
to put his theory of transition into practice. 
Bukharin is the key figure of this chapter, but I strongly believe that the 
theoretical discussion cannot be based solely on him, as the developmental process of 
the theory is equally important. I found that Bukharin's theory of transition was the 
most relevant to Liu's advocacies. However, I also notice that Liu had just been 
sticking to the simplest form of historical materialism, stressing the importance of the 
development of productive forces, the fundamental element that drives the social 
transformation via market development and wealth accumulation before the society 
can be transited to socialism. It was the practice of his ideology, his economic 
policies, his conception of party and organisation and his attitude towards political 
and economic reform that made him substantially a Bukharinist, though he was at the 
same time, in certain aspects. a Leninist as well. 
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Both Liu and his Russian counterpart, Bukharin, were purged and killed after 
conviction as capitalist reactionaries. However, it is indeed a simplification of the 
facts to regard Liu and Bukharin as in the camp representing political and economic 
reform while taking Stalin and Mao as the Orthodox revolutionaries who believed 
collectivisation could be achieved without having gone through capitalism. Bear in 
mind that Russian and Chinese political climates were entirely different, not least, the 
stage of economic development and the experience of war and civil war in these two 
countries before the revolution varied significantly in magnitude. To make the issue 
more confusing, both Bukharin and Liu showed signs of inconsistency in exerting 
their ideologies. Bukharin, for instance, had been an ultra-leftist who advocated war 
communism before he publicly stamped his acceptance of Lenin's New Economic 
Policy and began to talk about economic reform. Liu as well, had been questioned for 
his insistence on reform in the face of his support for the Great Leap (see Chapter 6) 
Therefore it is not actually accurate to categorise both of them as reformist in the 
socialist world during the Cold War, though they looked very similar in many aspects. 
3.2 The Origin of Historical Materialism 
3.2.1 An Introduction 
Frederick Engels, in his brief biographic draft on his companion, states that the 
materialist conception of history is one of Marx's two most important contributions to 
social science, along with the theory of surplus value (Engels in Marx & Engels, 
1968, 355-357). However, as stated in the introduction, historical materialism is just 
one of the popular interpretations of Marx's theory of transition, as there is no fixed 
rule in interpreting Marx's theory. "There is no such thing as 'Orthodox Marxism'. 
All orthodoxies-Kautsky, Lukacs, Stalin are particular theoretical constructions 
culled from the possibilities within the complex whole of Marx and Engels 
discourses." (Hirst, 1979, 420) 
Marx outlined his theory of history in the Preface of his 'A Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy' (1859). Marx put forward the assertion that the 
material productive forces determine the form of production relations, which form the 
economic structure of a society and the base supporting the constitution of legal and 
political superstructure. In summary, when the production relations could no longer 
accommodate the development of the productive forces, they would have become a 
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'fetter' restraining the expansion of the productive forces and the advancement of the 
society. The existing production relations will give way to the new productive forces 
when they are fully developed. Consequently, revolution will arise and the existing 
social and economic structure will collapse, and a new, or more advanced form of 
production relations, in which the new productive forces could fully function, is thus 
born (Marx, 1970, 19-21). 
Marx developed his theory of history out of Hegel's philosophy of history, 
which sees the spiritual attitude of human nature as the key feature of historical 
development; as Hegel says, "The phenomenon we investigate-universal history-
belongs to the realm of spirit." (Hegel, 1956, 16) For Hegel, human spirit reflects 
human consciousness, and "this self-contained existence of spirit is none other than 
self-consciousness-consciousness of one's being," and he believes that, if "the 
essence of matter is gravity ... (then) the essence of spirit is freedom." Man is capable 
of developing a better self out of his old self through self-realisation, or by 
objectifying the better self from himself via spiritual consciousness, where the 
freedom of spirit of man could be attained; as Hegel stresses, "the history of the world 
is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom." (Hegel, 1956. 17, 
19) Hence the evolution of human society to a more advanced level, in Hegel's sense. 
So while Hegel relied on "self-realisation" to upgrade oneself to a more advanced 
level, Marx replaced self-realisation with the "interaction of materials." For Hegel, 
"Man is conscious ... the objective world as a mere phenomenon of spirit, and man's 
relation to this world is one of knowing;" while for Marx, "man is an objective being, 
the objective world is the real and necessary realm in which man fulfils himself, and 
man's relation to the world is one of activity rather than knowing." (Maguire, 1972, 
87) 
As a concise comparison of both, "History is the history of human industry 
(world spirit), which undergoes growth in productive power (self knowledge), the 
stimulus and the vehicle of which is an economic structure (culture), which perishes 
when it has stimulated more growth than it can contain." We can actually make a 
similar comparison by quoting Marx's phrases in 'Critique of Political Economy': 
" ... no social order (Cultural Form) ever perishes before all the productive forces 
(Consciousness) for which there is room in it have developed." (Cohen, 1978, 26) 
The backbone that supports both Marxian and Hegelian thought is the dialectic nature 
of their theories. Both Marx and Hegel agreed that the "world is dialectically 
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structured", but while "Hegel sees reality as structured organically and 
developmentally," Marx believed "the world is a system of organically interconnected 
processes characterised by inherent tendency to develop. " (Wood, 1981, 208-210) 
However, "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence. 
but their social existence that determines their consciousness." This famous assertion 
of Marx presents the sharpest distinction of the materialists from the idealists, as Marx 
explained, "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of 
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production ... from forms of 
development of the productive forces these relations tum into their fetters, then begins 
an epoch of social revolution." Marx stressed that material condition was the most 
fundamental fact in changing a society, "the legal relations as well as forms of state 
are to be grasped neither per se nor from the so called general development of the 
human mind, but rather rooted in the material conditions of life." (Marx, 1970,21) 
"For a theory of social change to be Marxist it must be embedded in a 
historical perspective." (Lichtheim, 1961, 385) But the determinant for historical 
progression from capitalism to socialism is, in Marxist terms, economy. Wood 
believes that the central claim of historical materialism is economic determinism, i.e, 
the "people's economic behaviour" and their "mode of production in material life", 
which form the "basis of their social life generally, that this economic basis generally 
conditions or determines both the society's remaining institutions, and the prevalent 
ideas or forms of social consciousness. " (Wood, 1981, 63) Some Marxists believe that 
the "historic conception of economics" and the "economic conception of history" are 
inseparable, in view of Marx's emphasis on capitalist economic expansion before 
socialism. As productive forces (the economic power) will continue to distort political 
relations until they can be constrained from further development, "the age of freedom 
will only dawn when economic determinism is overcome and controlled". (Lindsay, 
1931,27,29,32,35) 
Marx formed his materialist conception of history years before the writing of 
his 'Critiques of Political Economy'. In one of his early writings, 'The Poverty of 
Philosophy' (1847), in which Marx criticised the French philosopher M. Proudhon, 
the primacy of the productive forces in human historical development had already 
been emphasised, " ... the relation in which productive forces are developed, are 
anything but eternal laws, but correspond to a definite development of men and of 
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their productive forces, and a change in men's productive forces necessarily brings 
about a change in their production relations." (Marx, 1955, 106-7) 
'The German Ideology' represents the first important work of Marx's mature 
writings, as it was the first time the conception of historical materialism was raised 
(Giddens, 1971, 18-19). The book elaborates how the production relations 
correspond to the development of productive forces, "it consequently follows that a 
certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain 
mode of cooperation, or social stage, and this mode of cooperation is itself a 
productive force. Further, the multitude of productive forces accessible to man 
determines the nature of society." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974, 50) This is then 
followed by discussion of how the productive forces could have affected the creation 
of a new society, " ... the form of community adopted by the settling conquerors must 
correspond to the stage of development of the productive forces they find in 
existence; if this is not the case from the start, it must change according to the 
productive forces." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974, 90) 
One of the most prominent theoretical assertions of historical materialism 
appears in 'The Communist Manifesto' (1848), where Marx put forward the argument 
that the productive forces were at their optimal level under capitalism, which would 
unleash maximum productive power through the expansion of markets and industries 
before the development of socialism. The class of bourgeoisie, according to Marx, 
was "the product of a long course of development in the feudalist society", where the 
elements of capitalism were cultivated. Hence the subsequent bourgeois dominance of 
the society was expected and inevitable-through which capital accumulation is 
maximised, and the productive power will reach its peak. As a result of the industrial 
expansion, the exploited class, namely the proletariat, arises. Class antagonism was 
thus intensified before the revolution of the proletariat succeeded (Marx in Marx & 
Engels, 2002, 222-5). Marx believed that the "enormous productive forces of 
capitalism generate possibilities for the future development of man which could not 
have been possible under the previous forms of productive system." (Giddens, 1971, 
15) 
Marx's historical evolution under the materialist conception, as presented in 
the Preface of the 'Critique of Political Economy', is that the stages of historical 
development of human society before the socialist revolution are Asiatic, Ancient, 
Feudalist and finally the rule of the Bourgeoisie. (Marx, 1970, 21) Though Marx had 
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mostly written about capitalism and post-capitalism, he did write about pre-capitalist 
development. The extracts of Marx's writing on pre-capitalist societies from his 
unpublished manuscript, which was later compiled into 'Grundrisse~, 892 pages in 
length, (first published in 1953), was released as a smaller book in 1952 with the title 
of 'Karl Marx, Pre-capitalist Economic Formation'. Nevertheless, it could still be 
true, as Jon Elster particularly points out, that Marx had written very little about the 
superstructure of the pre-capitalist society (Elster, 1981, 104). However, this has no 
doubt provided the revolutionaries like Lenin and Mao with plenty of space to 
manoeuvre-on how to theoretically position the economically backward nation for a 
legitimate revolution, or in sum, how to prove that time is ripe for socialist revolution. 
Marx first wrote about the classification of historical transformation in 'The 
German Ideology' (1845-6), in which he gave details regarding the evolution of 
property relations in response to the division of labour from tribal ownership to feudal 
ownership: 
According to Marx, these forms of property relations were firstly, tribal 
ownership, which corresponded to the undeveloped stage of production in which 
people live by hunting, fishing and the rearing of beasts or at the higher stage, 
agriculture. The division of labour was still elementary, and the social structure was 
limited to the expansion of family. The second type was the ancient communal and 
state ownership, which saw unions of tribes moving into a city by agreement and a 
more developed form of division of labour emerging. The ownership of property still 
belonged to the commune, which holds power only over their labouring slaves in their 
community. But private ownership of property and the antagonism between village 
and town had begun to exist. The third form of ownership was feudal ownership or 
estate property, which rose as the alternative to the former instead of emerging out of 
evolution. Its formation was basically the legacy of the Germanic annexation of Rome 
(note: this shows how Eurocentric Marx's theory is), and the direct producing class no 
longer consisted of slaves but of serfs and minor peasantry. Antagonism between 
town and country persisted and intensified (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974,43-6). 
Finally, the transition from feudalism to capitalism was, on the other hand, a 
process of evolution. Following the development of international or inter-city trade, 
the division of labour is at its mature stage. The burghers fought the feudalists and the 
revolution has its base in the cities. With the prevalence of the industrial revolution, 
wealth accumulated in fewer hands of the bourgeoisie as many former property 
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owners joined the proletariat-a legacy of the division of labour, where economies of 
scale rendered the ownership of the means of production by petty bourgeoisie 
insignificant. Class antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat sharpened 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 89-90; 2002, 223-8). The deepening rift between 
the bourgeoisie and the proletariat thus preconditioned the socialist revolution. 
In his 'Wage, Labour and Capital' (1847), Marx summarised the process of 
the evolution of human society, "Thus the social relations within which individuals 
produce, the social relations of production, change, are transformed, with the change 
and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The 
relations of production in their totality constitute what we called the social relations, 
society, and specifically a society at a definite stage of historical development, a 
society with a peculiar, distinctive character. Ancient society, feudal society, and 
bourgeois society are such totalities of production relations, each of which at the same 
time denotes a special stage of development in the history of mankind." (Marx in 
Marx & Engels, 78-79) 
To understand the process of historical materialism in detail, we must first 
take a look at the major elements and stages that form the theory, which include 
productive forces, production relations, base, superstructure, exploitation, alienation, 
class struggle, etc. 
3.2.2 The Elements and Processes of Historical Transformation 
Marx had never given a precise definition to productive forces. However, he 
did narrate the composition of production relations in the Preface of 'Critique of 
Political Economy', "The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the 
economic structure, the real basis, on which rises legal and political superstructure." 
(Marx, 1970,20) In one of his earlier writings, 'Poverty of Philosophy' (1847), Marx 
showed that he had already formed his conception of the connection between 
productive forces and production relations, "Machinery is no more an economic 
category than the bullock that drags the plough. Machinery is merely a productive 
force. The modem workshop, which depends on the application of machinery, is a 
social production relation, an economic category." (Marx, 1955, 116) Therefore, the 
productive forces comprise labour power and the means of production, and are 
independent of the economic structure, which is 'the base'; while the economic 
structure comprises the total of all production relations, and forms the base for the 
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constitution of a legal system and social relations, or the so called superstructure. of a 
society (Cohen, 1978, 28-30). Bukharin, too, stated that, "by productive forces, 
Marx evidently means here the material and personal elements of production and, the 
corollary of this, the category of productive forces is a technical and not an 
economical one." (Bukharin, 1979, 120) 
In line with the materialist conception, Marx had on many occaSIOns 
distinguished the existence of productive forces from the physical manifestation of 
human beings, for instance, "the productive forces appear as a world in themselves; 
quite independent of, and divorced from the individuals ... " (Marx in Marx & Engels, 
1974, 91) For Marx, it was the chain of production relations supported by productive 
forces, not the individuals, that form the society, "society does not consist of 
individuals; it expresses the sum of connection and relationships on which the 
individuals stand." (Marx, 1973, 265) Marx believed that the social history of man 
was the history of the development of his skill, strength and intelligence, which was in 
Marx's sense, the development of productive forces, "the appropriation of these 
forces is nothing more than the development of individual capacities corresponding to 
the material instruments of production. The appropriation of a totality of instruments 
of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the 
individuals themselves." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974,92) 
The production relations, or the connection between the productive forces and 
the social relations, are part of the economic structure, which could be enveloped in 
various forms of society, or social forms, like slavery, feudalism, proletariat, etc. For 
example, Marx explained that a Negro was not necessarily a slave, as a Negro could 
only become a slave when the production relations determined it. Therefore a sewing 
machine could be the means of production or a form of capital-it depends on the 
production relations concerned (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 78.) On this economic 
structure, or Base, in Marxist terms, a legal structure is erected to legitimise the 
ownership of the property. The legal structure, together with all the non-economic 
elements or institutions that are based on this economic structure, namely politics, 
ideology, social behaviour, beliefs, etc, form the superstructure. 
From the other perspective, the legal, political and intellectual superstructure 
could be explained through its beneficial consequences for the maintenance of 
production relations. In short, "politics and ideas are explained by the fact that they 
stabilise property rights, and the property rights are explained by the fact that they 
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give impetus to technical change (productive forces)." (Elster, 1986, 113) Similarly, 
Wood believes the production relations and superstructure are interactive, although 
one does not equal the other. As he points out with the example of property 
ownership, "Legal ownership, with its attendant 'juristic power' is distinct from 
property, and derives its content from the social relations it expresses. For Marx, 
social relations are not to be understood in terms of property relations (much less in 
terms of legal ownership or property rights). On the contrary, property relations (legal 
or moral) can be understood in terms of social relations." (Wood, 1986, 84) 
Marx's view on superstructure was indeed very social-based, as he asserted in 
his speech at the 'Trial of the Rhenish District Committee of Democrats' (1849) 
"society is not founded upon the law, but the law must be founded upon society." 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1977, 327) So according to Marx, illegal activities can be 
legitimised if they have become common practice; as an example he quoted the 
authorisation of the combination of workers by the English Parliament, " ... it is the 
economic system which has forced Parliament to grant its legal authorisation. In 
1825 ... Parliament had to modify the law in order to bring it more and more into line 
with the conditions resulting from free competition, it had of necessity to abolish all 
laws forbidding combinations of workers. The more modem industry and competition 
develop, the more elements there are which call forth and strengthen combination, and 
as soon as combination becomes an economic fact, daily gaining in solidity, it is 
bound before long to become a legal fact." (Marx, 1955, 148) In fact Marx even 
referred to the usurpation of land by the landed proprietors during the Stuart era of 
England as a case of legitimisation of a new production relation, where "they 
abolished the feudal tenure of land, got rid of its obligation to the state ... vindicated 
their rights to modem private property on estates to which they have only a feudal 
title." (Marx, 1961, 723) In other words, when something has become social practice 
it would appear as the new rule or new social perception, and its acceptance by the 
society would have legitimised its existence. 
In Marxist perspective, the ownership of labour power belongs to the workers, 
who might or might not own the means of production. Labour power is the only thing 
a worker can sell to the capitalist, in exchange for wages and means of subsistence. 
Unlike the serf under a feudalist system, the workers are free labour in the capitalist 
society, which means they have the right to exercise their labour power whether to 
work or not to work, or in other words, whether to sell their labour power. Howeyer. 
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as Marx pointed out in his 'Wage Labour and Capital' (1847), the workers, "whose 
sole source of livelihood is the sale of their labour, cannot distance themselves totally 
from the class of purchaser, that is, the capitalist class." Hence, although the labour is 
free labour, he has to discharge himself (or his labour power) to the bourgeoisie, who 
are the owners of capital, means and subsistence of production. If a serf belongs to his 
owner, then free labour belongs to the bourgeois class as a whole. Therefore, "labour 
is a commodity", Marx said, "neither more nor less than sugar." (Marx in Marx & 
Engels, 1968, 71, 73) 
The exchange value of commodities is price, and "wages are only the price of 
labour". After taking into consideration that the prices of commodities are either 
below or above the cost of production, Marx saw that the average price of 
commodities equalled the cost of production, which was also the cost of production of 
labour (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 71-2). This actual value or cost of the 
product is the use value of the product. The price at which the capitalists sell their 
commodities in the market is the exchange value, which is a mark-up of the use value. 
To fit the two into the materialist conception, Marx said, "Use value expresses natural 
relationships between things (product, commodities) and men, in fact the existence of 
things for men. Exchange value, as a result of the social development that created 
it .. .is the social existence of things." (Marx, 1972, 296) To view it from another 
angle, "exchange value expresses the social form of value," and this appears as a 
practice in bourgeois society. Use value, on the other hand, "is the substance of the 
commodity and the body of capital," because it "expresses no relevant economic form 
whatever, rather merely being the product ... " (Marx, 1973,301,872) 
The exchange value and wage labour, according to Marx, are the roots of 
capital accumulation and exploitation of labour. The capitalist does not pay the labour 
with the income generated from the product, but from his wealth, and he produces the 
end product with raw material and instruments that he already owns. "Wages are 
therefore, not the worker's share in the commodity produced by him; wages are part 
of the already existing commodities with which the capitalist buys for himself a 
definite amount of productive power." Labour is therefore a commodity the waged 
worker sells to capital-in order to live (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 72). "Capital 
consists of raw materials, instruments of labour and means of subsistence of all 
kinds ... component parts of capital are creation of labour, products of labour. 
accumulated labour." Then, the domination of "accumulated, past, and materialised" 
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labour over the direct and living labour has turned accumulated labour into capital 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 78-79). Subsequently, the inevitable development of 
capitalist society, the division of labour, will intensify the process of exploitation and 
capital accumulation. The competition among labour will grow in line with capital 
expansion, resulting from the growth of the application of machinery and the division 
among workers (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 89-90). 
The existence of exchange value has become a social form adopted by the 
products, thus separating the product from the producers, who appear to be producing 
for the society rather than for their own consumption. As a result, "individuals are 
subsumed under social production; social production exists above and beyond them as 
their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, or managed by 
them as their common wealth." (Marx, 1973, 158) Therefore for Marx, waged labour 
has thus become the essential part of the prerequisite of transition to socialism, as it 
will lead to the growth of the proletariat, who are the backbone of the revolution: 
"Capital presupposes waged labour, waged labour presupposes capital. They 
reciprocally condition the existence of each other; they reciprocally bring forth each 
other. .. Capital can only increase by exchanging itself for labour power, by calling 
wage labour to life. The wage labour can only be exchanged for capital by increasing 
capital, by strengthening the power whose slave it is. Hence, increase of capital is 
increase of the proletariat, that is, of the working class." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 
1968,80-81) 
This leads to the process of alienation, where the workers are said to be 
deprived of (or alienated from) the products they produce in an environment and with 
an instrument that is 'alien' to them. The workers are paid for their labour (work) 
instead of their products: "As, owing to the form of wages, all the products appear to 
be paid for, the unpaid part seems necessarily to come not from labour but from 
capital." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1953, 245-6) Therefore what has not been paid 
for is the surplus value the workers produce. The surplus value of the product does not 
belong to the workers, but the owners of the raw materials, machines, tools and 
reserve fund, which allow these owners to buy the labour power of the working class 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 69). Because of alienation from their product, men 
perceive the products have value, but in fact the products have value because labour 
has been bestowed on them: '"In principle, there is no exchange of products, but there 
is exchange of labour, which cooperated in production." (Marx, 1955, 67) 
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The result of alienation is the existence of two incompatible social 
processes-the socialised production, which sees the workers being alienated from 
the product; and the capital appropriation, which means the growth of the exchange 
value of commodities in the hands of the capitalists. This has finally resulted in the 
emergence of two social classes with conflict of interests. As Engels pointed out in 
'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific' (1880), "the contradiction between socialised 
production and capitalistic appropriation manifested itself as the antagonism between 
proletariat and bourgeoisie." (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1968, 398) In Marxist terms, 
this is a phenomenon of the final stage of capitalism and revolution is thus inevitable. 
The expansion of capital resulted in the emergence of the masses of the 
working class, who, as a result of alienation, did not own the product they produced, 
as the products were turned into capital and thus consolidated the capitalist system, 
"(The existence of) a class that possesses nothing but its capacity to labour is a 
prerequisite for the existence of capital. It is only the domination of accumulated, 
past, materialised labour over direct, living labour that turns accumulated labour into 
capital." In his 'Wage, Labour and Capital' (1847), Marx said, "The indispensable 
condition for a tolerable situation for the workers is therefore, the fastest possible 
growth of productive capital." It means the growth of the domination of bourgeoisie 
over the working class. "If capital is growing rapidly, wages may rise; the profit of 
capital rises incomparably more rapidly. The material position of the worker has 
improved, but at the cost of his social position. The social gulf that divided him from 
the capitalist has widened." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 79,81, 85) 
As discussed before, Marx's conception of history had been founded years 
before the writing of 'A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy' (1859) and 
'The Capital' (Vol. 1 , 1862), as the basic structure of his conception has seen little 
change, from early theses like 'The German Ideology' (1846), 'Wage Labour and 
Capital' (1847), and 'The Poverty of Philosophy' (1847); to the notebook that 
represents his interim period of writing, 'Grundrisse' (1857-8), and later works like 
'Theory of Surplus Value' (1862-3), and 'Critique of the Gotha Programme' (1875). 
However, inconsistency in terms of the description of historical stages does occur 
from one thesis to another. This seems to vindicate Jon Elster's comment of "lack of 
intellectual control." For example, in his Communist Manifesto (1848), Marx's 
historical development has been simplified (for no obvious reason), and only three, 
instead of four, types of societies are classified as the pre-socialist historical stages-
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slave society of antiquity, feudalism and bourgeois society (Marx in Marx & Engels. 
2002,219). 
Moreover, Marx habitually tended not to give clear distinction to the pre-
capitalist society, namely Asiatic (tribal community) and ancient (slavery). (Instead, 
he regularly combined the two) This could be due to the fact that the emphasis of 
Marx's theory of history is not on the transformation from tribal community to 
feudalist society, but on the development of socialism from capitalism. However, Eric 
Hobsbawn reminds us that for Marx, the societies of tribal community and slavery 
could have co-existed for a certain period of time (Hobsbawn in Marx, 1965, 34-5). 
Because of his ignorance of the East, Marx saw in India, which was then under British 
rule, the image of Asia (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1979, 125-133). Therefore the 
word "Asiatic" does not refer to a region but backwardness. In his 'Pre-Capitalist 
Economic Formation' (1857-8), Marx's elaboration of the third and fourth types of 
primitive society, Germanic and Slavonic, as alternatives to ancient society, showed 
that he was aware of the possibility of the coexistence of different types of society 
(Asiatic, Ancient, Germanic, Slavonic) before the evolution to the next stage (Marx, 
1965, 69-80). 
3.2.3 The Period of Transition 
In 'Critique o/the Gotha Programme' (1875), Marx gave an illustration of the 
transitional period, the period when capitalism is over but full scale socialism is yet to 
be imposed. First it was about who should be in charge, "Between capitalist and 
communist society lies the period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the 
other. Corresponding to this is also a political transition period in which the state can 
be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat." (Marx in Marx & 
Engels, 1968, 313) Marx then suggested that there would be two phases of 
communism. The first phase of communism (which Lenin calls socialism 23), 
according to Marx, would still see the existence of inequality in the society, as the 
more capable or superior will achieve higher incomes than the less capable. It 
recognises no class distinction, because everybody is a worker, but it still recognises 
the unequal individual endowment. Marx sees this as inevitable because the first 
phase of communism inherits the capitalist social system and economic structure that 
23 Lenin says, "In striving for socialism, we are convinced that it will develop into communism ... ·' 
(Lenin, 1975, 2: 298) 
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has existed for long time. When it comes to the higher phase of communism, Marx 
believes people do not work for a living but for joy of life, "labour has become not 
only a means of life but life's prime want" The division of labour would have 
vanished while the productive force is at its peak, and " ... the spring of common 
wealth flows abundantly--only then can the narrow horizon of the bourgeois right be 
crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs!" (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968,306) 
In 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific' (1880), Engels not only summed up 
Marx's conception of historical stages in a more orderly manner, but put forward what 
were virtually the prerequisites for a socialist society by elaborating the consequence 
of capitalist development in stages, and also brought up the notion of state capitalism, 
the interim stage after capitalism before socialism was born: 
Firstly, "the severance of producer from the means of production, 
condemnation of the workers to wage labour", and as a result, "antagonism between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie arises". Secondly, we will see a "growing 
predominance and increasing effectiveness of the law governing the production of 
commodities," and the deepening "contradiction between socialised organisation in 
the individual factory and social anarchy in production as a whole." Then, we see "the 
perfecting of machinery due to competition among manufacturers and unlimited 
expanSIOn of production". While advanced technology leads to maximum 
development of productive forces, which in tum brings overproduction, the capitalist 
form of production "prevents the productive forces from working and the products 
from circulating making it impossible for social well-being to develop along with 
production; the contradiction grows, the mode of production rises in rebellion against 
the form of exchange." And finally, "partial recognition of the social character of the 
productive forces is forced upon the capitalist themselves. Takeover of the great 
institutions for production and communication will then occur, "first by joint-stock 
companies, then by Trusts and by the state. The bourgeoisie will prove to be a 
superfluous class." (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1968, 409-410) 
This was the first time Marxist theory discussed a notion similar to state 
capitalism (and it was not by Marx, but Frederick Engels), though the term 'state 
capitalism' had never been applied. Engels saw in the aftermath of the disintegration 
of a capitalist system the inevitable takeover of the major industries and means of 
production by the state before they could be socialised under the rule of the 
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proletariat. The new state under this intermediate period of transition, according to 
Engels, "is an essentially capitalist machine, it is the state of the capitalists, the ideal 
collective body of all capitalists. The more productive forces it takes over ... the more 
citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage earners, proletarians. The capitalist 
relationship is not abolished; it is rather pushed to the extreme." As a result, it has 
rendered the capitalist "superfluous". And this extreme will transform the system to 
the opposite-the abolition of the state and the establishment of social ownership 
(Engels in Marx & Engels, 1969,403-408; Engels, 1943,306-312). As discussed 
later in the section on Lenin and Bukharin, this conception of state capitalism was 
vital in understanding both Lenin's and Bukharin's notions of imperialist state, which 
also bore significant elements of Hilferding's theory of transition. 
The critics of the theory must have been preoccupied by doubts as to why 
Marx was so sure that the production relations would give way to the expansion of 
productive forces. What if the (old) social relations stay on or the revolution (or the 
transformation, in the case of a post-revolutionary period) does not happen? Because 
of the ambiguity of the answers to these questions and Marx's inconsistency in using 
phrases in his writing, one could have regarded Marx's historical materialism as 
"simply a matter of dogmatic guesswork inspired by a priori speculative doctrine." 
(Wood, 1981, 81) However, "in any case, correctly used and understood, scientific 
socialism or Marxism is primarily a system of ideas, a method for comprehending the 
social universe, not a blueprint of either a socialist or communist society." (Balinky, 
1970, 8) 
In fact, Marx did admit that Historical Materialism is no master key to history 
and that revolution or transformation might not happen, as he stated in his letter to the 
Editor of the Otechestvenniye Zapiski in November 1877, "At the end of the chapter 
the historical tendency of production is summed up thus: that it 'begets its own 
negation with the inexorability which governs the metamorphoses of nature'; that it 
has itself created the elements of a new economic order, by giving the greatest 
impulse at once to the integral development of every individual producer; that 
capitalist property, resting already, as it actually does, on a collective mode of 
production, cannot but transform itself into social property. At this point I have not 
furnished any proof, for the good reason that this statement is itself nothing else but a 
general summary of a long exposition previously given in the chapter on capitalist 
production." (Marx in Marx & Engels. 1953,378-9) 
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The first ever country to adopt socialism, Russia, which had yet to have a 
developed and industrialised economy, became the centre of attention among Marx's 
critics. Long before the October Revolution, even when Marx was alive, he was well 
aware of the contradiction between reality and his theory. Contrasting his theory of 
historical materialism, Marx suggested that it was not necessary for Russia to go 
through capitalism, "Now what application to Russia could my critic make of this 
historical sketch? Only this: if Russia is tending to become a capitalist nation after the 
example of the Western European countries ... she will not succeed without having 
first transformed a good proportion of her peasants into proletarians, and after that 
having been taken to the bosom of the capitalist regime, she will experience its 
pitiless laws like other profane people. That is all." Marx also pointed out that his 
theory could be too Eurocentric, "But that (the issue of Russia) is too little for my 
critic. He feels he absolutely must metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis 
of capitalism in Europe into an historical-philosophical theory of the general path 
every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds 
itself. .. but I beg his pardon. He is both honouring and shaming me too much ... By 
studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one 
can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using 
one master key, a general historical philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which 
consists in being super-historical." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1953,378-9) 
In his preface to the German edition of the 'Communist Manifesto', written in 
January 1882, the period when the latter part of Marx's economic theories were 
founded, Marx referred to Russia as the starting point of socialist revolution, "The 
'Communist Manifesto' had as its object proclamation of the inevitably impending 
dissolution of modem bourgeois property. But in Russia we found, face to face with 
the rapidly developing capitalist swindle and a landowning bourgeoisie, just 
beginning to develop, more than half the land was owned by the peasants. Now the 
question is: can the Russian obshchina, though greatly undermined, yet a form of the 
primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist 
common ownership? Or on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of 
dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West? The only answer to that 
possibility today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletariat 
revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian 
common ownership of land may serve as the starting point for communist 
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development." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 2002, 206-207) But some argue that 
Marx's theory of economics was still appropriate to Russia, though it missed out in 
the US and UK, as he sees Russia had had rapid industrial or capitalist development in 
the 19th century. Furthermore, Marx's thought asserts that once socialism starts in one 
country, it spreads (Sweezey, 1953,21-22). 
Indeed, one could be preoccupied by the knowledge of the practical political 
environment that one lives in, while ignoring the fact that what Marx presented was 
just a set of social political theories formulated upon the political climate of the 19th 
century. It does not matter whether it is Asiatic-ancient-feudal-bourgeois-socialism or 
slavery-feudalism-capitalism-socialism-communism; what concerned Marx was the 
entire process of historical development, not the stages of historical transformation 
(Hobsbawn in Marx, 1965, 14). Marx did put forward the conception of the pre-
socialist society, but it is also true that Marx "did not complete the theory of transition 
from capitalism." Marx wrote a lot about capitalism, the prowess of the productive 
forces of a capitalist society and its inevitable transition to socialism. Therefore it is 
not surprising at all that some regard 'Marxian economics' as "in reality a part of the 
functioning of a particular social system, namely capitalism." (Sweezy, 1953, 307, 
310) The incompleteness shows that the description or the label of the type of society 
should not be the theme of the theory of societal evolution. It must be noted that Marx 
took the view of history common to his age, as he assumes that slavery, feudalism and 
capitalism are definite phases in the development of Western Society (Lichtheim, 
1961, 152). 
3.3 NEP and the Origin of Lenin's Theory of Transition 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Moshe Lewin summanses the features of the NEP as "coexistence of a 
centrally planned sector with several cooperatives and private ones, a mixed economy 
with market categories accepted as tools in economic life; significant decentralisation 
inside the state sector itself and the non-imperative character of economic planning; a 
relatively free interplay of social factors and interests; collaboration of the party with 
different groups of intelligentsia and experts, without the imposition of a too rigid 
ideology; ... an evolutionary approach to the process of industrialising society and to 
restructuring it, and a moderate use of censorship in a culturally and socially pluralist 
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setting." He called the system '"a liberal dictatorship."(Lewin, 1974, 95-96) In the 
eyes of economists, the NEP "'instituted in 1921 was a remarkable attempt to restore 
the shattered economy by establishing a mixed system in which the transactions of 
relatively small peasant households were undertaken via a relatively free market." 
(Wheatcroft, 1986, 267) 
The NEP was a policy of mixed economy under which, the state-owned 
industries traded with peasants through a market, which was partly in the hands of the 
state and partly in private hands. The market was operated within the definite 
constraints set by the Bolsheviks. However, no coercion was exerted against the 
peasants as they only sold what they agreed to sell. All banking and large-scale 
industries, as well as foreign trade were dominated by the state. The cornerstone of 
the policy was the proportional agricultural tax, or Tax in Kind, which was based upon 
the fixed proportion of peasants' net produce. After the state took a fixed portion of 
their produce, the peasants were free to sell their surpluses in the market. Though the 
grain price was fixed by the state, the peasant could hold back their surplus if the 
price was not right. It was in fact a market economy operated within a straightforward 
political framework (Gregory & Stuart, 1986, 59-60; Carr, 1952, 280-281; Davies 
at el, 1994, 8-9). However, the Tax in Kind was to be set at a much lower level than 
the grain requisitioning quota that it replaced, it would thus only "secure the minimum 
of the state's requirement on behalf of civilian consumers." (Service, 2005, 125) 
The New Economic Policy was generally viewed as the measure of economic 
recovery for the former Soviet Union after the devastation of the civil war and the 
economic radicalism from 1918 to 1920, the War Communism 24 . The Russian 
economy was then on the verge of collapse, as inflation was rampant and the currency 
devalued tremendously. The absence of imported goods and the fuel crisis halted 
industrial activities, while Moscow and Leningrad were struck by famine. As a result, 
industrial workers were restive, the military was in a rebellious mood and the 
~4 War communism, a policy of extreme measures to counter scarcity of resources during the Russian 
civil war between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, could be defmed as "fIrst, requisitioning of the 
countryside; second, strict rationing of the town population, who were classifIed into categories; third, 
complete socialisation of production and labour; fourth, an extremely complicated and chit-ridden 
system of distribution for the remaining stock of manufactured goods; fIfth, a monopoly of power 
tending towards a single party and the suppression of all dissents; a state of siege and the Cheka (Soviet 
secret police organisation)" (Serge, 1963, 117) However, War Communism was also the product of the 
illusion of the majority of party leaders, including Lenin and Bukharin, who "believed that the 
militarization of an economy and society at war produced the features of the higher communist 
system." Source: (Lewin, 1974, 8) 
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peasantry was calling for abolition of the state grain monopoly. The Bolsheviks, who 
had just won the civil war, were losing control and support of the nation as the regime 
was on the brink of being overthrown (Carr, 1952, 246; Dobb, 1966, 98-' 99; Davies 
in Davies et aI, 1994, 6). Russia was then in need of radical measures to overcome the 
CrISIS. 
The NEP was not only a remedy for the devastated economy, but should be 
regarded as a policy of transition as well. Of course, it is surely uncertain whether 
Russia would have implemented NEP had the civil war not happened. A ruined 
economy needs industrial and market expansion, or, in Marxist terms, the rapid 
development of productive forces, which should reach its peak under capitalism. The 
theme of the NEP was to revive the economy by surplus accumulation by the 
peasantry. However, in a newly liberated socialist nation like the former Soviet 
Union, surplus accumulation means a concession to capitalism, a step backward to the 
old society they have just overthrown. It is not surprising at all that "a lot of 
Bolsheviks felt that the October Revolution had been betrayed." (Service, 2005, 127) 
The revolutionaries' insistence on complying with the sequence of historical 
developments had resulted in paradoxes. On one hand, these revolutionaries insisted 
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that their country had ventured into the era of socialism, which was advancement 
from the stage of capitalism; on the other, they could not ignore the fact that their 
countries had not experienced the stage of capitalism, which in Marxist terms, would 
see the expansion of productive forces and wealth accumulation. Hence almost all 
policies of transition in socialist countries, be it Russia or China, provoked fierce 
debate and had always ended prematurely. 
3.3.2 Lenin and Pre-capitalist Transition to Socialism 
Lenin, who conceded that the launch of the NEP was a retreat from socialism, 
believed that the period of transition to socialism must be 'prolonged' (Lenin, 1971, 
636) in the post-civil war Russia. However, it must be noted that while Lenin kept 
calling the NEP a "concession" (Lenin, 1971,599) he was indeed the chief architect 
of the policy, though Nikolai Bukharin has been generally regarded as the strongest 
advocate for it. Besides, nobody played a more prominent role than Lenin in 
theorising the background of the NEP, which seemed to be the best way out for a 
country that practiced "revolution first, economic development later.' 
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The most prominent improvisation Lenin had ever made in relation to Marxist 
theory was the voluntary tendency of the revolution. "For the orthodox Marxist, any 
attempt by a given class to seize power before it had been put in a dominant position 
by the development of the economy would be premature and condemned to 
failure"(Schram & d'Encausse, 1969, 17). For Lenin, however, socialist revolution 
could take place in an economically backward country, because he believed that 
communism would introduce higher productivity of labour than the capitalist society. 
He saw labour under communism as voluntary (both for work and revolution), class 
conscious, and united (Lenin, 1936, 9: 439). In Russia, according to Lenin, the growth 
of a labour movement is spontaneous. Hence the uprising can also be a spontaneous 
process, a key to his theory of voluntarism for the revolution (Lenin, 1936, 2: 53). In 
his' What is to be done' (1902), Lenin drafted out a cohesive revolutionary plan, 
pointing out that in a country where the working class was not large and not well 
educated, political class consciousness could be brought to the workers from 
outside-they could be educated by the bourgeois intellectuals. He believed that a 
socialist revolution did not rise out of "trade union consciousness", which only 
brought the workers immediate material advantage. "The theory of socialism grew out 
of the philosophical, historical, and economic theory that was elaborated by the 
educated representative ... bourgeois intellectuals (which as Lenin suggested, including 
Marx)." (Lenin, 1936,2: 98) 
The backwardness of a nation, as Lenin saw it, could be a stepping-stone to 
the revolution. In one of his most representative works, 'Imperialism, The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism' (1916), Lenin criticised the working class of advanced countries 
as corrupt and "inclined towards opportunism" since they could easily be bribed by 
the material advantage they gain out of the capitalists' profit made by exploiting the 
colonised and backward nations. (Lenin, 1978, 118) In his 'Backward Europe & 
Advanced Asia' (1913) he stated that the bourgeoisies of the backward nations were 
still capable of playing a progressive role in revolution (because they were not yet 
corrupted), while in Europe the bourgeoisies had all been corrupted (Lenin, 1963, 
99-100). Therefore, he showed his optimism about the revolutionary potential of the 
colonised nation in 'Civilised Europe & Savage Asia' (1913): "under the suppression 
and aristocracy of the European, Asia was awakened; the people of Asia have become 
democratically minded." (Lenin, 1963. 57-8) 
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In support of his assertion and in line with the theory of voluntarism, Lenin 
put forward an argument in his "The Rights of Nation to Self-Determination' (1914) 
that the self-determination of workers can be achieved in the process of socialist 
revolution, and should be pursued by the proletariat of both the oppressed (colonised) 
and the oppressor (colonial master) nations (Lenin, 1964, 451). This attracted ire from 
the Polish female Marxist revolutionist, Rosa Luxemburg, who argued from the 
perspective of dogmatic Marxism that humans can only tum the right to self-
determination into reality under socialism, but not before achieving socialism. 
'"Socialism will never be accomplished if the burning spark of the conscious will of 
the great masses of the people does not spring from the material condition which has 
been built up by past development ... socialism will not fall as a manna from heaven. It 
can only be won by a long chain of powerful struggle ... " (Luxemburg, 1971,333) 
This assertion of Lenin not only rewrites Marx's theory of history that 
socialism is only possible when the nation is economically developed, but also 
underlines Lenin's view of socialist revolution from a global perspective-as Lenin 
believed that the building of socialism in Russia can only be successful if other 
nations have become socialist. "Until world socialist revolution breaks out, until it 
embraces several countries and it is strong enough to overcome international 
imperialism, it is the direct duty of the proletariat not to do battle against the giant of 
imperialism." (Lenin, 1975, 2: 624) However, Lenin did not make any further 
qualification to this statement in his later years, and this provided the room for debate 
over whether "Russia should go it alone in socialisation.' (See section 3.5) Lenin 
denounced the nationalist-based revolution as "liberal-bourgeois nationalism." For 
him, "all liberal-bourgeois nationalism sows the greatest corruption among the 
workers and does immense harm ... to the proletariat class struggle ... all these were 
concealed behind the slogan of 'national culture"', which was indeed a sort of 
"bourgeois fraud." According to Lenin, '"our slogan is the international culture of 
democracy and of the world working class movement." (Lenin, 1964, 23) So he 
stressed in his "Critical Remarks on the National Question' (1913), that under a 
'"working class democracy," the workers should pursue '"the unconditional unity and 
complete amalgamation of workers of all nationalities in all working class 
organisations." (Lenin, 1964, 22) 
This notion of "voluntary revolution" is complemented by the thought of 
Gramsci, who believed in the cultivation of intellectuals among the masses in order to 
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smooth the path to proletarian revolution. Gramsci pointed out that the reason why 
proletarian revolution did not happen in the West as it did in Russia was due to the 
vigorous defence of the status quo by the class of intellectuals, who were brought up 
and educated in the old society, and benefited from the capitalist system. Because of 
the persistence of these intellectuals, who continued to influence and educate society, 
the revolution that Marx predicted would happen at the peak of the development of 
productive forces would not come. According to Gramsci, every class of people has 
their own group of intellectuals, which he called "organic intellectuals." These 
intellectuals, who might not necessarily be highly educated, were pivotal in educating 
and influencing that particular class of people as well as leading them in any political 
campaign, including revolution. So in order to succeed in the proletarian revolution, 
the working class must have its own group of intellectuals. The key to the success of 
controlling one nation (or one society, or one class) was to control its intellectuals. 
The nurture of intellectuals among the masses was the key to the voluntary political 
campaign (Gramsci, 1971,5-23). 
In one of his fiercest criticisms of Leftists within the Party, 'Left-Wing 
Communism-an Infantile Disorder' (1920), Lenin reminded his party that "under the 
rule of the bourgeoisie it is very difficult to eradicate bourgeois habits from our own, 
i.e. the workers' party; it is difficult to expel from the party the familiar parliamentary 
leaders who have been hopelessly corrupted ... Yet these difficulties are child's 
play ... compared with these truly gigantic problems of re-educating, under the 
proletariat dictatorship, millions of peasants and small proprietors, hundreds of 
thousands of office employees, officials, and bourgeois intellectuals, of subordinating 
them all to the proletariat state and proletariat leadership, of eradicating their 
bourgeois habits and tradition ... " (Lenin, 1971,428) This worry of Lenin's regarding 
the obstacles they faced in re-educating the class enemy seems to have some of its 
resemblances in Liu's theory of "cultivation of communist members". However, 
Bukharin had other views, as he believed that as long as the proletariat was in power, 
the nation would move towards socialism in a process of evolution. (See section 3.4) 
3.3.3 Worker-Peasant Alliance during the Transition 
Lenin took very a pragmatic approach towards the revolution, in view of the 
weak and unorganised workers' revolutionary forces in Russia during the early 20th 
century. He thus talked about the cohesion of all classes in the revolutionary 
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movement, " ... not an organisation of average workers ... we must speak about a single 
all-Russian organisation of revolutionaries." (Lenin, 1971, 183) His emphasis on the 
alliance of workers and peasants in his letter to Pravda, 'Alliance between the Workers 
and the Working and Exploited Peasant' (1917), highlights the incapability of the 
proletariat to construct a socialist nation single-handedly, "The alliance between the 
Bolshevik workers and the Left Socialist Revolutionaries (note: a party representing 
peasants) is an honest coalition ... socialism is able to meet the interests of both." 
(Lenin, 1975, 2: 450) This resembles Marx's notion about the role of the peasantry in 
a socialist revolution. In his 'The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' (1852), 
Marx suggested that peasants are the potential ally of the proletariat, despite the 
assertion that they must not be given power: they can only be represented by someone 
else. Marx's "imperial sentiment of the peasant class" refers to the "smallholding 
peasants" who "want to see themselves and their smallholdings saved". (Marx in 
Marx & Engels, 1968, 162-5) Therefore the indication was clear-only the 
proletariat should hold the power. 
The inclusion of the peasantry in the revolutionary alliance seemed to be 
political expediency, as drafted by Lenin's 2-stage revolutionary plan in his 
'Socialism and Peasantry' (1905). Lenin stated that, the first revolution is waged 
within the present autocratic feudal system, forming the alliance with peasants as a 
"democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," with the aim of achieving 
bourgeois democracy and overthrowing the feudalists. The other revolution was a 
class struggle against the bourgeoisies and peasantry with bourgeois inclinations, and 
will be waged within the future bourgeois democratic system. (Lenin, 1962, 307-8, 
235-6) The notion of a dictatorship of the proletariat and the distrust of peasants (for 
their bourgeois instinct) has had long lasting effect on both the Russian and Chinese 
communist leadership. Lenin, like Marx and Mao, had no doubt that only the workers 
could be classified as the class of the proletariat, which will dominate the leadership 
of the country: " ... socialism is inconceivable unless the proletariat is the ruler of the 
state. This is ABC. "(Lenin, 1965, 334) 
Hence we see the rationale of the NEP. From the inclusion of the bourgeoisie 
in the revolutionary line-up for socialisation of backward countries, Lenin had shO\\TI 
his willingness to adapt to domestic peculiarities and to bend the orthodox rules of 
Marxism for revolution. All these culminated in the advocacy of the theoretical 
background underlining the NEP-state capitalism, by Lenin as a means of transition 
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to socialism for the nation. Lenin believed that state capitalism (for Engels' 
interpretation of state capitalism, please refer to the previous section), where the 
capitalist economy could be compatibly operated in a state-controlled market in 
combination with the proletariat dictatorship (Lenin, 1965, 344), was a system to 
revive the devastated Soviet economy and to develop the productive forces for 
socialist construction. Struggling to fend off the fierce accusations from the far left 
within Bolshevism, Lenin stated in his "Left wing childishness and petty bourgeois 
mentality' (1918) that in terms of the transition to socialism, one must take into 
consideration the existence of the mixed social economic structure in Russia (by 
then), which consisted of: 
1) Patriarchal-natural peasant farming 
2) Small commodity production 
3) Private capitalism 
4) State capitalism 
5) Socialism 
This socio-economic structure almost assimilates the one in 1950s China. Lenin sees 
in the present structure the domination by small commodity production, which is the 
key reason that socialist revolution is not suitable (Lenin, 1975, 2: 632). The state is 
set to control major resources of the country, namely banking and all other large-scale 
industries, and form an alliance of convenience between the socialist state and foreign 
capital through the policy of concession (the NEP) in order to promote foreign trade. 
The Tax in Kind, a type of proportional agricultural tax, is imposed on the peasantry 
to boost productivity and encourage accumulation, as urgent measures have to be 
taken to improve the condition of the peasants and to increase their productive forces. 
With the revenue from peasantry and commercial trade, Lenin hoped to re-build the 
heavy industries and improve the technology (Lenin, 1971,599). 
In fact, in as early as 1917, four years before the NEP was launched, Lenin 
had already put forward the explanation of what state capitalism entailed, in his thesis 
"Impending Catastrophe & How to Combat If', when the nation was under imminent 
threat of famine. According to Lenin, monopoly capitalism can be developed into 
state-monopoly capitalism. And if the state is merely an organisation of a ruling class, 
then capitalism under a revolutionary democratic state will mean capitalism 
dominated by workers and peasants. Therefore, state capitalism is a step closer to 
socialism than bourgeois capitalism (Lenin, 1975, 2: 211). Obviously, Lenin had a 
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deep faith in the structure of a monopoly capitalist economy, which he believed was 
the best foundation on which to cultivate heavy and advanced industries as well as for 
the government to maintain control of the major resources. This conception that 
envisions 'a massive state-controlled cooperative or business conglomerate as an 
institution of transition to compete with the capitalist in the market' is the vital 
element of the theories of transition of Liu and Bukharin. It actually bore a deep 
influence from the Jewish Marxist economist Rudolf Hilferding, who had significant 
influence on both Bukharin's and Lenin's notion of imperialism (see next section). 
In the Marxist school, however, the first outline of state capitalism (it was not 
referred to as such) as an intermediary of transition was articulated by Frederick 
Engels in his 'Anti-Dilhring' (1878), as discussed in 3.2. Lenin was convinced that 
while the transition from cooperative capitalism to socialism was one from small-
scale production to large-scale production, which was slower; the transition from state 
capitalism to socialism should be the one from large-scale production to another, 
which was easier and faster (Lenin, 1965, 348). On the other hand, although Marx did 
not, as stated in the previous section, complete the theory of transition from 
capitalism, he had actually pointed to the establishment of the cooperative as the 
model of a monopoly economy for the proletariat during the transitional period, 
though he did not envisage the cooperative as the means of huge centralised control 
apparatus as in the model of state capitalism of Lenin and Bukharin. Some believe 
that the production mode of a workers' self-managed producer cooperative was 
entirely in tune with Marxist theory, and it has been ignored by Marxist researchers 
(Jossa, 2005, 15-16). This could be vindicated by Marx's view of the cooperative as 
a feasible system of economic construction in Volume 3 of' The Capital' which states 
that the exploitation of workers could be overcome via the cooperative system, "The 
cooperative factories of the labourers themselves represent within the old form the 
sprout of the new, although they naturally reproduce, and must reproduce everywhere 
in their natural organisation all the shortcomings of the prevailing system. But the 
antithesis between capital and labour is overcome between them, if at first only by 
way of making the associated labourers into capitalists themselves, i.e. enabling them 
to use the means of production for the employment of their own labour." (Marx, 1959, 
431) 
Moreover, it is interesting that Marx saw the capitalist mode of production as a 
form of transition, "Without the factory system arising out of the capitalist mode of 
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production, there could be no cooperative factory ... the capitalist stock company, as 
much as the cooperative factories, should be considered as a transitional form from 
the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with the distinction that the 
antagonism is resolved negatively in the one and positively in the other." (Marx, 
1959, 431) His emphasis on the function of the cooperative as a symbol of 
communism was also seen in 'The Civil War in France' (1871), "lfthe cooperative is 
not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the capitalist system; if united 
cooperative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus 
making it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy, and 
periodical convulsion which are the fatality of capitalist production-what else, 
gentlemen, would it be but communism, 'possible' communism?" (Marx in Marx & 
Engels, 1968, 277) 
But this was not exactly the notion of cooperatives as the integral part of state 
capitalism for economic institutionalisation, as we see in Liu's theory of transition. 
The only time Marx came close to this was his comment in the 'Critique of Gotha 
Programme' (1891), where he mentioned 'state aid' for the cooperative, "The 
German workers party, in order to pave the way for the solution of the social question, 
demands the establishment of the producer cooperative society with state aid under 
the democratic control of the working people." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 311) 
Apparently, "the democratic control of working people" referred to the central control 
by the proletariat government. Marx's early impression of the cooperative could be a 
rather primitive idea. We must also bear in mind that Marx, as we have understood, 
had never been a real revolutionary. He therefore must not have foreseen the 
variation of cooperatives which emerged under the economic model of Lenin, 
Bukharin and Liu. 
3.3.4 Party Discipline and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
Lenin had never hidden his main concern-the social disorder and economic 
status after the civil war, and this could be the reason why he was widely regarded as 
a revolutionary who advocated strong party discipline, as he insists that, "victory over 
disorder, economic ruin and laxity is the most important issue." On the other hand, he 
was always expediently flexible in his approach. "Since workers hold power", Lenin 
believed that, "it is worthwhile to sacrifice a bit to the private capitalist." But he also 
stressed the temporary nature of the correlation of petty capitalist and proletariat. 
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"when the workers have learned how to defend the state system against the anarchy of 
small ownership, have learned to organise large scale production ... they will hold the 
trump card." Lenin also reminded his comrades that his approach still resembled 
Marx's thought, as "socialism is inconceivable without large-scale capitalist 
engineering based on the latest discovery of modem science ... state monopoly 
capitalism is a complete material preparation for socialism" In the period of transition, 
while the petty bourgeoisie are free to accumulate their wealth, Lenin hoped to keep 
them at bay with a straight requirement for obedience to the proletariat, as he thought 
the "uncultured capitalist" should be "ruthlessly suppressed", while the "cultured 
capitalist" could be bought off with "methods of compromise." (Lenin, 1975, 2: 
632-9) 
The importance of party discipline and the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 
post revolutionary era could be caused by the seizure of power by the proletariat in a 
pre-capitalist society; as from the perspective of Marxist theory, Russia had not 
reached an era where the majority of people were working class. However, this 
'orthodox' notion of the proletariat-ruled government did have its root in Marxism as 
peasants were generally landowners and had therefore been regarded as bourgeoisie. 
So for Lenin and Marx, peasants represented the petty bourgeoisie and the maj or 
representative of the proletariat was the worker. As discussed before, Marx had 
described the dictatorship of the proletariat as the only form of transitional 
government in 'Critique of Gotha Programme' (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968,313). 
When he talked about dismantling the coalition between capitalists and 
socialists after the domination of the proletariat, he gave no regard to the good faith of 
the petty bourgeoisie who show the communists their trust, "after seizing power, you 
must begin to talk about discipline ... (during the first phase of communism), control 
must be established over the insignificant capitalist minority, and workers who were 
corrupted by capitalism." (Lenin, 1975, 2: 312, 645) However, Lenin was always 
ready to concede should he feel that the time for radical change had not come. For 
example, the NEP's leniency towards the peasantry attracted criticism from the far 
Left, but Lenin stood firm, as he saw the success of the revival of the rural economy 
rooted in the initiative of the peasants: "there is only one way to achieve agrarian 
reform, which is unavoidable in present day Russia-playa revolutionary democratic 
role: as it must be effected by the revolutionary initiative of the peasants themselves." 
(Lenin, 1962, 315) He thus explained why the socialist revolution could not be waged 
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on the peasantry during the period of transition: (because of) the existence of the 
undeveloped state of class contradiction "in the people in general, and in the peasantry 
in particular", and because of economic backwardness, any form of socialist reform 
could not go beyond the framework of petty-bourgeoisie relationship." (Lenin, 1975, 
2: 309) 
Hence the whole picture of the Leninist ideology of transition-first the 
voluntary proletariat uprising in a backward country, and the education of the 
proletariat by the intellectual bourgeoisies; then the temporary alliance with the 
peasantry for democratic revolution to overthrow the feudalists and, after the 
revolution, the economic revival via rural accumulation; in which concessions were 
made to win the peasant initiative. Last would be the class struggle to purge the rural 
and urban bourgeoisies, as well as the establishment of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Finally, after the success of the revolution, the proletariat government 
should consolidate the power with strict centralised control and party discipline. 
Lenin's advocacy for voluntary and self-determined revolution by the 
proletariat and the peasantry does not appear to be materialist, but idealist-as it is 
rooted in self-consciousness. It seems like a major divergence from Marx's Historical 
Materialism. However, it could also be viewed from such an angle that Lenin, though 
arguably quite manipulative, had solved the unanswered question posited to Marx-
the timihg of the revolution. If revolution did not begin, particularly in an 
undeveloped country, then the voluntarism of the proletariat and the initiative of the 
peasantry is apparently the key to changing social relations. Though the practice looks 
consciousness-based, which seems to be idealist, it could be regarded as a 
reconstruction or improvisation of Marxist Theory. Lenin's view of consciousness in 
his 'Philosophical Notebook' somehow reflected the argument posited by the previous 
section that Marx's theory was indeed also very much human-centric, that, "man's 
consciousness not only reflects the objective but creates it." (Lenin, 1961, 212) This 
was echoed by Lenin's Marxist guru Georgi Plekhanov 25 (1856-1918) in his 
25 Georgi Plekhanov was widely regarded as the founder of Russian Marxism and Lenin was his 
admirer. After the split of the Russian Social Democrats in 1903, Plekhanov joined the Mensheviks. (or 
the Anti-Leninist, Minorityites) He believed that socialism can never be successful without the 
precedence of full-scale capitalism. As even if the workers in capitalist countries were left to 
themselves (without any intervention or revolution) they would come to socialism. In other words, he 
was the orthodox Marxist that believed Marx's theory should be applied strictly from the book. He 
went into exile and died in Finland in 1918. Sources: (Baron, 1963, vii-x; Volkogonov, 199 .. L 89-
91; Le Blanc, 1990,61-63) 
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'Materialist Conception of History' (1897), that, "there is no historical fact that did 
not owe its origin to social economics; but it is no less true that there is no historical 
fact that is not preceded, not accompanied, or not succeeded by a definite state of 
consciousness." (Plekhanov, 1969, 116) 
Despite being a socialist revolutionary, he knew the focus in the 1920s should 
be to rebuild the economy at all cost. It had become more apparent when he was 
seriously ill, that he was desperate to let his voice be heard before his death. He 
reminded his comrades in January 1923 that the time for full-scale socialist society 
had not come. In his words, it was this "semi-Asiatic ignorance from which we have 
not yet extricated ourselves ... " and the most important point he wanted to stress was 
that "the development of the productive forces of Russia has not attained the level that 
make socialism possible." (Lenin, 1971, 756, 768) However, while pushing for the 
full implementation of the NEP, he had never given any precise statement whether 
Russia should go it alone in the transition to socialism (which contrasted his earlier 
statement). That left room for debate after his death, and space for Stalin to assert his 
theory of 'socialism in one country'. 
By outlining the strategies of transition, he had filled the vacuum Marxist 
theory has left behind, which was the uncertainty of the practicality of the theory. 
Lenin was the first person to wage revolution by applying Marxist theory, albeit he 
did fine tune it to suit the practical situation. After the war communism, the 
devastation and backwardness of the Russian economy prompted him to reinterpret 
the theory of transition out of the existing Marxist ideology. Upon the launch of the 
NEP, Lenin had made his view clear that he did not believe instant transition to 
socialism was possible in the 1920s for the Soviet Union. His health undermined his 
desperate effort to exert his views and to convince his fellow comrades that the NEP 
was the way forward. Interestingly, despite his condemnation of the hard left and his 
support for a mixed economy, nobody portrayed him as 'right opportunist' due to his 
reputation as the father of the Soviet Union. 
The reason why Bukharin was so important in Russian's theory of transition 
was that he actually tried to complete the tasks that were supposedly Lenin's, albeit 
with his own interpretation and understanding of Marxism. So while this section 
discusses the original theory of transition for Lenin, the next section illustrates the 
overlapping of Bukharin's and Lenin's ideologies. Lenin's conception of transition 
could be understood better from the following statement where he hit back at those 
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who disagreed with his assertion, '"They all call themselves Marxists, but their 
conception of Marxism is impossibly pedantic. They have completely failed to 
understand what is decisive in Marxism, namely, its revolutionary dialectics. They 
have even absolutely failed to understand Marx's plain statement that in time of 
revolution the utmost flexibilit/6 is demanded." (Lenin, 1971, 767) 
3.4 Bukharin's Theory of Equilibrium and Lenin's Legacy 
3.4.1 Lenin, Bukharin and State Capitalism 
Bukharin had never been a prominent figure in terms of the development of 
Marxist theory. Though Lenin openly praised him as the '"most valuable and major 
theorist of the Party" (Lenin, 1971, 741), and his biographer regards him as the 
"official theorist of Bolshevism in the 1920s," (Cohen, 1970b, 41) he was still one of 
the least studied 20th -century Marxist theoreticians. "There is no Bukharinist School 
of Marxist thought and little attention has been paid to the idea of a thinker who was 
for the most part concerned with an academic career." (Kellogg, 1989, 357) His 
relentless support of Lenin's NEP had been overshadowed by his earlier opposition to 
the policy, when he was seen as one of those "who suggested an extremely radical 
line of instant socialism." (Nove, 1972, 44) Lenin's famous writing that attacked the 
leftists within the party, 'The Left-wing Childishness', was actually meant to accuse 
Bukharin (Nove, 1972, 58) of not supporting the NEP. Bukharin shifted sides only 
when War Communism was replaced by the NEP, and had since become the 
staunchest supporter of the policy. His interpretation of the New Economic Policy 
could be considered as a branch of thought derived and improvised from Lenin's 
practices and ideologies of transition. But it was his unique interpretation of historical 
materialism in transition to socialism that made him prominent in the study of Russian 
Socialism. 
26 Lenin was believed to be referring to Marx's statement in 'The Civil War in France' (1871), "The 
Commune made that catchphrase of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality .. .It supplied 
the Republic with the basis of really democratic institutions. But neither cheap government nor the 
'true Republic' was its ultimate aim; they were merely concomitant. The multiplicity of interpretation 
to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their 
favour show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form ... " (Marx in Marx & Engels. 1968, , 
276-277) 
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Besides, the dramatic change of stance (from opposing to supporting the NEP) 
prompts his biographer to believe that Bukharin actually had moments of ~·troubled 
uncertainty" on the eve of the NEP, and he finally made an opportunistic move to take 
a stand in between Lenin and Trotsky (Cohen, 1974, 103). However, Bukharin played 
the essential role of economic planner during the transitional period in the Communist 
Soviet, particularly when he became the strongest advocate of the NEP after Lenin's 
death. He even "influenced Lenin's thinking on crucial questions such as the role of a 
state in a future socialist society, and contributed new and original interpretation of 
the international economy." (Kemp-Welch, 1992, 3) 
Where economic theories were concerned, Bukharin inherited the belief in 
state capitalism from Lenin. His notion that the state-controlled major industries 
would steer the nation's economy towards socialism was clearly a legacy of Lenin's. 
Besides being preoccupied by the power of the state in transforming the economy as 
stated in Engel's 'Anti-Dilhring', both Lenin's and Bukharin's notions of state 
capitalism owed many of their ideas to Rudolf Hilferding (1877-1941), whose 
celebrated writing, 'Finance Capital' (1910), had been the major source of inspiration 
for the two Soviet leaders. Hilferding disputed Marx's theory of the eventual 
disintegration of capitalist society, by asserting that the increasing concentration of 
capital, along with the formation of cartels, was actually strengthening the capitalist 
system, as "the policy of expansion unites all strata of the propertied class in the 
service of finance capital." Finance capital, in its maturity, will concentrate the 
control over social production in fewer hands, and finally, the capitalist oligarchy. 
According to Hilferding, since capitalism would not collapse by itself, the most 
effective way to socialise the state for the proletariat was to wage revolution so as to 
seize power and thus get hold of the finance capital-"the state conquered by the 
working class, to seize finance capital in order to gain immediate control of these 
branches of production." (Hilferding, 1981, 365-370) 
The centre of Hilferding's thought was that cartels, or gigantic business 
amalgamations, would emerge at the peak of capital concentration in a capitalist 
society. Bukharin was significantly influenced by Hilferding's interpretation of state-
controlled finance capital as a gigantic machine that would swallow every business 
entity until only a single business cartel was left, and was directly controlled by the 
state. The expansion of this huge, single entity of "finance capital" would finally lead 
to war, and "hence to the unleashing of revolutionary storm." (Hilferding, 198 L 366) 
83 
According to Hilferding, at the demise of the capitalist society, free trade would be 
eliminated and trade monopoly would prevail, as capitalism would not collapse 
following the disintegration of old and obsolete production relations, as Marx had 
claimed. The only way out for the proletariat was to start a socialist revolution. 
This thought of Hilferding and the statements in Engel's 'Anti-Diihring' had 
moulded Lenin's and particularly, Bukharin's perception of state power as well as of 
the authority and significance of huge, amalgamated business enterprises. The 
ideological legacy of Hilferding had formed the theoretical background of Lenin's 
conception of the imperialist state, and Bukharin's conception of the gigantic 
corporate monster that would swallow everything, the 'Leviathan' (see discussion 
below). Bukharin had never hidden the inspiration for his writings from the public. 
His acknowledgements of Hilferding's contribution were notable in his book, 
'Imperialism and World Economy' (1915) (Bukharin, 1972,36, 64n1, 71, 107). Many 
would have regarded Lenin's 'Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism' (1916), 
and Bukharin's 'Imperialism and World Economy' (1915) as parallel. Few people 
noticed the fact that Bukharin's book was completed at least 6 months before that of 
Lenin, who had actually read Bukharin's writing and used it as his new book's 
reference (Zhen, 1994,57; Cohen, 1974,34-35). The most notable similarity of the 
two writings was that both of them saw the inevitable existence of imperialism as the 
final stage of capitalist development (Bukharin, 1972, 142; Lenin, 1978, 83). A 
researcher summarises Lenin's and Bukharin's notions of imperialist state 
development into three stages: firstly, the formation of concentrated economic units in 
the form of monopolies, trusts and syndicates; as a result, anarchy in the economy 
would be replaced by concentrated control and planning; secondly, banks as the top 
gun of the control apparatus, intensify the amalgamation of business enterprises and 
control major industrial policy; and finally, "the capitalist state, through central banks 
and the economic regulatory agencies ... superimposed its authority over the whole 
economic system as both controller and owner." (Buchanan, 1976, 67; see also Lenin, 
1978, 16--45,83, 84; Bukharin, 1972,64--65,70--73,118--119) 
But there are remarkable differences between the two. Lenin's idea of the NEP 
and state capitalism was always dialectic in nature. His notion of imperialism 
portrayed a coexistence of monopoly power and market competition in a 
contradictory unity, and he saw the interaction of the two would ineyitably create the 
highest stage of capitalism, i.e. imperialism. Finally, at the end of \"'hat he called the 
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"parasitic and decaying capitalism", Lenin foresaw the existence of an economic 
anarchy that was characterised by "simultaneous growth and decay"; as he said, 
"more and more prominently there emerges, as one of the tendencies of imperialism, 
the creation of the 'rentier' state, the usurer state, in which the bourgeoisie to an ever 
increasing degree lives on proceeds of exports and by clipping coupons ... on the 
whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before; but this growth is not only 
becoming more and more uneven in general, its unevenness also manifests itself, in 
particular, in the decay of the countries which are richest in capital." (Lenin, 1978, 
115-120) 
As with Bukharin's, Lenin's state capitalism emphasised the control of 
commanding height-the major resources and industries (or in Hilferding's term, the 
finance capital) by the state- and the co-existence of the private and state ownership. 
But he believed socialism would prevail through the final stage of class struggle when 
the proletariat had dominated the social production. Bukharin, on the other hand, did 
not see the intensification of economic anarchy at the end of capitalism. He believed 
in the emergence of an ultimate capitalist state mechanism that is colossal, powerful 
and interventionist in nature. This state machine would attain control of every 
business entity and major industry, including banks. Contrary to Lenin's thought, and 
more inclined towards Hilferding's conception, Bukharin saw the consolidation of 
capitalism by the state apparatus. He called this "ultra-imperialism," and believed its 
existence was "a real possibility." He also foresaw the establishment of "state 
capitalist trusts", a gigantic state-business amalgamation, which would "devour one 
another gradually until there came into existence an all-embracing power." Like 
Hilferding, Bukharin even perceived War as an inevitable outcome of capitalist-
imperialist development, as "War is one of the 'business operations' of modem 
bourgeoisie ... capitalist interest imperatively dictates these steps." (Bukharin, 1972, 
142, 148) As Cohen put it, Bukharin had translated Hilferding's insights into a 
"sequential, and inevitable historical equation: monopoly capitalism-imperialism-
war-proletariat revolution." (Cohen, 1974,27)27 
Although Bukharin' s less dialectic and more straightforward approach had 
been accused of violating the theory of dialectics (see below), he had actually laid 
down the pretext of his theory of 'grow in' socialist transformation and social 
27 For more comparison of Lenin's and Bukharin"s writings on imperialism, see Stephen Cohen . 
. Bukharin and the Bolshevik Rem/ulion' (Wildwood House, 1974). pp34-35 
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equilibrium in his writing of imperialism. By merging his idea of state as economic 
mechanism in "Imperialism and World Economy' with the importance of commanding 
height, Bukharin had found a new theoretical path for transition to socialism. In his 
"Towards a Theory of Imperialist State' (1915), he continued the line of his previous 
writing by predicting the inevitable formation of the ultimate capitalist state, and his 
assertion was straightforward: if the commanding height was in capitalist hands, a 
system of ""collective capitalism" would exist after all organisations of banks and 
entrepreneurs had been transformed into a Verbandskapitalist, the sole member of an 
organisation, where all domestic competition perished as the entrepreneurs united 
under a cartel to compete with foreign capital (Bukharin, 1982, 18). Later, in his 
"Economics of the Transitional Period' (1920), Bukharin went on to describe this 
gigantic state machine as the ""New Leviathan", the massive monster depicted by the 
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes to reflect the power of the state, ""the life of a 
state organisation that had become all-embracing, not the life of society, but that of a 
state - moves to the forefront. .. old Hobbes wrote that there is no power to compare 
with that of the state, but his Leviathan would seem like a puppy compared to the 
monstrous force displayed by the state apparatus of finance capital" (Bukharin, 1982, 
42) 
The ideological legacy of Engel's "Anti-Diihring' and Hilferding's "Finance 
Capital' could easily be spotted in his writings, "" ... the requirements of imperialist 
development compel bourgeois society to mobilise all its forces, to extend its 
organisation throughout the broadest possible context: the state absorbs into itself the 
whole multitude of bourgeois organisations .. .in which the state swallows up these 
organisations and once more becomes the sole universal organisation of the ruling 
class, with advanced, internal, technical division of labour." (Bukharin, 1982, 30-31) 
And this was consistent with his earlier writing of 'Imperialism', ""The individual 
production branches are in various ways knitted together into one collective body; 
organised on a large scale. Finance capital seizes the entire country in an iron grip. 
National economy turns into one gigantic combined trust whose partners are the 
financial group and the state. Such formations we call state capitalist trust." 
(Bukharin, 1972, 118) As Kemp-Welch points out, Bukharin "characterised 
imperialism by its most radical development: state intervention in the country"s 
economy and the consequent militarization of everyday life." (Kemp-\\' elch in Kemp-
Welch ed., 1992, 3) Consequently, Bukharin's "fear' of the domination of state-
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controlled finance capital, and his obsession with the power of the state in steering the 
economic development had become the major elements attributing to his belief in the 
smooth transformation of state capitalism into socialism via overwhelming control of 
commanding height by the proletariat state. 
Compared with Lenin's notion that the collapse of state capitalism was 
conceived of simultaneous growth and decay, Bukharin's view was comparatively 
simple. Dialectics would never be absent from Lenin's theory, as he stressed in his 
'Philosophical Notebook', "the identity of opposite .. .is the recognition (discovery) of 
the contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposite tendency in all phenomena." (Lenin, 
1961, 359-60) But Bukharin's dialectic was different. He believed that towards the 
end of state capitalism, the subordination of all the workers' organisations to the state 
will complete the transformation of state capitalism to socialism, '" Statification' of 
the trade union ... and all the mass organisations of the proletariat .. .into the vehicle of 
a general organisational process, systematically directed and led by the collective 
intelligence of the working class ... thus the system of state capitalism is dialectically 
transformed into its own antithesis ... workers' socialism." (Bukharin, 1979, 106) 
So Bukharin was indeed advocating a policy of evolution rather than 
revolution, that historical materialism "is not political economy nor is it history, it is 
the general theory of society and the law of its evolution." (Bukharin, 1926, xv, for 
further discussion see 3.4.2) In other words, Bukharin believed that as long as the 
proletariat rules, anything capitalist will be converted into its antithesis if put under 
state control. This could have also been reflected by Bukharin's application of Engels' 
statement of 'transformation to the opposite' (at the end of state capitalism), but in a 
more simplistic basis. As Bukharin stated in 'The Economics of Transition Period', 
" ... the dictatorship of the proletariat, will bear a formal resemblance to the epoch of 
the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie; i.e. it will be state capitalism in reverse, its own 
dialectical transformation into its own antithesis." (Bukharin, 1979, 101) This was the 
fundamental ideology behind Bukharin's 'grow in' theory of transition, in which he 
paralleled with his imperialist theory-while the growth of capitalism would 
consolidate capitalist power via institutional control of economy by the imperialist 
state, the transition to socialism could follow the same path via the control of 
commanding height by the proletariat. 
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3.4.2 'Growing into' Socialism and Social Equilibrium 
This conception of Bukharin's did attract criticism for its simplicity, or being a 
"fundamental postulate of uniformity and monism" (Day in Bukharin, 1982, Ii). He 
was accused of failing to apply dialectics correctly, "Bukharin was precluded from 
undertaking a systematic dialectical analysis of political and economic phenomena by 
his tendency to think of the capitalist state as a more or less transcendent form." (Day, 
1976, 246) Some, however, disagree, and argue that, "Bukharin's argument was lucid 
and involved a skilful use of the Marxist dialectic. He took two apparently opposite 
phenomena-autarchy and anarchy-and showed they were both strengthened in a 
parallel fashion with the development of capitalism." (Kellogg, 1989, 360) But even 
Stephen Cohen, Bukharin's biographer and staunch apologist, admits that his 
understanding of dialectics was "mechanistic", "sternly detenninistic", and 
"emphasising the hegemony of objective condition over the interventionist 
capabilities of man." However, having come to Bukharin's defence, Cohen believes 
that "the meaning of Marxist dialectics remained unclear." (Cohen, 1970b, 41, 51) 
According to Bukharin, a cooperative farm will be capitalist in nature if the 
commanding height is capitalist, as the cooperative will become "subordinated to the 
economic leadership of the bourgeoisie" via investment and bank savings. On the 
contrary, if the commanding height is socialist-controlled, then "the general bounds of 
cooperative development in our country are determined ... by the fact that the whole 
of large-scale industry, transport and the credit system are under the control of the 
proletariat...if our state economy is strengthened, the result will be a growing link 
between the proletariat and the peasantry-peasant cooperation will inevitably 'grow 
into' the system of proletariat economic organs." (Bukharin, 1982,237-8) 
It must be noted that, however, while Bukharin's assertion seemed to be 
overshadowed by his belief in the power of the commanding height, Lenin was the 
first in Russia to put forward the conception of improving material incentives and 
uplifting the cultural standard of the peasantry via rural cooperatives. Lenin realised 
that if Russia were to catch up with the West, the peasants, who were widely regarded 
as petty bourgeoisie, had to be transformed so that they could participate in the 
building of socialism, and cooperatives seemed to be the best media of transfonnation 
(Lih, 1991, 244). As Lenin put it, "With most of the population organised in 
cooperatives, the socialism which in the past was legitimately treated with ridicule, 
scorn and contempt by those who were rightly conyinced that it was necessary to 
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wage the class struggle, the struggle for political power, etc, will achieve its aim 
automatically." (Lenin, 1971, 760) It seems that Lenin, the revolutionary who 
overthrew the Imperialist Tsars, was against waging another class struggle again in 
his old age. Therefore it was sometimes difficult to tell Bukharip's notion from 
Lenin's, though they definitely supported their ideas with different theoretical 
backgrounds. Bukharin summarised his thought underlining the NEP, the theory of 
'growing into' socialism in his 'Concerning the New Economic Policy' (1925), "in 
line with our economic growth, and through corporations, the tax system, etc, we shall 
economically elevate the middle and poor peasants until they reach the point where 
their standard of living will approach the well-to-do. We shall not do so on the basis 
of robbers' repartition ... but on the basis of economic expansion. On the basis of this 
expansion, we shall reach an even higher stage, in which the peasantry will disappear 
as a special class in relation to the proletariat." (Bukharin, 1982, 207) This could be 
the reason why he was described as "deterministic" and "monistic" in his 
inteq)fetation of historical materialism, as he had simplified a supposedly complicated 
matter. But as we shall see in Chapter 4, Liu Shaoqi had also articulated a similar 
argument, that via 'cultivation' and education, and in line with the expansion of 
economy, he believed the transition to socialism could be completed without class 
struggle. 
This evolutionary form of transition had raised one question, could Russia 
march into socialism in isolation, as the 'evolution' progressed, without the rest of the 
Europe? Bukharin was obviously inconsistent in this respect. In the early 1920s he 
stood by Lenin's verdict that ~he Soviet could only become socialist if the rest of the 
world was swept by proletariat revolution, as he stated, "the complete and decisive 
victory of the proletariat, its worldwide victory, will ultimately restore the unity of 
society on a new basis ... then absolute, stateless communism will be a reality." 
(Bukharin, 1979, 43) This mirrored Lenin's speech in the first Congress of 
Communist International, " ... winning a Communist majority in the Soviet is the 
principle task in all countries in which Soviet government is not yet victorious ... the 
revolution will come very soon in many Western European countries ... then our 
victory can be assured and no power on earth will be able to do anything against the 
communist revolution." (Lenin, 1971, 163) But Bukharin shifted his stance after 
Lenin's death and supported Stalin openly for the advocacy of building . one-country 
socialism' in Russia. In his book particularly written for this purpose, . Building up 
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Socialism' (1926), Bukharin admitted that Lenin's idea was not to build a socialist 
state in isolation. But he tactfully argued that Lenin had also hinted at the possibility 
of a single socialist state in one of his latest writings, 'On Cooperation' (1923), where 
Lenin believed that the Soviets possessed "all that is necessary for the construction of 
a complete socialist society," and stressed that " ... this is not the building of socialist 
society, but it is all that is necessary to and sufficient for it." (Lenin, 197 L 761) 
Furthermore, Lenin's final statement in that article stated that the priority by then was 
cultural development, "in our country the political and social revolution was preceded 
by the Cultural Revolution ... this cultural revolution would now suffice to make our 
country a complete socialist country." In Bukharin's interpretation, Lenin referred to 
the cultural development as the final obstacle of transition to overcome before a 
socialist state could be born (Lenin, 1971, 766; Bukharin, 1926, 50-52). 
In short, according to Bukharin's interpretation, Lenin had implicitly 
'approved' the notion of the building of 'socialism in one country' a year before his 
death. However, some believe Bukharin's change was political, as he could be 
pledging his loyalty to Stalin when they managed to work together for the first few 
years after Lenin's death. As one could not find a precise statement of Lenin's that 
supported the notion, Bukharin was suspected of manipulation. Liu Wenhui from 
Nanjing Teaching University thus finds Bukharin guilty of assisting Stalin in 
consolidating his power, as well as digging his own grave (Liu, 2004, 114, 118-
119). Stalin, who was the pioneer and the strongest advocate of 'one country 
socialism', rejected the idea of the 'world revolution.' His theory of "self-sufficient, 
autocratic development" had laid the foundation for the new trend in Russian 
Communism-Stalinism, which was "in its essence national-communist." (Pantsov, 
2000,82) 
The honeymoon period for the two leaders was soon over, as Stalin finally 
turned against Bukharin after 1928. Bukharin was then purged and killed in 1938. In 
fact, it was 'world revolution' rather than 'one country socialism' that was the 
Bolsheviks' tradition, as they strengthened their belief in the inevitability of world 
revolution from the bitter experience of October Revolution and civil war. (Pantsov. 
2000,73-74; Kenez, 1999,32)28 But Cohen sees the 'grow in' model of transition as 
28 "When the Bolsheviks took power they believed their regime had no need for foreign policy. The 
aovemments of the world would be implacably hostile ... the Bolsheviks saw the solution to their 
t:> 
difficulties in immediate revolution." (Kenez, 1999, 32) 
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simply a coincidental match for Stalin~s notion of 'building socialism in isolation' in 
December 1924. He also sees that Lenin~s verdict in 'On Cooperation' was sufficient 
evidence ofLenin~s approval for advocacy. It seems Cohen suggested that Bukharin's 
support for Stalin was due to the non-contradictory nature of his theory of transition 
with Stalin's advocacy (Cohen, 1974, 147-148). However, Liu Wenhui~s account 
was plausible on the ground that Bukharin actually wrote a book, though a short one 
(' Building up socialism', 1926), to support the notion of the building of socialism in 
isolation. Regardless of whether Lenin had actually endorsed the idea, we cannot help 
but relate Bukharin to Liu Shaoqi, who, for political reasons orchestrated the Maoist 
cult in 1947, assisted Mao in propagating the Great Leap in 1958 and promoting the 
second wave of the Maoist cult at the Lushan Conference in 1959, and was purged 
during the Cultural Revolution and died of medical negligence (see Chapter 6 for 
detail discussion). 
Bukharin's belief in the 'growing in' model of transition was distinctive 
among the Marxist schools, as most Marxist leaders advocated the ultimate purging of 
bourgeoisie and political opponents via political struggle or revolution. The 'growing 
in' seemed like a branch of dialectic theory, but it did not emphasise the intra-society 
interaction and the contradiction between kulaks and the workers, like other 
communist leaders do. It thus gave an impression that Bukharin had buried all social 
contradiction under the presumption of 'equilibrium'. It is therefore not surprising at 
all that Lenin had, in his letter to Congress on 24th December 1922, accused Bukharin 
of not understanding dialectic, " ... his theoretical view can be classified as fully 
Marxist only with great reserve ... he has never made study of dialectics, and, I think, 
never fully understood it." (Lenin, 1971, 741) The simplicity of Bukharin's 
interpretation of the NEP is largely due to his preoccupation with the power of the 
state-controlled means of production, the commanding height, which he believed 
could alter the form of society, or steer the society in a specific direction. 
In his 'The New Economic Policy' (1925), Bukharin believed that "if we are 
strong ourselves, if real economic might is concentrated in our hands, if we control 
really powerful economic heights, we need not be afraid of an expanding economic 
turnover:' (Bukharin, 1982, 195) However, it could also be a norm that socialists 
were concerned by the state as a powerful mechanism of change. Gramsci had 
described the state machine as hegemony where, "the state is an entire complex of 
practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
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maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it 
rules." (Gramsci, 1971, 224) This seems to coincide with Marx's statement in his' The 
Civil War in France' (1891), that "the state is nothing but a machine for the 
oppression of one class by another, indeed, in the democratic republic no less than in 
the monarchy; and at best an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious 
struggle for class supremacy ... " (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 246) Some see that 
Bukharin's belief in 'winning over' the rich peasantry and bourgeoisie under socialist 
rule was rooted in his experience of War Communism, which reminded him of the 
danger of state violence, the result of the misuse of state power (Kemp-Welch in 
Kemp-Welch ed., 1992, 5). 
While Lenin was well aware of the existence of the social contradiction under 
any circumstances, Bukharin believed that a sort of social equilibrium could be 
achieved after long and painful struggle towards socialism via the NEP, " ... in theory, 
a complete disintegration of the apparatus is not necessarily bound to happen. Thus 
the new equilibrium arises through a prolonged struggle and that is why its 
establishment is slow and painful." (Bukharin, 1979, 118) His interpretation of the 
NEP was accumulation by the peasantry followed by the removal of grain surpluses to 
finance the construction of industries. State coercion, according to Bukharin, was vital 
in achieving the "minimal equilibrium", where the national and local government's 
organs of distribution as well as the taxation scheme (like the Tax in Kind imposed by 
Lenin via NEP, see section 3.3) will ensure the sufficient distribution of grain and 
surpluses to the urban and industrial area. Bukharin believed that both the peasants 
and the workers share some mutual interests, which make the equilibrium possible, 
"the peasantry itself has an interest in the growth of industry, which supplies it with 
agricultural machinery, artificial fertiliser and electric power ... the state power of the 
proletariat is the best means of protection against the restoration of the economic 
pressure of the large-scale landowner, banker and capitalist state." (Bukharin, 1979, 
116) It is this notion of urban and rural equilibrium that backed Bukharin in forming 
his theory of workers-peasant alliance, or Smychka, in his lengthy writing' The Road 
to Socialism & the Worker-Peasant Alliance' (1925). He strongly believed that .. the 
more quickly accumulation occurs in our peasant economy, the more quickly will it 
occur in our industry. That is, the more quickly the peasant economy emerges from 
poverty and the more prosperous it becomes. the more it will buy in the way of 
agricultural equipment and machines .. .industry requires successes in agriculture for 
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its own development; and agriculture reqUIres the development of industry. This 
mutual dependence is the most basic fact in determining the proper policy to be 
followed by the ruling party." (Bukharin, 1982,242) 
Although his version of peasant-worker relationship is more harmonised 
than other communist revolutionaries would have thought, Bukharin too, had never 
thought of sharing power with the peasant, as he stressed, "the leading role in this 
alliance must belong to the working class (workers)." (Bukharin, 1982, 222) The 
insistence on the dictatorship of the proletariat is implicated in his statement of the 
"protection" of the peasant by the proletariat against the large-scale landowner, or 
"tearing the broad layers of the peasantry away from this (capitalist) influence and 
helping them to free themselves." (Bukharin, 1982, 213) However, his pragmatism, 
which had softened his stance, had been reflected in many parts of his writings, as he 
always stressed that the priority of the nation after the success of the revolution, was 
to blend the contradicting classes into a mutual-aid working relationship, "the need 
for mutual assistance between industry and agriculture is the basic condition for the 
stability of the worker-peasant bloc, without which any movement towards socialism 
is inconceivable." (Bukharin, 1982, 245) 
Bukharin had never shied away from stating the pnmacy of economIC 
development, as he boldly stated that "the fundamental purpose of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat lies in the fact that it is a means of economic revolution ... the 
dictatorship of the proletariat turns all the relations of the world upside down ... the 
political dictatorship of the working class must entail its economic dictatorship too." 
(Bukharin, 1979, 48---49) Again, this had its root in Leninism, as the founder of the 
Soviet had asked, "Will not this (the NEP) be a reign of peasant limitation?" Then he 
answered, "No, if we see to it that the working class retains its leadership over the 
peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest possible thrift in the economic 
life of our state, to use every saving we make to develop our large scale mechanised 
industry ... " (Lenin, 1971, 787) 
Bukharin put forward his assertion of equilibrium and his belief in evolution 
comprehensively in his celebrated writing 'Historical Materialism' (1920), in which 
he made his own interpretation of Marxist theory. He stressed that, "whene\'er a 
society exists, there must be certain equilibrium between its technology and its 
economy, between the totality of its instruments of labour and its working 
organisation, between its material productive devices and its material human labour 
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system." (Bukharin, 1926, 136) Then Bukharin talked about the elements constituting 
the superstructure, "in general, these rules (the great variety of standards) indicate the 
line of conduct conducive to preservation of the society, class or group in question, 
and require a subordination of the individual to the interest of the group. These norms 
are therefore conditions of equilibrium for holding together the internal contradictions 
of the human social system ... " (Bukharin, 1926, 157-158) 
3.4.3 Bukharinism as a Marxist Theory of Transition 
In summary, Bukharin believed that, in Marxist terms, after the development 
of new productive forces had broken the old production relations and settled down as 
a new historical stage, a sort of "social equilibrium" would occur; this would be 
sustained until that equilibrium was "disturbed" and the whole cycle would start 
again. (Bukharin, 1926, 242-243) " ... the world consists of forces, acting in many 
ways, opposing each other." Bukharin explained his interpretation of 'dialectics', 
"These forces are balanced for a moment in exceptional cases ... a state of 'rest' .. .if 
we change one of these forces, immediately the internal contradiction will be 
revealed, equilibrium will be disturbed, and if a new equilibrium is again established, 
it will be on a hew basis, i.e. with a new combination of forces." Surprisingly, while 
Marx disputed Hegel's theory of history, Bukharin quoted Hegel to support his 
statement, "Hegel. .. called the original condition of equilibrium the thesis; the 
disturbance of equilibrium the antithesis, the establishment of equilibrium on a new 
basis the synthesis (the unifying proposition reconciling the contradiction). The 
characteristic of motion in all things, expressing itself in this tripartite formula (or 
triad) he called dialectic." (Bukharin, 1926, 74-75) 
Bukharin also stressed that historical materialism is a natural rule of social 
change, that any arguments that believed "the theory of historical materialism should 
under no circumstances be considered a Marxian sociology and should not be 
expounded systematically," are "in error" (Bukharin, 1926, xiv-xv). Bukharin 
seemed to be fond of relating historical materialism to the rule of nature, as he saw 
many developments were inevitable, "Man can never escape from nature." Bukharin 
said, "it is impossible, therefore, for the state of nature at a certain place and at a 
certain time not to act upon human society." Bukharin then tried to establish the 
relation between humans and nature via the perspective of dialectics, "when human 
society adapts itself to the environment, it also adapts environment to itself. .. the 
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interrelation between society and nature is a process of reproduction ... the process of 
reproduction is a process of constant disturbance and re-establishment of equilibrium 
between society and nature." (Bukharin, 1926, 105, 107, 111, 118) The interaction 
between man and nature, as Bukharin believed, involved the transfer of material 
energy from nature to society, as the "expenditure of human energy (production) is an 
extraction of energy from nature ... " (Bukharin, 1926, 11 0) But Lenin's view was 
entirely different, as he believed that "man's consciousness not only reflects the 
objective world, but creates it." (Lenin, 1961,212) As a Bolshevik, Bukharin realised 
that he could not defy the orthodox camp within the party, who believed class struggle 
must take place in the process of transition. Therefore he put forward his notion of 
evolution tactfully, "Marx therefore conceived of revolution as intervening when the 
equilibrium between the productive forces of the society and the foundation of the 
economic structure is disturbed; such is the content of the conflict solved by 
revolution, this, of course, means transition from one form to another. But so long as 
the economic structure still permits the productive forces to evolve, social change will 
not take place in the form of revolution. We shall here find evolution instead." 
(Bukharin, 1926, 244) 
One of the most famous criticisms of Bukharin's verSIOn of historical 
materialism was by Antonio Gramsci, the celebrated contemporary Marxist. Gramsci 
pointed out the first error of Bukharin's 'Historical Materialism' was that Bukharin 
asserted all his point of views from a philosophical ground that was thought to be 
proletariat in nature, believed to be representing the masses but only presumed (by 
Bukharin) to have existed; instead of the traditional system of philosophy. In 
Gramsci's words (Problems of Marxism in his 'Prison Notebook'), "The first mistake 
of the 'Popular Manual' (Bukharin's 'Historical Materialism') is when it starts, at 
least implicitly, from the assumption that the elaboration of an original philosophy of 
the popular masses is to be opposed to the great system of philosophy and the religion 
of the leaders of the clergy-i.e. the conception of the world of the intellectuals and of 
high culture." Secondly, echoing Lenin's view, Gramsci saw Bukharin's book 
"contains no treatment of any kind of the dialectic," and attacked the 'evolution' and 
'grow in' concept of Bukharin that, " ... philosophy of praxis is envisaged as split into 
two elements: on one hand a theory of history and politics conceived as sociology-
one that can be constructed according to the methods of natural science (experimental 
in the crudest positive sense). and on the other hand a philosophy proper, this being 
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philosophical alias metaphysical or mechanical (vulgar) materialism." (Gramsci~ 
1971, 419, 434) Gramsci's criticism of Bukharin was mainly based on the fact that 
any thesis that lacked the substance of dialectic could hardly be defined as a Marxist 
study, and from here, he condemned Bukharin's theory of evolution for transition to 
socialism as '"mechanical and vulgar materialism." Contrary to the views on 
philosophical grounds that Bukharin's theory of equilibrium could be flawed, those 
views from social economic perspective do not find the same problem. Salter sees that 
'" ... for Bukharin, equilibrium implied more than economic equilibrium but stood also 
for social equilibrium." He believes that Bukharin '"viewed the market as inherently 
benign in the sense that market relations between town and country, which provided 
the basis for maintaining the necessary economic balances, also provided the 
framework for maintaining harmonious social relations between the workers and 
peasants." (Salter, 1992, 563) 
It does not really matter whether one· regards Bukharin as an old Bolshevik 
(Cohen, 1974, 3), a liberal (Day, 1976, 259), a market socialist (Nolan, 1988, 12), an 
advocate for a '"rightist alternative" (Kemp-Welch, 1992, 18) or the supporter of the" 
third way" (Gregory in Gregory ed, 2001, 40). Similarly, it does not really matter for 
this research whether, in view of Gramsci's criticism, Bukharin was a genuine 
philosopher or a 'qualified' Marxist. What really matters was his new interpretation of 
the NEP as well as Marxism: as long as the finance capital and the major resources 
are in the hands of the proletariat, nothing could go wrong-even if it meant the 
kulaks (rich peasants) were allowed to accumulate their wealth and a free market 
exists. His notion of how the market could function has vindicated this, as he stresses 
in 'New Economic Policy' (1925) about the role of market in socialist economy: "We 
control the commanding height, we organise what is essential, then our state 
economy, by different means, sometimes even by competing with the remnant of 
private capital through market relationships, gradually increases its economic might 
and in diverse ways, draws the backward economic units into its own organisation, 
doing so, as a rule, through the market." (Bukharin, 1982, 189) 
His interpretation of the function of market might have portrayed him as part 
of a 'rightist opposition' amongst the Bolsheviks who advocated a market economy. 
But this seems to eclipse the notion he inherited from Lenin, which was to eliminate 
market and private trade, squeeze the "remnants of capitalists" out of the market, yia 
cooperative types of gigantic organisation; as Lenin kept reminding his men of his 
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real intention, "By adopting NEP we made a concession to the peasant as a trader, to 
the principle of private trade; it is precisely for this reason (contrary to what some 
people think) that the cooperative movement is of such immense important. .. We went 
too far when we introduced NEP, but not because we attached too much importance 
to the principle of free enterprise and trade-we went too far because we lost sight of 
the cooperative, because we now underrate the cooperative, because we are already 
beginning to forget the vast importance of the cooperative ... " (Lenin, 1971, 760-
761) Lewin, too, believes that in Bukharin's model, private entrepreneurs in the cities 
and countryside were "to be evicted in the long run." (Lewin, 1974, 41) Just as 
Bukharin had repeated in 'Historical Materialism', "The class that is dominant in 
economy will also be dominant in politics and will also politically fortify the specific 
type of production relations which will also give security to the process of 
exploitation operating in favour of this class." (Bukharin, 1926, 246) 
From radical leftist who doubted the function of the state as well as advocacy 
of war communism, to the staunch believer in the NEP and state capitalism, Bukharin 
seemed to have changed his thought from one side to another according to the 
political and economic environment of the former Soviet. But as Cohen pointed out, 
he was best described as a "seeking Marxism", which means he would, "view 
Marxism not only as the ideology of the party state, but as a system of living ideas 
competitive with and alert to the accomplishment of contemporary Western thought." 
(Cohen, 1974, 122) This is agreed by another researcher of Bolshevism, who believes 
that "there is no contradiction between Bukharin's pre-NEP justification for coercion 
applied to the peasantry and his later views during NEP ... He consistently affirmed the 
basic argument of Economics of the Transition Period about the cost of revolution; he 
consistently defined 'war communism' as a policy that would always be justified 
under similar circumstances of class struggle ... He consistently described the Russian 
civil war as a time for worker-peasant alliance-in contradistinction, for example, to 
the Hungarian revolution in 1919." (Lih, 1997, 70n52) 
We always forget the fact that revolutionaries are at the same time politicians. 
For example, Bukharin had actually suppressed and purged many intellectuals in his 
earlier years as Bolshevik leader after the October Revolution in an attempt to 'tame' 
intellectual dissidents. Bukharin's bloody campaign was based on a strict 
categorisation of classes, which characterised the apparatus of most socialist parties 
during their earlier years of revolution. (Zhen, 1997,51-53) This seems to contradict 
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our image of Bukharin, but it was also reflected in Liu Shaoqi' s ruthless struggle 
against rich peasants during the first phase of land reform, as well as his merciless 
purge of the 'corrupts' during the Four Clean Movement (see Chapters 4 & 6). Some 
of these politicians were at the same time good theoreticians. However, while we 
expect a theoretician to be consistent, we should not expect the same from a 
politician. 
Bukharin's mam concern was not to assert his school of thought or his 
interpretation of Marxism, but to revive the national economy and to go through the 
transitional period in stability. At least in this respect, he seemed to stand by his old 
master. Lenin's statement made during his last year of life should have drawn more 
attention. In the notes of his diary written on 2nd January 1923, a year before his 
death, Lenin showed that he had no doubt the time for the former Soviet to march into 
communism had not arrived, "under no circumstances must this be understood to 
mean that we should immediately propagate purely and strictly communist ideas in 
the countryside. As long as our countryside lacks the material basis for communism, it 
will be, I should say, harmful, in fact, I should say, fatal to communism to do so." 
(Lenin, 1971, 758) 
By simplifying the practice he inherited from Lenin, Bukharin had paved a 
new path of transition to socialism for newly liberated communist nations. His 
interpretation of the NEP was easy to understand, and the major elements of his 
interpretation-state controlled finance capital, market for competition with capitalist, 
accumulation of surpluses in peasantry and alliance of workers and peasants to 
achieve the ultimate equilibrium; had formed the backbone of Liu's theory of 
transition, though, the relationship between Liu and Bukharin remains unclear. It must 
also be noted that the ideological legacy that Lenin left behind was somehow full of 
ambiguity (as we will discuss later) so that some would regard Stalin as the more 
legitimate successor to Lenin's theory of transition. 
3.5 Stalin and Socialism in One Country 
3.5.1 Socialism in a Backward Country 
"If intellectual commitment to Marxism inspired the effort to bring about a 
socialist transformation of Chinese society, that same doctrine thought that socialism 
was impossible under conditions of economic back\\/ardness.~' (Meisner, 1999. 104) 
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Contrasting Bukharin, who believed that the transition to socialism could be a 
process of voluntary progression and social evolution, and a backward country like 
Russia would only be ready for socialism when the economy is fully developed; 
Stalin advocated for 'socialism in one country', and believed that socialist 
construction in a backward country is possible even without the full development of 
capitalism. The theme of Stalin's thought of transition is that the absence of socialist 
nations among Russian's neighbouring countries did not justify Russia's delay in 
moving into socialism, as poverty and backwardness provided the fertile ground for 
revolution; and rapid collectivisation and industrialisation is the key to the success of 
socialist economic construction. In the aftermath of the October Revolution, Stalin 
was clear about the direction of the Party and where the nation should head towards in 
years to come, even if at the time the notion of 'socialism in one country' was not 
popular. But he tactfully incorporated the reality of Russia into international 
communism, stating that if the Bolsheviks wished to maintain power in one country, 
they must "support and stir up revolution in all countries." (Stalin, 1936, 46) With 
such statements he avoided the issue of whether Russia should wait for other 
European countries to become socialist. 
Officially, Stalin only began his political campaign for 'socialism in one 
country' in 1926, when the weakness of the NEP had surfaced. However, his 
conception of 'socialism in one country' and his inclination towards rapid 
collectivisation had been obvious in the early years of his leadership. "Some 
comrades say that since capitalism is poorly developed in our country, it would be 
utopian to raise the question of a socialist revolution. They would be right if there 
were no war, if there were no economic disruption, if the foundation of the capitalist 
organisation of the national economy were not shaken ... " Stalin said in the Sixth 
Congress, 1919, "It would be rank pedantry to demand that Russia should 'wait' with 
socialist changes until Europe 'begins.' That country (Russia) which 'begins' has the 
greater opportunity ... We must discard the antiquated idea that only Europe can show 
us the way." (Stalin, 1953, 3: 185-186) Stalin never allowed doctrine to supersede 
common sense. Time and time again, Stalin had not doubted that doctrines were 
subsidiary to strategy and tactics. "(If) there is dogmatic Marxism and creative 
Marxism, I stand by the latter." (Stalin, 1953, 3: 200) In October 1920, in a regional 
conference at Vladikavkaz, Stalin said that the notion that the October Revolution in 
Russia could be "crowned with success" only if it \vas follo\ved by the West had been 
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refuted by events, since "Socialist Russia, which did not receive direct revolutionary 
support from the Western proletariat and is surrounded by hostile states, has already 
successfully continued to exist and develop for 3 years." (Stalin, 1953,4: 387-388) 
At the same time, by promoting the construction of socialism in a backward 
country, Stalin also took the opportunity to pit himself against Trotsky as the upholder 
and interpreter of Leninism. As a result of that, an important essay of Stalin, the 
'October Revolution and the tactics of the Russian Communists', which appeared on 
20th December 1924 in Pravda, stated that the successful establishment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia reflected the victory of 'socialism in one 
country'. Stalin denounced Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution as failing to 
recognise the significance of the alliance of workers and peasants, as well as the 
permanent nature of the dictatorship of proletariat. But most important of all, the 
article was meant to advocate 'socialism in one country' via the attack on Trotsky. 
"The victory of socialism in one country is not a self-sufficient task ... but as an aid, as 
a means for hastening the victory of the proletariat in all countries." Stalin stressed 
that 'socialism in one country' is possible because the world revolution needed a 
starting point, which in this case, was Russia. "The world significance of the October 
Revolution lies not only in the fact that it constitutes a great beginning made by one 
country in causing a breach in the system of imperialism and it is the first centre of 
socialism in the ocean of imperialist country, but also in that it constitutes the first 
stage of the world revolution and a mighty base for its further development." (Stalin, 
1953,6: 381-386,415, 419; Carr, 1959, 40) Therefore, according to Stalin, Russia 
was right to go it alone. 
Before Stalin called for collectivisation, he incorporated his notion of 
'socialism in one country' with the development of the economy via the NEP. The 
notion seemed to have the same appeal and same affiliation with the NEP, and it was 
regarded as the legitimate successor ofNEP. (Carr, 1959,48) That was why Bukharin 
for once stood by it, as neither agreed that Russia should wait for other capitalist 
countries to become socialist. (See section 3.3 of this chapter) When Lenin introduced 
the NEP he set forth the two conditions for the success of socialist revolution in a , 
backward Russia: "support at the right moment by the socialist revolution of one or 
several countries, and a compromise between the proletariat and the majority of the 
peasant population." (Carr, 1952. 277) 
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It is also argued that the absence of Western influence in the formation of 
Stalin's mind and character distinguished him sharply from the other Bolshevik 
leaders from the early era of the Soviet Union. He had never lived in Western Europe, 
and neither could he read nor speak any Western language. This had to some extent 
shaped his political style. Those who stood closest to him in the later years of his 
political life, like Molotov, Kirov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev, were all as 
ignorant as him of the West. Carr sees that Stalin remained a national rather than an 
international socialist. At the 6th Congress in 1917, Stalin once argued that had Engels 
been alive to see the present situation, he would have said, "Devil take the old 
formulae, long live the victorious revolution of the USSR." (Carr, 1958, 177-178, 
181) Regardless of whether the lack of Western influence had really moulded his 
political thought, it definitely gave Stalin the confidence to go it alone in the transition 
to socialism. 
3.5.2 Stalin and NEP 
Russian Marxists before 1905 had in general been reluctant to accept the view 
that a socialist revolution could be made in an economically backward country like 
Russia, i.e. in a country where the proletariat was in a small minority and where the 
bourgeois revolution had not yet occurred. (Carr, 1959, 36) This represented a very 
orthodox view of Marx's theory, which set forth the prerequisite for a transformation 
into socialism, namely the existence of a capitalist society. But Stalin made a brave 
amendment to this view. In April 1924, he told the whole world that the success of the 
Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 was proof of the possibility of 'socialism in one 
country', "formerly, the victory of the revolution in one country was considered 
impossible ... now this point of view no longer fits in with the facts, now we must 
proceed from the possibility of such a victory ... The history of revolution in Russia is 
direct proof of this." However, that was at the time when he worked closely with 
Bukharin, and the problems resulting from the NEP had not surfaced, so he still 
stressed "the complete victory of socialism" had not been assured, as he seemed to be 
content to repeat the conventional view that "for this (the complete victory of 
socialism) the victory of the revolution in at least several countries is needed." (Stalin, 
1953,6: 109-110) At the 14th Congress, to show his good working relationship with 
Bukharin Stalin even stated that '~we are, and we shall be, for Bukharin." (Erlich in , 
Blackwell ed .. , 1974, 222) Even by 1925, when Stalin began to push hard for 
101 
'socialism in one country', he still showed his support for Bukharin' s policy. 
believing that the "NEP Russia would be converted into Socialist Russia" ultimately, 
and accusing Trotsky of not believing that (Stalin, 1954,7: 32-33). 
But some do believe that the NEP had actually "humiliated many of the 
revolutionaries, who regarded the policy as a retreat, and a concession to human 
weaknesses." It is argued that at least one of the reasons Stalin backed NEP was to 
defeat his enemy of the left, the old guard. After the old guard and Trotsky were 
defeated, "he turned against NEP and enforced collectivisation and rapid 
industrialisation." (Schapiro in Urban ed. 1982, 420-421) This interpretation is 
plausible because, as discussed in the early section, Stalin always believed that rapid 
collectivisation was the only option to revive the Soviet economy. During his alliance 
with Bukharin, Stalin, for once, sounded like a 'Bukharinite' and supported the 
accumulation in the countryside, as he made some statements like: "our industries, 
which provide the foundation for socialism and our power, are based on the internal 
and on the peasant market." (Erlich in Blackwell, 1974,223) 
But his support for the NEP was based on the fact that the NEP will help 
Russia to go it alone on the road to socialism. Therefore he called for the alliance with 
unlikely allies, the peasantry, as their principal ally: the proletariat in the developed 
countries, was not ready. He stressed that the leading proletariat of the West "is the 
immense force, and it is the most faithful, most important ally of our revolution and 
our regime. But unfortunately the state of the revolutionary movement in the 
developed capitalist countries is such that the proletariat of the West is unable to 
render us direct and decisive assistance at the present moment." Stalin's awareness 
and observation of the political reality after the First World War prevented him from 
sticking to the orthodox revolutionary doctrine. Instead, he always hinted that the 
Soviet Union should go it alone in socialisation as soon as they could before the post-
war revival of capitalism, which was, for Stalin, inevitable, "The situation is that 
world capital after the war, after passing through several crises, has begun to recover. 
That must be admitted ... This is a gain for capital, and a loss for us." (Stalin, 1954, 7: 
26-27) 
However, when the appraisal of the NEP showed that the grain collection fell 
by one third in 1926, Stalin changed his tone drastically, linking the fall in the 
production to the "extreme backwardness of our agricultural technique and 
exceedingly low cultural level in the countryside," and the "scattered agricultural 
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production does not have the advantage that our large scale, united, nationalised 
industry has." At the Fifteenth Congress, 3rd December 1927, Stalin stressed that there 
was '"no other way out" except collectivisation, "Nationalised industries must and will 
develop at an accelerated rate. This is the guarantee of our advance to 
socialism ... what is the way out? The way out is to tum the small and scattered 
peasant fanns into large united fanns based on cultivation of the land in 
common .... the way out is to unite the small and dwarfish peasant farms gradually but 
surely ... " (Stalin, 1954, 10: 311-313) That was the year Stalin had yet to openly 
split with Bukharin, but his denouncement of Kulaks, the rich peasants, did somehow 
pass a profound message to Bukharin's camp, "there has been a certain increase in the 
number of kulaks in the countryside. That is the liability in the balance sheet of our 
economy." (Stalin, 1954, 10: 319) Stalin went as far as saying "as long as Kulaks 
exist, the sabotage of grain collection will exist too." (Erlich in Blackwell ed., 1974, 
228-231) 
Stalin's attack on the NEP after Bukharin's fall during the announcement of 
the First Five Year Plan showed his distrust of the peasantry, "the adherence of 
Bukharin's group to hoping to persuade the class enemy voluntarily to forego his 
interests and voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses to us ... they hope that these 
kulaks will give us their grain surpluses voluntarily at our procurement prices. Have 
they lost their senses?" (Stalin, 1955, 95) Stalin's attack against the NEP did not only 
happen after his split with Bukharin, as there were occasions when he could not hide 
his contempt. At the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923, a month after Lenin was 
incapacitated by strokes, Stalin surprisingly reversed his previous statement of 
support for the NEP, and stated that "evidently, we have to strengthen the barriers 
against an influx of non-proletarian elements, for the present time, under the 
conditions of the NEP, when the party is certainly exposed to the corrupting influence 
ofNEP elements." Furthennore, he also accused the NEP of causing "Great Russian 
Chauvinism", which, according to Stalin, helped to foster local nationalism that would 
undennine the Soviet interests as a whole. He claimed that the conflict of interest in 
localities is "especially dangerous now, under the conditions of the NEP.'· (Stalin, 
1953,5:218,248-249,273) 
If it was right to say that Stalin's distrust of the NEP was due to his distrust of 
Kulaks, and his distrust of kulaks was rooted in his belief in the division of classes, "is 
it not obvious that they do not understand the mechanics of class struggle, that they do 
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not know what classes are? Do they know the kulaks jeer at our officials and the 
Soviet government at village meetings called to promote grain procurement?" He re-
emphasised his point, "Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from the truth." 
(Stalin, 1955, 96) Stalin could not refrain from showing his real thoughts even during 
the period when he was 'jointly in charge' with Bukharin. In November 1920, while 
he was talking about the treatment of the bourgeoisie after the revolution, Stalin 
showed why he would launch massive and brutal purges against the peasantry during 
the collectivisation 8 years later. "As to our policy towards internal enemies. it 
remains, and must remain ... a policy of crushing all the enemies of the proletariat ... in 
the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat there can be no universal freedom, that is, 
no freedom of speech, freedom of press, etc, for our bourgeoisie. The sum and 
substance of our home policy is to grant maximum freedom to the proletarian sections 
of town and country, and to deny even minimum freedom to the remnants of the 
bourgeois class." (Stalin, 1953,4: 402) 
3.5.3 Collectivisation: The Immediate Task 
In as early as April 1918, Stalin enthusiastically spoke of "the consolidation of 
Soviet power in Russia and the beginning of the systematic reconstruction of the 
outmoded social-economic system on new, socialist lines," and called it one of the 
fundamental tasks of the Soviet dictatorship. We can observe Stalin's measure as the 
prototype of socialist construction, and he had indeed never envisaged going back to 
capitalism for economic purposes. This is reflected in what he called "the immediate 
task", and the future of Russia he foresaw just a year after the Bolshevik Revolution, 
"The growing scale of nationalisation of mills and factories, the increasing control 
over the branches of trade, the nationalisation of the banks, the daily developing, 
richly diverse activities of the supreme council of national economy ... all go to show 
how the Soviet power is penetrating into the pores of social life. The power of the 
centre has become the real people's power that has sprung from the depth of the 
labour masses." (Stalin, 1953, 4: 76) For Stalin, there was no confusion over what 
should be the priority. He admitted in 1920 that "Soviet Russia is performing an 
experiment without parallel hitherto in the world in organising the incorporation of a 
number of states and races within a single proletarian state on a basis of mutual 
confidence, of voluntary and fraternal agreement. .. But this experiment can be certain 
of complete success only if our practical policy on the national question in the 
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localities does not run counter to the already proclaimed Soviet autonomy." (Stalin. 
1953,5:375) 
Carr sees that Stalin was single-mindedly so determined to make the Soviet 
Union powerful, self-sufficient and independent of the West. The development of the 
political economy of Russia meant the idea stood at the opposite of the NEP. It 
transformed the priority from the appeasement of the peasant to industrialisation. ;'In 
one country" did not mean peasant socialism, as in old Russia, but the industrial 
socialism of Marx. It was a constructive and positive policy offered by Stalin, 
whereas his opponents had nothing to offer (Carr, 1959, 2: 49-51). While on the 
other hand, Tucker saw Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" reflected in the 
combativeness of war communism (Tucker, 1974,402--404,408--411; 1990,80-
86). 
Stalin's conception of industrialisation did actually strike at the hearts of the 
public, particularly amongst urban people, not least, the party members who were 
mainly urban workers. Nove links the issue to Russian nationalism, as he sees that the 
Bolsheviks shared some of the motives of industrialisation with the Tsarist 
bureaucrats, who believed that in order to achieve national strength and maintain 
independence, "Russia needed modem industries, especially heavy industries." The 
other reason that Stalin managed to mobilise support for rapid industrialisation was 
the so called national defence argument, or the defence of revolution. This conception 
was rooted in the belief that the "Russian Revolution was in constant danger from a 
hostile capitalist environment, militarily and technically far stronger than the USSR." 
Then it was this belief that the building of socialism and communism involved 
industrialisation, and a proletariat dictatorship would be insecure so long as it ruled in 
an overwhelmingly petty bourgeois, peasant environment. The rise of the number of 
Kulaks in the village was regarded as a potentially dangerous resurgence of 
capitalism. "For Russians, it was clear that by 1927, it was useless to wait for world 
revolution to solve these problems." (Nove, 1964,21) 
The hatred against rich peasants was exacerbated by the refusal of the 
peasantry to sell the grain to the state at the procurement price. Hence the rift 
deepened and the crisis worsened. In fact when the decision for collectivisation was 
taken at the Fifteenth Congress. it did not at the same time mean the launch of a mass 
purge. However, the plan of rapid industrialisation was hindered by the shortage of 
grain and raw material supplied to the city. as a result of the hostility of Kulaks and 
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the inefficiency of individual farming, and unless such resistance was broken, the Red 
Anny and the workers would suffer from grain shortages. By 1927, it became urgent 
to find the material and the financial means to expand the industrial base. The 25 
million peasant families who had benefited from the land redistribution after the 
revolution, refused to provide more marketable surpluses. All these were forcing 
Stalin to collectivise; as he said, "There was no solution, after 10 years of the 
proletariat dictatorship; agriculture, particularly grain production, was still lagging 
behind badly. Furthermore, fanning could not yield high levels of productivity due to 
the existence of small scale private farming and lack of technology." (Ellison in 
Blackwell ed., 1974,242-243) 
While Bukharin still believed that it was possible to advance slowly into 
socialism "at the pace of tortoise" and "on peasant nags", "(Nove, 1966, 401) the 
Bolsheviks were in a hurry. The Party saw themselves threatened by the 'imperialist 
interventionists' and the theme of economic industrialisation by then was not merely 
concerning speed, but also placing the priority on heavy and not light industries, since 
the heavy industries were always the foundation for arms industries. Stalin at this 
point swung towards the left, and his policy of all-out industrialisation and 
collectivisation was a means of making possible the acquisition of farm surpluses 
without having to pay the price which any free peasant would have demanded (Nove, 
1964, 23). In fact historical experience did not provide Stalin with any positive 
example of the function of the market. Stalin's distrust of the market could be 
strengthened by what Trotsky called the 'scissor crisis' in 1923. In 1921-1922: when 
agriculture was doing badly, prices for farm products were high. Since peasants had 
little money to spend on industrial goods, prices of the latter remained low. The state 
lowered output of industries to raise the prices, but the middle men or the merchants 
who were known as the 'Nepmen', held back industrial goods and pushed the prices 
even higher. Then the prices of farm products began to fall in 1922 following a good 
harvest, which made the life of the peasant even tougher. As a result, the peasant held 
back the fann products and the shortages of farm products spread the fear of famine 
(Suni, 1998, 150). The incident could be common in a market economy, but for 
Stalin, it was intervention from the hostile capitalist that must be rectified. 
Stalin explained why the collectivisation of agriculture was necessary, and 
why Russia could not wait until the agricultural economy was fully developed, \vhen 
he openly denounced Bukharin's theory of Equilibrium. "Our large scale industry, 
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centralised, socialised industry .. .is growing in volume from year to year. .. But our 
large scale industry does not constitute the whole of the national economy. On the 
contrary, small peasant economy still predominates in it ... Can we advance our 
socialised industry at an accelerated rate while we have such an agricultural basis as 
small peasant economy ... No we cannot ... What, then, is the way out? The way out 
lies in making agriculture large scale, in making it capable of accumulation, of 
expanded production ... " Stalin then stressed that there were two ways of doing it. 
One was the capitalist way, which was to make agriculture large scale by implanting 
capitalism in agriculture that would lead to the impoverishment of the peasantry. The 
other is the socialist way, which was "to introduce collective state farms into 
agriculture ... uniting small peasant farms into large collective farms, employing 
machinery and scientific methods of farming ... " He then labelled Bukharin's Theory 
of Equilibrium as the "third way", which was "non-existent", "utopian", "ridiculous" 
and "Anti-Marxist". (Stalin, 1955, 151-152) 
But was the failure of the NEP to collect grain from Kulaks the main reason 
behind Stalin's expansion policy? Stalin's policy to collectivise the peasantry for 
rapid industrialisation was actually rooted in his sense of insecurity in the face of 
hostile capitalist neighbours, his distrust of the peasant as petty bourgeoisie, and the 
fear of not being able to exchange Russian's raw material for machinery from the 
capitalist world. This had been reflected in his speech titled 'The party before and 
after the seizure of power' in 1920, in which Stalin could not hide his worry about the 
ability of Russia to obtain assistance from the developed West (Stalin, 1936, 48-49). 
Fourteen years later, at the Seventeenth Congress, 26th January 1934, Stalin reminded 
the nation that it was no miracle to have developed the economy at such pace in an 
economically backward country, because "this development took place on the basis of 
expanding socialist construction ... on the basis of the socially organised work of 
millions of people .. .it follows, then, that capitalist economy in the USSR has been 
eliminated and the individual sector in the countryside has been relegated to a 
secondary position." (Stalin, 1973,245) 
In his interpretation of 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism', Stalin stressed 
that if the time had come, they should begin to develop the socialist system and ignore 
the development of capitalism. "One must look forward, not backward." Stalin stated 
as why collectivisation by force was preferred to the voluntary evolution advocated 
by Bukharin, " ... the transition from capitalism to socialism ... cannot be effected by 
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slow changes, by reform, but only by a qualitative change of the capitalist system, by 
revolution ... Hence, in order not to err in policy, one must pursue an uncompromising 
proletarian class policy, not a reformist policy of harmony of the interests of the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, not a compromise policy of 'growing of capitalism 
into socialism. ,,, Therefore Stalin had doubt over the effectiveness of the expansion of 
the productive forces, calling it "vulgar materialism." (Stalin, 1973, 307-308, 315) 
3.5.4 Stalin and Lenin 
Himmer believed that, in terms of economIC construction and building 
socialism, Stalin "did not think much on his own, but rather took his cue from Lenin. 
Wherever the master led, the supposition goes, the disciple faithfully followed." 
(Himmer, 1994,515) 
Indeed, many believe that Stalin's policy was the continuation of Leninism, 
though they did not actually see eye to eye in the months before Lenin's death. This 
notion is particularly popular among the 'mainstream Cold War school.' To quote a 
few, "All basic elements of his policies were taken over by Stalin from Lenin." 
(Gurian, 1951, 7) "Lenin provided the basic assumption which-applied by Stalin and 
developed to its logical conclusion--culminated in the great purges." (Reshetar, 1964, 
218-219) "Stalin's victory ... was not a personal one, but the triumph of a symbol, of 
the individual who embodied both the precepts of Leninism and the techniques of 
their enforcement." (Daniels, 1960, 403) "Perhaps the most enduring achievement of 
Leninism was the dogmatisation of the Party, thereby in effect both preparing and 
causing the next stage, that of Stalinism." (Brzezinski in Treadgold ed, 1964, 6) 
"Stalin preserved the Bolshevik tradition" and approached the "completion of the 
work that Lenin had started." (McNeal, 1975, 136-137) "The second revolution was, 
as Stalin claimed, the legitimate extension of the first. " (Azrael in Huntington, 1970, 
266-267) "Stalinism can and must be defined as a pattern of thought and action that 
, flows directly from Leninism." (Meyer, 1986,282-283) 
However, even the 'counter-school' (in Stephen Cohen's words) like Carr and 
Deutscher share the view. Carr believed that without Stalin's revolution from above, 
"The sands would have run out for Lenin's revolution." In this sense Stalin continued 
and fulfilled Leninism." (Carr, 1950a, 214) Deutscher believed that Stalin managed to 
mobilise support because the national foundations of socialism were preserved, as 
Stalin had carried out the revolutionary goal of modernising Russia, while Trotskyism 
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could not provide a solid alternative to the Bolshevik, so "Stalinism continued in 
Leninist tradition." (Deutscher, 1966, 463) Astonished by the "implicit consensus" of 
the two camps of scholars, Cohen does not see a line connecting Lenin and Stalin in a 
straightforward manner. Instead he believed that Stalin maintained his popularity 
because "revolution from above means greater expansion of the state and its 
functions, which means an equally great expansion of jobs and privileges," as there 
were "multitudes of petty officials and workers who gained upward mobility and 
enhanced or even elite status." But Cohen also sees Stalin's leadership as a departure 
from Bolshevism and inclined towards Tsarist nationalism that had a "long history of 
state building, struggle against backwardness, and aspiration to world power." 
(Cohen, 1985,68--69) 
One of the most celebrated of Stalin's biographers, Colonel General 
Volkogonov, the ex-official historian of the Soviet Army, pointed out that Stalin did 
not understand economics. He said that "had Stalin been economically more 
perceptive, he would have been able to see in Lenin's last articles the outline of a 
conception of socialism that embodied a link between industrialisation and voluntary 
cooperative farming, a powerful rise in the culture of broad masses, an improvement 
in socialist relations, and the unconditional development of democratic principles in 
society." But Stalin had never, as Volkogonov believed, understood Lenin's prophecy 
that the NEP could be the solution for many problems (Volkogonov, 2000, 105). For 
Volkogonov, Stalin's economic view was "more than simple", as he envisaged a 
model of socialist state construction in which "the country had to be strong, and not 
merely strong, but mighty ... it needed to be totally industrialised ... the peasant must be 
brought closer to socialism. The method should be the broadest reliance on the 
dictatorship of proletariat, which Stalin understood purely in coercive terms." 
(Volkogonov, 2000, 105) On the other hand, Stalin's thought of transition could be 
the product of the political economic development for the period of 1926-1928. 
"Collectivisation could not be voluntary," says Nove, "while it would be going too far 
to describe Stalin as a true Leninist, if only because Lenin was not personally brutal. 
Stalin doubtlessly carried through some of the logical consequences of Lenin's policy 
and ideas ... Stalin was a necessary consequence of the effort of a minority group to 
keep power and to carry out a vast social economic revolution in a very short time. 
And some elements of Stalinism were, in those circumstances, scarcely ayoidable.'· 
(Nove, 1964,32) 
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The intriguing part of the development of Marxist theory of transition is that 
sometimes some theories do not look as Marxist as others, yet everything is debatable. 
"'N othing is more central to Marxism than the proposition that socialism presupposes 
capitalism, that socialism becomes a real possibility only on the basis of the material 
and social accomplishments of modern capitalist production." (Meisner, 1999~ 104) 
However, Marx was just a theorist, not a revolutionary, thus his theory did not 
embrace any practical revolutionary experience. Lenin proved that a poor and 
backward state like Russia could be the ground for revolution, but he had never 
explicitly claimed that Russia should go it alone in socialisation without having to 
wait for the revolution in the West. Instead, while in the early days he emphasised that 
socialism in a country would only be successful if the world had become socialist, he 
seemed to avoid the topic after the launch of the NEP, and began to place his 
emphasis on economic construction and wealth accumulation. Bukharin inherited the 
ideology of the NEP from Lenin and put forward his assertion that a backward 
country could become socialist via gradual wealth accumulation in the countryside, as 
long as the major industries and political power were controlled by the proletariat. 
Stalin, on the other hand, was more straightforward and consistent in what he wanted 
to achieve. He distrusted the peasantry, whom he regarded as capitalist, and believed 
that in order to build the Soviet as a super power without depending on the hostile 
Western states, the Soviet must collectivise agriculture as soon as they could, and . 
finance the industrial and military building with money generated from large-scale 
farming. 
3.6 Mao's Socialist Upsurge in Rural China 
3.6.1 After the Liberation-the New Democracy 
During the aftermath of the liberation, the leaders of the CCP were actually 
confronting "a cruel historical paradox," as Meisner describes, the CCP "are not 
unaware of the Marxian-defined material preconditions for socialism, and they were 
painfully aware that a pre-industrial and impoverished China lacked those pre-
conditions." (Meisner, 1999, 104) This posed a key problem for the CCP leaders in 
drafting an economic development plan. To copy the Russian economic model 
seemed to be the best option for Communist China by then. But China in 19.+9 could 
not be reflecting Russia in 1917, as there were radical differences bet\veen the two in 
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terms of historical situation and the level of economic development (Schram, 1969, 
75). Mao once admitted, "In the early stage of liberation we had no experience of 
managing the economy of the entire nation. So in the period of the first Five Year 
Plan we could do no more than copy the Soviet Union method, although we never felt 
altogether satisfied about it." (Mao, 1977b, 122) 
In as early as 1940, Mao had been looking for an alternative way to end 
Russian influence, which he thought was 'European.' Like Stalin, Mao was well 
aware of the peculiarity of China on the issue of period of transition. Knowing that it 
was impossible to go back to capitalism after the revolution, the CCP tactfully created 
a buffer zone in between capitalism and socialism called the New Democracy, a 
policy for the transitional period, both politically and economically, and which Mao 
introduced as a leader of the CCP, "For many years we communists have struggled 
for cultural, political and economic revolution ... the new society and the new state 
will not only have new politics and new economy but also new culture." He wrote in 
January 1940, "In the course of its history Chinese revolution must go through 2 
stages, first the democratic revolution, second, the socialist revolution ... Here the 
democracy does not belong to the old category, it is not the old democracy, but 
belongs to the new category-it is New Democracy." It shows that Mao was well 
aware of the backwardness of the nation and was keen to position the CCP revolution 
as the 'first phase', which was democratic revolution; while trying to distinguish the 
revolutionaries from the bourgeoisie, who were theoretically supposed to carry out the 
democratic revolution. For political theory, Mao introduced Democratic Centralism 
as the state system, which was referred to as a "joint dictatorship of all revolutionary 
classes," which meant no sharing of power with the bourgeoisie. This resembled the 
dictatorship of the proletariat introduced by the Russians.29 While for the economy, 
the New Democracy proposed a model of mixed economy that resembled the major 
elements of the NEP, "Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines ... shall be 
operated and administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the 
livelihood of the people ... but the republic will neither confiscate capitalist private 
property in general nor forbid the development of such capitalist production as it does 
19 Democratic Centralism had become Liu's favourite conception in his advocacy for a system 
incorporating both multiplicity and centralised authority, while Mao changed his stance and kept 
referrina to the more orthodox Dictatorship a/the Proletariat in his later years as the CCP leader. See 
b 
discussion in Chapter 4. 
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not at present dominate the livelihood of the people, for China's economy is still very 
backward." (Mao, 1965, 2: 340-342, 352-353) 
As we will discuss in Chapter 5, the economic policy for the period of 
transition in China once placed its emphasis on the accumulation of wealth before the 
nation could be ready for full scale socialist economy. It was the conventional 
perspective of Marxism-to build the economy as the foundation for transition before 
collectivisation of private ownership; and it mirrored the idea of Bukharin-as long as 
the proletariat was in charge, private ownership should be allowed to exist. However, 
as Mao took a dramatic tum in the later stages, Liu became the only strong advocate 
for the policy. The New Democracy was a product of mutual consent and the policy 
represented the decision of the Party Centre. However, it also became Mao's policy of 
transition because first of all, Mao was the leader of the Party, and secondly, he was 
the one who introduced the policy to the nation. In fact, in 1949, Mao was still taking 
a stance in support of the model of mixed economy. His report to the second plenum 
of the Seventh Committee on 5th March 1949 sounded like an endorsement to market 
economy: "China's capitalist industry, which occupies second place in her modem 
industry, is a force which must not be ignored ... because China's economy is still 
backward, there will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the 
revolution, to make use of the positive quality of the urban and private capitalism as 
far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In this period, all 
capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial 
to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand." (Mao, 1961,367-
368) 
However, Mao's speech on 6th June 1950 to the 3rd plenum of the Seventh 
Committee showed that there were differences between him and Liu. Urging the party 
members not to 'hit out in all directions,' Mao unveiled that he had never intended to 
go for the policy of mixed economy wholeheartedly, as his tolerance of the private 
businesses in China during the period of transition was based on pragmatism and 
political expediency instead of economics. Mao stressed that the major task by then 
was to eliminate the "remnants of Kuomintang forces, the secret agents and the 
bandits." ""In order to isolate and attack our immediate enemy," Mao stressed that "we 
must overcome them by every possible means ... In short, we must hit out in all 
directions ... we must definitely not make too many enemies. We must make 
concessions and relax the tension a little in some quarters and concentrate our attack 
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in one direction ... so that all the workers, peasants and small handicrafts men will 
support us and the overwhelming majority of the national bourgeoisie and 
intellectuals will not oppose us."(Mao, 1978,34-36) 
3.6.2 The High Tide of Socialism in Rural China 
Mao's emphasis on the rural economy differed from the Soviet model. 
However, before he pushed for full collectivisation, he emphasised the urgency of 
industrialisation during the aftermath of the liberation: "from 1927 to the present, the 
centre of our work has been in the villages, as we have been gathering strength in the 
village ... the period for this method of work has now ended. The period of 'from the 
village to the city' has now begun and the centre of the Party's work has shifted from 
the village to the city." (Mao, 1961, 363) He believed that China could "develop 
steadily, under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party, from an 
agricultural into industrial country ... " In the early 1950s, before Mao had run out of 
patience, he realised that rapid industrialisation might not be the key to the current 
situation, and turned to advocating gradualism and moderation in the countryside, 
where the rich peasants were to be left alone in order to foster the restoration of 
agricultural production. In June 1950, he called for maintaining the rich peasant 
economy in order to facilitate the early rehabilitation of rural production, and a well 
planned and orderly executed economic plan, "In line with the principle of making 
overall plans and taking all factors into consideration, drifting and anarchy in our 
economic work should be eliminated, existing industries and commerce should be 
properly readjusted ... The view held by certain people that it is possible to eliminate 
capitalism and realise socialism at an early date is wrong, it does not tally with our 
national condition." (Mao, 1978, 30) This comment contrasted sharply with what Mao 
intended to do later. Even in August 1953, he still defined the 'general line of 
transition' as "basically to accomplish the country's industrialisation and the socialist 
transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce over a 
fairly long period of time." (Mao, 1978, 102) In March 1955, Mao still recognised 
that the road to socialism "would be a long one." (Mao, 1978, 155) 
Economic policy became radical in July 1955, when Mao's patience ran out 
and he gave a vigorous push for collectivisation. His change of attitude "completely 
transformed the atmosphere in China." (Schram, 1989, 113) Mao's speech that 
underlined the turning point of China's economic policy, 'On the question of 
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agricultural cooperativisation' that he delivered to the central committee on 31 st July 
1955, described his comrades who preferred gradual transfonnation as "walking like a 
woman with small feet." Having accused the other leaders for "worrying too much 
and unnecessarily," Mao stressed that the question of whether to collectivise the 
peasantry should not be an issue anymore as the collectivisation had been part of the 
process. "The masses are now in front of the leaders," Mao said, enthusiastically. "in 
fact, the leader should take the lead." (Mao, 1966, 295-296) This was followed by 
his comment on 'The High Tide of Socialism in the Countryside', the book that was 
printed as propaganda for rapid collectivisation. Mao stressed that China was indeed 
more ready than Russia to go for full scale collectivisation. "Comparing ourselves 
with the Soviet Union: We had 20 years experience of fighting in the base areas, and 
had our training in three revolutionary wars, our experiences were exceedingly 
rich ... Therefore, we are able to set up a state very quickly, and complete the task of 
revolution." (Mao, 1974, 27) 
But in 1956 he turned moderate agam during the Eighth Congress as he 
succumbed to the pressure of his colleagues who opposed the radical collectivisation, 
which they called the Rash Advance. His speech at the enlarged meeting of the 
Political Bureau of the Central Committee on 25th April 1956, 'On the Ten Major 
Relationships', put forward a conciliatory set of policies that consisted of the major 
elements of the New Democracy. Mao talked about the relationships interrelating 
heavy and light industries, agriculture, state, interior regions and the coastal regions of 
China, economic and defence construction, units of production and procedures, 
central and local authorities, revolution and counter revolution and others (Mao, 1978, 
285-307). In the speech Mao also criticised the Soviet Union for adopting a measure 
that "squeezed the peasant very hard." Mao, who saw the economic construction more 
from the rural perspective than the industrial perspective, believed that Russia "takes 
away too much from the peasant at too low a price through its system called 
obligatory sales ... " However, such a comment simply mirrored the view of Bukharin 
and Liu who advocated accumulation within the countryside, as Mao said, "Our 
policies towards the peasant differ from those of the Soviet Union and take into 
account the interests of both the state and the peasant. Our agricultural tax has always 
been low ... the peasant suffers no loss." Mao also accused the Soviet of 
"concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities. shackling the local 
authorities and denying them the right of independent action." (Mao, 1978, 291) 
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Although 'On the Ten Major Relationships~ had become one ofMao's classic 
speeches that go down into the history as part of 'Mao's theory of transition'. it 
represented Mao's temporary concession to his opponents who were Anti-Rash 
Ad ,30 . M' . '0 h vance campaIgners. ao s statements III n t e Ten Major Relationships' that 
adopted a moderate and conciliatory attitude by no means implied that he was 
prepared to compromise to the will of the majority of his leading comrades. (Schram, 
1989,115) The Anti-Rightist Campaign in 1957, which Mao used to counter the Anti-
Rash Advance campaign led by Zhou Enlai, gave Mao the perfect platform to launch 
his radical policy, the Great Leap, and overturned the resolution passed during the 
Eighth Congress (Schram, 1989, 10). The leaders' explicit support for the 'Ten Major 
Relationships' had indeed upset Mao, who saw it as the reaction against his 
collectivisation policy. Mao was heard grumbling to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Chen 
Yun that, "everybody supports the Eighth Congress, they do not support me." (Huang 
in Lli ed., 1991, 436) Interestingly, Mao seemed to have forgotten that it was 'his 
policy~ and 'his speech' that had become the backbone of the Eighth Congress 
resolution. It also shows that Mao drafted the 'On the Ten Major Relationships' 
against his will. 
After the leadership supporting the Anti-Rash Advance had been defeated and 
the resolution of the Eighth Congress overturned, Mao was unstoppable. The 
collectivisation process that started at the end of 1953 and halted in 1956 had been 
resumed in 1957. Mao inaugurated an overall and large scale collectivisation at the 
Chengdu Conference, March 1958, where he stated why it was time to collectivise 
rural China, "the Russians have only achieved so little after 40 years; we could 
achieve more than that within 18 years if we really want to do so, and actually it is 
possible, because we have more people ... the pace of development is an objective 
issue, and regardless of whether it is an objective or subjective issue, as long as it can 
be done, we should push ourselves to the limit to achieve the target, and bearing in 
mind that our achievement should bear the characteristics of being 'more' (duo), 
'faster' (kuai), 'better' (hao) and 'more economical' (sheng) .. . now the enthusiasm of 
the masses is like a lOth degree typhoon, and we should not try to block it..." (Mao~ 
30 The Ant-Rash Advances campaign was led by Zhou Enlai, the then Premier of China and received 
strono support from Liu Shaoqi and Chen Yun, the then Finance Minister. The Anti-Rash Advance 
camp~ign was defeated by Mao in 1957 and the resolutions passed in the Eighth Congress were 
overturned. See Chapter 6 for more discussion on the Eighth Congress and Rash Advances. 
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1974, 166-167) The campaign culminated in June 1958 with the launch of the Great 
Leap. But what was the rationale underlining Mao's collectivisation? 
Mao believed that as a foundation for socialist transformation. large scale 
industrialisation is not enough, as China must not merely engage in material 
preconditions without considering the question of superstructure (Mao, 1974,334). If 
Liu was the advocate for primacy of productive forces, he was more materialistic and 
believed in the material expansion of the forces to break the old production relations, 
then Mao was a believer in the function of the superstructure, making use of social 
factors to mobilise the masses to accomplish his goal. "Mao tended to exalt the 
revolutionary will of human beings until it became not merely an important factor in 
history, but an all powerful force capable of re-shaping the material environment in a 
completely arbitrary fashion." (Schram, 1969, 79) This to certain extent reflects 
Mao's lesson learned during the years of guerrilla warfare-the distinctive features of 
the Yan' an model: self-reliance, decentralisation, antagonism to bureaucracy and 
elitism, collective aims and discipline, non-material incentive, and the participation of 
the masses in all aspects of social and economic activities. Mao's strong advocacy for 
rapid collectivisation in the years after liberation originated from his experience of 
step-by-step transformation of every aspect of rural life. Thus, contrary to Liu's and 
Bukharin's idea, he criticised the idea of "mechanisation first, collectivisation later", 
as he believed that collectivisation could and should precede the mechanisation of 
agriculture (Peck in Mao, 1977b, 14-15). In his speech at the Chengdu Conference 
(March 1958), Mao showed his preference for rural experimentation to 
mechanisation, as he encouraged the peasantry to develop and modify their farming 
tools on their own, "the modification of farming tools should be expanded to every 
comer of the peasantry. This is the beginning of the technological revolution ... China 
is such a massive country that we could not have complete mechanisation of the 
peasantry. (If we continued in this way) some handicraft production would still be 
manually operated even after a thousand years ... " (Mao, 1974, 165) On the other 
hand, Mao encouraged trial and error, "People must put their thought into practice to 
gain results, meet with failures as problems arise, only through such a process can 
knowledge gradually advance ... Let them get involved in all activities and learn from 
their work, and they will become more capable." (Mao, 1966,296) 
Mao also observed from the Russian model the possibility of building a strong 
socialist industry from a backward nation. On why China could pursue socialism 
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before industrialisation, Mao said that "The 600 million people of China are poverty 
stricken. That seems like a bad thing, but it is really a good thing. Poor people want 
change, want to work, want revolution." (Mao, 1966, 381) In his criticism of the 
Soviet economic policies, Mao boldly claimed that, "Lenin said, 'The transition from 
capitalism to socialism will be more difficult for a country the more backward it is.' 
This would seem incorrect today. Actually, the more backward the economy is, the 
less difficult the transition will be. The poorer they are, the more they want 
revolution." (Mao, 1977b, 50) 
Having believed that the coordination and hard work of "a few hundred 
million peasants" would make collective farming successful (Mao, 1974, 165), Mao 
also put forward an assertion on why superstructure should be prioritised over the 
mechanisation, " ... as the degree of mechanisation (in the West) is high, the major 
problem after a successful revolution would not be advancing to mechanisation but 
transforming the people. Countries of the East, such as China and Russia, however, 
had been backward and poor. .. their ability to develop productive forces has fallen far 
behind the West .... The Soviet textbook only addresses the prerequisite of materialism 
and seldom engages in the question of superstructure, ie, the class nature of the state, 
philosophy and science. All history of revolution shows that the full development of 
new productive forces is not a prerequisite for the transformation of backward 
production relations. Our revolution started with Marxist-Leninist propaganda, which 
served to create new public opinions in society. Only after the backward 
superstructure is overthrown in the course of revolution does the possibility to destroy 
the old production relations emerge. After the old production relations have been 
destroyed, and new ones established, the way is clear for the development of new 
social productive forces ... It is difficult to deal with problems of economic base and 
production relations if the question of the superstructure is neglected" (Mao, 1974, 
334; 1977b, 51) 
In other words, Mao argued that while change may be triggered off by an 
incremental development of the productive forces, fundamental changes of the society 
can only be made if the beliefs and attitudes of the masses have been changed. "It is a 
general rule that you cannot solve the problem of ownership and go ahead to expand 
the productive forces, until you have mobilised the masses and seized political 
power." (Mao, 1974, 347: 1977b, 66) Schram also sees that it is in harmony with 
Mao's "consistent stress on the importance of conscious activity. subjective forces 
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and the superstructure." (Schram, 1989,5) Ironically, Mao always stressed his doubts 
over the effectiveness of the Soviet model. The major similarity between Mao's 
model and Stalin's model was that both preferred rapid collectivisation without 
having to wait for the national economic foundation to be constructed, and both 
squeezed the peasantry to finance the industrialisation. But Mao believed that the 
expansion of the peasantry could be by primitive means of production, and by 
incorporating the collective farming with the increase of manpower, would have 
achieved the desired goal. Therefore Liu's advocacy for industrialisation as a 
precondition for mechanisation had been questioned, "COllectivisation is not all 
together determined by mechanisation, so industrialisation is not the prerequisite for 
it." (Mao, 1977b, 48) Furthermore, Mao had no doubt that the Sovief s model could 
not be applied in China without any alteration, "Some comrades have found in the 
history of the Soviet Union grounds for criticising what they call impetuosity and 
rashness in our present work of agricultural cooperation ... but on no account should 
we allow these comrades to use the Soviet experience as a cover for their ideas of 
moving at a snail's pace." (Mao, 1966,309) 
3.6.3 Mao's View on Contradiction 
Mao's view on contradiction and class struggle had a deep impact on his 
decision to collectivise farming, and played a significant role in his theory of 
transition. Basically, Mao did not trust the bourgeois class, and any incorporation of 
the petty bourgeoisie into his development system was for him, just a measure of 
political expediency. In this aspect, he was the same as Stalin. The difference is that 
Stalin did not trust the masses, while Mao did. Interestingly, though Liu did not trust 
the masses, he did not view the bourgeoisie as a class enemy as much as Mao did but 
was positive about the existence of private capital; but he emphasised central 
authority and advocated a centre-organised economic development model, which was 
similar to Stalin's. In one of Mao's most celebrated works, 'On Contradiction', 
written in August 1937, Mao stated that "as long as class exists, contradiction 
between correct and incorrect ideas in the Communist Party are reflections within the 
Party of class contradiction. At first, with regard to certain issues, such contradiction 
may not manifest themselves as antagonistic ... the contradictions would have become 
antagonistic if the comrade who has committed mistakes did not correct them." So 
Mao's earlier version of contradiction was quite moderate, as he said, ""Economically, 
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the contradiction between town and country is an extremely antagonistic one in both 
the capitalist and socialist society ... But in a socialist country and in our revolutionary 
base areas, this antagonistic contradiction has changed into one that IS non-
antagonistic; and when communist society is reached the contradiction will be 
abolished." (Mao, 1965, 1: 344-345) 
This assertion actually echoes Liu's theory of 'extinction of class 
contradiction,' which believes that contradictions between classes (hostile 
contradictions with the enemy) would have been extinct as long as the proletariat is in 
power, and the only contradiction left was the contradiction among the people (Liu~ s 
view on contradiction will be discussed in Chapter 4). However, in June 1952, Mao 
gave a revised version of his view on contradiction, where he stressed that "with the 
overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat-capitalist class, the contradiction 
between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principle 
contradiction in China, therefore the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined 
as an intermediate class. " (Mao, 1978, 77) In June 1953, Mao warned that "the 
transition period to socialism was filled with contradiction and struggle. Our present 
revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the previous armed revolutionary 
struggle. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of 
exploitation once and for all." (Mao, 1978, 94) 
Mao put forward his latest version of contradiction in his writing 'On the 
Correct Handling of Contradictions among People' (2ih February 1957), which had 
laid down his view of class struggle before the launch of the Great Leap. "Now we 
have two types of contradiction, the contradiction with the enemy and the 
contradiction among people. These are contradictions that differ completely from 
each other. .. But first of all, we must be clear of what enemy and people mean, as 
different historical backgrounds and different countries might have different 
definitions ... At the present time, upon the construction of socialism, anybody, 
organisation or class who supports the construction of socialism should be categorised 
as people, and anybody who opposes and sabotages such construction is an enemy." 
Mao pointed out that "the contradiction with the enemy is antagonistic, and the 
contradiction among the people is non-antagonistic." However, Mao reminded that 
the contradiction among people could become antagonistic if it is not handled 
correctly. .His elaboration of the Hungarian uprising in October 1956 unveiled his 
main concern about the 'enemy'-the dissidents within the country. "Some people are 
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really happy after the Hungarian incident," Mao said, ~·they hope something similar 
will happen in China as well ... this is against the interest of the people, they will never 
have any support." (Mao, 1966, 327-33 1 ) 
Though in 1957, Mao agreed that the turbulent class struggle that 
characterised the revolutionary periods had come to an end, he insisted that "'the class 
struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the 
different political forces, and the class struggle in the ideological field between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie will continue to be long and tortuous and at times will 
become very acute ... the basic contradictions in socialist society are still those 
between production relations and the productive forces, and between the 
superstructure and the economic base ... however, the existence of bourgeois ideology, 
bureaucracy in our state institutions, and flaws in certain links of our governmental 
system, are all in opposition to the economic base of socialism." (Mao, 1966, 327-
328, 336) 
For Mao, contradiction between classes always existed, and that belief was 
rooted in his distrust of bourgeoisie. However, during the Eighth Congress in 1956, 
where he was forced to retract his policy of rapid collectivisation, Mao gave a 
statement stating a more compromising view regarding class struggle, saying that 
"'The difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of 
division of labour within the same class ... what is the point, then, of classifying these 
social strata into two different categories?" (ZGZYBGT, 1956,2: 213-214) But then 
in December of the same year, he overturned his earlier statement again, as the 
editorial board of Renmin ribao published an article titled • More on the Historical 
Experience of the Dictatorship of Proletariat' (Zailun wuchanjieji zhuanzheng de lishi 
jingyan), apparently under the instruction of the central authority, seemingly intended 
to clarify the matter of • contradiction' , "'Under certain circumstances, the 
contradiction among people would become a contradiction with the enemy ... As a 
conclusion, as long as somebody takes a stand on the side of the people, they should 
not treat the two types of contradiction equally. Those who deny the class struggle 
and do not distinguish between the enemy and ourselves are definitely not Communist 
or Marxist Leninist." (Renmin ribao, 29th December 1956) Mao's notion of 
contradiction, which he elaborated in 1957 via • On the correct handling of 
contradiction', actually reflected his classification of comrades and class enemies as 
'friends and foes', i.e. those who agree with him and those who oppose (See Dittmer, 
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1998, 165). His high profile purge in 1957 of the intellectuals who voiced their 
discontent during the' blossoming and contending' (damingdafang) of the Hundred 
Flower Campaign31 reflected his intolerance of any supposed class enemy. But the 
profiles of Mao's 'class enemies' do not comprise only the bourgeoisie, as 
fundamentally, those who opposed his authority and policy were classified as enemies 
of the people as well. Therefore with Mao, contradiction with the enemy always 
existed. 
James Peck believes that Liu represented the main ideological critic of Mao's 
VIew on the masses. He pointed out that Liu's view carried significant Soviet 
influence and for Liu, "purity of devotion and ideological orthodoxy were the ultimate 
safeguards' for the ability of the party to act correctly on behalf of the masses." (Peck 
in Mao, 1977b, 20) Liu believed that class struggle against a class enemy was deemed 
unnecessary after he had joined the Communist Party because he would be educated 
and transformed within the party. But such conception had directly challenged Mao's 
idea of contradiction, and Mao's reaction was to defend his idea vigorously, even it 
was the time when the two leaders were on good terms, "Some seem to think that 
once in the Communist Party, people all become saints with no differences or 
misunderstanding ... monolithic and uniform." (Mao, 1978, 515) Similarly, Mao 
claimed that components of a socialist economy cannot be born or "brought into 
being" inside a capitalist economy based on private ownership. "This is our main 
difference with the revisionist," Mao said. The argument that capitalism may 
peacefully develop into socialism is a "serious distortion of Marxism". (Mao, 1974, 
319-320) 
In his criticism of Soviet political economic textbooks, Mao championed a 
measure of immediate and complete social transformation for the period of transition. 
"Marx had said that from capitalism to communism there is a period of 'revolutionary 
transformation'. We are now in such a period ... In this transitional period, all social 
relations must be fundamentally transformed." (Mao, 1974, 320) In order to succeed 
in this complete transformation during the transition period, Mao urged the party 
leaders to be ready to apply tough measures if the result did not tum their way, "The 
31 The Hundred Flower campaign (baihuaqifang), was Mao's initiative to promote intellectual 
criticism of the party in order to fence off the resistance to adventurism within the party. However, the 
campaign backfired, as the criticism against the CCP had been so immense that M.ao had :0 co~vert the 
campaign from an encouragement of intellectual debate to a method of conductmg rectIficatIon. The 
Anti-Rightist movement was launched in 1957 and hundreds were purged and killed. 
Sources: (Bo, 1993,2: 603--634; Teiwes in Macfarquhar et al (ed.), 1987.61.135) 
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Communist party and the revolutionary of every country must have both their hands 
ready (two measures and one as alternative): one for winning the revolution 
peacefully, one for taking power with violence ... the bourgeoisie will not give up their 
political power without a fight." (Mao, 1974, 324) However, like Stalin, Mao had 
never thought the backwardness of the country would hinder the process of socialist 
economic development, "Lenin said, 'The transition from capitalism to socialism will 
be more difficult for a country the more backward it is.' I think this is incorrect today. 
Actually, the transition is easier the more backward the country is, as the poorer they 
are, the more they want revolution." (Mao, 1974,333) 
3.6.4 Mao's Theory of Uninterrupted Revolution 
Nee and Peck observe the undercurrent beneath the solidarity the leadership 
showed in launching the Great Leap, as well as the branching of theories of transition, 
"While the CCP seemed relatively united on the first step of the transition towards 
socialism, beneath the surface were questions which became increasingly 
prominent. .. Was the aim of the revolution merely to build China's wealth and power, 
or was it to entail the creation of a new socialist man as well? Was a professional 
party, equipped to lead China's industrialisation through its mastery of planning and 
scientific technology, the proper motivating force for building a socialist society? Or 
was that force the creativity of the masses, liberated by new social, political, cultural 
and economic relationships?" (Nee in Nee at el, 1975, 45) In evaluating the 
application of the Soviet model in the 1950s, Mao began to see dangerous 
implications, the growing gap between town and countryside that threatened the 
revolutionary transformation of the nation, and the application of the Soviet model 
could exacerbate the situation. But Mao did not have a clearly worked out alternative, 
and differences within the Party occurred. Therefore, when Mao supported the 
agricultural collectivisation in July 1955 he was actually returning to "the experience 
of working among the peasants that had come to practical and theoretical fruition in 
Yan'an." (Nee in Nee at el, 1975,47-48) 
Meisner believes that the ideological impetus of the Great Leap, or the rapid 
collectivisation plan of China, was "deeply rooted in revolutionary Maoism." He sees 
Maoist revolutionary ideology consists of "a voluntaristic belief that the 
consciousness and moral qualities of human beings are the decisive factors in 
determining the course of history, and a populist belief in the true revolutionary 
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advantages of backwardness ... These beliefs, combined lessons derived from the 
experience of a decade of post-revolutionary history, received their most general 
theoretical expression in what was announced on the eve of the Great Leap as ·the 
theory of permanent revolution.'" (Meisner, 1999, 192) Meisner views Mao's concept 
of permanent revolution as "characterised by an endless series of social contradictions 
and struggles which can be resolved only by radical revolutionary breaks with 
existing reality." Calling Mao "super Trotskyist", Meisner sees Mao's conception of 
developing the nation's economy as mobilisation of people who were armed with 
"revolutionary spirit, will and leadership;" as Mao attributed the success of the 
revolution and collectivisation to the "boundless creative powers of the masses and 
their inexhaustible enthusiasm for socialism." (Meisner, 1999, 195-197) 
But it is indeed an overstatement to call Mao a Trotskyist, let alone "super 
Trotskyist". Trotsky believed that the revolution would not end even after the 
proletariat had successfully seized power. The working class who came to power in 
Russia would for a brief moment receive good support from the peasants, who accept 
the working class as the leadership. As Trotsky saw it, "the proletariat in power will 
stand before the peasantry as the class which has emancipated it." However, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would become inevitable as there was virtually no 
agreement between the workers and the peasantry. The so called worker-peasant 
alliance was merely a sort of political expediency. When the proletariat tightened their 
grip on state control the peasant would find their interests sacrificed, as consideration 
would be given first of all to industrialisation and national economic building rather 
than the development of the peasantry. The peasantry would then tum hostile against 
the workers' government that was on the verge of collapse; but Trotsky believed that 
the second wave of revolution would never succeed because "historical experience 
shows that peasantry are absolutely incapable of taking up an independent political 
role." As a result of its failure to reorganise the country, the proletariat was not able to 
advance beyond the stage of revolution they have already achieved due to the 
backwardness and poverty of countryside. The primitive foundation of the country 
undermined the proletariat's effort to coordinate agricultural and industrial 
production. Trotsky asserted that the proletariat would not be able to push the 
revolution into another stage without the victory of socialist revolution in other 
European countries. So the cycle would go on in a backward country like Russia and a 
real socialist state would never emerge, if Russia remained isolated and backward. 
(Trotsky, 1969, 71-73; Nee et aI, 1975, 112-113) 
It is debatable to conclude that Mao's notion of permanent revolution was 
actually the rationale behind his preference for rapid expansion of socialist industries 
and collectivisation. But Mao did talk about 'permanent revolution' in 1958 on the 
verge of launching the Great Leap. On 28th and 30th January 1958 at the Supreme 
Conference, Mao was in bullish mood after the defeat of the Anti-Rash Advance 
camp led by Zhou and Liu (in 1957). He said, "A friend accused us of being over-
ambitious, unrealistic . and impatient. But what does it mean? Who is being 
unrealistic? Are we talking about the reactionaries or the revolutionaries ... Our 
unrealistic targets were set by 600 million Chinese people, and we are impatient and 
unrealistic in the name of socialist deVelopment." (Mao, 1974, 155) But his 
elaboration of permanent revolution, or uninterrupted revolution, did not seem to 
resemble much of Trotsky's version of permanent revolution. Instead of continuous 
class struggle at every stage of revolution, Mao indeed talked about continuous 
unfolding of events in the process of economic expansion, "Now we are in a new war, 
just as we were trying to concur with mother nature ... after the zhengfeng 
(rectification in Yan'an), we are now focusing on the technological revolution. We 
have to learn properly, we have to do experimental farming; we have to join the 
factory as trainees, to learn natural science, social science, and literature. But social 
revolution must continue on a daily basis, rectification must go on ... So we are talking 
about permanent revolution: we have land reform after the liberation, and we have 
mutual aid groups and cooperatives after land reform, cooperativisation of handicrafts 
and joint ownership (state and private) of trade in 1956, rectification in 1957 (to purge 
the dissidents of the hundred flowers campaign), then we have technological 
revolution. One event after another, you must mould the metal while the temperature 
is high, we should not stop and we will unite anybody that can be united." (Mao, 
1974, 157) 
3.7 Afterwards 
3.7.1 Liu's Position 
Marx stated in the 'Communist Manifesto' that the pre-capitalist reyolution 
was the bourgeois democratic revolution, which was to overthrow the feudalist Lord. 
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when the new productive forces of capitalism had brought about conditions for 
change of the old production relations of feudal society (Marx in Marx & Engels, 
2002, 225-7). This perception of the precedence of democratic bourgeois revolution 
over the socialist revolution forms the basis of Lenin's two stage revolution: an All-
Russian-alliance (worker and peasant) revolution and the final class struggle against 
the class enemy during the proletariat revolution. The manipulation is understandable. 
as the Bolshevik revolution did not take place in a capitalist nation but a semi-
feudalist state. Both Russia and China had more or less propagandised the importance 
and the necessity of the period of transition after they came into power. Apparently, 
the purpose of embracing a transitional period in their revolutionary propaganda was 
to provide the excuse to develop the nation's economy after the revolution, in a 
"bourgeois way". However, economic development of the transitional period also 
bore the rationale of instituting doctrinal legitimacy as well, since it was seen as 
compliance with Marxist theory that no proletariat revolution could be successful 
without the full-scale development of productive forces under capitalism. This 
seemed to be reflected in Liu's advice to his comrades that the CCP have completed 
the first task by winning the revolution, now they had to complete the second task, 
which was economic construction; and if the second task failed the first completed 
task failed as well (Liu, 1981, 2: 2-5, 32, see discussion in Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, it must be noted that nothing in Liu's theory of transition will 
match Bukharin's and Lenin's thoughts precisely. Neither could we find any evidence 
linking Liu's true inspiration in forming his own theory of political economy with 
Bukharin. But this theory section serves the purpose of providing the ideological 
background of similar practices in the past, i.e. the idea behind the Soviet economic 
reconstruction that happened years before the formation of Communist China; and the 
insights of debate and political struggle arising from the implementation and 
theorisation of the NEP. In comparison with the NEP, China's version of transitional 
policy, the New Democracy, was launched in the 1940s by the CCP as a scheme of 
mixed economy to ~evive the economy after the civil war, and Liu was a staunch 
believer in it. As we will discuss in Chapter 5, Liu's conception of the co-existence of 
five types of economies bore some resemblance to Lenin's model. The NEP's 
emphasis of the control of commanding height, too, was reflected in Liu' s advocacy 
for the control of major industries. Liu seemed to echo Bukharin's notion that the 
Kulak (rich peasant) should be allowed to accumulate wealth in order to finance the 
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construction of the economy (Bukharin, 1982, 189-193) by stating that "The long 
term accumulation of wealth (by the capitalists) would fund the construction of heavy 
industries, the success of which would enable us to transform the urban capitalists into 
socialists; the development of the nationalised industries would result in the 
mechanisation of agriculture, which would then prompt the socialisation of the rich 
peasant economy in the rural area, and the development of agricultural 
collectivisation." (Liu, 1981, 1: 430) His preference to educate and transform the 
bourgeoisie rather than to purge them resembled the "grow in" notion of Bukharin, 
and even some elements of Lenin's voluntary revolution. Nevertheless, Liu's 
advocacy for party discipline was absent in Bukahrin's theory. For this reason many 
had related Liu to Lenin (calling him the Leninist of China), for advocating strict 
party discipline in his earlier years (see section 3.3.4); while some even think that this 
was the legacy of Confucian teaching in Chinese society. We will discuss this in 
Chapter 4. 
Their support for a smooth and time-consuming transition to socialism instead 
of an instant transition via class struggle was one of the reasons both Liu and 
Bukharin were criticised by their fellow countrymen, as Cohen put it, "the 
fundamental criticism of Bukharin's sociological theory and its implication was that 
equilibrium presupposes social harmony while orthodox Marxism proves the 
prevalence of social conflict." (Cohen, 1970b, 58-59) However, there are minor 
differences between them in terms of "smooth transition." Bukharin believed that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat would ensure the ultimate 'grow in' (transformation) of 
the bourgeoisie, (Bukharin, 1982, 192), while Liu implicitly resisted the perception 
that the time for proletariat dictatorship had matured. Instead, he carefully avoided 
direct collision with Mao by ambiguously labelling their regime dictatorship of 
people's democracy, and chose to advocate the education and the cultivation of the 
bourgeoisie, while being optimistic about their ultimate submission to communism 
without having to purge them. (Liu, 1981,2: 2-5, 32; 1: 327,337) 
That brings us to another topic that caused Liu significant trouble: his open 
statement on the extinction of class struggle, in which he stressed that after the 
success of the proletariat revolution, the contradiction left behind was just the 
contradiction between different ideologies and principles, not contradiction with the 
class enemies (Liu, 1981, 1: 210-211). Liu further clarified his yiew on the 
resolution to contradiction, "if the differences are on principle and fundamentaL then 
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no one should compromise unwillingly, as resolution embracing mutual consent must 
be worked out. However, if the differences are not fundamentaL then they should be 
allowed to exist, or else it will undermine the party unity." (Liu, 1981, 1: 206) On the 
other hand, Bukharin had never pointed to the extinction of class struggle. But his 
belief in the 'grow in' model of transition, which is evolutionary in nature, had no 
doubt eased the tension of class contradiction away. This had placed him in an odd 
position among orthodox Marxists, and his implicit opposition to the ruthless purge of 
class enemies on the grounds of his evolutional theory of history had depicted him as 
the ideological rival of Stalin. Coincidentally, Liu had the same problem with Mao for 
almost identical reasons. 
One of the most prominent similarities between Bukharin and Liu was their 
advocacy for the establishment of massive trade institutions or business 
conglomerates to manage the operation of the major industries, or the commanding 
height, on NEP's terms. As we shall see in Chapter 5, Liu's rationale behind his 
support for the nationwide establishment of cooperatives as a trading medium in 
channelling the resources in between towns and countryside, and the replacement of 
state-owned industries by 'the Trust', the industrial amalgamation; had the same root 
as the motives of Bukharin and Lenin in the establishment of cooperatives-let the 
proletariat control the major resources and political power, then everything will be on 
its way. But what underlined the characteristic of Liu's theory of transition was his 
emphasis on the primacy of the productive forces, which Bukharin and Lenin did not 
quote as often as Liu. Not as well read, and not as good an economist or theoretician 
as Bukharin and Lenin, Liu seemed to play to his strength by keeping it simple. By 
stressing the primacy of productive forces, which is indeed the essence of Marx's 
theory of history, Liu shielded himself under the banner of orthodox Marxism from 
the hard left of the CCP. It worked well in China where the majority of the population 
had low literacy. Unlike Bukharin, who at least enjoyed a long period of time of 
speaking and writing his mind, Liu had to compromise his position under Mao' s 
watchful eye and the complexity of inner-party power struggles. 
3.7.2 Bukharin and Chinese Revolutionaries 
Due to the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, Soviet Communism had 
become a role model for China's revolutionaries in pre-communist China. The control 
of the Comintem by Russians and the formation of the Chinese Communist Party \\ith 
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Russian supervisIOn had had significant impact on the development of Chinese 
communism. However, as Wang points out in his research on Chinese historiography. 
"on one hand, Chinese Marxists were attracted to the Soviet experience in applying 
Marxism to historical studies ... on the other hand, they attempted to circumscribe the 
Soviet influence in order to strike a balance between history and theory, the foreign 
and the indigenous, and the national and trans-national." Wang sees an irony, "The 
fact of the matter is that the Marxists who succeeded in making the revolution in 
China were not those who had followed the Soviet model" (Wang, 2000, 95, 102) 
Hammond, who studies the earlier relation between Bukharin and China's 
revolutionaries also points out an interesting fact: When the CCP was operating under 
the advice and instruction of the Comintem in the early 1920s, one of the key persons 
in charge of the Comintem was Bukharin, whose Marxist writings had somehow 
become a theoretical guidance for the earlier batch of Chinese communists, who, 
unlike Mao, chose to be the obedient subordinates of the Comintem. Besides, 
Bukharin maintained organisational control of the Comintem so that "the theses of the 
Sixth Chinese Communist Party Congress held in Moscow in June 1928 would have 
been overseen by Bukharin, while Stalin would have had a certain responsibility for 
organisational matters." So Hammond suggested that the "genesis of the Li Lisan 
line" 32 was actually Bukharin, whom he believed had a say in China's early 
revolutionary plan. Although Li claimed to be a staunch Stalinist, "Bukharin' s 
organisational power was too great for Li Lisan to be simply a 'Stalinist' candidate." 
(Hammond, 1975,466-468) This could be true to a certain extent, as Cohen believed 
that before Bukharin was ousted in 1928, Stalin was responsible for organisational 
matters while Bukharin drafted the theoretical guidelines for economic development. 
Since there was hardly any original economic writing by Stalin before 1928, "Stalin 
was largely a Bukharinist in economic philosophy; as he groped toward policies that 
were in effect counter-Bukharinist, he began to become a Stalinist." (Cohen, 1974, 
313) 
31 Li Lisan (1899-1967)was one of the founders of the CCP, and the CCP leader from 1928 to 1930. In 
1928, Li Lisan, the Party leader of the Chinese Communists by then, was ordered by the Comintern .to 
re-extend Central control over the Chinese Communist movement and to build a Red Army. U's 
dilemma was that if he supported the build-up of a Red Army before he could control it, he would 
undermine his own political influence and those who had controlled the Red Army would replace him. 
But if he did not support the build-up of Red Army he was in direct opposition to the Comintern. The 
'Li Lisan line' was therefore Li's attempt, to resolve the problem. This was supported by the 
Comintern as part of their development plan in China's revolution. He was dismissed from the 
Politburo on i h January 1931. (Thornton, 1969, xv) 
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But this earliest connection between Bukharin and Chinese revolutionaries had 
a dramatic twist-the CCP leaders pledged their support for Stalin and denounced 
Bukharin and Trotsky as revisionists and traitors after Bukharin's fall. Bukharin~s 
guidelines had been replaced by Stalinist leadership with a spirit for struggle and 
fighting. But later, in the power struggle against the Comintern delegate Wang Ming33 
(see discussion in Chapter 4), unquestionably a Stalinist, the CCP under Mao's 
leadership showed their defiance and refused to copy the Soviet model mechanically, 
as they believed that the Chinese revolution had to take into account the peCUliarity of 
Chinese historical experience. "That leaves us with a paradox," Hammond said, "the 
Chinese communists led by Mao supported Stalin, but not their own Stalinists. The 
resolution of this paradox, as one might expect, involves Bukharin ... (but) no specific 
organisational link can be traced between Mao and Bukharin after 1928. This results 
in part from the fact that the Chinese Party as a whole was less affected by the 
factional struggles in Moscow, but also from the failure of the pro-Bukharinist 
opposition to organise successfully." (Hammond, 1975,467-468) 
An outline of the political view by one of the pioneers of the CCP in 1929, 
Chen Duxiu, compiled by Saich as an archival record of Chinese revolutionaries, 
highlights the difference between the Comintern and the CCP that Bukharin was 
actually treated the same as other Russian leaders, from the perspective of Chinese 
communists, "Since comrade Lenin's illness and death, a serious opportunist crisis 
had occurred in the leadership of the Comintern and the Soviet CP controlled by 
Zinoviev, Stalin and Bukharin ... they have used Soviet diplomatic strategy to replace 
the world revolutionary class struggle ... " (Chen in Saich, 1996, 414) Therefore it 
would be interesting to contemplate the reasons behind the similarity between Liu's 
and Bukharin's thought. As China is still not an open society, the actual history of 
Liu's socialist learning and the genuine inspiration of his writings is still a mystery. In 
Liu's day Bukharin was hardly mentioned and Liu could only refer his idea to their 
mutual communist guru, Lenin. However, it could also be possible that all socialist 
revolutionaries who chose to persist with the original version of historical materialism 
and advocated the primacy of productive forces would have chosen the same path. 
33 Wang Ming, or Chen Shaoyu as was his real name (1904-1974), was a CCP Comintern lo~alist, 
and one of the famous '28 Bolsheviks' who studied in Russia. He was then sent back to Chma to 
oversee the implementation ofthe'Li Lisan Line', and finally took over from Li the leadership of.the 
Chinese Communists on 21 sl June 1931 when Li failed to deliver. (Thornton, 1969, 119-120; Saleh. 
1996, xxiv-xxv) But he was defeated by Mao and Liu in the inner power struggle of the CCP. (see 
discussion in Chapter ..f) 
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The root of all these ideological confrontations, which were also the origin of 
almost all power struggles within both the CCP and the Bolsheviks, was the 
legitimacy of their Marxist doctrines. The interpretation of Marxism had thus become 
the key to legitimising their doctrines. In view of Marx's huge volume of writings and 
his inconsistencies, it was almost an impossible task to have a one-for-all 
interpretation. The result of the power struggle was that the interpretation of Marx had 
become rather political, not philosophical or theoretical. That was why the faith of 
many revolutionaries met tragic ends. 
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Chapter 4: Liu Shaoqi on Party and Organisation 
4.1 Introduction 
Although the notion that Liu was a party disciplinary master (Terrill, 2003, 
174; Schunnann, 1968, 544; Schram in Lewis ed., 1970, 170-173; Hutchings, 2000, 
283)34 is not incorrect, as far as Liu's writing and practices were concerned, more 
emphasis was placed on the organisation and party unity, than on discipline. This 
chapter attempts to discuss Liu's ideas on party and organisation during the 
transitional period, as we will look at Liu's views on authority, the party's ideological 
guide, class contradiction and the transfonnation of class enemies. 
Section 4.2 will discuss Liu's promotion of the Maoist cult as the central 
ideological guide, and his subsequent attempts to withdraw it. The section sees Liu's 
propaganda of Mao's ideology as the replacement for Marxist-Leninism in an attempt 
to undennine the Soviets' influence on the Chinese Communist leadership, as well as 
to create a more peculiar image of the revolutionary leader to rally support from the 
peasantry, among which the depth of Marxist-Leninism might not be fully appreciated 
due to low level of literacy. Therefore the Maoist cult was always the more effective 
option as a central ideology in mobilisation. In fact, Liu tried to halt the campaign 
promoting the cult when he realised that the worship of Mao had been radicalised and 
become irrational. Regardless of whether there was a political deal between Mao and 
Liu, as many claim, Liu's intention to position the Maoist cult as a party ideological 
guide is beyond doubt. The historical facts and politics behind the scenes will be 
discussed fully in Chapter 6, which deals with the issues that might undennine the 
coherence of Liu's theory. This chapter, on the other hand, merely concerns 
theoretical discussions. However, the separation of theoretical and historical 
discussions can sometimes be difficult. 
We will then look at Liu's advocacy for the transfonnation of class enemies 
via education and the cultivation of good communists. The centre of the discussion in 
section 4.3 is Liu's persistence with the adherence to sets of central party rules, his 
zero tolerance of corruption and any irregularity within the party. or in his words, the 
34 Lowell Dittmer sees the publication of Liu's selected works by the CCP in the 1980s as an attempt to 
portray Liu as a "circumspect, paternalistic, :igidly disciplined, and intelligent Leninist." in order to 
promote the supremacy of party discipline. (DIttmer, 1984, 126-128) 
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"purification of the party. ~~ Liu believed the best way to deal with crises was to iron 
out any wrongdoers in accordance with strict rules and discipline, regardless of their 
class and background. The best example of this was his handling of the Four Clean 
Movement, where he famously asserted that class enemies were not his concern. as he 
only persecuted those who were 'unclean' (the wrongdoers). His celebrated writing, 
'How to be a Good Communist,~ which outlined the behavioural standards of an ideal 
communist member, was his model of inner party purification measures, with which 
he hoped to mould all newly joined communist members to be good communists. He 
also believed in evolutionary changes, as he urged the existing members of the Party 
to exert their influence on new members or petty bourgeoisie in order to convert them 
into a proletariat in times to come, without the necessity of class struggle. Having 
taken into consideration the size of China's population and the potential havoc should 
factional conflict occur, what concerned Liu was a set of rules for everybody to 
follow, and to transform those at the 'wrong end' into good communists. His 
statements consistently showed little preference for class struggle and placed much 
emphasis on the initiative of the party's members. On the other hand, his emphasis of 
self-cultivation and party discipline could easily portray him as a party disciplinarian, 
as claimed by many Western Scholars. 
In section 4.4 we will discuss Liu's view on contradiction, which was a vital 
issue in socialist revolution. Contradiction had been regarded as the element reflecting 
Marx's theory of dialectics. Lenin believed that contradiction between different 
classes or parties continued to exist under any circumstances, even after the revolution. 
This notion had been so popular in the communist world that it became the principle 
that underlined the campaigns of class struggle. Liu, on the other hand, believed that 
contradiction between proletariat and bourgeoisie would cease to exist after the 
success of a proletariat revolution. In line with his advocacy for the party's 
purification and cultivation of good communist members, Liu stressed that the 
remnants of the petty bourgeoisie could be transformed into good socialists without 
class struggle. The centre of his thought in this respect was that as long as the 
proletariat was in charge, sooner or later the bourgeoisie would be transformed into 
good socialists. This resembled Bukharin's evolutionary model of grow in transition, 
which we have discussed in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, Liu's tolerance of inner party 
pluralism seemed to contradict his conception of party purification. But while Liu 
stressed the importance of the unity and discipline of the Party. he saw the existence 
of the variety of ideas and attitude as part of human nature. This was actually the 
rationale behind his assertion that while contradiction between classes had ceased 
following the liberation, the contradiction among people with "different ideologies 
and principles" always existed. As Dittmer analyses Liu's 'Inner Party Struggle' 
(1941), he concludes that Liu encouraged 'principled' (impersonal, reasonable, issue 
oriented) debate but called for compromise on 'unprincipled' dispute (Dittmer, 1974, 
20). More importantly, he had always been confident that this sort of multiplicity 
within the party would not render the leadership ineffective, as long as the proletariat 
were in control, and everybody followed party rule. 
4.2 Party's Ideological Guide: The Maoist Cult 
The power struggle in Yan'an35 against the Comintern-Ied Wang Ming had a 
long-standing impact on Liu's policy formation. Should he and Mao be defeated in 
the power struggle, the party could have been split into two and the cooperation with 
the Nationalists in fighting the Japanese could be in vain. Similarly, Liu would have 
never forgotten the hardship he had gone through in uniting the workers from the left 
wing Red Union and the Nationalist-inclined Yellow Union during his leadership of 
the Union movement in Anyuan. That explains why Liu stressed in his letter to Song 
Liang, 'Answering Comrade Song Liang' (1943), that, "the Chinese Communist Party 
has an obvious weakness-lack of theoretical appreciation (of Marxism). The 
theoretical learning among the party members has never been sufficient, and many of 
our failures in the past were the failures of leadership, which were rooted in ignorance 
(of Marxist theory)." (Liu, 1981, 1: 220) "The revolutionary spirit of the CCP 
members is highly respectable," Liu wrote in 1943, "but their ideological preparation 
for scientific Marxist-Leninism has been poor." (Liu, 1981, 1: 293) In another speech, 
'Training in Organisation and Discipline' (1941), he expressed his belief in the 
35 The blockade of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Base Area (which comprised the bordering areas of Shaanxi, 
Gansu, and Ningxia Province, with its centre of politics at Yan'an) by the Japanese army and the influx 
of patriotic intellectuals with different ideological background into Yan'an had shown Mao the urgency 
to resolve the problem of the ideological cleavage and power struggle between the mainstream CCP 
leaders and the Wang Ming led Comintem supporters. With the support of Liu, Mao launched a 
campaign to rectify "subjectivism (zhuguanzhuyi), factionalism (zhongpaizhuyi), and blind application 
of party doctrine (dangbagu). ,. The campaign was officially launched in February 1942 at the opening 
ceremony of the Central Party School, and was first carried out in the form Of. study movement for 
senior cadres. It was soon broadened to the whole party. The end of the campaIgn saw the defeat of 
Wang Ming's camp and the establishment of Mao's absolute authority. 
(Saich, 1996,971-991; Teiwes, 1979,58-101) 
significance of a central ideology for the party, "The unity of the party lies in 
ideological unity emanating from Marxism. Such ideological unity is the most 
fundamental matter, without which it will be impossible to form the party and 
maintain its unity ... ideological unity precedes unification in organisation; the latter. 
on the other hand, helps, moves and, in a certain degree, consolidates the unity in 
ideology." (Liu, 1969, 1: 371-2) 
Then Liu highlighted the same issue again in his speech 'On Party' (1945), 
where he expressed his thought of reorganising the CCP, "Among all the issues 
regarding party construction, the most important of all is the ideological 
construction ... which means to transform and re-educate our members, particularly 
those from petty bourgeois background, with Marxist-Leninist ideology." Liu 
explained why a sole existing dominant ideology is vital for the survival of the party, 
" ... most members had got themselves involved in the revolution before they could 
acquire good knowledge of Marxism, hence the deficiency of ideological construction 
within party. This gives the petty bourgeois within the party, who have not been 
transformed, the opportunity to spread (the thought of) opportunism in the party." Liu 
saw the problem in a straightforward manner, "Many of our members suffer from the 
errors they make because they are theoretically unprepared." (Liu, 1981, 1: 327,337) 
The observation of Liu's that Chinese Communists were ideologically 
unprepared for a socialist nation had no doubt prompted his orchestration of the 
Maoist cult. The label of' Mao Zedong's Thought' was actually not the creation of Liu, 
but was originally the idea of politburo member Wang Jiaxiang (Wang, 2001,16). But 
it was Liu who advocated the idea enthusiastically. In as early as 1941, Liu had begun 
to promote 'Mao's Thought' to the cadres in the army camp (Wang, 2001, 16). After 
the Yan'an rectification, Liu decided to systemise the construction of the Maoist cult, 
in order to introduce to the members an ideology that, in comparison with Marxist-
Leninism, takes a shorter time to appreciate while having more domestic appeal in 
China. In his letter to Song Liang, Liu gave his analysis of why the party members 
were generally weak on theory, "Firstly, the history of Marxism in China is not long, 
unlike Europe, where Marxist ideology has existed for nearly a hundred years. 
Secondly, China was at that time (with the formation of the CCP) objectively ready 
for revolution, therefore all revolutionaries in China had to involve themselves in the 
revolutionary work immediately, before they could find sufficient time for Marxist 
study. Thirdly, we are short of Chinese translations of Marxist theory, and most 
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Marxist books wrote about European history and culture, while China was hardly 
., 
mentioned. The Chinese historical development has its distinct characteristics. 
Fourthly, there are two extreme ideological inclinations within the party: one 
emphasises the theory and ignores practicality, while another attaches overwhelming 
importance to practicality and neglects the study of theory." (Liu, 1981, 1: 221) From 
there, Liu had laid down the foundation for the establishment of the Maoist cult and , 
had legitimised the necessity to replace Marxism with a domestic ideology as a 
central line to unite the party. In order to reinforce Party unification during the 
struggle of the Yan' an period, Liu saw the necessity to create a hero or an idol, and 
the cult of political discourses to mobilise the party members. As Wylie points out, 
Liu himself "had no notion of how far the swelling cult of Mao and his thoughts 
might eventually be carried." (Wylie, 1980,279) 
He presented Mao's thought as an ideology complementing Marxism for the 
first time in his 1943 article, 'Liquidate the Menshevik Ideology within the Party'. 
With the power struggle ofYan'an in mind, he wrote, "How would it be possible that 
our party would not commit serious errors in matters of principle within the 
leadership of the various aspects of the revolutionary movement? This requires that, 
our party members, above all our cadres, must be able to distinguish true and false 
Marxism and Leninism ... various kinds of pseudo-Marxism must be crushed, that the 
abundant historical experience of our party during these past twenty-two years must 
be summed up, that our studies must be well developed to enhance our vigilance, and 
the guidance of comrade Mao Zedong must permeate every link and every department 
of our work." His intention of creating a 'great leader' as a symbol for Chinese 
revolution as well as the representative of the real Marxism was obvious, "These two 
kinds of Marxism have existed from the beginning in the communist movement of 
China ... the first kind, the pseudo-Marxism of China, belonged to Chen Duxiu, the 
Trotskyites of China ... the second kind, the genuine Marxism in China, comprised 
Comrade Mao and many others .. .it is a fact that in the long, strenuous and 
complicated twenty-two years of revolutionary struggle, it has finally been possible 
for our party, the proletariat and people of our country to find their own leader in 
comrade Mao Zedong." (Liu, 1969, 1: 440,442--443,438) 
But Liu planned to do more than that. The 'official launch' of the Maoist cult 
was Liu's speech in the Seventh Congress, April 1945, where he tried to position Mao 
at the same level as Karl Marx, "Mao Zedong's thought, is the combination of 
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Marxist-Leninism and the Chinese revolutionary practice. It is Chinese Communism , 
and Chinese Marxism. Mao's thought represents the continuous development of 
Marxism in the colonised, semi-colonised, and semi-feudalist countries, and also the 
classic example of localisation of Marxism ... Mao's thought is a comprehensive 
revolutionary ideology for the Chinese, its content is entirely Marxist, yet perfectly 
Chinese ... It is the only correct ideology and policy used by the Chinese proletariat to 
liberate the nation." (Liu, 1981, 1: 333-334) The speech put Maoist theory in an 
unchallenged position, " ... Maoist Thought is the only and correct way to save China. 
History has told us that when the revolution was carried out under Mao's guidance, it 
succeeded; when the revolution was derailed from Mao's guidance, it failed." (Liu, 
1981, 1: 334) This statement seems to have a political motive, as it is believed that the 
period "derailed from Mao's guidance" was referring to the period under the 
leadership of Comintem-inclined Wang Ming. 
Nevertheless, the speech was very crucial in the construction of the Maoist 
cult, as it displayed a systematic theorisation of Maoist theory, instead of mere 
irrational praise of the leader, which was phenomenal during the Cultural Revolution. 
Comparing Liu' s praise of Mao with Lin Biao' s theory of the summit, which labelled 
Maoist Thought as 'the new stage of Marxist theoretical development and the summit 
of the contemporary Marxist-Leninism, the highest of everything' and Mao as "the 
greatest leader and the greatest genius," (Renmin ribao, 19th August 1966), we see 
Liu's rationality and restraint. The reasonableness behind Liu's praise was 
underscored by his well constructed theorisation of Maoist ideology as well as his 
motive-a central line for the masses to stick to during the revolution. As he said in 
the Congress, "Mao's thought was formed in the revolution and serves the revolution; 
it is the practice of Marxism in China, and the improvisation of Marxism under the 
new historical development of China. It is the combination of scientific spirit and 
revolutionary spirit. . .it is every member's responsibility to study Maoist Thought." 
(Liu, 1981, 1: 337) 
Many do not realise that Liu had subsequently, in a series of events, tried to 
rectify what he had done. We will have more discussion on the historical and political 
development of the events in Chapter 6, while we place our focus on Liu' s theory in 
this chapter. In 1947, two years after the Seventh Congress. in response to a slogan 
that read: "Chairman Mao is the saviour of the nation", Liu told a senior politburo 
member Liu Lantao that, "the public say that (the slogan) because they love the 
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Chainnan, the cadres say that because they are closely related to the Chainnan as 
fellow proletarians, and these relationships are precious. But we must bear in mind 
that the saviour of the nation should not be any individual, but the Party. To regard an 
individual as a saviour is not scientific, and it is definitely not Marxist." (Feng, 1998, 
523) A year later, when Liu addressed the students of the Marxist-Leninist College in 
December 1948, we saw a dramatic tum from what he said in the Seventh Congress, 
"Chainnan Mao stresses that Marxist-Leninism is a theory of universal truth, that we 
can apply it in every aspect ... Therefore we must have practical experience and 
theoretical knowledge (of Marxism), and we must learn from the Chinese experience 
as well as from the foreign experience ... " (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 170) 
Note that Maoism was no more the 'only and correct' way, as he now believed 
"we must learn from the foreign experience as well." Moreover, it was interesting that 
Liu still managed to legitimise his statements by implicating they were Chainnan 
Mao's ideas. Liu seemed to regret his advocacy of Maoist cult at a later stage, though 
he had never expressed it explicitly. In his address to the Marxist College students, he 
added something that seemed unimaginable during the time when Mao was regarded 
as God, "Many issues have been solved by Lenin. As we did not read Lenin's 'Two 
Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution' (1905), the success of the 
revolution has thus been delayed by 20 years. If all of us had read Lenin's 'Two 
Tactics', we could have succeeded in 1927." (Liu, 1981, 1: 410-411) So it was no 
more "Mao's way is the only way to succeed." In other words, Liu had decided to 
cool the heat of the Maoist cult eight years before the Eighth Congress (1956) was 
held. 
The Eighth Congress (1956), which had been regarded as a victory for those 
who preferred the delay of collectivisation and a model of mixed economy, marked a 
milestone for China's economic planning. The retreat from 'impetuosity and 
adventurism' was a victory for the cautious minded economic planner, namely Zhou 
Enlai, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Deng Zihui and Chen Yun.36 However, one of the 
36 The 'adventurism' referred to the collectivisation process and the adventurous economic 
development that was favoured by Mao. Zhou rallied for the halt of the irrational expansion and was 
supported by Liu. Mao had to make temporary concessions in view of the opposition ~e fa~ed for 
pushing forward the collectivisation, and wrote the famous' Ten Major Relationships', \\hJCh Virtually 
supported retention of private ownership and private trade to show his support for the Eighth ~ongress. 
'The Ten Major Relationships' and other resolutions were passed at the Eighth Con~ess .10 A~~ust 
1956. But the resolutions had never been put into practice as Mao overturned them With hiS political 
power and influence, speeded up the process of collectivisation and launched the Great Leap two years 
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most prominent aspects of the Eighth Congress that was overlooked was the attempt 
to abolish the Maoist cult, and the leadership behind the plot to withdraw the Maoist 
cult as a policy was Liu. General Peng Dehuai admitted during the trials of the 
Cultural Revolution that he initiated the replacement of the clause of 'Maoist Thought 
as our principal thought' with 'Marxism as our principal thought' in the Party's 
Articles, and Liu agreed, "I dislike personality cults as well." Liu responded, "let us 
cancel this clause." (Feng, 1998,286; ZGYJZZS, 1970,375) 
After the Eighth Congress, Liu raised the question of the need for a better 
system to constrain the leader's authority in the Second Plenum of the Eighth 
Committee, 10th November 1956. Liu seemed to have been inspired by the recent 
denunciation of the Stalinist cult in Russia by Khrushchev, as he said in his speech: 
"In some socialist countries, the leaders have become a special class of their own and 
form a class of ruling elites. We should avoid making the same mistake, or else 
sooner or later, a class of ruling elite could emerge in China as well. To prevent the 
emergence of a ruling class that distances themselves from the masses, we should 
have some new regulations instituted." Liu then proposed some amendments to the 
current system, which not only reflected his intention to curb the Maoist cult, but also 
his ideological principles on party and organisation. Three of these proposals, which 
had never been put into practice, were actually at odds with the political climate in the 
late 1950s: Firstly, Liu urged limitation of the power of the leader, as he said, "There 
must be a ceiling on the power the leaders of the nation could exercise;" secondly, Liu 
saw the necessity of ending the practice of lifelong leadership within the Party, and 
suggested capping the term a leader could serve; and thirdly, he saw the necessity to 
superintend or monitor the leader via a cabinet or committee. (Or, he was actually 
dealing with the legacy of his own errors: he was the culprit who positioned Mao as 
the sole power holder, see below) (Liu, 1991, 643-645) As an advocate of the 
Maoist cult, his proposal looked bizarre, and this showed Liu's regret as well as his 
realisation of the legacy of the cult. This is a fact that has always been neglected by 
those who accused Liu of orchestrating the cult. 
One of the fiercest criticisms of Liu by the Red Guard was his omission of the 
A 
Maoist cult in the revised version of his celebrated writing 'How to be a good 
communist'. When the speech was delivered for the first time in 1939, Liu urged his 
later. (Teiwes in Macfarquhar et al ed .. 1987. 126; Teiwes & Sun, 1999,30-31; ZYWXYJS. 1998b. 
108) For detailed discussion of the events before and after the Eighth Congress, see Chapter 6. 
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party members to "strive to become the best pupils of Marx, Engels, Lenin and 
Stalin." However, when he revised the script of his speech in 1962, he altered the 
statement and omitted Stalin from the article, as it read, "Be worthy pupils of Marx 
and Lenin." (Liu, 1969,1: 159,225) At the same time, it was also the critical moment 
when Mao felt threatened by the 'revisionist propaganda' of Khrushchev, who 
denounced Stalin and abolished the Stalinist cult. Although Mao had never had a good 
relationship with Stalin, he regarded the omission of Stalin from the 1962 article as a 
sort of hostility against him, given the fact that he was still fond of popularising his 
own personal cult. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the Red Guard accused the 
revised version of 'How to be a good communist' as a theory of conspiracy, "a 
propaganda of capitalism and anti-revolution in China ... the attack on Maoist thought 
and Chairman Mao ... the Chinese Khrushchev cooperated with the foreign 
Khrushchev, opposing Marxism and Maoism ... he (Liu) responded to the request by 
Khrushchev, deleted Stalin from the article, attempted to deny Stalin as a Great 
Marxist-Leninist, openly contradicting Chairman Mao's praise of Stalin ... he 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of being a good pupil of Marx and Lenin, while 
he did not mention Chairman Mao at all ... " (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 505-506) Regardless 
of how the facts were exaggerated and twisted in such accusations, it was undeniably 
an interesting development that Liu, the advocate of the Maoist cult, did not 
encourage the members "to learn from Chairman Mao" in the 1962 version of his 
most celebrated article, particularly during the period when the Maoist cult was a part 
of life in China. 
Liu had no doubt speeded up his rectification to Maoist cult after the Great 
Leap, in which he observed how the personal cult of a leader could ruin a nation. In 
his speech during the celebration of the Fortieth anniversary of the founding of the 
CCP (1961), Liu had again placed Marxist-Leninism ahead of Maoism, "All party 
members and cadres should study conscientiously the basic Marxist-Leninist 
principles of socialist revolution and socialist construction, study the theoretical and 
practical problems of China's socialist construction as elucidated by Comrade Mao 
Zedong on the basis of Marxist-Leninist principles, study the general line and the 
various specific policies of socialist construction as formulated by the Central 
Committee of the Party, and study the experience in socialist construction of the 
Soviet Union and other fraternal countries." In this statement, Mao has become 
merely an interpreter of Marxism, instead of the inventor of a Chinese political theory. 
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In addition to that, contrary to the 1945 (Seventh Congress) statement of "it is every 
member's responsibility to study Maoist Thought'~, Liu stressed, "As for the large 
number of new party members, they must in addition be given basic education in 
Marxist-Leninism and basic knowledge of the party." (Liu, 1968, 141) Liu's shift of 
stance became more obvious in 1964, when the Secretary General of Jiangsu province. 
Jiang Wei, told him that the party's provincial committee had decided to impose the 
policy of 'learning Mao's teaching and instruction as a prevention of mistakes and 
fraud' in all counties and cities. Liu responded, "You cannot treat Marxist-Leninism 
as unchallenged principles, just like you cannot treat Maoist Thought as such. We 
learn from somebody because he is right, not because of his supreme status. Many 
party members apply Maoist Thought strictly and blindly, which is wrong. You are 
not the only one who made this mistake." (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 371) But all these 
'corrections' by Liu culminated in 1966, the eve of the Cultural Revolution, when he 
hit back directly at Lin Biao' s theory of summit, "of course, the development of 
Marxist-Leninist theory will continue, as its development will not stop here (upon the 
formation of Maoist Thought). Anybody who thinks so (Mao's thought is the summit 
of development) is wrong, that is mechanical materialism." (ZGYJZZS, 1970,464) 
Apparently, in his effort to overturn what he had constructed, Liu kept 
referring the members to the Central rules and the Party's authority. Liu's notion that 
no individual should supersede the party had never changed. However, one of Liu's 
weaknesses, or one of the reasons behind his tragic fall, was that he was always 
indecisive at crucial moments. There was one occasion where Liu could actually 
extinguish the Maoist cult, but not only did he let the opportunity slip through his 
fingers, he instead started the second wave of the Maoist cult. During the Lushan 
conference in 195937, when Mao decided to purge General Peng Dehuai by framing 
him with a treason charge38, many of the politburo members were outraged. That was 
the time when the impact of the Great Leap began to be felt and Mao was indeed 
under tremendous pressure to concede to a more 'rightist' programme. This prompted 
one to speculate whether Mao's persistence with the Great Leap could have been 
significantly challenged if Liu had firmly stood his ground, whilst having the support 
37 The political and historical background of the Lushan conference as well as Liu's involvement in 
promoting the second wave of Maoist cult will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6, which studies Liu's 
involvement in the Great Leap and the possible inconsistency in his theory. 
38 Peng submitted a 'letter of opinion' to Mao stating the deficiency of the current economic plan and 
uroed Mao to halt the Great Leap. Peng was then purged on conviction of treason. See Chapter 6 for 
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detailed discussion of events. 
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of the Premier Zhou Enlai and the Finance Minister Chen Yun. But Liu's inclination 
towards appeasing Mao prevented him from doing so. Worst of all, at the end of the 
Lushan Conference, Liu succumbed to Mao's insistence in that he finally delivered 
two speeches, one on 1 i h August and the other on 9th September (1959), to reinforce 
the Maoist cult, " ... regarding the opposition to the personal cult ... some in our party 
suggest we should abolish personal cults, one of them is comrade Peng ... to take 
charge of a nation of 650 million people, and to be accepted by a nation of 650 
million people, is not an easy task ... only a strong party is able to unite such a massive 
nation .. .in order to combat imperialism, feudalism ... and to mobilise hundreds of 
millions of people to construct communes ... we cannot achieve that without the strong 
commanding power of an outstanding individual. . .in fact, I have been advocating a 
personality cult, or maybe the words 'personality cult' are not suitable, I should say I 
support enhancing the reputation and credibility of Chairman Mao. I have been doing 
this for a long time ... and I will continue to do so. I support strengthening the personal 
cult of Chairman Mao, as suggested by comrade Lin Biao and comrade Deng 
Xiaoping. I will do it even if some of you do not agree ... some try to abolish personal 
cult in China by quoting the abolition of Stalinist cult in the Soviet Union, that is 
wrong .. .is destructive to the accomplishment of the proletariat." (Li, 1993,368-369) 
On the other hand, Liu's reluctance and hesitation to go further on the Maoist 
cult was also fully reflected in the last few lines of his speech, "Is the leadership of the 
CCP and Chairman Mao the best leadership we could have? The best choice we have 
made? I think we could say that. .. would it be better if Karl Marx and Lenin became 
our leaders? Maybe it will be better, but maybe not." This contrasted sharply with Lin 
Biao's speech in Lushan that "only Chairman Mao is a great hero, nobody else should 
think he can be a hero." (Li, 1993, 211, 369) After that, Lin Biao praised Mao in 
public regularly, and at the eve of the Cultural Revolution, Mao was already hailed as 
"the great teacher, the great leader, the great guide, and the great commander-in-
chief." (Renmin ribao, 19th August 1966) So it could be more accurate to say that 
while Liu started the wave of the Maoist cult, it was Lin Biao who propagandised and 
popularised it. In fact, Liu had been trying to cool the heat of the cult after the Great 
Leap, particularly during the period of revival (1962-1964). In September 1964 he 
wrote to Jiangwei, the first Secretary of Jiangsu Province and stated that "we should 
not take Marxist teachings as doctrine, and we should not take Maoist writings and 
speeches as doctrine." (Ding, 1967, 251) 
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Nonetheless, empowered by Liu's interpretation of theory, the speech in 
Lushan was another milestone in the construction of the cult, in that it sawall Liu's 
efforts before 1959 to curb the spread of Maoist cult end in vain. The speech also 
raised the question of whether there was any political deal between Mao and Liu. 
Some believe that Liu' s support of Mao was the result of the deal sealed between the 
two during the Yan'an period (Gupta, 1982, 50), and others believe Liu's support of 
Mao during the Great Leap was due to the consideration of his role as the 'heir 
apparent' (Lieberthal in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 307; Short, 1999,483). It must 
be noted however, that Mao had announced his retirement in the Sixth Plenum of the 
Eighth Central Committee (28th November-10th December 1958), and Liu had 
subsequently assumed the position in April 1959, four months before the Lushan 
conference (Teiwes & Sun, 1999, xxii). For a better elaboration of Liu's real 
intentions, it is necessary to have discussion of political and historical development 
besides studying Liu's theories. But in order to avoid ambiguity and confusion, the 
politics behind Liu's controversial speeches at Lushan will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
It was indeed Liu's reluctance to resist Mao that mattered. Consequently, Liu tried to 
rectify the wrong he did in Lushan during the next eight years before his fall in 1967, 
but it was already too late. 
4.3 Ideological Transformation: Self-Cultivation and Party Purification 
However, Maoist theory's domination of the party is just part of Liu's picture 
of a united, single-voiced, and highly centralised party. Liu believed that, in view of 
the mixed background of the party members, a centrally guided transformation of 
party members into staunch communists is vital in securing the success of the 
revolution. So after the attempt to single out other schools of thought by promoting 
the Maoist cult, Liu presented his notion of self-cultivation of the party members, a 
process that he believed was essential during the transitional period. Liu had warned 
that the exercise of transition is a long term and painful process (Liu, 1981, 1: 427-9.) 
Therefore, in this process, or during the period of transition, the party members should 
transform themselves into good communists. He put the notion forward in his 
celebrated speech' How to be a good communist' (1939), advocating self-cultivation 
and self-improvement of party members. The theme of the speech could be 
summarised as, 'everybody can be a good Marxist and communist in as far as they are 
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willing to learn and transform themselves', as Liu stressed, "We must see the 
necessity to transform ourselves, and indeed we are all transformable." (Liu, 1981, 1: 
98) Liu even referred to phrases by Marx to show that such requests to Communists 
are indeed Marxist, "Both for the production of mass scale communist consciousness , 
and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of man on a mass scale is , 
necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical movement, a 
revolution; this revolution is necessary ... because the class overthrowing it (the ruling 
class) can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the marks of ages and 
become fitted to found society anew." (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974, 94-5) Liu's 
conclusion of this Marxist statement is, "that is to say, the proletarian must go through 
a long period of social revolutionary struggles, and in such struggles, he must be able 
to change the society, and finally, to change himself." (Liu, 1981, 1: 98) 
Liu's view of transformation basically sees everyone has the potential to be a 
good Marxist, as his main concern was the willingness to be changed, not the class 
background. Liu believed that every party member would have carried with them 
some social habits and ideologies of the old society, regardless of the classes they 
were from (Liu, 1981, 1: 112-114). To elaborate his point, Liu even quoted the 
philosophies of ancient China, a period denounced by the communists as feudalist, 
"Meng Zi (a famous Confucian thinker) had said: everyone can be Yao-Shun (Yao 
and Shun, the two legendary emperors in Chinese ancient history, highly respected for 
their benevolence and wisdom). I think the statement is correct ... every communist 
should try his best to improve his quality of thought and personality. He should never 
think that the great personalities we found in Marx and Lenin are unattainable ... " (Liu, 
1981, 1: 106) However, Dittmer sees that "Liu's model of learning is one of ego-
adaptation and emotional repression." (Dittmer, 1998, 162) 
When Liu was in charge of the first phase of land reform (1947), he could not 
wait until the completion of land reform for party reorganisation. Instead, he 
combined the two tasks in one campaign, as he believed that if the party was not 
'pure,39, the land reform was doomed to failure. He made it clear in the National Land 
Office meeting on 20th August 1947 that since the majority of the cadres were rich 
peasants, the land reform could not be completely successful. "In order to carry out 
39 Liu referred 'pure' to the adherence to the Party's rules and a party free of corruption, a party in 
which everybody was a good communist. It must be noted that Liu did not referred 'pure' to the 
superiority of certain classes. 
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land reform, we must construct an organisation that is capable of doing the task." Liu 
stressed, "The rectification of the party should be top down ... as the root of the 
problem is at the central. .. from highly ranked leaders to lowly cadres, a complete re-
organisation is needed ... We must realise that this rectification is not only for the 
success of the land reform, but also for the purity of the party." (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 1: 
576-577) According to a member of the editorial board of his 'official biography', 
Jin Chongji, Liu had indeed overestimated the problem of corruption during the land 
reform, which had thus resulted in many brutal purges of local cadres and rich 
peasants (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 1: 576; see also Gu, 1996, 270-271). However, 
regardless of whether Liu was right, he had demonstrated his conception of 'the 
party's refinement via his interpretation of the failure of land reform. As he reported 
the progress of the reform to the Centre on 4th August 1947, "This problem is 
pervasive and it is getting serious: many cadres are not pure, they are fond of 
bureaucracy, lack ideological education and do not behave properly. This is the reason 
why the land reform fails." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 87) 
So what did Liu try to achieve by advocating self-cultivation and inner-party 
purity? The answer should be a single-minded party who shared the same ideology 
and belief. Contrary to Mao's preference for the mobilisation of the masses, Liu 
favoured a model that was entirely centre-guided. As he asserted in his address to the 
Central Committee during the 'Conference of 7000 Cadres' in January 1962, 
"Comrade Mao had, in the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, categorised 
the party disciplinary rules into four: the individual obeys the organisation, the. 
minority obeys the majority, the subordinate obeys the superior, and the party obeys 
the Centre ... Among the four, the most important is the last one, the whole party must 
obey the Centre (Liu, 1981, 2: 384). Liu was very straightforward on what underlined 
the primacy of Central power: the Party's interests, "Party members have personal 
interests, which sometimes might conflict with the party's interest. In such cases, the 
members should sacrifice their personal interests unconditionally. We should always 
fight for the party's progress and success, and regard the party's achievement as 
ours ... Our party members are no ordinary people, but enlightened proletariat 
fighters ... therefore their personal interest should not overshadow the interests of party 
and proletariat." (Liu, 1981, 1: 134-135) 
Actually, four years before the conference, he had already made his view clear 
during his visit to the press office of the Beijing Daily. on 30th June 1958, \\'hen some 
of the editors thought it was wrong to follow the party blindly and do \vhatever they 
were asked to do, Liu replied, "Is it good for the members to be (merely) tools of the 
party? It is good, of course. To be a party's tool with strict obedience-that makes 
unification easier, hence the standardisation of ideology. The press, the congress, the 
Chairman and the Premier are all tools (of the party). The party is the tool of the 
people and the proletariat ... an individual will be successful if the party is 
successful. .. there is no unsolvable contradiction between personal interest and the 
Party's interest." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 429---430) It is obvious that Liu's emphasis 
was not on 'strict obedience', but on the significance and superiority of Party over 
individual. In other words, nobody could surpass the Party, including the Party 
leadership. 
It is thus not difficult to understand why Liu had been portrayed as the Party's 
disciplinary master, given his emphasis on the single-mindedness and the purity of the 
Party. But the rationale behind his ideology is that: the CCP had been a huge and 
complex organisation so that its members were from various backgrounds, it was thus 
always at risk of being derailed from the supposed Marxist path, either by 
opportunists or reactionaries. While Mao tends to exaggerate the polarity between the 
classes and to encourage the loyalists to fight the reactionaries, Liu restricted the 
reactionaries with strict regulation and tried to tum them into party loyalists. 
According to Liu, strict discipline has become indispensable in governing the party, as 
the number of party members had risen tremendously since the establishment of 
Communist China, from 2.7 million in 1949 to 5.8 million in 1951. There were more 
than 10 million CCP members at the eve of the Eighth Congress (1956). "The rapid 
rise in the number of the party members will inevitably have negative impact on the 
quality of the members." Liu said, "Many join the CCP for merit, status and a good 
life, not for the ideology. These people do not have to bear any risk (of their life, like 
the revolutionaries at the early stage of revolution). As they have not gone through the 
challenge the senior revolutionaries did .. .in addition to that, due to the governing 
position of the CCP and the peaceful post-liberation political environment, life was 
easy and many cadres have thus become corrupted." (Liu, 1981, 2: 68-69) Liu 
believed that the only solution to the problem was to rectify and clean up the party, so 
as to "'maintain the purity of the party:- "'Those who had not been properly assessed 
must now be thoroughly reassessed, and those who had not been educated must now 
be re-educated. -- Regarding how the disciplinary action should be taken, Liu stressed 
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that '"those who are still not qualified after the re-education should be expelled from 
the party if they show bad personality traits, while those unqualified but without bad 
personality traits should be advised and counselled before they were asked to leave:' 
(Liu, 1981,2: 75) 
Liu had shown his preference for rules and discipline years before 1949. In 
1938, during the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee, Liu was assigned the 
authority to draft the foundation of the CCP's rules and regulations, as nobody could 
do a better job than him. He drafted out the' Three Decisions', which had become the 
blueprint of the CCP's basic disciplinary rules. The 'Three Decisions' consisted of 
'The decision regarding working procedures and discipline of the Central Committee', 
'The decision regarding the formation of temporary working organisations by cadres 
at all levels', and 'The decision regarding the working procedures and disciplinary 
rules for party members at all branches and all levels'. These drafted procedures were 
then all passed as resolutions in the Politburo meeting, and most significantly, they 
had channelled authority to the Politburo. The resolution stated that "without the 
authorisation of the Centre, the Politburo or the Secretariat, a Central Committee 
member (like Liu or Mao) could not issue any statement on the party's behalf, nor 
could they voice any opinion that deviated from the central decision and policies". 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996, 1: 241) On the other hand, the 'three decisions' could be viewed 
as just expedient measures to counter the interference of the Comintem in the CCP's 
daily affairs. Nevertheless, Liu had demonstrated his capability of meticulous 
planning and logical analysis; and the drafts also reflected his perception of party 
supremacy. 
Liu's consistency III his ideology and practice could have been 
unchallengeable had it not been marred by incidents where he yielded to Mao's power 
politic, and such incidents were so vital that they overshadowed Liu's 
accomplishments. On the other hand, we must also see the fact that Liu had to survive 
the political struggles both within the party and against the Comintem. However, after 
the eve ofYan'an rectification and the fall of Wang Ming, Liu suggested that the CCP 
must have a chairman at the Central Secretariat. In the meeting of the Politburo on 
16th March 1943. the post of Chairman (of the Central Secretariat) was created and 
Liu centralised all the power that he had channelled to the Politburo five years ago 
solely to Mao. This moment inaugurated the dictatorship of Mao with Liu as the 
second in command, as \vell as the 'heir apparenf. (Hu. 1994, 273) A Russian 
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journalist, Peter Vladimirov, who spent three years (1942-1945) in Yan'an as an 
observer of the Comintern, believed there was a deal between the two leaders. His 
diary, which was recently translated into Chinese by the CCP but labelled "for internal 
circulation only', suggests that Liu was, at the beginning, quite sympathetic to Wang 
Ming. However, Liu changed his political stance and even his attitude towards Kang 
Sheng, the Head of Intelligence whom Liu hated but who was trusted by Mao. And 
Vladimirov believed that was the reason Liu managed to retain his post in the CCP 
Central Secretariat (for pleasing Kang Sheng and Mao). According to Vladimirov, Liu 
had also been in constant power struggle with Zhou Enlai, over whom he finally 
managed to gain the edge. The only thing Zhou and Liu shared was their hatred of 
Kang Sheng (Vladimirov, 1975, 118, 121, 128,462), 
However, while Vladimirov's connection with the Comintern could have 
undermined the credibility of his accounts, most of the sources refer to Liu's alliance 
with Mao in Yan-an as well as the establishment of Mao's personal cult as an 
inevitable political development. The influx of patriotic Chinese intellectuals into 
Yan-an to fight the Japanese, had raised the alarm concerning the dangers of failing to 
maintain a coherent fighting unit with a "certain degree of ideological orthodoxy." 
(Saich, 1996, 971) Liu, who appeared to have been accusing the Comintern-supported 
returned students of 'Left-Opportunism' before the Yan-an rectification campaign 
(Wylie, 1980,40; Shum, 1988,212) was an unlikely ally to Wang Ming, though at the 
initial stage he struggled against the returned students without Mao's help. Wylie also 
points out that Liu, though, was not "totally opposed to Mao's leadership as such, but 
rather disagreed in principle with, or at least disliked, a trend towards a Maoist cult." 
(Wylie, 1980, 114) 
Liu's obsession with strict discipline and the Party's purity was reflected again 
in his controversial handling of the Four Clean Movement (or the SEM, Socialist 
Education Movement), a rectification campaign in rural China called upon by Mao to 
counter the revival of mixed economy after the devastation of the Great Leap, and to 
destroy the reformist coalition led by Liu. Mao, who had been frustrated by the halt of 
the Great Leap, could not hide his resentment against the policies implemented by Liu 
during the 'period of revival' (1962-1965). Furthermore, the uprising in Hungary, 
the reformist triumph in Yugoslavia and the official denouncement of Stalin by Nikita 
Khrushchev had been haunting him and had threatened his sense of security. With the 
increase in the reported cases of corruption among cadres, Mao decided to raise the 
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banner of class struggle again and launch the Four Clean Movement (to clean the 
organisation, thought, economy and politics) in 1964 to purge those who were in the 
opposite camp to him. His rationale was simple, "what if a revisionist like 
Khrushchev emerges in China?" (Cong, 1989, 538-540; Short, 1999,515-518; Bo, 
1993, 2: 1105-1106) The campaign seemed to have been aimed at the revisionists 
within the party, but Mao's target was actually the class enemy and the bourgeois 
leadership, which was implicitly referring to Liu Shaoqi (Feng, 1998, SOl). He told 
Liu and the Central Committee that about "one third of the political power was 
already in the enemies' hands", and had thus generated a sense of emergency within 
the party. Liu believed the statement (or at least he accepted the statement 
wholeheartedly) and redrafted Mao's 'The First Ten Points', a guidance for executing 
the campaign, into 'The Later Ten Points.' 'The Later Ten Points' stated clearly the 
classification of class enemies, and the yardsticks for punishment and reward (Cong, 
1989,528-533). This was again a work typical of Liu: logical, categorical, and with 
strong administrative rationale. 
More interestingly, Liu added in the 'Later Ten Points' that the Four Clean 
Movement must not only involve 'educating' the class enemies (rich peasants, 
landlords, hooligans), but also rectifying the corrupt cadres as well: as Liu believed 
that the "education movement must be, at the same time, a party rectification." (Bo, 
1993, 2: 1114) Note that Liu had a tendency to launch rectification campaigns as 
supplementary to centre-guided mass-scale movement, reminiscent of what he did 
during the land reform in 1947. This research sees the reasons behind such tendencies 
being first of all, the distrust of the masses by Liu, as he did not believe the masses 
would have the correct motive and organisational skill to conduct a mass movement 
initiated by the Party; and secondly, his preoccupation with the supremacy of Party 
purity made him feel the urgency to rectify the wrongdoer as and when it is necessary .. 
While Mao's intention of launching the Four Clean Movement was to fight the 'class 
enemies,' Liu was looking beyond the line separating the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie. "The corruption is so pervasive," Liu said, "that a new class of 
(corrupted) political elite could emerge, even from the proletariat, even from the 
Communist Party." (Liu, 1991. 718) So it is not difficult to understand that when the 
Four Clean was steered towards the extreme left by Mao; Liu, who appeared to have 
agreed with the direction of the movement, drafted a harsher and more detailed 
rectification plan to make it one of the notorious purges in China' s history. Based on 
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the investigation report of his wife in Taoyuan, Hebei province, which had been 
written with the prejudice that '"one third of the cadres are class enemies," a newer 
guideline, the 'Revised Later Ten Points', had added significant changes to the 'Later 
Ten Points'. One of them was the replacement of the local cadres with the 'Work 
Team' (gongzuodui) from the Centre as the unit in charge with absolute power to 
conduct the campaign. The 'Revised Later Ten Points' also reminded the Work team 
not to rely on the local cadres for assistance in carrying out investigations. In addition. 
the 'Revised Later Ten Points' separated the campaign into two phases, first to clean 
up the party and secondly, to reconstruct the organisation. Liu even pointed out that 
the seizure of power (means replacing the local cadres with a centrally appointed one) 
and struggle against the corrupt should take place immediately in those 'rotten' 
communes (Bo, 1993,2: 1121-1122). 
The Four Clean Movement was a disaster and Liu could not discharge the 
responsibility because he was fully in charge of the campaign. The campaign that was 
planned with administrative rationality had been conducted so recklessly by the Work 
Team that many cadres, whether rich or poor, corrupt or innocent, were purged, killed 
or forced to sell all their belongings to pay their 'fine', a self-declared amount of their 
wealth that (claimed to be) funded by misappropriated money (Bo, 1993,2: 1124-
1126). Unhappy about the purging of the masses, as well as worrying about the 
possibility of repercussions from the outraged lowly cadres, Mao accused Liu of 
'"inclining towards the right though pretending to be left (xingzuoshiyou)", while 
ignoring the fact that the root of the problem was his revival of class struggle. Such 
accusations triggered the much talked-about argument between the two leaders, which 
had, bar the political correctness of the Four Clean Movement, accurately reflected 
Liu's conception of party and organisation. Mao condemned the Work Team for not 
relying on the masses, as the movement had become anti-proletariat (for Mao, masses 
mean proletariat). Mao believed that those cadres who were not so seriously corrupted 
(or, in Mao's term, '"only misappropriated insubstantial amounts of money") should 
be spared. He told Liu that the real enemies were the 'senior cadres and central 
leaders behind the rich peasants and landlords', and those 'from the ruling class'. Liu 
replied, '"Our targets consist of three types of people, those landlords spared from the 
previous land reform, the newly risen bourgeois class, and those who are corrupt.·· 
Mao hit back, "Forget about the classes, now I am talking about the ruling elites who 
have become the bourgeoisie. our enemy." And Liu's reply was classic, as it \yas the 
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exact reflection of his centre of thought, "The main contradiction of the movement is 
between Four Clean and Four Unclean, not the contradiction between enemy and 
friend. We should solve the problem as it is, and rectify the wrong as it is, not by 
categorising everybody as either enemy or friend." (Wang, 1999,54-60; Liu. 2002, 
20--21; Jie, 1996, 64--66; Feng, 1998,501--503) 
So we see the major difference between Mao and Liu in terms of their view of 
party discipline. In the rectification campaign, Mao would have perceived the identity 
of his enemies without looking into the conviction. In fact, Mao always knew who he 
wanted to purge. In the case of Four Clean Movement, Mao insisted that the enemy 
was the 'ruling elite', which apparently meant there were some in the current 
leadership whom he did not like. Liu on the other hand, would prefer to stick to a set 
of guidelines and would only purge the wrongdoers. During the Four Clean 
Movement, Liu followed the guidelines strictly and found that the majority of the 
lowly cadres were guilty of various degrees of corruption. His repressive reaction to 
the corrupted cadres had not only gained him the label of orthodox Leninist, but also 
conviction for 'struggling against the revolutionary masses' during the Cultural 
Revolution (Dittmer, 1998, 185). However, in order to have a better understanding of 
Mao's and Liu's conceptions of discipline, it is important to discuss their notion of 
contradiction. The above illustrates Liu's preference for administrative rationality, 
clear-cut procedures, and the reliance on the central guidance as well as strict party 
discipline; while his obsession with a party free of bad elements had sometimes 
trapped him in a controversial historical position. Liu's ideology and perception of 
party and organisation had been very noticeable, though from time to time Liu seemed 
to echo what Mao had said and carried out the tasks like a loyal servant upon Mao's 
instruction. It is indeed not difficult to distinguish Liu's characteristics even from his 
full involvement in Mao's catastrophic events, like the Four Clean Movement. 
4.4 Contradictions, Inner Party Pluralism & Democratic Centralism 
We could not separate Liu's notion of contradiction from his tolerance of inner 
party pluralism. However, Liu's tolerance of inner party pluralism seemed to 
contradict his notion of party purity. The truth is, Liu's perception of purity refers to a 
party free of corruption and indiscipline members, while his tolerance of inner party 
pluralism was simply a transitional measure and political expediency--to compromise 
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on the complexity of the backgrounds of party members before all the non-Socialists 
could be transformed into staunch socialists after the period of transition. 
As Mao had been the most prominent figure in the Chinese Communist Party, 
his speech in 1957 'How to Deal with the Contradiction among People' had 
overshadowed Liu's work in this area. Though Mao was no doubt the first to write 
about the theory of contradiction (in 1937), few would have noticed that Liu was 
indeed the first CCP leader to give detailed and systemic discussion on the handling 
of contradiction (Lii, 2003, 46; Feng, 1998, 213). The 1937 article of Mao, 'On 
Contradiction' (Mao, 1952, 765-805), was largely a Maoist interpretation of Marx's, 
Engel's and Lenin's works in terms of contradiction, as we have discussed in Chapter 
3. Mao forwarded his assertion that "confrontation is a form of the contradictory 
struggle," stating that the persistence of the reactionaries with their ideology would 
transform contradiction into confrontation (Mao, 1952, 800-802). The relatively 
more important work of Mao regarding contradiction was his 1957 speech, which 
highlighted the practical application of his notion of contradiction. Mao stressed that, 
"Now the whole nation is more united than ever. .. but that does not mean 
contradiction does not exist, the notion of a society without contradiction is a naIve 
one. There are two types of contradiction that we encounter in our society. One is the 
contradiction between enemy and foe, the other is the contradiction among the 
people ... but we must first clarify who is the enemy ... bear in mind that the 
classification of enemy varies from time to time. During the Second World War, the 
Japanese and the traitors were the enemies ... now we are at the stage of building the 
socialist state, and the enemy are those parties or groups who were against the 
socialist revolution, and those who sabotage the building of socialism." (Mao, 1966, 
327-328)40 
Most important of all, Liu had theorised the issue of inner party contradiction 
in a cohesive manner and the change of political climate from the 1940s to the 1950s 
did not affect the consistency of his theory. In as early as 1945, before the new China 
was born, Liu stressed that the major contradiction within the party was the 
contradiction between the proletariat ideology and non-proletariat ideology. He 
believed that the only solution to this ideological contradiction was to introduce 
education in Marxism. ""That's why the priority of all sorts of party construction is 
40 Mao's conception of contradiction and his change of view have been discussed in section 3.5.3 of 
Chapter 3, the paragraph presented here is just a summary to ease comparison. 
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ideological construction." (Liu, 1981, 1: 327) Note that this is in line with his theory 
of inner purification and cultivation of the communist, as we discussed in the previous 
section. Besides, Liu seldom mentioned the contradiction with the enemies, but 
mostly he stressed the conflicting nature of different ideologies. That was why self-
cultivation was to him so important, as he advocated transforming the enemies. In 
1951, Liu wrote about the 'Contradiction among People' for the first time when he 
expressed his view on a case of dispute between the management and the workers of a 
state-owned factory, "When the factories were owned by the capitalists, the 
contradiction of production relations existed between the classes of bourgeois and 
proletariat, as well as between employers and employees. But when the proletariat has 
taken over the nation's leadership, and the factories have been nationalised, 
contradiction among classes would disappear. .. the existing contradictions would be 
contradictions between the factory's management and the workers ... they are the 
contradictions and relations among the workers and the people. This is non-
confrontational, and can be resolved." (Liu, 1981,2: 93-94) 
But Mao, in response to the resolutions passed in the Eighth Conference that 
were not in his favour, delivered a speech titled 'On the Correct Handling of 
Contradiction among the People' (ruhe chuli reminneibu de maodun), on 27th 
February 1957, in the Enlarged Meeting of State Affairs. Discussing the issue for the 
first time, Mao echoed Liu's statement that the contradiction with enemies was 
confrontational, while the contradiction among people was not. However, he believed 
the contradiction with enemies still existed, and did not clarify, like Liu did, how to 
resolve the two types of contradiction. "To make it simple," Mao talked about the two 
types of contradiction, "one is to identify the enemies from our people, and the other 
is to differentiate the rights and the wrongs. Of course, the matter regarding the enemy 
is also the matter of right or wrong-just like the confrontation between us and the 
reactionaries like imperialists, feudalists, and bureaucrats, though it is different from 
the right and wrong of the contradiction among people." (Mao, 1966,327-329) Mao 
used a major portion of his speech to criticise the uprising in Hungary and all his 
would.be enemies in China, while not giving detailed accounts of how to handle the 
contradiction among people. Two months later, on 2th April 1957, Liu delivered a 
speech that was also titled 'How to Dealll'ith the Contradiction among People' at the 
Shanghai party conference, where he put forward a statement that was used in his 
conviction during the Cultural Revolution, "Fundamentally. the class struggle in our 
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country is over." Liu said, "Now the main contradiction is no longer the contradiction 
between classes or with the enemies, but within the public (renminneibu), for example, 
the contradiction between proletariat and non-proletariat, workers and peasants, 
workers and capitalists, economic base and superstructure, production relations and 
productive force, public (people) and leaders, public and bureaucracy~ materialism 
and idealism ... " we could see how Liu tried to depict a picture of contradicting 
figures, elements, or facts, that naturally coexist in a society. "Therefore," he said, 
"these contradictions are non-antagonistic, and the resolution for them should be non-
confrontationaL .. " (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 398) 
Liu had made two issues clear: first, since the proletariat had seized power, the 
class struggle was presumably over; second, there were proper methods to deal with 
the contradiction among people. Liu's theory resembled his assertions that had been 
quite consistent over a period from the 1940s to the 1950s. To put them in a cohesive 
manner, we see first of all, Liu's tolerance of different voices within the party, as he 
put forward in his speech 'On Inner Party Struggle' (1941) to the Central Party 
School student, "Comrades must understand that the inner party struggle is actually 
the struggle between different ideologies and principles. The clear division between 
different ideologies and principles is necessary. But it does not mean we should fight 
each other ... we should resolve the differences via discussion and education... the 
contradicting principles among the comrades, and comrades' obedience to the party as 
well as the obedience of the minority to the majority are all inseparable ... the correct 
way to carry out inner party struggle is, while the division of ideologies and principles 
exist within the party, the division of organisation should not exist. We should not 
fight each other on the grounds of different ideologies and principles." (Liu, 1981, 1: 
210-211) 
Liu further clarified his view on the resolution to contradiction among people, 
"if the differences are on fundamental principles then no one should compromise 
unwillingly, as resolution embracing mutual consent must be worked out. However, if 
the differences are not fundamental, then they should be allowed to exist, or else it 
will undermine the party unity." (Liu, 1981, 1: 206) So we see the centre of Liu's 
notion of 'party discipline' was actually party unity, the existence of a central line that 
could hold the whole organisation together. Secondly, Liu's conception of 
contradiction made him believe that these differences of ideologies and principles 
could be resolved via the education of the minority (the \\Tong' side) by the majority 
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(the 'right' side). This sort of self-improvement process was, for Liu, a type of 
dialectical interaction. Liu's perception of dialectical interaction was independent of 
any ideological framework, as he recognised the fact that the interaction would 
happen freely, naturally and dialectically. This is best illustrated by his description of 
the possible social evolution under the new economic policy, the New Democracy. "Is 
New Democracy capitalist or socialist? It is neither of these but it comprises the 
elements of both. This is a special historical circumstance-it can either transform the 
nation into socialism, or into capitalism." (Liu, 1981, 1: 426-7) Therefore, the 
interaction that takes the form of inner party education, conducted via inner party 
struggle, would ultimately help to purify the party, as Liu stressed, "The inner party 
struggle is to maintain the party's purity and independence." The notion of self-
cultivation also resembles the same rationale, "The reason a communist has to 
cultivate himself ideologically is to make him a clean and loyal cadre member, the 
model for others." (Liu, 1981, 1: 179, 167) Connecting the above with his writing in 
1951 and his speech in April 1957, we see that: Liu's tolerance of pluralism and 
multiplicity was rooted in his belief that these differences within the Party could be 
resolved via 'education' and 'cultivation' in the process of transition, as long as the 
CCP was in charge and the adherence to its rules was maintained. 
It must also be noted that Liu's theory of the 'extinction of class struggle' that 
caused him enormous troubles did have a Marxist background. First of all, it seems to 
portray the situation depicted by Marx as the first phase of communism in the 
'Communist Manifesto', that when the proletariat is in power, classes are abolished, 
but inequality still exists (Marx in Marx & Engels, 1968, 306; see section 3.2.3 in 
chapter 3); secondly, in 'The German Ideology' (1846), where Marx believed that the 
contradiction in the absence of historical factors, which means the legacy from the 
previous intercourse of productive forces, will be the contradiction of the individuals, 
"The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other, so long as 
the above mentioned contradiction (contradiction of different productive forces) is 
absent, are conditions pertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them ... " 
(Marx in Marx & Engels, 1974, 87) And what Liu described as the 'contradiction 
among people' seemed to resemble Marx's 'contradiction of the individuals'. In his 
'Socialism, Utopian and Scientific' (1892), Engels stated what he believed to be the 
aftermath of the revolution, "The proletariat seizes political power and turns the 
means of production into state property. But, In doing this. it abolishes itself as 
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proletariat, abolishes all class distinctions and class antagonisms; abolishes also the 
state as state." (Engels in Marx & Engels, 1968, 406) Engels stated clearly that when 
the power and the means of production are in the hands of the proletariat, class 
distinction and the state would be rendered invalid. In addition, Marx had actually 
stated in the 'Communist Manifesto' (1848) that, "Of all the classes that stand face to 
face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a real revolutionary class. The 
other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of modem industries ... ,- (Marx in 
Marx & Engels, 2002, 231 )41 In other words, contradiction between bourgeoisie and 
proletariat would have "died out" if the proletariat revolution were successful. This, in 
Liu Shaoqi's terms, could mean the extinction of the bourgeois class via education 
and self-cultivation. 
This conception of Liu in terms of party and organisation had inevitably given 
birth to more of Liu' s policies reflecting the principles of inner party pluralism, which 
seemed to portray Liu as a liberal among the CCP leaders. For example, Liu was the 
first CCP leader who vowed to accept people from social ranks other than the 
proletariat as party members. In as early as 1932, Liu wrote about the eligibility of 
union members in an article titled 'The Backgrounds of the Members of the Union in 
the Soviet Area' published in Hongqi zhoubao (The Red Flag Weekly), " ... regardless 
of whether he or she is a factory worker, rural labourer, or office staff, no matter what 
is his or her religious and political belief, sex and age, place of origin ... as long as he 
is earning his living by selling his labour, he or she is eligible to be a union member." 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996, 1: 121-122) Liu had been quite consistent with this line of 
thought, as he even gave new interpretations of intellectuals, who had been 
traditionally classified as bourgeois. In 1949, Liu suggested including intellectuals in 
the revolutionary class, " ... the office staff in our factories are part of the workforces. 
We should not classify them as bourgeois simply because they are closer to the 
capitalists ... this will create division among the working class, and it is principally 
wrong." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 1: 200) In 1949 at Tianjin, Liu made a more precise 
statement, " ... the factory executives, university lecturers, and journalists all live on 
wages, so they should be allowed to join the union ... " (Liu, 1988, 238) 
I believe that what Liu did not say was: "if the CCP is in power, everybody 
can be transformed into a good communist, regardless of his or her class or 
41 These are all additional discussion to Chapter 3, which has covered the same area of studies from a 
different perspective. 
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background". However, Liu revoked his open support for intellectuals upon Mao's 
insistence that intellectuals should always be classified as bourgeois. He kept his 
silence even when the Premier, Zhou Enlai, fought hard to give intellectuals a proper 
social status in the spring of 1956 (Zhu, 2003, 9). This has shown clearly that Liu was 
afraid of Mao.42 Nevertheless, this is not detrimental to the fact that Liu had been 
advocating, possibly unwittingly, a sort of limited pluralism within a state or a party. 
According to the memoir of one of Liu's secretaries, Liu Zhengde, Liu's widow 
Wang Guangmei recalled how Liu was worried by the revolts in Poland and Hungary 
against Soviet control. Liu said, "If we do not allow 'small democracy' (xiaominzhu), 
do not even allow people to raise their concerns and opinions, then we are actually 
forcing them to pursue a 'big democracy' (daminzhu) (which is more problematic and 
even harder to control)." (Liu, 1994,38) 
But Liu was surely not a liberal. Liu's conception of the party was "liberal but 
focused," featuring a "contradictorily united relationship between the majority and the 
minority, the higher level and the lower level, the local unit and the CC" (Xu, 1980, 
part 1, ch 8, quoted in Dittmer, 1998, 165). So this brings us to what underlines Liu's 
thought of Party, discipline and organisation. What made Liu believe that the 
contradicting figures within a party could coexist and problems would be resolved, 
while the authority remains with the Party Centre? The answer could be Democratic 
Centralism, Liu's conception of the political system. H. F. Schurmann points out that 
the CCP was able to have the Nationalists defeated because they had stronger 
organisation. He stresses that two elements are central to the organisation of the CCP: 
first, the theory of contradiction, and second, Democratic Centralism, the Chinese 
Communist version of democracy. Schurmann sees in Liu a leader dealing explicitly 
with the theory and practice of organisation much more than Mao, and he seems to 
imply that the theory of contradiction that Mao illustrated in his speech in February 
1957 was based on Liu's work43 . Schurmann also sees the theory of contradiction and 
Democratic Centralism as highly practical in maintaining the unity of the party 
(Schurmann, 1960, 47--49). In one of Liu's early and undated speeches, 'Training in 
Organisation and Discipline' (Zuzhi yu jilii de xiuyang), he said, "What is the party's 
42 As we will see in the discussion of Chapter 6, aggression by Mao would always see a concession by 
Liu 
43 It is highly controversial to make this point, though Liu w~s m~re, proficient a.s a theoretic~a~. 
However, Mao did form his lengthy essay 'On Ten Great Relationships based on hIS study of LlU s 
idea prior to the Eighth Congress, see Chapter 6 
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organisational structure? It's a structure of contradiction; an object born out of the 
unity of contradiction ... the party is neither a joint association, nor a joint organisation 
of local party organs. It is a complete body of a collective nature~ comprising different 
party members and different departments." (Liu, 1969, 1: 369) 
His interpretation of Democratic Centralism was that he saw the leadership as 
'Centre" and their responsibility to members as 'democracy', and these two are 
actually contradictory in nature from the perspective of real democracy. "The party 
higher-level cadres were voted into office by the lower-level cadres who must, in tum, 
listen to the leaders they elected. This is the unity of contradiction in a system called 
Democratic Centralism." But he had never forgotten to remind the party members that, 
"The principle of Democratic Centralism calls for obedience of the minority to the 
majority, individual to the organisation, the lower level to the higher level and the 
party to the Central Committee. In addition, there is the disciplinary constraint, 
requiring every member to act in accordance with organisational principles." (Liu, 
1969, 1: 372, 374) In such we see the effort of Liu to disguise authoritarianism under 
the banner of pluralism, as he concluded, "Democracy and centralism are interrelated, 
inter-dependent, and inter-penetrated. You cannot take one out of the other." (Liu, 
1981, 2: 364) In the celebrated speech 'On Party' (1945), Liu even subordinated the 
leader whom he tried to position as party idol to his theory, "Comrade Mao is the 
leader of our party, but he is also an ordinary member of the party. He is under the 
direction of the party, and adopts a most scrupulous attitude in observing party 
discipline in every aspect." (Liu, 1981, 1 :319) Liu stressed that any obedience with 
conditions is wrong. "The obedience should be unconditional; the principle of 
Democratic Centralism must be followed strictly." (Liu, 1991,337) 
Liu's handling of the Cultural Revolution at the beginning of the movement 
was actually a reflection of his belief in 'centralism'. On 25th May 1966, the big 
character poster created by Nie Yuanzi and his followers first appeared in Beijing 
University. After Liu had assumed temporary command of the party in Mao's absence 
on 1 st June 1966, he dispatched the 'work team' to curb the heat of the student 
movement among the universities. Unaware of Mao's real intention in launching the 
campaign, Liu's main concern was the possible derailment of the Cultural Revolution, 
which he believed would lead to public chaos. He imposed the 'eight requirements' 
on the movement on 3rd June 1966, in which he requested that 1) the 'big character 
poster' must only be displayed within the university compound; 2) the meeting held 
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by the students involved in the movement must not disrupt the on-going classes; 3) 
the demonstration should only be held within the university compound and not take to 
the streets; 4) foreign students were not allowed to observe the activities nor to take 
part; 5) the campaigners should not disturb the family of those who were accused in 
the movement; 6) the confidentiality of the movement must be maintained; 7) 
physical assault and fabrication of conviction must be avoided; 8) all campaigners 
must stick to their position and act as good leaders (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 640; Ding, 
1967, 257). With the work team and his intention to impose discipline on the 
movement, Liu "committed the errors that defined his essential guilt." (Dittmer, 1998, 
54) However, it had clearly shown Liu's persistence in practicing the primacy of 
central authority as well as his distrust of the masses. 
Therefore Liu's notion of Democratic Centralism was, on one hand, the 
members elect their leader, on the other, the members must also obey the leader; the 
leader commands the members, but he must subject himself to the party's command. 
There is no party member that could go beyond the party's authority. Liu was 
extremely careful in choosing his words, as he tried to strike a balance between 
democracy and centralism. Consequently, this could be confusing for those who tried 
to ascertain Liu's personality. Nevertheless, Liu was the CCP leader who mentioned 
democracy the most, "The centralism and unification of the party was rooted in the 
basis of democracy. In order to strengthen the unity of the party, we must, seriously, 
promote democracy." And he was one of the central leaders who believed the 
existence of opposition would help the party to improve, "the key to promoting 
democracy within the party is to encourage criticism (of the Party's Centre) and self-
criticism within the party." (Liu, 1981,2: 411-412) "We must have some opposition 
parties, whether they are from the public or within the party, we need some open 
opposition," but it was not an ordinary opposition that he meant, as he was indeed 
referring to opposition that would not challenge the central government, " ... as long as 
these opposition parties do not break the disciplinary rules, do not conspire to 
overthrow the government ... if they just have different opinions, they should be 
allowed to exist." (Liu, 1991, 713-716) So the bottom line of his tolerance of 
opposition had been made clear: "Some members intended to sabotage the unity of 
the party and confront the party ... they attempted to create divisions within the 
party ... (in such cases) the party should in return carry out harsh struggle against them, 
punish them, and even expel them if necessary:' (Liu, 1981,2: 130) 
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4.5 Afterwards 
The claim that Liu~s theory on party and organisation resembled the Leninist 
theory of strict party discipline is not entirely correct, though it is still acceptable to a 
certain extent. What Liu stressed was the centralised control of the Party and the 
gradual transformation (or self-cultivation) of the non-proletariat, in comparison with 
Lenin's conception of discipline that was rooted in distrust and scepticism of the 
bourgeoisie. As we discussed in the previous section, Lenin talked about dismantling 
the coalition between capitalists and socialists after the domination of proletariat~ as 
he believed that after seizing power, the proletariat must begin to impose strict 
discipline in order to expel, or filter the remnants of the capitalists. In other words, 
Lenin's acceptance of the bourgeoisie was a sort of political expediency, as he had 
never hidden his distrust of them, and it must be noted that this is entirely different 
from Liu's distrust of the masses. The root of Lenin's scepticism was actually his 
belief that the building of socialism in Russia could only be successful if other nations 
had become socialist. 
Liu's theories were quite substantially resemblant to Bukharin's model of 
'grow in' transition. Bukharin saw that towards the end of state capitalism, the 
subordination of all the workers organisations to the state would complete the 
transformation of state capitalism to socialism, and he called the process statification. 
Bukharin believed that as long as the proletariat rules, anything capitalist will be 
converted into its antithesis if put under state control. This could have also reflected 
the application of Engels' statement of 'transformation to the opposite' (during the 
end of the period of state capitalism) by Bukharin, but on a reductionist basis. 
Bukharin saw the formation of the workers-peasant alliance (which, in the Russian 
case was the alliance of proletariat and capitalist), or Smychka, could achieve a sort of 
equilibrium that would not only maintain the stability of the society during the 
transitional period, but also gradually transform the nation into socialists. This has 
been reflected in Liu's tolerance of members from different backgrounds during the 
transitional period, as his belief was that the dialectical interaction via party education 
would transform these people into socialists. Bukharin talked more about economy 
than party unity, but his famous advocacy for the control of 'commanding heighf by 
the proletariat during the transitional period had no doubt reflected Liu's insistence on 
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central control. However, where central control is concerned, Liu was more Leninist 
and even sometimes, Stalinist; though approaches taken by the three leaders were 
different. So the complexity of the leadership styles and the politics could present a 
confusing scenario: Liu did not trust the masses and preferred centralised control, like 
Stalin and Lenin, but he tolerated inner party multiplicity and resented continuous 
class struggle; Mao on the other hand trusted the masses and hated bureaucracy and 
centralisation, but he could not stand a single word of opposition and would destroy 
his enemies in a ruthless manner without hesitation, like Stalin. Therefore those 
(particularly the American school) who are not familiar with the historical 
background of Chinese and Russian communism could easily jump to conclusions 
such as calling all revolutionary leaders 'Stalinist' or 'Leninist'. 
As one of the revolutionaries who survived the cruel power struggle and brutal 
warfare before the liberation, it was not a surprise at all that Liu did not appreciate the 
meaning of real democracy. He was in a dilemma when he tried to counter Mao's 
influence with his well-theorised Democratic Centralism, while knowing that he was 
fighting the idol that he created. He had never opposed Mao openly. Most of the time 
Liu found himself stuck in the hesitancy of whether to fight or appease Mao, and 
always tangled with ambiguous statements, like this, " to implement Democratic 
Centralism, we must avoid individual dictatorship ... group leadership will only be 
successful under Democratic Centralism ... but the principle of our group leadership is 
not to deny the function of an individual leader, but to enhance the personal 
leadership so that the leader would carry out his duty in more effective manner." (Liu, 
1981, 2: 455, 271) His indecisiveness could be his weakest link, and that undermines 
his credentials as a theorist significantly. But to understand Liu's theory as a whole, 
we should also look at what separated him from Mao distinctively-his theory of 
transition in economy. 
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Chapter 5: Liu Shaoqi on Economy 
5.1 Introduction: The Consolidation of New Democracy 
New Democracy (xinminzhuzhuyi) was launched in the 1940s by the CCP as a 
scheme of mixed economy, as well as a conception of the political alliance of various 
classes during the period of transition in China. Mao's interpretation in the early 
1940s sees New Democracy as an improvised version of Sun Yat San's 'Three People 
Ideology' (sanminzhuyi)44. It is called 'new' because it began with the "premise that 
bourgeois democracy was bankrupt in a China so long oppressed by the bourgeois 
democracy of the West; Mao announced that the new state was to be not a bourgeois 
state but a people's republic." (Meisner, 1999, 58) If Sun Yat San's revolution was 
seen as a democratic bourgeois revolution on one end, and the Soviet regime was the 
dictatorship of the proletariat on the other, then, Mao said, that New Democracy fell 
in between. It had a proletariat-dominated government, and a society comprised of 
petty bourgeoisie, proletariat, peasants and intellectuals. Bank, transport and major 
industries should be state-owned, but private ownership of property, as well as the 
private enterprises that "could not have major impact on the nation" would continue 
to exist, because "China's economy is still very much under-developed." (Mao, 1952, 
643-649) 
After the victory over the Nationalist Army, the Second Plenum of the 
Seventh Central Committee outlined the 'Common Framework' (gongtonggangling): 
a temporary constitution that comprised the economic, political, educational and 
cultural agendas as policies for the period of transition. It stressed that the priority of 
the nation by then was to revive the economy by implementing New Democracy. 
(BNSBWH, 2002, 4: 1681-2)The imposition of New Democracy was actually the 
product of mutual consensus among the major leadership that everybody saw as the 
only way out for China's economy, and it was believed not to be a short term plan. In 
June 1950, Mao complemented the policies in his speech delivered at the Third 
44 The Three People Ideology, which was invented by Mr. Sun Yet San, was the backbone of the anti-
feudalist revolution in China (1911). It advocated the unification of the nation and the dignity of ethnic 
Chinese (min~/11I), emphasised the people's right to rule the country and the protection of basic human 
rights (minquan), and believed that better quality of living could be achieved through wiser distribution 
of wealth and the modernisation of industries (minsheng). See more discussion on Mao's reaction to 
New Democracy in section 3.5 of Chapter 3 
161 
Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee, '"Some thought we should eliminate 
capitalism at an early stage (right after the revolution). That is wrong, as it does not 
suit our country." He then gave further illustration on 23rd June 1950, '"Gradually, our 
country will progress. We have gone through the war, and we are now going through 
the economic reformation via New Democracy. One day in the future, when the 
economy has been revived and consolidated and the cultural development has 
blossomed, we will then be ready for socialism." (Mao, 1977a, 19, 27) This was 
echoed by the Premier, Zhou Enlai, who stated in 1949 that, '"It will be a long period 
of time before our country can progress healthily and steadily to socialism." (Zhou, 
1984a, 12) A year later, on 13th April 1950, Zhou had not forgotten to remind his 
comrades in a committee meeting that, "Everybody knows it would take roughly 15 
years to attain socialism. So I think we should cooperate with the capitalists during 
the period of transition. This is not the time to get rid ofthem."(Zhou, 1984b, 166-
167) 
Note that Mao did not talk about the immediate transformation of the nation 
into socialism. In the Enlarged Meeting of the Political Office in September 1948, 
Mao agreed that it was not the time to abolish private ownership, '"when do we begin 
to 'attack' (i.e. to nationalise private businesses and to collectivise private properties)? 
I think it will take another fifteen years after victory (the success of the revolution)." 
A year later, he made another cautious statement that, '"we will assess the state of 
development in about twenty years time, before we decide whether to go into 
socialism." In February 1951, Mao was still defending New Democracy, as he 
believed that China should '"take three years for preparation and ten years for full 
economic construction before marching to socialism." (Gu, 1996, 361) However, that 
did not reflect Mao's real agenda, as Mao was actually reluctant to prolong the period 
of transition. When Mao gave his interpretation of New Democracy, he stressed that 
the development of China's economy "must not only benefit the bourgeois minority, 
as it should also constrain the expansion of private capital and assure equal rights to 
agricultural land." (Mao, 1952, 650) Note that this is a self-contradicting statement, as 
the containment of private businesses was not in line with expansion of productive 
forces, which was the theme of New Democracy. But it does reveal Mao's views on 
economic construction. (For more discussion on Mao's collectivisation plan and his 
change of mind, see Chapters 3 and 6). 
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The most vigorous defender of New Democracy was Liu Shaoqi, who gave a 
definitive and comprehensive explanation of the policy from the perspective of 
Marxism. Liu also highlighted the primacy of the development of productive forces 
before the establishment of a socialist state. "The society of New Democracy consists 
of the elements of both socialism and capitalism," Liu said, in calling this "a special 
historical form." In 1951, Liu said in the Meeting of National Propaganda that, 
" ... Now there are many people who talk about socialism, I think it's too early, at least 
ten years too early. Of course, we will keep talking about socialism as the party's 
ideology and propaganda. But in terms of practicality, to achieve socialism within ten 
years is beyond our reach." (Liu, 1993,47,182) In a brief report written in June 1949, 
Liu had outlined the components of the economic model under New Democracy, 
which he believed would have coexisted in the newly liberated China. These 
components were: 
1. Nationalised industries 
2. Cooperative economy 
3. State capitalist economy 
4. Private capitalist economy 
5. Petty commodity trading (Liu, 1981, 1: 426-7). 
The model he presented resembled the mixed economy model of Lenin that 
we discussed in Chapter 3, with little difference. Liu particularly stressed that petty 
commodity trading still formed the major part of China's economy, and the 
nationalised industries would take the leading role. "'The contradiction during the 
period of New Democracy is the contradiction between the capitalist economy and 
socialist economy; therefore the support of petty commodity trading is vitaL .. so they 
should be treated with caution". (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 161-162) Liu always 
believed that if China were to revive its devastated post-war economy, the existence 
of private businesses was vital. For Liu, the key component of the structure of a 
socialist economy was the nationalised industries, which were still at the infant stage 
of development. In September 1948, Liu pointed out in his article 'The Economy of 
New Democracy and Cooperatives' that "China is still an agricultural country with its 
economic strength in small scale production ... to eliminate capitalism prematurely 
will be a significant mistake". (Bo, 1993, 1: 47; Zhang in Lii ed., 1991,326) "During 
the ten year period when we are building the economy, all five components of the 
163 
economy have to grow, though more attention could be paid to the development of 
large-scale nationalised industries." 
In July 1951, Liu stressed again that China needed time to transform itself , 
"we would take at least ten years to go into socialism, the most may be fifteen years, 
and I do not think we need twenty years." (Liu, 1993, 206-209) Therefore Liu 
warned the radical left that the fundamental principle of land reform is not to aid the 
poor with properties confiscated from the rich, but to "emancipate the rural productive 
forces from the 'fetter' of the feudal landlord." (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 232) Liu sees in 
New Democracy a long term policy of mixed economy to develop the Chinese 
economy; while rich peasants, the traditional target of the socialist revolutionary, 
should be protected, "the policy to protect the rich peasants is not a temporary 
measure, but a long term one. The rich peasant economy should be preserved for the 
whole term of New Democracy. Socialisation of the rural economy and 
collectivisation of rural properties can only be achieved when large-scale mechanised 
farming exists in rural China. But this takes time." (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 235) Note the 
contrasting difference between his and Mao's statement in treatment of private 
business and the bourgeois class. Liu's perception of economic development under 
the New Democracy could be summarised as follows: 
1. The backbone of the economy is the nationalised industries, which consist of 
major heavy industries and finance institutions; the establishment of which 
was the prerequisite before the nation could become socialist. 
2. The development of cooperatives as the distributing channel for goods from 
rural China and small-scale producers, helping the poor peasants and petty 
bourgeoisie by improving their income as well as preparing them for future 
collectivisation and institutional transformation. 
3. State capitalism would be the dominant economic structure of New 
Democracy. Businesses of private capitalists would not be abolished in so far 
as their existence did not undermine the function of the nationalised industries. 
4. Any industry of a monopolistic nature (like Railways) should be nationalised. 
However, partial or divisional privatisation of nationalised enterprises IS 
allowed provided it is under state supervision (Liu, 1981, 1: 427-9). 
Apparently, Liu was well aware of what the policy had to achieve for China, 
and what he expected from the policy. Therefore he pushed his point further in March 
1951 when he drafted the 'Eight standard conditions to be a Communist member. For 
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the first time, Liu stressed that the policy of New Democracy must be consolidated 
instead of being replaced in the near future and he stated, "The ultimate objective of 
the CCP is to establish a communist state. Now it has to struggle to consolidate the 
New Democracy, while in the future it has to struggle for the realisation of socialism, 
and finally it should push for the emergence of communism." (Liu, 1981, 2: 62) 
During the period between the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the differences between 
Mao and Liu had not become explicit.45 However, Liu's ability and enthusiasm in 
giving a new dimension to the interpretation of New Democracy, as well as his 
advocacy of the 'consolidation' of the policy in 1951, invoked resentment from Mao. 
While Liu believed he was basically echoing Mao's statement besides giving his 
personal interpretation, Mao had decided to speed up the collectivisation and halt the 
New Democracy. Seemingly, the rift between the leaders was due to Mao's change of 
mind, as Liu's notion of the 'consolidation of New Democracy' could barely mean 
any deviation from Central policy, particularly when the majority of the leaders had 
shown solidarity in the defence of the policy. But a detailed study of the two's ideas 
would have revealed that from the very beginning, Liu's perception of New 
Democracy had been different from Mao's. In other words, the rift had long existed 
even before Liu urged consolidation of the policy. 
The first aspect of Mao and Liu's differences with respect to New Democracy 
was their views upon the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In 
addition to what has been discussed in Chapter 3, one of the possible reasons that Mao 
turned his back on New Democracy sooner than expected could be the result of the 
'Three Anti-Movement' 46 at the end of 1951, which was aimed at rectifying 
'corruption, waste and inefficiency' among the cadres, when he gave instructions to 
45 Although, as stated in Chapter 3, there were occasions when Mao called for earlier collectivisation 
before he succumbed to the pressure within the party in 1956 at the Eighth Congress, the rift between 
them had only surfaced in 1957, after Mao defeated the Anti-Rash Advance camp. However, Liu had 
remained low profile since then, though he continued to give his own interpretation of economic 
policies under the shadow of Mao. The 'official rift' between them occurred in 1962 when Liu 
admitted that the Great Leap was more a human error than natural disaster. 
46 The movement was launched on 1 st December 1951, followed the discovery of pervasive fraudulent 
activities by party's cadres in rural China. In the countryside the main methods were intensification of 
land reform and development of cooperatives, while in urban areas they were the suppression of 
counter-revolutionaries and democratic reform, attack of secret societies and independent labour forces. 
The campaign was then followed by the 'Five Anti-Movement' on 26th January 1952, which targeted 
the urban capitalists to tackle bribery, tax evasion, embezzlement of materials, abuse of state property, 
and spying on national economic information. It was actually "meant to strengthen control over 
business, as activists in workers' organisations were encouraged to examine their employers' finance 
and uncover evidence of tax evasion and malpractices." (Teiwes, 1979, 105-108; Dillon, 1998, 102-
103,316) 
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clean up the party in the mass purges against the corrupted cadres. Mao regarded the 
rectification movement as "a war between bourgeoisie and proletariat". (Mao, 1988, 
646) Bear in mind that in 1950, Mao still stressed that, "the enemies that we struggle 
against were imperialists and feudalists, not the native capitalist." (Mao, 1987, 292) 
After the purge, however, Mao was overwhelmed by its outcome that had depicted a 
picture of pervasive corruption amongst the Party's cadres, which was presumably 
directly connected to rich peasants or the bourgeoisie. By 6th June 1952, Mao had 
already decided to leave New Democracy behind and get rid of the capitalists, as he 
said, "After defeating the landlord and the corrupt bureaucrat, the contradiction within 
China now is the contradiction between workers and the native capitalists, hence the 
native capitalists are no longer positioned in the middle (since they had become the 
target of the struggle, they should be positioned on the Right)." (Mao, 1989,458) 
Liu, on the other hand, had never regarded the contradiction between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the major contradiction within society, as was 
discussed in Chapter 4. As he pointed out in his report to Stalin in 1949: "if a regime 
were to concentrate its attack on capitalists, the country would soon be under the 
dictatorship of the proletariat (which should only exist upon the completion of 
transition)" (Shi, 1990, 161) Similarly, in 1957, during the aftermath of the 
collectivisation of rural China, Liu reminded the nation that it is time to make 
construction of the economy our priority, " ... now the enemies have been eliminated, 
the landlord and bourgeois class have been eliminated, the anti-revolutionary has also 
been eliminated. So basically the major contradiction between classes has perished, 
the problem of our contradiction with the enemies does not exist." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 
2: 398) Almost ten years later, the Red Guard's attack on Liu during the Cultural 
Revolution was in fact a revelation of the rift of the two leaders, " ... how dare Liu say 
the class struggle is over? This is contrary to Chairman Mao's idea, how dare he say 
class struggle does not exist in socialist nations? Chairman Mao has made it clear-
class struggle exists anytime, everywhere ... " (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 366) Comparatively, 
while Mao formulated his economic policy on the basis of class struggle and 
contradiction, Liu implemented New Democracy on the basis of economics; as 
Schram sees it, "Liu placed great emphasis on doing things in an orderly manner, and 
not allowing the process of agrarian transformation to get out of hand ... he declared 
that collectivisation would only be possible sometime in the future if the necessary 
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industrial basis had been laid to permit the introduction of mechanised farming." 
(Schram, 1969, 79) 
In Mao's 'On Contradiction' (1937), in which he copied many of the contents 
of Engels' Dialectics of Nature, he emphasised the existence of contradictions as a 
reflection of dialectics, as he says, "The universality of contradiction is, it exists in 
any process we could have, and it occurs throughout the whole process of all kinds of 
development." (Mao, 1952, 771) But Liu saw the building of the economy as the main 
task ahead for the nation, as he believed that the contradiction between the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat did not pose a major threat to social stability. In Liu's 
picture, the only native capitalists who existed in China after the liberation were the 
bourgeoisie, whom he regarded as pivotal in reviving the nation economy. He 
believed that building the productive force was the priority of the government, and "as 
long as the Third World War does not break out ... our only mission is to build the 
economy." He repeated his view on 26th August 1952, stressing that he could not see 
any possibility or necessity for mass scale collectivisation or socialisation campaigns 
in the near future, as the nation "should now concentrate all their effort in economic 
construction." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 302) 
The second aspect that divided Liu from Mao in terms of New Democracy 
was their views on the function of capitalism. Mao believed that feudalism had been 
deeply rooted in the newly liberated China. So capitalism was, for Mao, a lesser evil 
that could expediently replace feudalism before socialism could be introduced. Thus 
Mao said, "To get rid of the oppression of domestic feudalism and foreign 
imperialism and to replace them with capitalism is not only an improvement, but also 
an inevitable process. This process does not only benefit capitalists, but also the 
proletariat. .. we have had foreign imperialism, colonialism, and feudalism, we are 
indeed short of (the elements of) capitalism at this moment." (Mao, 1953, 1083-4) 
So capitalism was just 'something in short supply' that he needed to impose so as to 
replace feudalism. As Cui from Guangxi Nationalities College points out, Mao did not 
specify a specific policy to deal with the capitalists; but instead, he advocated the 
struggle against the capitalists as well as making use of capitalism concurrently, 
without particular emphasis or priority being asserted (Cui, 2000, 54). Hence, Mao's 
stance towards capitalism looked ambiguous, and that reflected a notion of political 
expediency, as he said in the Third Plenum of the Seventh Committee (1950). that the 
priority by then was to eliminate the remnants of KMT (the Nationalist Party or 
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Guomindang), and in order to isolate the primary enemy, "we should rally the petty 
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class and 
on the basis of the worker-peasant alliance. The national bourgeoisie will eventually 
cease to exist, but at this stage we should rally them around us and not push them 
away. We should struggle against them' on one hand and unite with them on the 
other." (Mao, 1961, 35) 
Liu also talked about concurrently uniting and struggling against the capitalists, 
but he looked at capitalism more objectively, as he believed that capitalism was a 
stage of social evolution that a nation must go through, particularly in terms of 
economic construction. Tactfully, he differentiated native capitalists, who were indeed 
the petty bourgeoisie and domestic entrepreneurs, from the so called bureaucratic 
capitalists, who were classified as such because of their background as the ex-
members of the KMT. As a result, he was able to prioritise the tasks for his comrades 
in dealing with the capitalists. "We have three enemies, namely imperialism, 
feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism ... " Liu said in Tianjin, in April 1949, "we 
must know the difference between friends and enemies. To regard native capitalists as 
enemies is against the benefit of the workers. Dealing with the native capitalists 
involves unification and struggle. Politically, we should unite them to struggle against 
the imperialists, feudalists and bureaucratic capitalists; economically, we would unite 
them to develop our productive force. We cannot single out unification from struggle, 
or vice versa, as the two issues are related to each other. But what is the priority? 
Today, the priority is to unite them. So the struggle against the native capitalists must 
be on a limited scale and should not damage the unification." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 
201) To legitimise the capitalist elements of New Democracy, he put forward his 
carefully phrased statement, "Today China should allow the development of 
capitalism because the initial stage of industrial capitalism is progressive, and it will 
assist the development of productive forces .. .In his 'Communist Manifesto'. Karl 
Marx told us that capitalism has only existed for 100 years (in the West) yet it 
manages to maximise the level of productivity. Today, capitalism in China is not at 
the corrupted terminal stage, but at an infant stage. It could still be developed ... " 
(ZGYJZZS, 1970, 213) 
The undisguised support for the persistence of capitalism made Liu an odd 
figure in the newly established Communist China. Unsurprisingly. Liu's support for 
capitalists drew waves of accusations, which, as Dittmer summarises, convicted Liu 
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as being opposing to socialisation and pursuing revisionism. Dittmer points out that 
Liu justified his 'shielding of capitalists' by "alleging the bourgeois were making 
progress in transformation through thought reform to a proletariat standpoint," which 
was firmly denied by Maoists (Dittmer, 1998, 197-199). Although most of the 
CCP's leaders shared the perception of the necessity of imposing New Democracy in 
the early 1950s, few could, like Liu, visualise a clearer picture of what should be done 
during the transitional period, and that was why the ambiguity of New Democracy 
emerged. Therefore it is not surprising at all that one of the first Red Guard attacks on 
Liu during the inauguration of the Cultural Revolution was against his interpretation 
of New Democracy, "Liu has twisted the facts by claiming the period of transition to 
socialism as the period of New Democracy, he does not recognise the period of 
transition as socialist ... this has shown his bourgeois inclination." (ZGYJZZS, 1970, 
364) This statement from the Red Guard simply reflected the confusion over the 
definition of the period of transition, and the controversy of whether the period was 
socialist or capitalist, a question that had been haunting the CCP leadership. Therefore, 
in as early as 1951, Liu had gone a step further by urging the consolidation of the 
policy, in an attempt to shrug off the ambiguity of the definition of New Democracy 
and the reluctance to accept the legitimacy of the capitalists. It was obvious that Liu 
had a set of ideologies that underlined his advocacy, which not only distinguished him 
from the mainstream leadership, but also reflected his ideologies in rebuilding China's 
economy. So while New Democracy was the Central policy, the 'consolidation of 
New Democracy' was originally Liu's idea. Liu's idea of economic construction in 
China via the consolidation of New Democracy comprised two major elements: firstly, 
the primacy of productive force, and secondly, the cooperative as a means of 
distribution. 
5.2 The Primacy of Productive Forces 
5.2.1 The Retention of Capitalism 
Liu's problem with the Maoist leadership probably started with his celebrated 
series of 'Tianjin Speeches' (Tianjin jianghua), in April-May 1949 during his trip to 
the newly occupied Tianjin to visit the local entrepreneurs. "The problem of today's 
China is not the dominance of the capitalists, but the shortage of capitalists." Liu says 
on 28th April 1949, "If the bourgeoisie are eliminated as a result of class struggle, 
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factory closures and worker redundancies would follow, this is therefore not a 
favourable solution for the workers ... while capitalism has existed in other countries 
for hundreds of years, it has just existed in China for few decades ... so it should be 
continued under New Democracy." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 201) But as a communist 
leader, Liu's 'theory of exploitation' could have surpassed all the perceived 
boundaries, "There are three enemies for revolution (foreign imperialist, Chinese 
feudalist and bureaucratic capitalist), but there are also four friends of the revolution, 
who are workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national capitalists, and we must be 
able to differentiate them. If we were to attack capitalists, we would have attacked our 
friends. Capitalists do exploit workers, but (at the present time) this exploitation is 
capitalist instead of feudalist, so (at this stage) we will not oppose the exploitation but 
welcome it and let the private businesses develop. We would only constrain the 
exploitation when produce is abundant and surpluses (of social wealth) exist." 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 209) 
Apparently this is the plain application of Marxist historical materialism, but it 
did take great courage for a communist leader of a new socialist state to make such a 
speech. Mao, on the other hand, though not impressed by Liu's 'advocacy for 
exploitation', had to suppress his anger at a time when comforting the bewildered 
entrepreneur was the priority. Mao was understood to have grumbled to Bo Yibo that, 
'''exploitation is good' is not a proper statement." (Bo, 1993, 1: 55) Liu's 
preoccupation with the primacy of productive force had actually underlined almost all 
of his economic theories. However, it is also said that Liu was in fact dispatched to 
Tianjin with the mission to stabilise society and ease the public's fear of the new 
regime. Therefore, Liu was just carrying out a duty assigned to him by the Party 
centre, as even Mao had forwarded a moderate statement in terms of economic 
development, "Only when production in cities is restored and developed, when 
consumer cities are transformed into producer cities, can the people's political power 
be consolidated." (Lieberthal, 1980, 40-42) But Liu's self-styled interpretation of 
the Party's message had made him stand out, and the statement of 'exploitation is 
good' had cost him dear during the Cultural Revolution. Lieberthal also sees Liu 
opposing the Party's practice of mass mobilisation and pushing for demobilisation of 
Tianjin's population, as well as encouraging the formation of labour-capital, worker-
staff, and student-faculty alliances in order to win the "cooperation of the people who 
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virtually monopolised the city's scarce administrative and entrepreneurial skills-the 
capitalists." (Lieberthal, 1980, 43) 
So the series of Tianjin Speeches that he gave in 1949 were not, as Bo Yibo 
described, "accidentally deviating from the main line." (Bo, 1993, 1: 62) Instead, the 
speeches simply reflected Liu's notion that even communist rhetoric could be 
secondary to the development of productive force. Economic construction had always 
been Liu's priority. In order to improve living standards, Liu believed there were two 
jobs to be done, "Firstly, to overpower the foreign imperialists, the Chinese feudal 
landlords and bureaucrats, establish the dictatorship of the people's democracy, 
achieve the independence and unification of China ... launch the land reform to 
eliminate the classes of landlords and feudalists, so as to emancipate the productive 
forces from the city and the village." For Liu, to defeat the feudalists is to emancipate 
the productive force, which had been 'fettered' under feudalism. But this was just the 
first step, "This is still not the development or improvement of productive forces." 
Because this was only "the job to be done before we could proceed to the second 
task ... with the establishment and consolidation of a people's democratic dictatorship, 
and the gathering of other resources, we will thus develop the economy, on the current 
foundation, to utilise every unit of resources we have to lift productivity, to improve 
the quantity and quality of production ... in order to progress the nation towards 
industrialisation, which is the only way to improve the living standards of Chinese 
people." Liu believed that only the development of productive forces could complete 
the revolution with a perfect ending, "If we could not carry out the second task 
successfull y after the first task, we could not claim to have succeeded in the 
revolution-in fact, our revolution would have become meaningless."(Liu, 1981, 2: 
2-5,32) 
Liu's insistence on the priority of productive force development seemed 
inevitably, to portray him as a spokesman for the capitalists, which could have been 
detrimental to his image as one of the top leaders in the CCP. Liu knew that the public 
perception against capitalism could be a problem; therefore, he had been very careful 
in phrasing his words. In the Eighth Congress (1956), he stretched his prowess of 
theorisation to the extent that he redefined and repositioned capitalists in Chinese 
society, "" .the foreign imperialists have been removed, China has become a great 
independent country, the puppet of the foreign imperialist-the opportunist 
bureaucratic capitalists have been eliminated, as have the feudalist landlords and the 
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rich peasants. Those landlords and rich peasants who used to exploit the poor have 
been transformed into new and hard working men. Native capitalist is a stage in the 
transition from being an exploiter to a labourer and contributor. .. " Apparently, Liu 
tried hard to shield those with a rich peasant background from the hostility of the Left, 
as he reminded his comrades in the Eighth Congress, that, "The storm of revolution is 
over, new production relations have been established. Therefore the mission to fight 
has become the mission to protect the nation's productive force. The methods to 
struggle have to change as well." (Liu, 1981, 2: 202-3, 253) This echoed Liu's 
assertion in the early 1950s-"The policy to protect the rich peasant is not a short 
term policy, but a long term one." (Liu, 1981, 2: 40) This statement became Liu's 
liability during the Cultural Revolution, but it did show how Liu's belief in the 
primacy of productive force had affected his ideology. But Liu was indeed very 
certain of what the preservation of the rich peasant was for, "The long term 
accumulation of wealth (by the capitalists) would fund the construction of heavy 
industries, the success of which would enable us to transform the urban capitalists into 
socialists; the development of the nationalised industries would result in the 
mechanisation of agriculture, which would then prompt the socialisation of the rich 
peasant economy in the rural area, and the development of agricultural 
collectivisation." (Liu, 1981, 1: 430) By then "the rich peasant economy will no 
longer be needed, but it would take a long time to get us there." (Liu, 1981,2: 41) 
From the very beginning, Liu knew his plea for the continuation of a capitalist 
market might attract fierce criticism, so the assertion of the "development of 
productive forces" has become his trump card, as he could always relate the notion to 
Marx's theory on productive forces. The legitimacy of such a claim had enabled him 
to avoid political turmoil when he praised 'capitalist exploitation' and proposed a 
long-term policy to protect rich peasants. Most important of all, such legitimacy 
allowed him to advocate some principles of a market economy as a solution to the 
problems faced by Chinese economic construction. Hence Liu's stereotypical defence 
of a capitalist economy would normally sound like, "To curb the expansion of the 
private industries would undermine the development of productive forces." ~7 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 279) Wang of Zhong Shan University sees Liu's method as ""to 
develop productive forces via the market economy_ guiding the peasant in transition 
47 A statement extracted from his speech given in a seminar conducted by the National Political 
Committee, on 13 th May 1951, printed in his Nianpu (Liu's life: chronological record) 
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to collective farming from private farming." (Wang, 2004, 105) But it is not entirely 
correct to say that Liu placed his emphasis solely on the growth of a capitalist 
economy, as what Liu believed in was the overall progress of all the five economic 
components, including the capitalist economy. In a speech given in July 1951, Liu had 
made it clear that, "At the stage of New Democracy, nationalised industries, 
cooperative economy, private capitalist economy, state capitalist economy, and petty 
commodity trading should all be developed ... gradually, the industries would 
proportionately outgrow the agriculture, and the socialist and semi-socialist economy 
would proportionately outgrow the private capitalist economy as well. This will take 
ten to twenty years, then we could transit to socialism via agricultural collectivisation 
and nationalisation of heavy industries ... to achieve collectivisation by merely relying 
on the peasant is an empty dream." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 284) 
After Mao had decided to speed up the collectivisation in 1957, overturned the 
resolution of the Eighth Congress and restored his old assertion that the major 
contradiction of the society was still the contradiction between proletariat and 
bourgeois48; Liu in 1959 still reminded the nation that, "when the mixed economy 
becomes a single model of socialist economy, the contradiction between the 
productivity and the social demand would become the major contradiction. This is the 
contradiction that will cultivate the productive forces." (Liu, 1993,406) The centre of 
Liu's thought was that the production relations should be adjusted or altered to suit 
the development of productive forces, not the other way round (Xi, 2002, 11). During 
his visit to Henan in 1957, Liu discovered the inability of the rural Chinese to cope 
with institutional changes during the process of collectivisation. He thus made an 
important statement that reflected his interpretation of Marxist theory, "Since the level 
of productive forces is so low, we should have a smaller production unit, and a 
smaller distribution unit as well. An oversized distribution unit would cause the 
expansion of production relations, to an extent that a lower level of productive forces 
could not match:' (Liu, 1993, 328-329) Liu stressed his points again in 1959 when 
48 The first time Mao changed his mind was during the period of 1951 and 1952, when he believed the 
root of cadres' corruption was the existence of capitalism. That was followed by the launch of the 
. Three Anti' & . Five Anti' Campaigns and later the implementation of the General Line of Transition 
in 1953, which was meant to replace New Democracy and to speed up the collectivisation of rural 
China. Mao succumbed to reality after the unsatisfactory result of the first five year plan and agreed to 
more market based economic measures at the Eighth Congress (1956). A month after the conclusion of 
the Congress, the uprising in Hungary gave Mao the best excuse to ignore the resolution of the Eighth 
Congress and to implant the fear of capitalism once again into the party. (Feng, 1998, 266-29..+; Gu. 
1996,359-374) See Chapter 3. 
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he issued a warning against drastic institutional change during the Great Leap, ·,It is 
detrimental to the development of productive forces if the production relations expand 
faster than productive forces." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 512) 
5.2.2 The Reform of Work, Rewards and Distribution 
Wealth distribution and the relationship between the administration and the 
public are the other two topics that Liu saw in connection with the development of 
productive forces. When Liu expressed his concern on the working relationship 
between the cadres and the labourers, he stated that the relationship between the 
leaders and the public could affect the development of productive forces, "'Of all the 
relationships among the workers (he meant proletariat), the most important is the 
relationship between the leaders and those working under them, as well as between 
national (political) institutions and the public. If the factory managers, the head of the 
nation, and the ministers could not sustain good relationships with the public, it would 
have a negative effect on the development of productive forces. To understand this, 
we have to view it from the economic perspective." (Liu, 1993, 416) Liu tended to 
relate productive forces to human nature, as he saw the motive of workers to work 
hard as a driving force behind the expansion of productive forces. This perception 
could have also underlined his belief in the retention of capitalism. His comments on 
the socialist distribution system (of wealth) gave a further illustration of this notion, 
"the distribution system is a very important part of production relations. A good 
system of distribution would lift the workers' spirits, hence the expansion of 
productive forces. The development will go the opposite way should the distribution 
be unfair. This is the rule of economy. So (as to sustain the level of productive forces) 
the socialist society should always review its system of distribution." (Liu, 1993, 328) 
Indeed, Liu managed to blend his notion of contradiction into his theory of productive 
forces, presenting himself as a new interpreter of Marx, though most of the time he 
was merely circling around a few major issues, and made the most use of them. 
Nevertheless, the lucid application of Marxist theory in connecting distribution with 
the productive force reflected his ability in theorisation, "The contradiction between 
productive forces and production relations in a socialist society is reflected in the 
distribution system. The production relation has to match the productive forces. and 
the two would not match each other if the distribution were unfair, which would in 
turn undennine the development of productive forces. Only a fair and rational 
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distribution system would sustain the development of productive forces." (Liu, 1993~ 
337-338) So the theme of Liu's ideal distribution system is not "equality'. but 
"fairness' . 
The reason behind Liu's concern over the distribution system was his fear of 
the dominance of ultra-left ideology-the advocacy for the distribution by needs (""to 
each according to his need", the theme of the highest phase of communism, see 
discussion in section 3.2.3), which he believed would hamper economic development. 
Therefore Liu openly opposed the practice of egalitarianism 49, which he condemned 
as non-socialist. In April 1961, the year when the calamitous impact of the Great Leap 
had surfaced, Liu quoted the people's commune and public canteen50 as examples of 
how egalitarianism could damage productivity, ""The public canteen fosters 
egalitarianism, and many (who supported the canteen) are afraid of the revival of the 
two extremes (rich and poor) should the public canteen be abolished .. .it is possible 
we might have those two extremes again, but that is not a big issue ... with the current 
system of allocating the food and household goods in the peasantry, the poor would 
have a certain level of social security. But we should also have some differences 
among ourselves-some are better off, and some are not. It is not beneficial to the 
economy if everybody is equal. Egalitarianism defies the theme of socialism, which is 
}rom each according to his ability, to each according to his work'; and we should not 
confuse ourselves with the central ideology of communism- }rom each according to 
his ability, to each according to his needs'! So (since we are still at the stage of 
socialism), egalitarianism is against the central thought of socialism-" to each 
according to his works.' If we abandon socialism, we could never reach communism, 
as socialism is the stage before communism." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 513) 
To sum it up, this speech in Changsha of Hunan on 24th March 1957 could 
have indicated Liu's thought in connecting productive forces, distribution, and 
contradiction, '"Distribution under socialism is an important issue, which reflects the 
contradiction between production relation and productive force, and the contradiction 
49 Egalitarianism, the research's translation of pingjunzhuyi, was Mao's utopianist all-equal distribution 
at its extreme. It believes in averaging all resources and income with the number of population, without 
giving consideration to the amount of work done by individuals. It was the common practice during the 
Great Leap. It is in line with the final phase of communism that Marx mentioned in the Critique of the 
Gotha Programme (1875). See section 3.2.3 
50 Public Canteen (gonggongshitang), or public dining room, was set up alongside the people's 
commune in 1958 as the food caterer for the peasant, who was urged to dine in the canteen and stop 
home cookin a since the state had taken care of food and lodging as a form of welfare. "Many social 
b 
innovations collapsed long before the public dining room did (Hinton, 1983,228-232). 
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between the superstructure and economIC base. These two contradictions exist 
permanently, whether now, then or in the future. In a capitalist society, these two 
contradictions are the contradictions of different classes; while in a socialist society. 
these contradictions are the contradictions among the people. Now we have 
established a socialist society, the problem of ownership has been resolved, but at the 
same time the problem of distribution has become more obvious. Therefore we should 
stick to the principle of reward for work done, distributing fairly and rationally 
according to the workers' contribution, in order to enhance the development of 
productive forces." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 391-392) 
Liu believed that the distribution of wealth was one of the key factors behind 
the expansion of productive forces. His speech delivered at the Central Party School 
on i h May 1957 had clearly indicated his appreciation of the impact of distribution on 
the productive forces, "Improper accumulation and distribution would undermine the 
development of productive forces. While excessive accumulation is not good, 
insufficient accumulation is bad for the economy too; likewise unequal distribution. 
The distribution among workers and peasants must be fair and reasonable, or the 
situation could be chaotic. If we have excessive numbers of non-productive personnel, 
they would have taken a huge share of the total income and the permanent workers 
would be unhappy. This sort of resentment or ill feeling means that the distribution 
system has become an obstacle to the development of productive forces. If the cadres 
receive more performance bonus than the workers, it is the problem of distribution. If 
the administrative expenses are too high in that they were incurred at the expense of 
workers income, it is also a problem of distribution. The differences as a result of 
official ranking, the gap in wages, the job vacancies, as well as the allotment of places 
in higher education are all the problems of distribution." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 401) 
Liu's belief in the primacy of productive forces and the significance of income 
distribution had finally driven his reform on work and pension policies. The reform 
. was a bold attempt in the 1950s for a socialist state, particularly when a communist 
leader tried to abolish a permanent employment scheme. It must be noted that the 
CCP had inherited a huge number of public servants from the defeated Nationalist 
Party. In addition to that, there were four million unemployed urban workers in China 
during the aftermath of the liberation. In order to stabilise the nation and to avoid 
social unrest, the Chinese nationalised industries had recruited these surplus work 
forces under a measure called 'replacing aid with jobs (yigongdaizhen).' Gradually. 
176 
the number of workers grew in line with the recovery of economy. In 1956, the state 
even broadened the recruitment scheme to include vocational and university 
graduates, retired military personnel, and the released prisoners. These people were all 
offered a 'permanent contract', which means they could never be retrenched. They 
were subject to Central allocation to job vacancies nationwide and basically their 
livelihoods were secured and jobs were 'guaranteed', or in Chinese terms, 'baoxialar. 
Those who were not fortunate enough to be allocated ajob would be taken care of by 
the state (Zhou in ZYWXCBS ed., 1989,364-365; Ye in Lii ed., 1991,372). 
Liu was the first CCP leader who opposed the system openly and called for a 
reform. Liu believed that the policy of 'permanent contract' should be abolished and 
the temporary workers should have no statutory right to become permanent workers 
automatically. In 1957, Liu expressed his concern over the current workers and their 
pension schemes when he was on his provincial tour to the provinces of Hunan, 
Hubei, Henan, Hebei, Guangdong and Shanghai City, "As long as you are brought in 
(recruited) you are not to be retrenched, and this applies to all workers in all 
departments and ministries-I think China is the only country in the world that 
practices such a policy. Even the Russians will lay off their workers after the contracts 
are seen off, let alone the capitalist countries. Only our workers have the iron rice 
bowZSt, as we would not retrench anyone even if the job is done or there is no job at 
hand. The advantage of the system is the minimal unemployment rate. But can the 
system be altered? Retrenchment of workers should be allowed. If this is not agreed, 
the state should have the right to allocate the excess workforce to less favourable jobs 
(with lower income). Everybody looks for nothing else but the high-income job. They 
refuse to leave when the projects are finished, or refuse to do other jobs when these 
good jobs are taken up; I believe this is unfair. This will not be sustainable as the state 
could not shoulder the burden for long." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 396-397) 
The proposed reform of work and recruitment policies was part of Liu' s vision 
of the reform of the whole distribution system. He suggested that from then on the 
new workers should sign a flexible contract with clauses stating that redundancy is an 
option should the job be discontinued, and temporary workers should not be promoted 
to permanent workers at the end of their contract if they did not have the required 
skills. Most important of all, Liu believed excessive workforces should be reassigned 
51 Iron rice bowl, or tie fan 11'(1/1, refers to a very secure job. Rice bowl in Chinese means job of a 
person, or something he makes a living from. 
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other tasks or reallocated to other workplaces (Liu, 1981, 2: 470). It was understood 
that Liu had once told a cadre in charge of a coalmine not to recruit the peasants (vvho 
lived nearby) as permanent workers, but only as temporary workers. Liu even 
suggested paying higher wages to the temporary workers and not insuring them under 
the social benefit scheme (Xu, 2002, 71). 
This sort of 'practical' approach reflects Liu's determination to fight 
egalitarianism, and it was of course contradictory with his role as a communist leader. 
One of his colleagues who shared his views was the Premier, Zhou Enlai, who 
suggested introducing the performance-based bonus and promotion scheme. He 
believed that skilled labour should enjoy extra 'skill benefits' and intellectuals should 
draw higher salary (Zhou, 1993, 273-277). Like Liu, Zhou was against 
egalitarianism, which he believed would undermine the development of productive 
forces. However, he did not advocate abolishing the 'guaranteed employment' 
scheme, the backbone of the whole welfare system. As expected, the resistance to 
Liu's proposal was strong and it did cause an uproar among the temporary workers, 
who created havoc and threatened to continue their resistance if their contracts were 
not made permanent. Liu did not back down and repeated his assertion and 
explanation. However, many local authorities had made concessions in the face of 
possible domestic social unrest. Liu's proposal had thus never been put into practice; 
let alone ever actually gained overwhelming support from the Central Committees. 
Seven years later, in 1964, Liu was still adamant about his ideas and reminded the 
nation of his failure to reform the recruitment scheme, "You know I have always been 
against the practice of converting temporary contracts into permanent ones. 
Unfortunately, things just get in the way." (Liu, 1981,2: 469) 
Nonetheless, Liu did attempt to tackle the work and pension problems from an 
alternative angle, with what he called the dual system of education and work. 
(liangzhong laodongzhidu he liangzhong jiaoyuzhidu) In May 1958, at the Second 
Committee Meeting of the Eighth Congress that launched the Great Leap, Liu 
suggested the factories establish vocational schools for their workers, who could then 
attend half-day classes while working for another half day. According to Liu, those 
who had graduated "'could stay in the factory, as they would be promoted to higher 
rank or be reallocated to other factories." On the other hand, Liu proposed the , 
establishment of more part-time high school in the peasantry, where he believed the 
secondary school pupils could study for half a day instead of full day, and spend the 
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rest of the day helping on the farm, so that the students "do not need a summer or 
winter break, they work when the farm is busy, and study when the job is done." His 
rationale for the proposed system is that "our current educational system is not 
relevant to our job market; this would not raise the quality of the workers, and would 
not promote common education." (Liu, 1981, 2: 465-469; for detailed discussion of 
the system: Li, 2002,83-87; Peng, 1994,67-70; Huang & Li, 1996,72-76) 
However, the real reasons behind such proposals were to make substantial cuts 
in unnecessary working hours, and to ease the burden of financing free rural education 
by the state, as he said, "this is the method for sustaining general education and 
financial sufficiency of the schools concurrently ... with the establishment of the part-
time school, the kids should be able to feed themselves. In addition to that, with some 
financial assistance from the state and their families, they will be doing well." (Liu, 
1981, 2: 466) "We could provide more opportunities for those who aim to advance 
their studies. But at the same time, we solve the problem of excess work forces ... the 
factories are schools, and the schools are factories, the students do not rely on the 
country, and they do not rely on their family. They make their own living, they study 
and work." (Xu, 2002, 71-72) Conveniently, Liu intended to use the system to 
reduce the number of permanent workers. In the speech he delivered to Guangxi 
cadres in 1964, he once again revealed his purpose of introducing the work-study 
system, "To practice the dual systems in work and study, is to combine the school 
with the workforce, as well as consolidating urban and rural labour ... so that we do 
not have to increase permanent workers, or in fact we could reduce the number of 
permanent workers, and recruit large numbers of temporary or contractual workers.~' 
(Liu, 1981,2:470--472) 
With Mao's approval, the system was launched in 1958 with optimism. In 
1965, there were 849,000 dual system primary schools, and 7,294 dual system 
secondary schools in rural China. Seemingly, the implementation did not encounter 
much difficulty. However, the system failed to accomplish its intended objective and 
had difficulty in student recruitment. Suzanne Pepper believes that the failure of the 
system was due to its creation of a two-tier system, which promoted inequality. A 
survey showed that if given a choice. the rural parents would send their children to the 
full-time middle school instead of the work-study middle school for qualitative 
teaching. Worst of all, it had been the general perception (in China' s society) that 
rural labour was at the lowest rung on the productive system, and agricultural work-
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study school was regarded as an inferior version of the regular variety. So the farmers 
would prefer their children to help on the farm to supplement the family income rather 
than attending the work-study school, which could not bring immediate benefits. 
Therefore Liu's attempt was actually to "build an education system based on a 
division of labour between two separate forms of schooling and serve to reinforce the 
differences between them." Unfortunately, as a result, "two separate and unequal 
education systems" were formed (Pepper in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987,417--420). 
Chinese scholars generally deny such claims. They see the failure of the work-
study system as being rooted in its inability to shrug off the shadow of the Great Leap. 
The work-study schools, mostly established in rural China, had all been operated 
under the administration of the people's communes. Therefore, the pervasive 
prevalence of the ideology of collectivisation had pushed the schools' expansion in an 
irrational way so that the limited resources could not cope. Huang & Li from Anhui 
Teachers' College argue for the system that, "the majority of China's population are 
peasants, who mostly could not even write their name. The work-study system aimed 
to rectify this and promote common education. The failure of the imposition has 
nothing to do with the system itself."(Huang & Li, 1996, 75; Li, 2002, 86) Actually, 
while Huang denies the existence of a two-tier educational system, he at the same 
agrees that the Chinese social perception is the root of failure, as observed by Suzanne 
Pepper. Nevertheless, the system was halted and labelled 'dual system of capitalism' 
during the Cultural Revolution after Liu's fall. In retrospect, the system was 
experimental and did not actually achieve much financial saving for the state, and it 
was in fact implemented without detailed and careful planning. But it did reflect Liu's 
willingness to go beyond the ordinary boundaries to test new policies. Most 
significant of all, the work-study system simply reflected the existence of multiplicity 
and pluralism that Liu was willing to tolerate within a single model of politics, which 
is the theme ofLiu's ideology of transition. 
5.2.3 Private Farming 
One of the fiercest accusations of Liu during the Cultural Revolution was his 
advocacy for contractual farming and the retention of private land in 1960 after the 
impact of Great Leap had surfaced. The notion of contractual farming first emerged in 
1954, at the initial stage of the period of collectivisation, where the strongest advocate 
of the plan, the then Director of Rural Work Department, Deng Zihui, argued that, '"in 
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order to reallocate the labourers and reorganise the institution in a more efficient 
manner, we should establish responsibility systems." (Gu, 1996, 666) Three years 
later, at the end of the first five year plan, Deng drafted 'Regarding the Production 
Management of Agricultural Cooperatives' (a blueprint of new guidelines to manage 
the agricultural institutions) in September 1957 to revive the under-performing 
agricultural sector. The policy requested the establishment of group and individual 
responsibility systems in rural China, and the generalisation of the system to allow the 
peasant to be sub-contracted with the land they had been working on so that they 
could be held responsible for the productivity of the land like a private landowner. In 
other words, it was to divide the land between each household with a fixed output 
quota, which was literally named 'baochandaohu. '-Guaranteed production by 
household. It was also called the 'Three Guarantees System,' (sanbao), which means 
the peasant had assumed the responsibility for the work (labourer), production, and 
finance of running a piece of land allocated to them. Many versions of the system had 
emerged, particularly in the 1960s. But the general idea is that a certain level of 
output was promised, or agreed (that is why it was called a guarantee). Any loss or 
shortcoming would be borne by the peasant but excessive production could be 
retained as reward. An individual farmer, a household, a production group, or even a 
cooperative could be the unit to be contracted under the responsibility system (Gu, 
1996, 666; Huang, 2000, 240). According to Kate Zhou, who has done substantial 
research of the background of guaranteed production by household, the name 
'baochandaohu' first appeared in Zhejiang, 2ih January 1957. 'Baochandaohu' in 
Zhejiang, as Zhou claims, contained four elements: 'baochandaodui' , output quotas 
contracted to production teams; 'zerendaohu', each household was responsible for 
part of the production quotas; 'dingedaoqiu', the output of land was fixed and anyone 
responsible for the land could decide how many work points a worker could receive; 
and 'tongyijingying', a sort of unified administration, where the production and 
distributive decisions were made by the team leaders (Zhou, 1996, 47). 
The contractual farming was soon abandoned as a result of the Anti-rightist 
movement in 1957 52 . A year later. the Great Leap followed and the contractual 
52 The Anti-rio-htist campaign was a follow-up mass-scale rectification after the launch of the hundred 
flower blosso~ movement, which encouraged the public to voice their concern without fear of being 
penalised. The 'Hundred Flower" had attracted thousands of intellectuals to voice their dissatisfaction 
and criticism against the government. Fearing the negative impact of the wave of de-Stalinisation that 
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farming was entirely halted. However, three years later, it first re-emerged in Anhui, 
where the peasantry were desperate to find a solution for making a living out of the 
devastated agricultural economy. Zhou labels this as the second phase of 
'baochandaohu' (1961-1962). Surprisingly, the peasants' initiative did not meet 
strong resistance from the provincial Party Officials, who saw no alternative if they 
were to revive the rural economy. The provincial First Secretary Zeng Xisheng, who 
was initially a staunch Maoist and die-hard supporter of the Great Leap, proposed the 
Anhui version of 'baochandaohu'-'zerentian', or 'responsibility farm' system. 
'Zerentian' allowed commune members to receive work points according to the 
output of the land they were assigned. Soon the practice was copied all over China 
and variations of responsibility systems existed in provinces like Henan, Guangxi, 
Hunan, Zhejiang, Shanxi, Ganshu, and Guizhou. In Guanxi and Hubei they called it 
'sanbaoyijiang', or 'three contracts plus rewards'. The production team contracted the 
production brigade to produce a certain quantity of grain at a cost using certain labour 
forces. Teams that surpassed the quota were permitted to retain the surplus as reward. 
The province that showed the most prominent support to the system was Henan, 
where the county leaders and many of the high-up cadres gave their support and 
assistance to the implementation of 'baochandaohu'. In Xinxiang County, for 
example, each worker would be assigned responsibility for a piece of land with a set 
output target. The worker would be rewarded for above contract output. While in 
Luoyang County, the Party's Second Secretary Wang Huizhi promised the peasants 
that the contractual farming would be persisted with for three years and nothing 
would be changed. Not long after that, 800 production groups and more than 100 
public canteens had been dismissed (Cong, 1989, 234-235; Zhou, 1996, 48-50; 
ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 905-907). 
The system was actually private farming in disguise, and had indeed lifted the 
morale of the peasant. The official report of the practice reached Mao in March 1961, 
when Zeng Xi sheng, the Anhui's leader, reported to Mao about the implementation of 
the system in Anhui. Mao agreed to continue the 'experimenf, though yet to agree to 
make it a national policy (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 905-907). On the other hand, Liu 
was indeed on Deng Zihui' s side and always believed that contractual farming would 
make the management of agricultural institutions more efficient and effective. To hint 
was storming the Eastern Europe, Mao responded by launching the Anti-Rightist movement and 
thousands were purged, arrested, and killed (Teiwes & Sun, 1999, xviii; Meiner, 1999, 179). 
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at his support for the proposal, Liu said that, "agricultural activities must enjoy a 
certain level of freedom (he meant privatisation). High levels of collectivisation 
would harm production." (Liu, 1993, 329) But he did not endorse the system openly 
because he had yet to see Mao's approval. The then personal secretary of Mao, Tian 
Jiaying, another supporter of private farming, met Liu when he returned from his tour 
of investigation in Hunan. After reporting to Liu the current situation of Hunan's rural 
economy, Tian asked for Liu's opinion on the responsibility system. Liu said, "It is 
pretty clear now that the system (private farming) is necessary." Tian asked if Liu 
thought it was proper to tell Mao, Liu answer, "You can tell the Chairman." However, 
Liu asked Tian to compile the 'positive views' of intellectuals before presenting them 
to Mao as proof of the practicality of the system. Interestingly Liu asked Tian not to 
let Mao know it was his idea (Dong Bian et aI, 1989, 67). But Mao did not agree with 
the conclusion drawn from Tian's investigation. Mao believed that the 'experiment' 
had gone out of control and revived capitalism in the peasantry. He thus ordered the 
termination of the practice of contractual farming (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 905). 
Since Mao had made his disapproval public, Liu had been keeping quiet until 
18th July 1962, when he addressed a group of lowly cadres who were being relocated 
to a rural area. "Now the economic foundation of people's communes is still not very 
stable. Many have lost their confidence (in the commune) and there are peasants and 
cadres who ask for the division of land between each household. The Party Centre is 
investigating this issue, and we have yet to come to any conclusion. You should 
promote collective farming while giving motivation to the local cadres when you 
arrive at the rural areas." Obviously, Liu carried out his duty as Mao's spokesman and 
he was supposed to back Mao's denouncement of contractual farming. But instead, 
when he continued, he could not keep his genuine opinion to himself, "I think it 
should be fine if we allocate a piece of land to an individual or to a group, as I think 
the responsibility system is going to work. The only problem is how to relate output 
with the system." (Liu, 1981, 2: 461, 463) This shows that Liu was clear about what 
he stood for, and he had a good appreciation of how the farms should be run during 
the period of transition. 
There is also evidence suggesting that Mao had once agreed not only on 
experimentation of the system, but on full implementation. Mao only regretted his 
approval in August 1962, when he decided to use the "restoration of capitalism" as a 
means to legitimising his attack on his political opponents. In this case. the opponents 
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that were perceived to be threatening his power comprised the 'capitalists'~ or the 
camp that supported the contractual farming, which included Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, 
Deng Xiaoping and Deng Zihui. Deng Zihui was eventually made the scapegoat and 
was later dismissed from all posts he had held and his Rural Work Department was 
dissolved. Liu was of course, blacklisted by Mao (Huang, 2000, 241; DZHBJ, 1996, 
379-380). Despite Mao's resentment, which resulted in the launch of another 
rectification campaign, the Four Clean Movement in 1963 53, the shadow of 
contractual farming had never really gone away. The farmers took advantage of the 
chaos in the peasantry during the rectification campaign, where many lowly cadres 
were killed, to try to resurrect private farming. Thousands of villagers invaded 
collectives to voice their dissent. Reportedly, premises were vandalised and public 
tools were stolen and sold in the black market. To protect the private farming, which 
was believed to be the only way to survival, peasants in Jiangxi, Sichuan, Zhejiang, 
Hubei, Hunan, Henan, Anhui, Ningxia, and Shanxi were involved in armed struggle 
against the Central government. Finally, armed forces were deployed to restore order, 
and the peasants were forced to go back to collective farming. Kate Zhou calls this the 
third phase of 'baochandaohu' (1967) (Zhou, 1996, 51-53; NYWYH, 1981, 869-
870), which was ended following the launch of the Cultural Revolution. 
The ideology underlining Liu's support of the system was actually in line with 
his conception of the party and organisation-the existence of multiplicity under the 
superiority of Central control. This could be well defined by Deng Zihui' s defence of 
contractual farming, which sounded very much like Liu's theory, "I believe a certain 
level of 'limited freedom' should be allowed as long as it is not beyond our control. I 
think in the past we have exaggerated the risk of reviving capitalism. So the 
imposition of limited freedom should be expanded to more areas. These 'limited 
freedoms' included expanding the reserved private land, borrowing land (from 
government) for private farming, enlarging reserved land for keeping poultry, 
borrowing land during winter and so on. The land used for private farming should not 
be more than 20% of the total agricultural land. The production relation (in the 
country) is still very much collective farming. Do you think the economy will tum 
capitalist because of that 20% of private farming? We own the national economy and 
53 For the detail of Four Clean Movement or SEM, see the previous chapter, Chapter ~: Party and 
Organisation. 
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the cadres are ours (the party), if you think capitalist would succeed you would have 
overestimated the power of capitalism." (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 906-907) 
Therefore, it is not surprising at all that Liu clashed with Gao Gang and Rao 
Shushi over the collectivisation of the peasantry in North East China. The North East 
of China was one of the earliest areas to be 'liberated'. The Chief Official of the 
North East, Gao Gang, advocated a rapid move towards collective farming during the 
aftermath of the land reform. He proposed to the Central Committee the banning of 
private farming and private employment entirely. Gao believed that any party member 
who was found hiring labourers should be sacked. Liu responded to the proposal with 
firm objections. Liu told the Deputy Director of the Department of Organisation, An 
Ziwen, on 23rd January 1950 that, "the development of the North East has been 
positive after the land reform, as the living standard has improved. Now the peasants 
who own three horses and a large plough are not rich peasants anymore, but middle 
peasants. The formation of mutual aid groups in the North East has foundations 
constructed on the poverty-stricken economic base. This is not a good foundation. I 
heard 70% of the peasants have joined the groups, but (I believe) those who opted to 
join are either poor or bankrupt. If the number joining the collectives reduces in the 
future, it could be a good sign as it means more peasants have become better off. .. it is 
too early to talk about this (Collectivisation). Now should be the era of private 
ownership. We should not regard those who agree to join the group as anti-private 
farming-as the truth is that they are not able to do private farming. Can the existing 
mutual aid groups be transformed to collective farms in the future? I think it is 
impossible .. .if we were to transform private farming to collective farming; we need 
the precedence of large-scale agricultural mechanisation. If party members become 
richer, they do not actually have to surrender their assets, as the country would not 
confiscate any of their belongings. Therefore private ownership could be retained for 
the time being. When the time for collectivisation arrives, if these rich peasants 
surrender their earnings to the public, they could still be regarded as good Party 
members." (Liu, 1993, 152-155, 192) 
Gao Gang was of course, offended by Liu's remark. But most importantly, 
Mao was annoyed as well, and "he expressed his strong dissatisfaction to Bo Yibo 
when Gao showed Liu's letter of response to him." (Gu, 1998, 406) The event had 
triggered the power struggle between Liu and Gao Gang, who believed ~1ao was on 
his side. It is not one of the main lines of this research to review the power struggle 
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between Liu and Gao in detail, but a brief discussion of the incident could reveal 
some background of the era where Liu tried to exert his idea on building the 
productive force in the peasantry via private farming. The argument over the 
collectivisation of North East China was followed by an incident that involved the 
debate over the contradiction on benefits between workers and the administration. 
Deng Zihui, one of Liu' s confidants, who was also the Secretary of the Central South 
Office, accused the Union of Central South China of "not safeguarding the workers' 
benefits" in July 1950. Tactfully, Liu endorsed Deng's comment, by describing the 
contradiction between the Union's leadership and workers' benefits as "minor 
differences among the proletariat", which would definitely exist during the period of 
transition. "The differences would only disappear when we reach the ultimate stage of 
communism". Liu strongly believed that there is mutual consensus between the Union 
and the Workers in that both advocated the superiority of the proletariat. As "in terms 
of the benefit of the workers, both union and the workers should take the same 
stance." (Liu, 1981,2: 95-96) 
Gao, on the other hand, showed strong objection to Deng's idea, stressing the 
importance of the centralisation of authority, as he said, "All three parties-The party 
(CCP), the Union and the workers should have the same and the only goal-to stay 
united and increase production. Any contradiction among the proletariat is wrong." 
(Huang, 1998, 172) The Party Secretary of the National Union, Li Lisan, expressed 
his agreement with Deng and Liu when he met Mao in October 1950. "Some believe 
that there is no difference between public (the party, union) and private (the workers) 
interests within a nationalised enterprise, but some believe such differences do 
exist. . .1 am one of the latter," Li said, "as such differences could be resolved 
peacefully ... the idea that it is impossible to take care of public and private interests 
concurrently is wrong." But unexpectedly, Mao was furious about Li's comment and 
removed Li from the Union Secretary Post (ZYWX:YJS, 1998a, 2: 736-737; 
ZYWX:CBS, 1998, 176). After the CCP came to power the influence and the 
independence of the Union had been seriously undermined. Apparently, Mao intended 
to make the Union the puppet of the CCP. The workers voiced their concerns as the 
fear that the Union could no longer represent the workers arose. Their dissent was 
brought forward by Li Lisan, who was then sacked for arguing that "the Union had 
become too subservient to management in both privately owned and state-run 
enterprises and as a result had alienated the workers," as the basic task of the trade 
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union was to uphold workers interests (Teiwes in Macfacquhar et al ed .. 1987, 109; 
Guillermaz, 1972, 118-119). Following the fall of Li Lishan and Deng ZihuL Gao's 
political sense told him that Liu could be in trouble. He had thus become ambitious 
and aimed to replace Liu as Mao's lieutenant. 
The third event that exposed the difference between Liu and Gao was the 
issue of collectivisation in Shanxi province. The Committee of Shanxi Province had 
submitted a report titled' How to upgrade the Mutual Aid Team in the Old Areas54 , to 
the Central and Northern China Office on 1 i h April 1951. The Provincial Committee 
pointed out that the time was right to abolish private ownership and private farming. 
They believed that with the introduction of 'public accumulation' 55 and 'pay by work 
done' the traditional attitudes of petty private farming could be overcome. Liu 
responded with firm opposition after he received the report from the Northern China 
Office. "The production cooperative that the Shanxi Provincial Committee proposed 
was socialist, but it is not possible to reach socialism directly via these agricultural 
cooperatives and mutual aid teams. Chairman Mao has said that we need cooperatives 
to reach socialism; Lenin had said the same thing. But they did not mean direct 
transition to socialism with merely the establishment of a few cooperatives ... this is 
imaginative socialism, or utopian socialism, or we can call it utopian agricultural 
socialism. It can never be realised. There are many in our party who have been 
preoccupied with utopian socialism. They have to change their mind, as the transition 
to socialism cannot be solely based on the institutional reform of the peasantry. 
Mechanisation must take place before the socialisation of rural economy can begin." 
(Liu, 1993,210-211) 
To Liu's embarrassment, Mao was critical of his comments and expressed his 
support to the Shanxi Provincial committee openly when he held a meeting with Liu, 
Bo Yibo and Liu Lantao, the Acting Head of the Northern Office. Gao was quick to 
respond by writing to Mao of his new proposal for establishing mutual aid teams in 
the North East. Mao gave his blessing to the proposal and praised it thus, "the 
direction comrade Gao shows us is correct." All these factors had made Gao believe 
that Liu's time was up. He teamed up with Rao Shushi, the Director of the 
'i4 Old Areas-the areas where the fIrst phases of land refonn were carried out, most of which were 
occupied by the CCP before 1949. 
55 Public Accumulation, or gonggongjilei, refers to the collective revenue of group fanning that is to be 
put aside as public savings. 
Source: China Economic History Forum http://economv.guoxue.com/article.phpI1811 
187 
Department of Organisation and an ex-Liu subordinate, to launch a personal attack on 
Liu in 1953. For once Liu's position was under threat and events show that it was 
indeed Mao who spurred Gao to take on Liu in order to undermine Liu's influence. 
However, in a dramatic shift of stance, Mao suddenly abandoned Gao as it was 
believed that he saw Gao as a threat to his leadership. As Huang points out, Gao was 
purged because of his "brazen intervention of personal affairs, especially his reckless 
lobbying among the military leaders." But Gao's reckless advances were rooted in his 
confidence and perception that Liu had been out of Mao's favour, not realising that 
Liu's lower profile had augmented his aggressiveness. Ultimately Mao made his 
choice (Huang, 2000, 11-12; Feng, 1998, 183; For detailed story, see ZYWXYJS, 
1998a, 2: 729-755; Gu, 1996,403--411; ZYWXCBS, 1998, 167-187). 
The advocacy of the primacy of productive force had inevitably positioned Liu 
as a Rightist, since the preservation and continuous development of capitalism was for 
Liu, an unquestionable priority. However, this merely portrays part of Liu's thought 
in economic development. To view the whole picture, we have to look at his 
advocacy of developing the cooperative as a means of distribution in rural China as 
well as a link between the rural and urban economy. Concluding the two sections, we 
will see that Liu's theory in economy actually mirrored many elements of the NEP, 
which used a central mechanism to control a model of mixed economy. 
5.3 Cooperatives as Means of Distribution 
5.3.1 Introduction: 
Mark Selden interprets Cooperative as "Group social and economic mutual aid 
initiated and sustained by producers, and cooperative economy refers to the range of 
economic activities conducted by cooperatives." He summarises the principles of 
cooperation into three: 
1) The primary aim of cooperatives is to contribute to the welfare of their 
members, that is, they are self-help or mutual aid organisations 
2) They embody principles of democratic management in which members share 
decision making 
3) They are open and autonomous organisations based on voluntary participation 
and freedom of withdrawal (Selden in Vermeer et al ed., 1998, 20). 
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Collectives or Communes56, enlarged versions of the cooperative, on the other 
hand, were the product of collectivisation. They "eliminated smaller, semi-voluntary 
cooperatives and subordinated farmers to the state, countryside to the city, and 
agriculture to the state's industrial and military priorities." In short, they "presided 
over a regime of compulsory labour and sales to the state, provided vehicles for state-
centred accumulation featuring the transfer of the rural surplus to the cities and to 
industry." (Selden in Vermeer et al ed., 1998, 22) After the completion of 
collectivisation in 1957, cooperatives were virtually wiped out in China and the 
institutions that became the key features during the Great Leap were collectives, or 
people's communes. 
Cooperatives had been at the centre of Liu's economic thought. For Liu, the 
success of New Democracy, the model of mixed economic policy, depended 
significantly on the success of a social distribution system that could burden the 
supply of daily goods to rural and urban China with reasonable price, as well as the 
purchase of the handicrafts and agricultural sub-products from the peasantry. As we 
discussed in the previous chapter, cooperative economy, according to Liu, was one of 
the major economic entities that existed in post-liberation China. In addition, Liu had 
a very clear notion of what sort of cooperatives China needed and how they should be 
operated. Cooperatives were also the most written about topic by Liu. Liu had written 
at least 30 articles or speeches concerning cooperatives from 1948 to 1957, all of 
which had been compiled in a book published in 1987. 
In one of his manuscripts written in as early as 1948, Liu illustrated the three 
types of cooperatives that would exist under New Democracy. The first is the 
consumer cooperative (xiaofei hezuoshe), which acted as a grocery retailer to the 
registered members. It aimed to replace the 'capitalist trader' as the trading medium in 
order to halt the exploitation of consumers. The consumer cooperatives were mainly 
intended to help the urban residents, and were supposed to have good coordination 
with the state-run businesses, from which they made bulk purchases of low price 
goods before reselling those goods to the public. Liu believed that the consumer 
cooperatives could be set up in factories, governmental departments, schools or even 
harbours. While goods were scarce during the aftermath of the civil war, Liu saw the 
establishment of cooperatives as a measure to counter inflation. Liu believed that it 
56 Those who label collectives as communes also describe cooperatives as collectives (see 
'collectivisation' and 'communisation' in Bianco, 2001, 240). 
189 
would, theoretically, ensure the continuous supply of goods at affordable retail prices 
with the support of state-run wholesalers. Liu even saw the consumer cooperatives as 
the forefront mechanism of a possible rationing system, which linked the state-run 
industries as the suppliers, should the country suffer from severe shortage of goods 
supply, as he said, "Such cooperatives could be set up in anywhere in the country, and 
together with the establishment of the state trading company, the rationing system of 
consumer goods can be implemented." (Liu, 1987, 27-28) But after 1949, Liu 
seemed to play down the role of the consumer cooperative as he realised that its 
functions could have overlapped with the SMC (Supply and Marketing Co-op), which 
he advocated enthusiastically. Generally perceived as insignificant, consumer 
cooperatives seem to have been ignored in most of the discussions or regarded as 
merely part of the SMC. Vivienne Shue, who has done comprehensive studies of the 
cooperative in 1950s China did not mention consumer cooperatives in her celebrated 
publication on peasantry and cooperatives (Shue, 1980, 144-274). 
The second type of cooperative was the SMC-Supply and Marketing 
Cooperative (gongxiao hezuoshe), which purchased handicrafts and agricultural by-
products from rural China for sale in other peasantries or urban areas, and supplied 
the peasantry with daily goods, subsistence and production tools. Its functions were 
almost the same as the consumer cooperatives, except that it played a double role-it 
not only supplied the goods to the peasantry at a reasonably low price, it had to 
purchase from the peasantry the farm produce at a good price so as to lift the living 
standards of rural China. In 1948, Liu gave a detailed definition of the SMC and its 
functions, as he classified SMCs into the Agricultural SMC and the Handicraft SMC, 
which were basically the same except for the products they dealt with. Liu even 
stressed that SMCs must not at the same time, act as consumer cooperatives, which 
means SMCs would not sell consumer goods and production tools to the peasant. But 
a year later Liu changed his mind and believed that the SMC should source 
production tools at the best possible price for the peasant. Liu's latest notion of SMC 
embraced the possible co-establishment of some downstream industries: small 
handicraft factories to be set up alongside the SMC, which would market the factory's 
products, and at the same time bring in farm produce for further processing or 
packaging in the factories before the produce could be sold to urban areas. This makes 
the SMC the key figure in channelling the goods distribution in rural China (Liu, 1987, 
28-29, 40-41). Obviously, in view of the complex economic environment and low 
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literacy of the peasantry, well-defined regulations were needed to differentiate the 
SMC from the consumer cooperatives as well as to govern its development and 
operation. Unfortunately this had never been done. We will discuss the functions of 
the SMC, its role in promoting domestic trade and why the SMC was the most vital 
element in Liu's model of cooperative economy. 
The third type of cooperative, according to Liu, was the production 
cooperative or agricultural production cooperative (APC). Liu saw in post-revolution 
China the existence of three types of production cooperatives. First was the Mutual 
Aid Team (laodong huzhushe), which was designed to "evolve from the Peasant 
Association that had been established to implement land confiscation and 
redistribution" (Stettner & Oram, 1987,4), as well as to encourage the combination of 
workforces and the sharing of production tools among families or work units in farm 
work in order to improve efficiency, while the ownership of production tools and the 
farm produce remained private. Some point out that the Mutual Aid Team was a 
necessity particularly during the aftermath of land reform, where "the industrial and 
handicraft sectors of the economy were still disorganised and incapable of quick and 
cheap mass production and distribution of farm tools, and the total number of oxen 
and other draught animals was still far from sufficient." (Shue, 1980, 145) Liu viewed 
the establishment of the Mutual Aid Team as the preliminary stage of collectivisation, 
and believed that it should continue to exist for some time before the collective could 
be introduced. The second type of production cooperative was the collective farm 
(jitinongchang). This was the stereotype of the Russian model, where the farmers 
formed a collective unit to carry out farming while the production tools were owned 
collectively. Produce belonged to the farm unit and wages were paid according to 
work done, while private farming on a limited scale was allowed in the families' 
backyards. The third type of production cooperative was the people's commune 
(renmingongshe), Mao's Utopian and ultimate form of collective farming championed 
by the communists. No private ownership existed in the people's commune, and no 
private farming was allowed. The farm work was shared equally and the distribution 
was by need, not by work. Apparently, Liu did not see the possible existence of 
people's communes in the near future, "now is still not the time for the construction of 
second and third type production cooperatives." (Liu, 1987,29-31,294 nI6-18) 
Liu had been criticised heavily during the Cultural Revolution for his speech 
at the National Conference of Propaganda in 1951, when he championed the Russian 
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model of mechanised rural collectivisation as the model of development. "some 
comrades believe that cooperativisation could be achieved by the expansion of a few 
Mutual Aid Teams, Work Teams or Cooperative Farms-this is wrong. 
Cooperativisation and collective farming will not be successful without the 
precedence of industrialisation and mechanisation." A similar expression was given in 
his speech to the first batch of graduates of The Marxist-Leninist College in 1951, 
which had augmented his differences with Mao, "the establishment of a few 
cooperatives cannot be considered as the beginning of cooperativisation. The correct 
way is to do it like Russia, where you see massive landscapes being collectivised for 
mechanised farming piece by piece. We are not there yet." (ZGYJZZS, 1970,365) On 
15th February 1953, the Central Government had passed the 'Resolution regarding the 
Agricultural Production Cooperatives', which had been implemented since December 
1951 when it was issued as an unofficial guide for production cooperatives. Various 
types of Mutual Aid Teams had emerged within two years of the guide being 
introduced, as the number of aid teams soared to 8,034,000. The resolution indicated 
the necessity to maintain status quo, which meant the retention of private ownership 
and the restriction on the practice of egalitarianism (BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 1910; 
SHKXY, 1998, 125-129). 
The political correctness of this resolution was actually based on the' Common 
Principles' (gongtonggangling), which was a temporary constitution drafted during 
the aftermath of the revolution. The Common Principles were established to deal with 
the devastated post-war economy and chaotic social order, as they comprised a mutual 
agreement among the leaders that the retention of private businesses was deemed 
necessary. However, on 15th June 1953, Mao had decided to overturn the agreements 
embedded with the Common Principles. He criticised the delay in the transition to 
socialism, in an unexpected manner to his colleagues, "some people are still practising 
New Democracy, while the democratic revolution is over. . .it is damaging (to the 
society) ... the transitional period is full of contradiction and struggle, and our struggle 
now is even tougher than the struggle we had during the armed revolution in the 
past. .. " Mao even questioned the rationale of "the period of transition", when he said, 
"There is ambiguity, what is transition? We have been in the period of transition for 
years, and in fifteen years time we will still be in the process of transition, we will 
never reach there (socialism)." (Mao, 1977a, 81-82) Mao thus proposed the 
replacement of Common Principles: the General Line of Transition, in 1953. The 
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General Line represented a milestone of Mao's change of mind, as it was meant to 
speed up the collectivisation of peasantry. The theme of the General Line was actually 
" 
to gradually socialise the ownership of production tools, which Mao believed was the 
foundation of socialist economy (Gu, 1996,372; BNSBWH, 2002,5: 1913). 
One of the legacies of the launch of the General Line was the emergence of 
the fourth type of cooperative-the Credit Cooperative, which was the result of the 
reformation of agricultural institutions under the process of cooperativisation in 1953. 
The credit cooperative had become the representative of the People's Bank in rural 
China, the financial provider to the peasant as well as the financial support network 
for the SMC. Naturally, the consequence of economic development would be the 
establishment of financial institutions, as Shue sees it, the development of the credit 
cooperative could be evolutional, that "For if SMCs were to be able to sign the 
planned volume of advance purchase contracts and complete their commodity 
procurement work, clearly there were going to have to be some large sums of 
centrally managed money devoted to these tasks and funnelled to them quickly. The 
immediate key steps in socialist transformation were going to be heavily dependent on 
a fair degree of planned management of the rural money supply and particularly on 
the ability of the cadre to produce loans and investment when peasants responded to 
the incentives deliberately built into the various contract systems ... " (Shue, 1980, 247) 
In some areas the credit cooperatives were incorporated with the SMC. 
However, Liu had never agreed to merge credit businesses with cooperative 
operations, and we will discuss this later. Though not very successful, the credit 
cooperative did function to support cooperativisation in rural China. Together with the 
other three types of cooperatives, they formed the whole range of cooperatives that 
existed in China before the Great Leap and the emergence of the people's commune. 
While Liu advocated the SMC as a pivotal institution of his economic model, Mao's 
emphasis had always been the production cooperatives. As Liu tried to revive China's 
rural economy with commercial activities, Mao believed that the result of 
collectivisation-the combination of sheer human power and primitive farming tools, 
could lift the level of productivity. Liu's hope of the SMC bridging the economic 
interaction between urban and rural China had never been realised, as the policy was 
disrupted by the rapid collectivisation of rural China. Liu actually even believed that 
the establishment of cooperatives could finally lead to the formation of a new social 
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order; as for Liu, the public depending on cooperatives for their living could live in a 
more equal society (Liu, 1987, 31). 
5.3.2 The Objective of the Cooperatives: Liu's Perspective 
The Chinese Scholar Li Boren summarises Liu's notion of the objectives of 
the cooperative into three, which I see as fairly accurate and reflective: 1) 
improvement of productive forces and collectivisation of peasantry via the expansion 
of commercial activities, 2) to embrace the cooperative as a new social order and way 
of life for society, and 3) to construct and reorganise a planned economy via the 
development of cooperatives (Li in ZYWXCBS ed., 1989, 317-330). 
In 1948, Liu laid down the rationale of the establishment of cooperatives in 
post-revolution China. "Major industries, including heavy industries and 
transportation are mainly controlled by the state. However, small industries like the 
handicraft industries and small-scale transport operators are still in the hands of 
private capitalists." Liu explained the economic background of China in his 
manuscript, "Generally, China is still a society where small scale-industries dominate 
the economy ... The role of the cooperative now is to reorganise small-scale 
production, to improve the productivity of small industries, so as to enable them to be 
transformed into large scale collective industries in the future." On the other hand, Liu 
knew the problem engulfing the reorganisation of these small industries, "Most of 
these small industries or private capitalists are separated from each other and scattered 
around rural China. We need to link them together with a sort of commercial relation, 
which will connect them to the state-owned major industries." The cooperative, 
according to Liu, was the tool that could connect the small scale rural industries to the 
major industries; but to enable a cooperative to perform its role, the existence of 
market and the function of commercial activities were necessary; as Liu said, 
"Commercial activities are important in this sort of economic model, which comprises 
a large number of small scale industries. Small industries are normally located in the 
remote areas; therefore they need businessmen to sell their produce in the market as 
well as supplying them with food, groceries and production tools. Apparently, this 
role of business medium could be taken over by the state-governed cooperative. and if 
the cooperatives carry out their duties in accordance with the ideology of New 
Democracy, and if the cooperatives do not exploit the small industries and poor 
consumers like the capitalist businessmen do, but give them material support in their 
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daily life ... not only will the small businesses and industries develop and strengthen 
their productive forces, their development will also fit into the framework of the 
national economy as a whole." (Liu, 1987, 2-4, 7) 
It must be noted that the reason Liu highlighted the importance of commercial 
activities was his intention to replace businessmen (who acted as the middle men in 
trade) with cooperatives, so as to eliminate exploitation without the abolishment of 
the market, as he stressed, '"the purpose for establishment of cooperatives is to 
eliminate speculative commercial activities, and to ensure the victory of New 
Democracy." Interestingly, Liu was talking about swapping businessmen with 
cooperatives, and eliminating speculative commercial activities via another type of 
commercial activity. The idea encouraged the development of rural private (family) 
businesses with the assistance of cooperatives, in a system he called, '"cooperative 
commercial system." Liu believed this cooperative commercial system could compete 
in the market, which was still allowed to exist, to oust the capitalist businesses. His 
concern over losing the '"battle" to the capitalist businessmen actually reflected his 
objection to banning private businesses; otherwise the 'class enemy', which was also 
the competitor in the market, would not have existed in post-revolution China. Instead, 
he chose to outperform them in the market, '"think carefully, if we do not construct a 
well-integrated and nationwide cooperative system in China, if we do not develop a 
commercial cooperative system, how could we compete with the opportunistic 
businessmen? Are we able to struggle against the feudal capitalists? We would not 
win without cooperatives. Because in this sort of struggle, the determinant of victory 
is the cooperative, and of course, its commercial activities" (Liu, 1987, 6-8) 
Knowing that it was tough to promote trade and commercial activities in a communist 
state, Liu kept calling the private businessmen '"opportunistic businessmen," so as to 
draw a line between cooperative business and the conventional business, which he 
described as '"opportunistic". On the other hand, the notion actually mirrored the 
concept of Nikolai Bukharin, who believed that large state-controlled business entities 
could outperform the capitalists in the market, as long as the major resources or 
industries (the commanding height) were in the proletariat's hands, "We control the 
commanding height, we organise what is essential, then our state economy, by 
different means, sometimes even by competing with the remnant of private capital 
through market relationships, gradually increases its economic might and in diverse 
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ways, draws the backward economic units into its own organisation, doing so, as a 
rule, through the market." (Bukharin, 1982, 189) 
The other communist revolutionary who shared their view was the founder of 
the NEP, V. 1. Lenin, who believed that the formation of cooperatives is politically 
correct both "from the standpoint of principle (the means of production are owned by 
state) and the standpoint of the transition to the new order by means that will be 
simplest, easiest, and most intelligible for the peasantry." Lenin stressed that in order 
to build a socialist state" they have to "learn to build it practically". The practicality 
emphasised by Lenin was actually "the adoption of the NEP" and subsequently "the 
concession to the peasant as a trader, to the principle of private trader;" as a result, "it 
is precisely for this reason that the cooperative movement assumes such importance." 
Lenin seemed to be the first revolutionary to advocate the introduction of mixed 
economy with the major industries under the party's control. The statement in his 
article 'On Cooperation' (January 1923), seemed to reflect Liu's ideology of 
economic construction, "as a matter of fact, the power of state over all large-scale 
means of production, the power of state in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of 
this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the assured 
leadership of the peasantry by the proletariat, is not this all that we need to build a 
complete socialist society from the cooperatives, from the cooperative alone ... under 
NEP?" But Lenin reminded his colleagues in the way of Liu commenting on the 
people's commune, "This is not yet the building of socialist society, but this is all that 
is necessary and sufficient for this building." (Lenin, 1971, 760-761) It might not be 
a coincidence that Liu echoed Bukharin's and Lenin's statements, as Liu had openly 
quoted and praised the NEP of 1920s Russia when he was elaborating his economic 
construction plan in 1949 (Liu, 1981, 1: 428), though NEP was then regarded as 
reactionary by the Stalinist leadership--China's closest counterpart in the 1950s. Liu 
had actually never hidden his admiration of the NEP, as he stated in 1948, "when 
Lenin was implementing the NEP in the Soviet Union, he talked about learning to do 
business and the revival of free trade and capitalism." Liu's rationale behind quoting 
the NEP was simple, "We have been placing our emphasis on industries and 
agriculture, and simply ignore the importance of commerce. We have to compete \\ith 
the capitalists. Remember this, those who lead the market lead the national economy!" 
(Liu, 1987, 23) 
196 
But there are significant differences between them in terms of the application 
of the notion of a state-controlled market economy. While Lenin and Bukharin only 
advocated the persistence of the market for the state-run businesses to compete with 
the 'remnants of capitalists', Liu went a step further by specifying the form of state-
controlled institution to be operated in the market-the SMC. That also explains why 
the cooperative for Liu was a way of life. One of Liu's strengths is to present his 
ideologies and notions as well-classified practical measures. Liu believed that the 
cooperative could change the life of the nation if it could carry out the duties it was 
supposed to perform, particularly in the peasantry, where the masses still lived in 
poverty with scarcity of resources. There are four important tasks that Liu thought the 
cooperatives should perform in rural China, "Firstly, cooperatives must be able to 
promote and sell surplus rural produce, and the price must be good enough for the 
peasant to make a profit; secondly, supplying the peasant with the production tools 
and materials, and making sure the price is low and the delivery is timely; thirdly, 
supplying them with food, subsistence and groceries at a price reasonably lower than 
market price. And finally, to provide the facilities for personal savings and loans, in 
which the interest on loans must be low. Our past experience has proved to us, 
however, that the SMC should not operate as a finance institution. Only the bank 
should be the loan provider, as uncollected or overdue loans could seriously affect the 
SMC's operation. Financial activities aside, the SMC should be accountable for all the 
other three tasks that I mentioned, and do their best to help the peasants." (Liu, 1981, 
2: 100-101) 
Apparently, while discounting the role of financial provider, Liu wanted the 
SMC to focus on the three "fundamental roles of the SMC", which he believed would 
be the reasons "why the peasant wanted the Party to establish the cooperative", and 
had direct impact on the peasant's daily life (Liu, 1981, 2: 104). Liu's hope of an 
economic revolution via the cooperatives was reflected in his speech at the First 
Conference of Cooperative Operators, in July 1950, where Liu enthusiastically 
praised the existence of cooperatives as a "very great development" for the nation. 
Repeatedly, Liu reminded the cadres that, "the system of cooperatives is a social 
system, a new and progressive social system ... we must establish our reputation 
amongst the public. The old commercial network is gone, so we have to create a ne\', 
network. We believe in ten or fifteen years time the cooperative system will become 
our new social system."(Liu. 1987, 89) But this notion of the 'cooperative as a way of 
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life' is not something entirely new. Twenty-seven years earlier, Lenin had expressed 
the same line of thought, '"all we actually need under NEP is to organise the 
population of Russia in cooperative society on a sufficiently large scale; for we have 
now found the degree of combination of private interest, of private commercial 
interest, with state supervision and control of this interest, that degree of its 
subordination to the common interests which was a stumbling block for many 
socialists." (Lenin, 1971, 760-761) So it was pretty obvious that the "common 
interest that was a stumbling block for many socialists" was commercial activities, 
which should be subordinated to state supervision instead of to capitalist 
businessmen; as both Liu and Lenin believed that the leading role played by the 
cooperative in this aspect could reorganise the population and shape a new way of 
life. 
The centre of Liu's thought on the cooperative could actually be summarised 
by an excerpt of the statement he made in December 1948, '"Without cooperatives, the 
proletariat could not command the peasants in economic development and realise the 
alliance of workers and peasants ... as nationalised industries and cooperatives are so 
closely related to each other. The nationalised industries are the tool of the proletariat 
in new China, and cooperatives are the collective businesses of the rural masses. The 
alliance of the two would lead us to socialisation of the economy. Without 
cooperatives, the nationalised industries could not develop; and cooperatives would 
turn capitalist if the nationalised industries did not exist. So the proletariat must bear 
in mind that even though we have secured the political power, possess the major 
industries, we still need the cooperatives in the transition to socialism." (Liu, 1987, 
21-22) This has unveiled another stage of economic development under the process 
of cooperativisation that Liu envisaged, the reorganisation of the planned economy, 
and the construction of the business cartel. I see that with the existence of the 
cooperative, Liu hoped to group all small private businesses among the peasantry 
under the administration of one single mechanism, the SMC. The SMC would buy 
from the small entrepreneurs and farm producers while supplying them with 
production materials purchased from the nationalised industries. So instead of having 
the common economic structure in capitalist countries, in which the supply and 
demand cycle operated in the manner of: "wholesaler-businessmen (retailers)-
consumer; I believe that Liu intended to make this the economic cycle in rural China: 
l-lalionalised (Major) Industries-Cooperatives (SMC)-Consumers (Peasant); and in 
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urban China: Nationalised (Major) Industries-State Trading Company-Consumers 
(Workers). In this case, the cooperative was a state-controlled business medium , 
which centralised the sales and purchasing activities and tried to achieve a monopoly 
by defeating the remaining capitalists through trading in the market. On the other end 
of the spectrum, where the suppliers (nationalised industries) were concerned, Liu 
proposed to establish 'The Trust' 57, a sort of business conglomerate that harboured a 
few major industries under one organisation for more effective control, and was 
intended to be independent of the Central administration (Gu, 1996, 645-646, Liu, 
1981, 2: 506). 
In summary, in Liu's opinion, the objectives of the cooperative were to firstly, 
replace the businessmen with the cooperative as the medium of commercial activities; 
secondly, to oust the capitalists in the market via the cooperative with the backing of 
nationalised industries; thirdly, to make' living with the cooperative' a new way of 
life where more equal distribution within society could exist, particularly in rural 
China; and finally, with the success of the cooperatives, to reorganise the structure of 
a planned economy-to realise market monopolisation by the proletariat through 
merging major industries. Liu perceived that the existence of huge and independent 
business entities like the SMC and 'The Trust' would ultimately squeeze the private 
retailers and wholesalers out of the market, hence the accomplishment of the market 
monopoly by the proletariat. In the coming section, we will discuss the formation and 
functions of' The Trust'. 
5.3.3 'The Trust': Business Cartel in the Socialist World 
Jack Gray's view on Liu's preferred economic model sees Liu "putting the 
manufacture and operation of farm machinery in an autonomous national trust 
explicitly modelled, as far as internal organisation is concerned, on Western capitalist 
Trusts." (Gray, 1973,62) 
It was difficult to ascertain whether 'The Trust' was originally Liu's idea. 
Towards the end of the Great Leap, the CCP aimed to replace the current model of 
nationalised industries that were loosely based on the Soviet model-where the 
decision making and administration of all industries were centralised under the 
Party's leadership. It seemed to the CCP leadership that the root of the operational 
57 For definition see the footnote 5 of Chapter 3 
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inefficiency of these industries was bureaucracy, where lack of professional 
administrators, slow decision making, and cost-ineffective operations had all appeared 
to be the causes of ineffective industrial development. 'The Trust' was first officially 
discussed on 25th March 1960, when Deng Xiaoping gave the illustration of 'The 
Trust' in the Central meeting at Tianjin, " ... the purpose of 'The Trust' is to improve 
industrial development, and to use resources more efficiently ... constructing . The 
Trust' concerns the reconstruction of production relations and superstructures. The so 
called' Trust', was the centralisation of administration in one industry, which will be 
governing many industries that affiliated to it ... " (Bo, 1993, 2: 1172-1173, Gu, 
1996, 646) Note that Deng might not be expressing his own idea, as he was just 
addressing an issue that had been discussed by the Central Committee. However, 
thirteen months prior to the Tianjin meeting, Liu did talk about the advantages of' The 
Trust' during discussion of a ministerial report given by the then First Minister of the 
Engineering Industry, Zhao Erlu. Liu told Zhao that, "There are many sections in one 
big factory. The efficiency of the operation of each section can never be the same. 
Some departments would be operated more efficiently than the others. Inevitably, we 
would tend to formulate our operating schedule based on the slowest or most 
ineffective section, but that will hinder the development of the productive forces. That 
is why the capitalists have to establish 'The Trust'. 'The Trust' is in fact the 
capitalists' cooperatives. How to apply the concept under collective ownership is the 
fundamental question to consider before we could replicate the conception in our 
society." (ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 445) 
Regardless of whether 'The Trust' was Liu's idea, he was the staunchest 
advocate for the concept. Liu's preference for large-scale business conglomerates was 
closely related to his belief in the reorganisation of the 'commanding height' and the 
consolidation of the grip on major industries; and ironically, the decentralisation of 
administrative control in business entities. The rationale underlining Liu's intention to 
reorganise the large-scale industries was the lack of coordination among those 
industries, or what Liu referred to as 'San' (Scattered) 58 . Liu believed that "all 
industries and businesses must be well-organised and their operation well planned." 
He rated the administration of the Chinese economy as "very unorganised", as this 
example illustrates: "tobacco, for instance, appears on the record as a single item, 
58 'San' in Chinese, means scattered around or all over the place. Liu referred it to lack of organisation 
and coordination. 
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showing millions of cartons in volume, but without any product classification. In fact, 
there are hundreds of brands of tobacco, yet they classify it as one item. (which means 
itemisation was not done)" Besides, the shortage of business managers was Liu's 
concern, too, "some local cadres blindly expand industry by constructing new 
infrastructures and purchasing new equipment, without taking into consideration the 
limitation of domestic resources." Therefore Liu saw the purpose of 'The Trust' was 
"to reorganise, not only one entel1?rise, but the whole industry, and the national 
economy as a whole ... " (Liu, 1981, 2: 228,473-474) 
However, it seems to me that Liu was talking more about improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the administration of the industries, than merely 
encouraging the unification of business units, though the latter was the general 
perception of 'The Trust' by other communist leaders. Benedict Stavis views it the 
same way, as he calls 'The Trust' "the establishment of semi-autonomous 
corporations to organise production and distribution on a cost-efficient basis in 
individual sectors of the economy (Stavis, 1978, 187-8). Liu also noticed that the 
location of business outlets and the allocation of consumer goods in China were based 
on the administrative areas drawn up by the bureaucrat, instead of on the demand for 
the goods and materials. In other words, the nationalised industries were not 
constructed in strategic locations (Liu, 1993, 313). He suggested administering these 
nationalised industries with commercial apparatus (or in accordance with simple 
economic theory of supply and demand), and reorganising the distribution channels 
without bureaucratic interference. In addition, Liu also urged the forging of closer 
commercial links between nationalised and private industries as well as between rural 
and urban areas via functions of market mechanisms (Liu, 1981, 2: 365). As he 
pointed out: bureaucracy was actually containing the expansion of commercialisation 
and undermining the independence of business organisations, and "the breaking of the 
containment is imminent, and unavoidable." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 572) 
Liu's ideology of 'The Trust' was more about reformation of institutions than 
the merger of business entities. However, Liu had never ceased to emphasize the 
ultimate objective of 'The Trust'-the monopolisation of the market by the 
proletariat, or the nationalised industries. So for Liu, institutional reform, independent 
management, and industrial mergers are all concurrent issues and inter-related, just as 
he pointed out in his discussion with Bo Yibo on 24th October 1963. "The issue of 
institutional systems should be studied carefully. We should learn from capitalist 
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expenence of enterprise management, especially their expenence III market 
monopolisation. We should also learn from the good experience of the Russians; as 
regards 'The Trust', the Syndicate, didn't Lenin mention them before? Give it a 
thought and envisage this, what we relate to good enterprise management are actually 
good organisation and planning, and the reduction in bureaucracy. The establishment 
of a professional enterprise management company is a good idea and worth a try. The 
Central and Provincial Commerce Departments are all governmental administrative 
departments, which I believe could not manage business enterprises effectively ... the 
professional enterprise management company would be the better choice for 
managing business enterprises (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 583). Riskin appreciates Liu's 
assertion on the grounds that he believes the objective of 'The Trust' was actually to 
"create powerful, professional units of management that would pursue technical and 
economic efficiency free of daily interference by the Party and Government." (Riskin, 
1987, 165) 
This conception of Liu could be the reason Riskin differentiates him from 
Deng Xiaoping, whom Riskin sees as a market socialist; while classifying him as a 
'technical bureaucrat' in the same category as Bo Yibo who, as Riskin believes, 
advocated segregation of administrative responsibilities professionally (Riskin, 1987, 
179). Dittmer, too, points out that Liu's introduction of' The Trust' "is taken to be a 
paradigm of scientific management and its objectification of men for the sake of 
specialisation, standardisation and systemisation." Dittmer makes a similar 
interpretation of Liu when he defines Liu's concept of party and organisation as 
"rational-legal bureaucracy operating III tandem with incipient technical 
meritocracy. "(Dittmer, 1998, 197,201) Liu had always stressed the independence of 
enterprise administration more regularly than other leaders, as he believed that the 
business enterprises should have "limited rights to independent management" in terms 
of planning and financial management. So Liu urged the officials of the Economic 
Department "do not interfere in those issues that are not supposed to be interfered 
with." Liu even criticised bureaucratic interference in the economy as "feudalist, as it 
could not even be regarded as capitalist (which meant it was worse than capitalist)." 
(Liu, 1993, 507, 528) Some believe that this notion of 'The Trust' was the 
unprecedented advocacy for the segregation of management and ownership of 
nationalised enterprises in communist China. or even the socialist world as a whole 
(Su, 2000, 13: Zhu. 2001, 87; Chen, 2003. 34). 
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Liu did raise the issue of the segregation of duties in as early as November 
1959, years before' The Trust' was imposed, "Where do the productive forces come 
from if the amount of investment remains the same, the ownership remains public, but 
the level of production rises significantly? The answer is: It all depends on who is in-
charge of the investment ... all enterprise ownerships are public, but the performance 
could be different from one to another, because it depends on the persons in charge, 
and how they execute their operational plan ... " (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 469) He had 
openly criticised the bureaucratic nature of enterprise management in socialist 
countries, "in the past, we had been using administrative measures to manage the 
factories and business enterprises. Even the Russians had done the same thing before. 
But this has been proven wrong; we should use economic measures to manage 
business enterprises." (Liu, 1993, 528) 
However, the experiment of 'The Trust' was for Liu, much more than the 
institutional reform and professional management of business enterprises. As 
discussed before, Liu was indeed aiming at the ultimate monopolisation of the market 
by state-controlled institutions. Segregation of duties aside, Liu had never given up 
his advocacy for large-scale business organisations, as he believed that business 
conglomerates with high levels of efficiency were the only way to wipe out the 
capitalists in the market, and this underlines his strong support for the establishment 
of 'The Trust'. "That (independence of management) does not mean the Party and the 
Centre do not bother at all," as Liu tried to remind his colleagues, "the Centre plans 
the economy, balances the use of resources, monitors the progress of the industries 
and takes care of ideological (political) education. The production should be taken 
care of by the factories and the enterprises." (Liu, 1993, 528) This reflects the 
dominance of the idea of a state controlled capitalist market in Liu's conception, as 
we discussed in the previous chapters. Dittmer has seen the same development, as he 
said, "The Trust brought management and technical work to the fore and introduced 
rules and regulations to manage the masses, while letting cadres and political 
personnel shut themselves up in the office reading statistical returns and reports and 
studying 'business methods'." (Dittmer, 1998,201) Stavis believes that the theme of 
these institutional reforms was to introduce profit as the measure of efficiency, '"Liu, 
Deng (Xiaoping) and Peng Chen believed that technological reform required 
efficiency, that efficiency in tum required centralised administration, specialisation of 
function in factories and bureaucracies. and material incentives for workers and 
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administrators; and that profits were the crucial measure of efficiency." (Stavis, 1978, 
200) To achieve this, Liu believed that 'The Trust' should not only take care of 
production while hoping the state will sell the products on their behalf. They should 
take care of the sales as well. This for Liu is the key to changing the existing 
system-both private and state-owned enterprises take care of their production and 
sales, without bureaucratic interference. Liu had stated that, '"the capitalist Trusts 
dominate the market through sales and they are successful; this is an experience for us 
to learn from." (Liu, 1993, 528, 530) 
So how did 'The Trust' relate to the cooperatives? They did not appear to be 
inter-related at first glance. But both 'The Trust' and Cooperatives played vital roles 
in Liu's picture of market monopolisation, in that both will supposedly function in the 
market to eliminate capitalists and competition. "The capitalist enterprises are all very 
well organised," Liu said when he was attending the seminar of' The Trust' in 1965, 
"they have good internal organisation, and that is why they could achieve economy of 
scale, reduce operating costs, and improve the products' quality as well as 
productivity. But they are subject to stiff competition from other organisations. They 
are unable to iron out the competitors and price speculation (in his word, to 
'organise'), or have control over elements external to their enterprise. Then in order to 
monopolise the market, the capitalist 'Trust' emerges. But even the 'Capitalist Trusts' 
still face competition, which exists external to 'The Trust'. Complete monopoly has 
never existed in the capitalist world. The 'Socialist Trust' should have better 
organisation than the 'Capitalist Trust'." (Liu, 1981,2: 473) 
It is obvious that Liu believed the 'Socialist Trust' could survIve the 
competition. But in order to survive, the elements external to 'The Trust', like the 
supply of raw material, must also be 'organised' in order to create a 'standard 
market', which is where the function of central planning came into the picture. This 
seemed to contradict Liu's advocacy of decentralisation. But it must be noted that Liu 
had never advocated a market free of all restrictions or tried to accommodate fair 
competition. Instead, besides urging the segregation of duties and professional 
management in business conglomerates, Liu advocated state support via price control, 
so that the business institutions were finally capable of squeezing the capitalist out of 
the market. To do that, the nationalised industries (or in this case, 'The Trust') would 
work closely with the SMC to determine the retail price of subsistence and production 
tools in the peasantry, as well as the purchase price the SMC paid for the goods. Liu 
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believed that cost effectiveness would only be achieved with huge commercial 
institutions or business conglomerates run by professional business managers. 
Therefore it is not surprising at all Liu had made it clear that the scale of SMCs "'must 
be big, as small SMCs will collapse," (Liu, 1987, 24) though he did not specify how 
'big' is big. 
Like the cooperative, 'The Trust' lacked standardised operating guidelines. 
Liu did appear to be indecisive and ambiguous when he talked about the level of 
control the Centre should impose on 'The Trust', "we should study different types of 
'Trust' before we decide which one is suitable to us. We could centralise the control 
of human resources, finance and property, or we could just centralise the control of 
planning, pricing, the supply of materials and product sales, or only the planning and 
relocation of workers. We should have many versions (of 'The Trust') , you cannot 
just rely on one, but the key purpose is to unify these enterprises." (Liu, 1981,2: 474) 
So while Liu was clear about what he wanted to achieve with 'The Trust', he had 
never had the chance to outline the detail of operating guidelines for the 'Trust'. For 
its short spell in China, 'The Trust' remained experimental. 
5.3.4 The Operation of Cooperatives-Liu's Perspective 
We have discussed Liu's perception of the cooperative objectives and looked 
into Liu's perceived link between the cooperatives and 'The Trust' in the state-
controlled business model. Before we go further into Liu's conception of the practical 
operation of the cooperative, we should take a look at the regulations governing the 
cooperatives. The 'Draft of Cooperative Law' (hezuosheJa caoan, quoted as the 
'draft' from here on) was first written in July 1950 under Liu's close supervision. Liu 
had made three modifications in July, August and October 1950, before the Draft was 
issued to various government departments for feedback and opinion. But the Draft 
had never been put through as a resolution and officially implemented, though it had 
become the unwritten rule or guideline for the establishment of cooperatives in the 
1950s. It would be unrealistic to monitor the implementation of the policy against the 
Draft. as it was impossible to monitor the adherence to central regulations in remote 
areas of China, where the local cadres always had the upper hand. Nonetheless, the 
1950 Draft had somehow reflected Liu's ideology in cooperative development. Below 
is the summary of some of the important clauses: 
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1) The nature of cooperatives: It is an institution fonned by people who wish to 
defend their economic interest. Anybody~ regardless of their sex~ age, religion, 
and race, with the exception of persons who were stripped of their political 
rights, could join as member 
2) Type of cooperatives: there are three types of cooperatives: the consumer 
cooperative in the cities, the SMC and production cooperative in the 
peasantry, and the independent handicraft cooperatives in both urban and rural 
areas 
3) The objectives of the cooperative: the cooperative is a commercial institution 
established by accumulating funds of the hardworking people, with the 
purpose of purchasing cheaper goods and production tools, and selling 
produce at higher prices, without the exploitation from the middlemen. 
4) The principles of the cooperative: membership is voluntary, and the freedom 
of members to withdraw their shareholding is assured. 
5) The operation of cooperatives: the cooperative should always satisfy the 
members' needs and ensure sufficient return of material benefits to the 
members. The cooperative should follow the government pricing policy, and 
should not pursue high profit margins by setting illegitimate prices. 
6) The cooperative is an independent, people's (non-governmental) organisation. 
It should have representatives at various levels (county or provincial) of 
congress or committee meetings. 
7) The cooperative is a unified organisation of vanous levels of smaller 
cooperative. Every level of cooperative is an independent economic unit, 
which carries out operations independently and is responsible for its own 
profit and loss. All cooperatives are governed by China's National 
Cooperative Union, under the principle of democratic centralism. 
8) The relationship between cooperative and the state: the cooperative should 
perfonn its duty in accordance with state economic policies, and the 
government should assist the cooperative via favourable treatment in tenns of 
loans, interest rate, income tax, and pricing (GXHZSJJ, 2001, 47; Liu, 1987, 
194-201). 
The 1950 Draft actually placed significant emphasis on the SMC rather than 
the production cooperative. The more comprehensive governing act of the production 
cooperative was passed and became official on 15th February 1953 (as . The CCP 
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Central Resolution regarding the Cooperation of Agricultural Production and Mutual 
Aid, 1953'), as part of the programmes attached to the collectivisation process under 
the General Line of Transition (SHKXY, 1998, 125). So for Liu, the cooperative that 
played the major role in the building of the national economy was the SMC, not the 
production cooperative. Liu had never hesitated to annoy his more conservative 
colleagues by playing down the possibility of reviving the economy solely via 
agricultural activities. Instead, he reminded them that commercial activities should be 
the mainstream activities, "Some comrades believe that only the production 
cooperative creates value, while the SMC does not. They say commercial activities 
depend on production, this is not wrong ... but bear in mind that small producers are 
controlled by the businessmen, because small producers need the market to 
sell ... Therefore although commercial activities depend on production, they actually 
control·production." While Liu had been encouraging the SMCs to expand (as he said, 
"the scale of SMC must be big, small SMCs will collapse ... " see above), he had no 
doubt that the production cooperative should not be expanding rapidly, as he was very 
sure that the time for collectivisation had not arrived, "the scale of a production 
cooperative must be small, it could collapse easily if it is too big. Today, it is easier 
for the advanced cooperative to collapse than the elementary cooperative. So do not 
expand beyond what your capability could cope with ... you can only consolidate the 
expansion of (production) cooperatives when you possess machinery." (Liu, 1987, 
22-24) 
This statement IS so vital that it laid the foundation of Liu's notion of 
cooperativisation-the agricultural production cooperative should not expand prior to 
the establishment of commercial activity and the consolidation of the SMC. Contrary 
to the traditional socialist thinking of developing productive forces by increasing 
production, Liu strongly believed in building the productive forces through 
commercial activities of cooperatives. Besides, it also matches Liu's notion of 
historical materialism, as he thought the cooperative should not be expanded beyond 
"the capability they could cope with," which means Liu believed that productive 
forces should not be expanded beyond the boundary of the existing production 
relations. Furthermore it clashed with Mao's idea of collectivisation and the 
expansion of agricultural cooperatives, as the statement ·'the scale of production 
cooperatives must be small" highlights the major differences between the two leaders. 
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The strength of the SMC was, as Liu saw it, the assistance from the state. Liu 
suggested the SMC should have close coordination with the state trading company59 
for better classification of the items and the determination of selling prices; as both 
the SMC and the state trading company sourced their goods from large state 
enterprises (or nationalised industries). Liu even went into the detail of what the SMC 
should sell, "the SMC has little capital, so it should only stock those items needed by 
the members and seldom distributed by the state, like sauces, towels, toothbrushes and 
soup." But Liu seemed to forget that the state trading shops, in this aspect, were also 
the SMC's competitors in the market. Instead Liu regarded the state trading company 
as another governmental medium to aid the SMC, as he said in 1950, "some people 
may request that the SMC price their items the same as the state trading company. I 
think this is not right. The state trading company should price their goods higher than 
the SMC; in order to assist the SMC to grow ... there should be price discrimination 
(by large state enterprises) in supplying goods to state trading shops and SMCs 
respectively. The main assistance that SMCs receive from the state is actually in 
pricing." Though Liu did not give a definitive guideline in the statement, it seems to 
me that Liu had never envisaged fair competition with the capitalists in the market. 
The rationale underlining his confidence that state enterprises and the SMC would 
defeat the capitalists was his plan to assist the two institutions with state resources. 
Interestingly, he would go to the extent of undermining the profit of the state trading 
company in order to assist the SMC. But just like' The Trust', Liu wanted the SMC to 
be independent of any bureaucratic interference, "One of the (earlier) clauses of the 
Draft of the Cooperative Law states that the cooperative should be governed by the 
state enterprises. This is a wise regulation. I propose to remove the clause. The large 
state enterprises should lead the cooperative via economic means, through contractual 
obligation and pricing policy. It should never try to lead the cooperative via politics 
and law." (Liu, 1987, 81-83) 
59 State trading companies, or state enterprises, are the businesses in operation after the collectivisation 
of commerce and industries in urban China, where the private businesses were 'merged' with state-
owned companies and their owners virtually became the employees of the enterprises, from which they 
earned interest on the proportion of share they owned--estimated by the state. Their counterparts in 
rural areas are cooperatives. But as Riskin accurately points out, "virtually all enterprises are either 
state-owned or treated as though they were, and in which the central government not only sets 
priorities, but carries them out administratively by distributing finance to, or ordering output from, the 
various enterprises." (Riskin, 1988, 9 n 1, 95) 
208 
Apparently, Liu preferred the existence of a sort of formal commercial 
relationship between the SMC and the state enterprise, though the latter still assumed 
the role of a carer. Contrary to Liu's preference, Shue finds that the SMC was to a 
certain extent, encouraged to be the mere extension of state enterprises. Not only did 
the cooperatives "take up business in geographical areas and in commodity areas 
where the state trading company left off," as discussed in the previous paragraph, she 
believes that in reality the SMC could never be independent as "they depended on the 
state trading company for so much-for loans, for preference and price reduction on 
transport services, for assistance with accounting, record keeping, and pricing, for 
their purchasing power and their supplies of basic goods." I believe the reason behind 
such dependency could be the low level of literacy in rural China. Practically, it was 
almost impossible for a peasant-operated cooperative to compete in the market 
independently, even if its operation was fully compliant with the guidelines. Shue 
indeed portrays the true picture of the SMC, "they had little choice but to respond to 
the leadership of state-run commerce if they want to stay in business." (Shue, 1980, 
208-209) 
Liu did have a set of guidelines to operate the SMC, though not all of them 
seemed to be practical. First of all, he allowed the rich peasant to join as a member, 
but only as consumer, not as trader, as he stressed, "Can the rich peasant, 
businessmen, capitalists, and landlord join the cooperative? Of course they can, but 
only as a consumer. They cannot buy from the SMC and sell in other places. When it 
comes to promoting the members' produce, the SMC should try to sell that produce 
from the poor peasant before the rich peasant's produce can be put on the shelf. In 
addition to that, the rich peasant cannot be the person in charge of the SMC."(Shue, 
1980, 85) Apparently, the regulation available was not sufficient to monitor the rich 
peasant or to prevent them from buying goods for commercial purposes; not least, 
most of the SMCs were located in rural China where peculiarity normally overruled 
formality-as rules were hardly followed. Although the SMC aimed to serve the 
whole rural population, non-members could not enjoy the benefits. This could result 
in problems where poor peasants could not afford to join the cooperative due to a lack 
of shareholding funds. For this, Liu's solution was straightforward, "The fund should 
be subscribed to by those who want to sell their produce through the SMC. If you 
have more produce to sell your subscription should be higher, or vice versa. Those 
who do not have produce to sell but only want to join as a consumer could subscribe 
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even less, in which case the existing members would determine the amount of 
minimum subscription via democratic means." (Liu, 1987, 103) Liu should have 
known by then any policy that lacked absolute and definitive clarity would only lead 
to chaotic implementation in rural China; that he should not leave anything to the 
peasant discrepancy. His single mindedness was reflected by what actually happened 
to the SMC- discrimination of membership admission, "one of the most serious 
problems was a tendency among SMC organisers to favour rich peasants and well-to-
do middle peasants in recruiting members and in distributing the benefits of 
membership such as loans of fertiliser and seed." The reason underlining such 
tendencies was the fear of the difficulty in loan collection should the loan or credit be 
given to poorer peasants (Shue, 1980, 209-210). However, this could be the blind 
spot of the Chinese leaders of that era, who were after all revolutionaries, weak in 
policy implementation, and had too much faith in the initiative of the peasant, their 
closest ally in revolution. Nevertheless, it shows Liu's determination to make the 
SMC independent of the Centre. 
Another issue contradicting Liu's advocacy of commercial activities was his 
objection to the profit making nature of the SMC, as he stated clearly in September 
1948 that "if the SMC motive is to make profit, it would have paralleled the capitalist 
businessmen .. .it would result in a more speculative market. .. this is the reason why 
many cooperatives had failed in the past. Because the cooperative is not a profit 
making organisation: as it aims to buy high and sell low, it should not pay a dividend 
to the registered members." Liu seemed to realise that practically, the SMC could not 
make any profit. But he changed his tone in 1951 when he agreed that the SMC 
should "split the profit into two, one as pension fund with the other as dividend for 
shareholders." (Liu, 1987, 14, 103-104) This could mean attracting new members, 
as he actually did not intend to make the SMC a profit making institution. The SMC's 
objective of buying high and selling low actually contradicted the basic economic 
theory. Liu hoped to lift peasant living standards by paying more to them, and to 
make most of the goods affordable to most rural households. At the same time, he 
also wanted the SMC to act as the peasant representative to compete in the market, as 
he hoped, to squeeze the capitalist out with lower selling prices. 
The SMC would absorb any losses incurred during the business transaction. 
So if we view the SMC and the peasant as two separate entities then the SMC was not 
a good business organisation. But if both peasant and the SMC were regarded as a 
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combined force in the market, then it should be accepted as a commercial institution. 
Liu was aware of these contradictions, therefore his continuous modification of the 
operating guidelines simply reflected his intention to play down the level of state 
support via formal commercial relations. In 1951, Liu stated that, "the SMC have the 
absolute rights to distribute the rural produce they purchase from the peasant, but they 
should give priority to the state and other cooperatives, particularly in distributing 
those items in scarcity. They should also lower their profit margin when they sell to 
the state and other cooperatives, and they should not sell to private capitalists for a 
higher price. However, the SMC could sell the surpluses not needed by the state to 
private businessmen through the market. The SMC may also set up retail outlets to 
promote their produce; and workshops or factories to modify, repack and add value to 
the produce before marketing them. The SMC should not involve itself in financing 
business. The credit business would only be carried out by bank ... In order to ensure 
that the SMC business is in line with the life of the peasantry, I oppose the SMC 
carrying out any activity not relevant to the sale of local produce and supply of 
grocery, or any profit-driven activity." (Liu, 1987, 104-105) 
At this point, we see Liu was not actually a "market economy advocate". It 
must be noted that ideology underscores Liu's support for the continuous existence of 
the market and the retention of the petty bourgeois economy; and private ownership 
was the multiplicity he could afford to allow to exist under the authority of planned 
economy. In order to establish an absolute advantage over the rivals in the market, he 
had to ensure that the SMC could have access to all resources the state provided. Liu's 
advocacy for independent and professional management may sound reformist, but 
there was no ambiguity over the role the SMC should play-not only as an 
independent rural commercial institution to trade for the peasant, but also as an 
extended branch of the planned economy to organise collective purchase and 
distribution in the peasantry. This had become particularly obvious when the SMC 
became the primary organ to implement 'unified purchase and supply' in rural China, 
which emerged as a central policy and might not be Liu's idea. 
As Liu gave clarification on how the SMC should promote and sell its produce 
III 1952, he emphasised that one of the SMC's roles was to ensure the smooth 
implementation of the central economic policy, "While selling the members' produce 
has always been the objective of the SMC marketing strategy: primarily, we should 
always aim to complete the tasks of purchasing industrial materials and export items 
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as per quota set by the centralised purchasing plan. The centralised purchase of 
industrial material (from the peasantry) should be contracted to the SMC, and the 
completion of the task is the priority. The surpluses of the purchases or produce not 
needed by the national industries could be marketed through the SMC to other 
cooperatives. The SMC's sales of industrial material (to the state) would be the 
biggest sales the SMC could make; it would also be their most reliable income. The 
completion of centralised purchase for the country would see the SMC achieve the 
objectives of serving both the country and the peasantry." (Liu, 1987,261) 
Liu's enthusiasm in promoting the SMC seemed to reflect his preferred 
economic model and his perception of the function of market: a market dominated by 
few major players, namely cooperatives, state trading company, and nationalised 
industries, with some 'remnants of capitalists' still actively trading in the minor 
industries. Under this conception, rural welfare and national economic goals could be 
both taken care of via the establishment of a range of business cartels operating 
independently but developed under a state-controlled economic plan: while 'The 
Trust' would merge the major industries to become industrial conglomerates so as to 
improve their efficiency and productivity; the SMC organises the private trades in 
rural China, generating income for the peasant while securing the supply of goods to 
the urban area. The goods flowed from nationalised industries to the SMC, and were 
sold at low prices to the peasant; the handicraft and agricultural produce were 
purchased at high prices from the SMC, and channelled to the urban users through 
state enterprises. Liu believed this would ultimately render the petty capitalists 
ineffective. At the same time, he was well aware of the contradiction in his theories, 
as he was trying to impose a market economy and a planned economy concurrently. 
The following statement would have summarised his concern over the SMC, "On one 
hand the SMC should distance itself from the private capitalists (to operate in a way 
different from the capitalists), and on the other it should differentiate itself from the 
nationalised enterprise as well. Then only will we see the real character of the SMC. It 
is a collective economic institution for the hardworking masses. It would help to lift 
the living standards of the peasant and petty bourgeoisie, who might tum into private 
capitalists if we do not handle them properly; and it would also enhance the status of 
the state enterprises and help to construct the nation's economy. So this sort of 
cooperative comprises the elements of a socialist economy. while being a semi-
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socialist economic institution. This is what I understand about the SMC.·· (Liu, 1981, 
2: 113) 
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Chapter 6: Liu and the Great Leap-Ideological Inconsistency 
or Political Expediency? 
6.1 Introduction: The Origin of the Great Leap 
The Great Leap Forward (dayuejin), the policy that resulted in great famine in 
China, (and some call it the Great Leap Famine, see Yang, 1996, 1; Teiwes & Sun, 
1999, xi) was Mao's most ambitious economic development plan, and is notoriously 
known for its calamitous legacy, the result of which was famine on a vast scale that 
caused millions of deaths. The tragedy was further compounded by flood, drought and 
cold weather, which exacerbated the death toll (Selden, 1993, 18). It set ambitious 
targets for both agricultural and industrial growth, and attempted to develop the country 
via the mobilisation of the masses instead of technological advancement, as Mao 
believed that he could achieve the target through "more rational use of human labour 
and the stimulus given to peasants' enthusiasm for work." (Nolan, 1988, 48) As a result, 
"work and action became a manifestation of political attitude ... expressions of such 
attitudes intertwined with economic performance and were measured by ability to meet 
and exceed goals. The pressure to exaggerate economic performance contributed to the 
massive famine during the Great Leap as rural cadres exaggerated grain production and 
sought to outdo each other with regard to the state even though their own village 
population had little or no grain for their own use." (Oi, 1999,6) 
The campaign was launched with the belief that the combination of mass labour 
. forces and primitive tools were the perfect replacement for mechanised farming. The 
Leap was also perceived by the CCP as the alternative route to achieving 
industrialisation without foreign aid. Mao placed the Great Leap under the 
administration of the General Line of Building Socialism, which was meant to replace 
the General Line of Transition that was launched in 1953. The new General Line was 
underlined by the slogan of "more, faster, better, and more economical" (duo, kuai, hao, 
sheng). The Great Leap actually incorporated three separate and related campaigns; 
together they formed what the CCP called "The Three Red Flags" (sanmianhongqi), 
which comprised the General Line, the Great Leap and the People's Commune, the 
ultimate forn1 of collective farm. Also incorporated in the Great Leap was the Great 
Steel Production (daliangang) , the campaign to produce more steel at any expense so 
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that China could beat Britain and the US in steel production within 15 to 20 years. As a 
result, even household tools like cooking pots were melted down in the backyard 
furnace to produce iron and steel. 
Harris compares it with the Soviet Union in 1929-31 and describes the Great 
Leap as an attempt to "break through the limitation of backwardness, to ward off the 
pressing demand of the mass of population for some improvement in their living 
standard, and to accelerate vastly the growth of all sectors of industries." (Harris, 1978, 
48) But some instead believe that war communism could be a better reflection of the 
Great Leap in Russia than the post NEP period of 1929-31 (Nolan, 1988, 10). The 
intention to break through the backwardness could just be one of the general 
interpretations, as the rationale behind the launch of the Great Leap had been complex. 
Basically, to sum up the opinions of the origin of the Leap, one could say that the Leap 
was "impelled by crop failures, the withdrawal of Soviet technical support and a 
foreign exchange deficit with the USSR, the imperative need for investment funds for 
industry and the US-led economic blockage of China;" (Stettner & Oram, 1987, 7; 
Howard, 1988, 37) though it still depends on what the focus of one's interpretation is. 
Below are some popular interpretations of the background of the Great Leap. 
Contrary to the common notion of the Leap as 'Mao's catastrophe,' Hsu 
believes the Great Leap was meant to better an already successful economic plan. The 
year of 1956, two years before the launch of the Great leap, "marked a spectacular 
advance in industrial output that topped the previous year by 25 percent, matched by 
the increase of 60 percent in capital investment." Hsu also points out that the first five 
year plan, which ended in 1957, still exceeded the original target by 17 percent 
according to the fixed price of 1952. Steel, iron and electric power production all 
achieved a 25 percent increase over the original quotas. The coal and grain output were 
8 and 11 percent above quota respectively. So for Hsu, "the success of the First FYP 
prompted the government to launch a more ambitious Second FYP for the period of 
1958-1962. Unrealistically, it called for an overall increase of 75 percent in both 
industrial and agricultural output by 1962, and 50 percent increase in national income 
(Hsu, 1995, 654). 
Most of the research however, points to the urgency to clear the bottleneck due 
to unsatisfactory performance of the first FYP as the main reason underlining the 
launch of the Great Leap. Mao launched the Great Leap as an alternative plan to the 
de\'elopment strategy that had been imported from the Soviet Union. In order to avoid 
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the repetition of the problems that occurred during the first FYP, Mao and his 
colleagues settled on the approach of utilising mass mobilisation they had adopted 
during the years of power struggle against the Comintern and KMT in Yan' an. as we 11 
as the belief that superhuman effort motivated by political zeal was the key to the 
success of any mass scale campaign. Despite the collectivisation that had already 
started in 1953, farm production as a whole did not increase significantly. The first FYP. 
which was based on the Soviet model, extracted revenue from the agricultural sector to 
construct industries. But in the 1950s, while the Chinese population was four times 
higher than the Soviets', the standard of living was only half as high. Therefore while 
the Soviets could rely on a consistent rural surplus, the Chinese "first had to develop a 
means to create and enhance that surplus." Let alone the fact that the Soviet party 
membership was 70% urban, while the CCP's was 70% rural, that exploitation of the 
countryside seemed irrational if rural output could not be boosted (Fairbank & 
Goldman, 2006, 369; Lieberthal in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 294, 298-300). 
However, some regard the launch of the Great Leap not as the result of abandonment of 
the Russian model, but as the "intensification of the Stalinist economic model," as the 
Leap assimilated the Stalinist model of industrialisation via rural exploitation 
(Friedman, 2005, 6). 
Contrasting the view that the first FYP was doing well, some see the amount of 
agricultural savings to finance the construction of industries during the first FYP as not 
impressive, as grain production could hardly be called self-sufficient, (Yang, 1996, 22) 
and there is also a belief that the Great Leap was the consequence of "two mediocre 
harvests in a row". (Hsiung, 1970, 185) Some believe the picture was in fact much 
bleaker, as Mao needed a development plan to double grain production in order to 
counter the perennial problem of severe food shortage (Zagoria, 1962, 88-90). The 
intensification of agricultural collectivisation and industrial investment in 1955-56, 
and the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relationship had indeed created new strains on 
China's economic development, which called for a more radical new solution. 
This connects us to another popular belief: to regard the Great Leap as an 
attempt to generate resources for modernising the Chinese military forces after the CCP 
realised that it was unlikely to get sufficient aid from the Soviet Union. The withdrawal 
of Russian scientists from China did halt China's hope to become a superpo\ver via the 
development of its atomic programme. Mao thus saw the necessity to initiate a self-
reliance programme and Chinese aims were to be sought predominantly through the use 
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of Chinese power, which was to squeeze the peasantry for the revenue to build the 
military. This point of view has attracted interpretations from different perspectives: 
Some see it as the indulgence of chauvinism instead of Marxist orthodoxy by Mao 
because of his desperation to develop China's first atomic bomb (Bianco, 2001, 48; 
Chang & Halliday, 2005, 444). Some view it as the result of the international political 
struggle, as Mao needed an urgent and vast-scale military build up because of .. the 
failure to capture Taiwan and the subsequent intrusion in the Taiwan Strait by the U.S 
Seventh Fleet as well as the reluctance of the Soviets to assist in the conflict,~' (Hsiung, 
1970, 185-186); or because of Mao's "failed attempt to lure the Russians into direct 
military confrontation with the US," which "had prompted the cutback in military 
subsistence that the Soviets imposed as a penalty for Mao's 'audacity'." (Rice, 1972, 
159-160) Macfarquhar agrees that the Leap was "a catalyst for the emerging Sino-
Soviet dispute," as he sees the Leap as abandoning a balanced development strategy. 
He agrees that the result of the first FYP was "striking", but he points out that the 
revenue generated was insufficient to cope with the developments following the Sino-
Soviet split (Macfarquhar, 1983, 1-2). 
Mao could have been launching the Great Leap as one of his approaches to 
promoting "controlled social conflict as a way of changing the organisation of work and 
of forcing people to clarify their political standpoint", and the policy of the Great Leap 
was a particularly "concentrated expression of Mao's political values and methods of 
operation", as well as embodying Mao's belief in the virtues of self-reliance and 
popular activism. However, the Sino-Soviet relationship in the 1950s was pivotal in 
determining domestic policy, and the Great Leap could just be a reflection of the 
relationship. Mao was on the offensive after relations with the Soviet Union turned sour. 
and thus in search of a "Chinese solution to the problems of social change in an 
underdeveloped peasant society." (Solomon, 1971, 331-332) 
But many view it from the perspective of inner-party political struggle and 
suppression of dissidents, as they saw the Great Leap as the consequence of Mao's 
rejection of the opposition to Rash Advance60 (janmaojin) and Mao's concern that the 
essence of his economic development plan, "more, faster, better, and more economical" 
(duo, kuai, hao, sheng) could be wiped out following the retreat from the Rash Advance. 
60 Fanmaojin, or Anti-rash advances, was the campaign initiated by Chen Yun, the then Finance Minister. 
and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier. Its aim was to slow the pace of collectivisation and rationalise the 
economic development plan. Liu was believed to be supportive to the campaign. See also Chapters 3. 
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Economic growth in 1957 was slow, as the 1957 annual growth rate fell behind the 
growth rate of the whole First FYP in both industrial output (11.4% compared to 25.7%) 
and agricultural output (3.6% to 3.80/0). Therefore Mao's desire for greater pace (of 
development) was understandable. However, Teiwes points out that the Great Leap 
could be the result of a series of events that unfolded during the period prior to the Leap. 
or what he calls the incremental policy process. Mao's decision to launch the Great 
Leap could have been significantly influenced by the intellectual repercussions the 
party experienced during the Hundred Flower period, as well as the Anti-Rightist 
movement in June 1957. All these had convinced Mao that the rightists had got the 
upper hand, and the threat from the bourgeois reactionaries was immense. Mao' s public 
declaration of "surpassing Britain in steel production within 15 years" fuelled "both his 
insistence on faster growth in the immediate period, and his subsequent resistance to 
retreating as difficulties became apparent." (Teiwes & Sun, 1999, 53-54, 53n2; 
Teiwes in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987,133-142; Fang, 1984, 182-183,203-204) 
Bachman provides an alternative view regarding the origin of the Leap in that 
he believes the series of Leaps and Retreats between 1956 and 1962 were the 
consequences of the political struggle between different bureaucratic coalitions. He 
does not see the Leap as a product of the ideology of an individual leader, namely Mao. 
He sees Mao as a coordinator to implement the policy that prevailed among those 
proposed by different political camps. Bachman points out that the Ministry of Industry 
favoured an increase in capital investment while the Ministry of Finance preferred to 
slash budgets. Finally, the elements external to the party leadership such as the uprising 
in Hungary, the shortfall of the First FYP as well as the desire to get rid of the Soviet 
economic model inevitably drove the pro-Leap coalition to prevail (Bachman, 1991. 
5-7,219-221). 
Generally, opinions about the origin of the Great Leap do not show significant 
deviation from each other. They all point to Mao's desire to speed up the rural 
collectivisation, the desperate attempt to be self sufficient, the crisis of the scarcity of 
resources for military build-up, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relationships, as well as 
the necessity to better the First FYP without copying the Soviet model of economic 
development. Most important of all, Mao realised that the resources for industrial 
construction must be extracted from the countryside, which still constituted 800/0 of the 
country's productive forces. Yet the rural Chinese only receiyed 8% of the state 
in\'t~stment for their hard work and contribution (Yang, 1996, 22). As a result. though 
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the Great Leap was not fundamentally caused by low investment, a disastrous outcome 
seemed to be inevitable. 
Regardless of the reason behind the launch of the Great Leap, this chapter 
attempts to discuss two contradicting facts-Liu's involvement in the launch of the 
Leap and his consistency in implementing his ideology. On one hand, Liu advocated 
the operation of a limited market economy under the authority of a centralised 
economic plan, in which the major resources would be fully controlled by the state. 
while private businesses and commercial activities, as well as the rural trade of family 
produce were all allowed to exist. On the other hand, the Great Leap was not only a 
mass mobilisation of rural labour for economic building, but also a mass 
collectivisation plan, in that no private ownership or commercial activity would exist 
under the policy. With the construction of the people's commune and the replacement 
of the General Line of Transition with the General Line of Building Socialism, family 
farming and private ownership of domestic livestock were instantly eliminated. In 
addition, the Great Leap involved mass-scale decentralisation of central authority, with 
the slogan "downward transfer of authority and power" (quanlixiafang) that actually 
contradicted Liu's preferences for centralised control and his emphasis of the 
supremacy of the Party Centre. In sum, if Liu genuinely supported the Great Leap, he 
would be regarded as inconsistent with his ideology and practice and the hypothesis of 
this research would be rejected. 
In this chapter, we will go through the historical events concernmg the 
development of the Great Leap as well as Liu's involvement. We will review how the 
Great Leap unfolded and most significantly, how Liu tried to strike a balance between 
being himself and Mao's lieutenant, while shouldering the role as the leader who 
officiated over the Leap. The discussion will be in chronological order, focusing only 
on relevant events. It begins with the aftermath of the Anti-Rash Advance Campaign, 
when Mao hit back at the proposal to delay collectivisation as well as overturning the 
more moderate economic development policy agreed during the Eighth Congress 
(1956). The chapter will follow Liu's involvement in every event during this period, 
including his positive reaction to the Anti-Rash Advance campaign launched by the 
Premier Zhou Enlai, his relentless support for Mao in the launch of the Great Leap and 
the purge of Marshall Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference. as well as his assistance 
to Mao in launching the second wave of the Leap. The analysis will focus on whether 
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Liu really saw the Leap as the way to construct China's economy, or whether his 
support for the Leap had been against his own belief. 
Though in many events Liu had shown explicit support for the Leap, there is 
more evidence to prove that Liu did not go with the mainstream factions of the CCP 
wholeheartedly. It is obvious that he had been aware of the irrationality of the campaign 
from the very beginning, and he switched to the side opposing Mao almost instantly 
once he had gathered sufficient evidence to prove the campaign wrong. The existing 
accusations of Liu supporting the Leap were mainly based on the speeches he delivered 
during the Anti-Rightist campaign (1957), the launch of the Leap (1958) and at the 
Lushan Conference (1959), when he was acting as the Party's representative and the 
Chairman of the Republic. This has been a grey area in the study of modem Chinese 
History, and one of the common assertions is that Mao should not take sole 
responsibility for the orchestration of utopianism-the slogan of "overtaking Britain in 
15 years in steel production" was not Mao's creation, but was indeed inspired by their 
Soviet counterparts; and Liu was the first to talk about "overtaking Britain in just 2-3 
years" and Zhou Enlai was the one who invented the slogan "Leap Forward". (Gao, 
1999,123; Teiwes & Sun, 1999,70) 
This research will provide evidence that while acting as Mao's faithful 
lieutenant, Liu indeed tried hard to put forward his own line of thought through the 
overwhelming mainstream ideologies during the whole period of the Leap, and notably, 
this was evidenced by the existence of many self-contradicting statements in Liu's 
speeches or writings during the period (1957-1959). Therefore, his apologists as well 
as his critics extract relevant portions of these statements respectively as bases for their 
arguments. This research attempts to present the picture from a wider perspective, and 
find that Liu's weakness was not the inconsistency in his political and economic 
thought, but his inconsistency in politics. He lacked endurance and nerves of steel in his 
ideological pursuits, had been too concerned about his political career and inclined 
towards pleasing Mao. At the end of this section, the research can conclude that Liu had 
been consistent with his economic ideology and practices for the period of transition; 
but the weakness of his character, Mao's superior political power, and the inner 
struggle of the CCP had made him succumb to reality from time to time. 
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6.2 Anti-Rash Advance 
A detailed study of the origin of the Great Leap is not significantly releyant to 
this research. It would also be controversial to state that the origin of the Great Leap 
was the Rash Advance: Mao's version of the rapid economic development via setting 
high output and capital investment targets. The formation of a radical development 
policy during the pre-Eighth Congress period, Zhou's Anti-Rash Advance policy and 
Mao's rejection of the more cautious projection for the Second FYP were the important 
and relevant events to observe in order to deduce Liu's political inclination during the 
pre-Great Leap period. The exaggerated projection of agricultural output at the end of 
the First FYP was incorporated within Mao's vision of rapid collectivisation, a remedy 
to improve agricultural yield within a short period of time and to shorten the 
transitional period. In the spring of 1955, Liu's close ally, the then Agricultural 
Minister Deng Zihui annoyed Mao by chopping 20,000 collectives (or Advanced 
Cooperatives) in a shake-up to impose order on the irrational pace of collectivisation. 
Mao's response was a furious attack on what he called 'rightist opportunism', which he 
believed had undermined the progress of socialisation and economic development. Mao 
gave a further push to advances in economic development by calling a central meeting 
for local cadres on 31 st July 1955. At the meeting, he made a report with the title of 
'Regarding the Agricultural Collectivisation', which stressed the enthusiasm of poor 
and middle level peasants in response to the collectivisation campaign, and criticised 
the reluctance of some of his colleagues to advance at a higher pace. Mao's famous 
criticism of these 'rightist' colleagues as "walking like tiny footed women" had 
generally been regarded as a direct attack on Deng Zihui and the leadership behind him, 
Liu (Feng, 1998,268; Macfarquhar, 1974, 19, 326n; BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 2007). Most 
importantly, like other leaders in the central leadership during the period, Mao was 
planning to put forward his own agenda in the forthcoming Eighth Congress, which 
would lay down the foundations and principles of the economic development plan for at 
least the next five years. Apparently, Mao was hoping to make use of the Congress as a 
platform to launch his desired economic programme, as he reminded his comrades that 
"the centre of thought of the Eighth Congress was to oppose rightist ideology and 
conservatism," as adopting the conservative measures would "prolong the time of 
transition and render the development less effective:' (Gu, 1996, 542: Bo, 1993, 1: 
521-522) 
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Before the Eighth Congress, Liu was among those who were criticised by Mao 
as 'rightist opportunists,' as he represented a group of central leaders with a more 
'rational approach', (Feng, 1998, 268-269) Liu's self-criticism during the Cultural 
Revolution seemed to vindicate this-he was in the same camp as Deng Zihui. and he 
was also the leader who approved Deng's proposal to dissolve the collectives 
(Macfarquhar, 1974, 19), Although he continued to act as Mao's spokesperson for 
almost every major event, including the accusation of 'rightist opportunism' in 
December 1955; it was still correct to say that the aggressive development plan drafted 
before the Eighth Congress had all been Mao's idea. In October 1955, Li Fuchun, the 
person in charge of the SPC (State Planning Commission), submitted a proposal of a 12 
year construction plan that would fully collectivise the countryside and build a socialist 
state by 1967, The report had also set targets for every aspect of the development in the 
12 year period. Mao accepted the projection but thought it was still too conservative. 
He conveyed the projection in his own writing, the' 17 Articles', which advocated the 
completion of collectivisation by 1959. The articles also comprised various targets set 
for development at different stages, like the elimination of illiteracy within 7 years, 
tremendous increases in grain production in poor provinces by 1967 (1.5 times the 
production of 1955), and the extermination of rats, flies and mosquitoes in rural China 
by 1967. In December, Mao invited opinions on the' 17 Articles' from provincial level 
leaders. On the basis of consultations involving provincial officials and county cadres, 
the 17 Articles were expanded to the '40 Articles', which became an ambitious 12 year 
programme for agricultural development formally adopted by the Supreme State 
Conference in January, 1956. It included the plan for annual increments in the 
production of grain and cotton by 8.8% and 10.5 % respectively for the 12 year period 
from 1955 to 1967. This had resulted in the alteration of the original plan by 
departmental ministers and domestic governments. In order to please the central 
leadership, some departments even retargeted 1962 as the year of the completion of the 
plan instead of 1967 (Tan, 1999,27; Teiwes & Sun, 1999,21-22; Tong, 1996,350; 
BNSBWH, 2002,5: 2018-2026; Bo, 1993, 1: 523-524; Gao et al ed .. , 1999.66-67). 
On 5th December 1955, Liu conveyed Mao's message at the meeting conducted 
by the Politburo for all provincial and city cadres, where he reminded his colleagues 
that the centre of thought for the forthcoming Eighth Congress was "anti-rightist and 
anti-conservative", Echoing Mao's assertion, Liu stressed that the socialisation and 
industrialisation of the PRC should be completed earlier. 'The whole party should be 
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geared towards the Eighth Congress," as Liu said, "the Congress should be conducted 
properly (with Mao's message incorporated)." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 347) This could 
easily be interpreted as Liu's support for a radical approach, but Liu was actually acting 
as Mao's spokesman (Teiwes & Sun, 1999,22; Bo, 1993, 1: 521-525). 
Mao believed that he had won other leaders over. Triumphantly, on 2ih 
December 1955, Mao wrote in the preface of 'The High Tide of Socialism in Rural 
China', a collection of selected examples of the' successful story' of collectivisation in 
the peasantry, that "within just a few months, more than five million peasants have 
joined the collectives; this is a great achievement ... It has also told us that we only need 
three to four years to complete the transition to socialism. It also indicated that the 
socialisation of Chinese handicraft industries should be completed earlier than 
planned ... due to the rightist conservatism, developments have been hindered ... there are 
many things that can be achieved through hard work, but some people refuse to believe 
that they can be done." (ZGZYBGT, 1956, 1-4) The resolution of 'The Development 
Guidelines of Agriculture for the Period of 1955 to 1967' was approved on 23rd January 
1956, at the Politburo meeting. The resolution, which was fundamentally based on the 
'17 Articles', stated that the advanced cooperatives (or collectives) should replace all 
other lower forms of cooperatives by 1958 at the latest, while 85% of all peasants 
should have joined a cooperative by the end of 1956 (BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 2023). 
At this point, some members of the leadership decided to cool the heat of the 
'advances'. The members of the Central Planning Committee, the Premier Zhou Enlai, 
Finance Minister Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian realised that the target set for the 
economic development was exaggerated and unachievable, and decided to intervene 
(Huang, 2000, 214). On 8th February 1956, Zhou gave the speech that signalled the 
beginning of the Anti-Rash Advance in his address to the cabinet that, "we do not only 
want more and faster, but also better and more economically. Watch out, there are some 
signs of impatience and impetuosity. Chairman Mao said 'we only need roughly two to 
three years to complete the basic construction of socialism.' But he only means the 
socialisation in the major areas, whilst those private businesses in the remote areas 
should be given more time to transform ... we should forget about the earlier completion 
of industrialisation and not pursue those unrealistic and unachievable targets, or else the 
consequence could be calamitous ... we must not try to achieve industrialisation earlier. 
look at it carefully, it is impossible." (Zhou, 1984a, 190-191; Gu, 1996. 543) 
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Compared to Liu, the pre-Great Leap Zhou was bolder and more consistent. and 
was never short of courage in resisting Mao. On several occasions he was forced to 
make self-criticisms, but he stood his ground, though his resistance to the Chairman 
was relatively gentle in manner. Liu was a far better theoretician than Zhou, and had a 
set of coherent theories of economic construction. However, his political stance always 
undermined consistency in the pursuit of his ideological beliefs. It must be noted that 
Liu lived his political life with two faces: while he acted as Mao's general by 
conveying the chairman's message, at the same time, he still advised his colleagues 
with his own interpretation of the economy. For example, on 4th January 1956, just a 
month after he gave the 'anti-rightist speech' at the Politburo meeting, he told the 
Deputy Minister of Commerce, Yao Yilin that "the commercial activities under 
socialism are not flexible ... they could not adapt to the change of environment 
rapidly ... the capitalists are much better in this respect. They can do a good job because 
they are flexible ... so it would be a good idea to organise those experienced 
businessmen into groups as consultants or advisors, as we should learn from them and 
we should learn the strengths of capitalism." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 353) So it is not 
entirely correct to regard Liu's speech condemning the rightists and conservatives as 
the proof of his support for Mao's adventurism. 
For the preparation of the Eighth Congress, Liu had been calling for government 
officials and departmental ministers to report to him on the domestic and departmental 
problems encountered by the government in economic development since December 
1955. Within six months, Liu had already held seminars with 36 departmental ministers 
and this was a record for the Chinese Communist leadership in the 1950s, as no central 
leadership bothered to carry out such a massive task of 'data collection.' This showed 
Liu's preference for systematic and fact-based approaches. On the other hand, Liu's 
seminar with the ministers had interested Mao, who had at the same time, realised that 
he could not push forward his more aggressive agenda smoothly. So Mao joined Liu in 
the meeting with the cadres. Having picked up Liu's points in the briefing with the 
ministers and cadres, Mao formed his celebrated 'The Ten Major Relationships' that 
portrayed Mao as an open-minded leader who advocated a mixed economy (Feng: 1998. 
269-272; BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 2038; Teiwes & Sun, 1999,46). 
'The Ten Major Relationships' comprises the relationship between the hea\'y 
industries, light industries and agriculture; the relationship between the coastal 
industries and inland industries; the relationships between economic and defence 
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construction, the relationship between the nation, units of production and producers. the 
relationship between the Centre and the local; the relationship between ethnic Han and 
ethnic minorities; the relationship between revolution and anti-revolution: the 
relationship between right and wrong, and finally the relationship between China and 
foreign countries (Mao, 1978, 284-291). The first five relationships, which were 
economy related, were relatively liberal by Mao's standards. It could reflect either a 
temporary change of mind by Mao, or a concession by him after the Anti-Rash 
Advance had prevailed. 
Mao's 'Ten Major Relationships' had copied many of Liu's ideologies in 
economic construction, as the contents comprised elements ofLiu's ideas. For example, 
Mao re-emphasised that the priority in economic construction was light industries and 
agriculture, rather than heavy industries. This reflected Liu's preference for the 
sequence of economic development: 'nong, qing, zhong', which means agriculture, 
light industries, and heavy industries. Besides, Mao also stressed the importance of the 
independence of factory management and the necessity of low agricultural taxation in 
lifting the living standards of rural communities. Nevertheless, the report of the' Ten 
Major Relationships' by Mao on 25th April 1956, at the Central Enlarged Committee 
Meeting had given the Politburo a perfect platform to launch a less aggressive, more 
calculative, cautious, and commercial based economic policy for the next five years in 
the forthcoming Eighth Congress. For Mao, the 'Ten Major Relationships' not only 
saved him from isolation, but could also be used as a banner to indicate the Party's 
intention to shrug off the Soviet influence. At the introduction of the 'Ten Major 
Relationships,' Mao attempted to show the originality of his idea by drawing a line 
under the Soviet model, "particularly worthy of attention is that in the Soviet Union 
certain defects and errors that occurred in the course of their building of socialism have 
lately come to light." He attacked the Soviets' overemphasis on heavy industries and 
their high agricultural tax, claiming that the Soviet method "had squeezed the peasantry 
very hard," and giving comments like "you want the hen to lay more eggs and yet you 
don't feed them well ... what kind of logic is that!" So the official policies based on the 
'Ten Major Relationships' indeed suited everyone and had thus become the backbone 
of the Eighth Congress (Mao, 1978,284-291; Teiwes in Macfarquhar et al ed .. 1987, 
126). 
The retreat from "impetuosity and adventurism' was a victory for the cautious 
minded economic planners, namely Zhou Enlai, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun. 
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and Liu. Zhou pushed for a further slice of the new budget on 11 th Mav 1956 at the 
- , 
State Council Conference, where he stressed that "we have been opposing conservatism 
for eight or nine months and we cannot continue doing that forever." Following the 
conference, the new budget report for the Second FYP, which had had substantial 
deductions from the' 17 Articles' -based original budget, was approved at the Politburo 
meeting on 10th June. It was believed that the approval of the budget deductions was 
due to the firm support by Liu, who chaired the meeting. (Teiwes & Sun, 1999, 30-31; 
ZYWXYJS, 1998b, 108) In fact, Liu even demanded the Propaganda Department write 
an editorial in the Party-controlled press Renmin ribao (The People's Daily) to promote 
the resolution of the Eighth Congress. The editorial was first drafted by the propaganda 
chief Lu Dingyi, then revised by Mao's secretary and the Deputy Director of the 
Propaganda Department, Hu Qiaomu, who also agreed with the idea of Anti-Rash 
Advance. Liu did the final revision before submitting it to Mao. The editorial, which 
was published on 20th June 1956, stated the importance of striking a balance between 
retreat and advance, "we must oppose conservatism, and at the same time oppose Rash 
Advances ... recently there are some inclinations towards impatience and impetuosity. 
Some targets set are too high, and the practical situation was not taken into 
consideration. This is the legacy of anti-conservatism ... the impatience of the lowly 
cadres was caused by the adventurous attitude of the departmental leaderships ... with 
the introduction of the '40 Articles', every department wants to show their compliance 
with the central policy and more unrealistic targets were thus set. . .it will be impossible 
for the lowly cadres to achieve the desired target." (Gu, 1996, 543-544; ZYWXYJS, 
1998a, 2: 827; ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 368; BNSBWH, 2002,5: 2040) Mao was said to 
be angered by the editorial and refused to read it when Liu submitted to him, as he said, 
"I don't want to see that." (Bo, 1993, 1: 538) 
Liu always tried to balance his pursuit of economic construction and his 
relationship with Mao. Apparently, Liu was on Zhou's side, as only those who were pro 
Anti-Rash Advance would take part in drafting and revising the editorial. However, it is 
fair to say that unlike Zhou, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian, Liu did not take a bold stance 
on Anti-Rash Advance. The Eighth Congress was a success for Zhou and those who 
supported Anti-Rash Advance. Liu headed the Congress by making the 'political 
report' while Mao only delivered the opening speech. Liu grabbed the opportunity to 
put forward his ideology of economic building, though it appeared to haye been based 
on Mao's "Ten Major Relationships'. The essence of the speech \\'as actually entirely 
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Liuist-the emphasis was placed on the pnmacy of productive forces as well as 
contradictions among people. "The thunderstorm of the revolution is over. new 
production relationships have been established, now the mission of the struggle is to 
protect the development of productive forces ... The main contradiction within our 
country is the contradiction between the construction of an advanced industrialised 
nation and the current situation of a backward agricultural nation; the contradiction 
between the people's demand for higher levels of economic and cultural development 
and the inability to satisfy the people's demand; and the contradiction between 
advanced socialism and backward social productive forces ... " (Liu, 1981, 2: 253; 
ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 374-375) As discussed in Chapter 5, this speech with its 
prominent characteristics of Liu, not only underlined the Congress' plan for the Second 
FYP, but had also been regarded as the guideline for future economic reform by the 
existing Chinese government officials. 
The Rash Advance ended following Mao's retreat. Some researchers even call 
this the end of the 'first leap' (MacFarquhar, 1974, 86; Huang, 2000, 217; Teiwes in 
Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 119-122), or the 'small leap' (Bachman, 1991, 223). 
However, Mao was not ready to stick to the resolution passed during the Eighth 
Congress. He had been looking for opportunities to tum the tables. Mao's genuine 
feeling was reflected in December 1956 when he grumbled to Liu, Zhou and Chen Yun 
that, "everybody supports the Eighth Congress, nobody supports me." (Huang in Lti ed., 
1991,436) 
6.3 The Launch of the Leap 
At the Second Plenum of the Eighth Central Committe~, which was held for the 
discussion of the 1957 budget on loth November 1956, Liu had given a speech that was 
regarded by many as a show of his political inclinations in the struggle between Mao 
and Zhou. Liu asked the committee, "What is a stable and reliable government? It 
means people do not take to the streets (to protest the problem of livelihood) as they 
still have faith in the Party." He stressed that the only way to avoid the dissatisfaction 
of the masses was to ensure steady economic development. He said, "Is it better to 
incline towards left or towards right? I think it (the economic development) should be 
slower, slightly towards the right, so that we would be able to rectify it if it does not 
work well. But if we move too far left, we would not be able to rectify anything if it 
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goes wrong." (Bo, 1993, 1: 556--557) It was obvious that Liu agreed with Zhou more 
than he agreed with Mao. But beyond all expectations, Mao struck back at the Third 
Plenum, which was held from 20th September to 9th October 1957. The legacy of the 
Hundred Flower Campaign 61-the revelation of the unexpectedly high level of 
dissatisfaction among intellectuals, as well as the open criticism by lowly cadres against 
the Centre had given Mao the best excuse to curb 'bourgeois-inclined' policies. In 
addition, as stated in the introductory section, the Hungarian uprising, had poured fuel 
onto the fire, and Mao believed the time was ripe to re-Iaunch the Leap. As the 
Hundred Flower had been transformed into a rectification campaign, 200,000 cadres 
from 19 provinces including Hebei, Beijing, Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, 
Hunan and Sichuan had been purged (BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 2130). It was under this 
current of Anti-Rightist rectification that Mao dominated the Third Plenum. He restated 
the existence of the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which 
was contrary to the resolution of the Eighth Congress that had just been passed a year 
ago: "During the period of transition, major contradictions exist between socialism and 
capitalism .. .last year we eliminated private ownership, but we did not eliminate the 
people (capitalists). These people have not been transformed. The contradiction 
between the proletariat and bourgeoisie, and the contradiction between socialism and 
capitalism are the main contradictions during the period of transition." (Bo, 1993, 2: 
624) 
An interesting comment by Mao at the Third Plenum was his implicit criticism 
of Liu. Mao believed that the Anti-Rash Advance had wiped out the policy of 'more, 
faster, better, more economical'; the National Agricultural Development Plan (which 
was based on Mao's 17 Articles) and the Organising Committee of Promoting 
Development. "The problem of 1956 was Gust) the over-spending of 3 billion Yuan and 
the production of six million unusable double-wheeled ploughs," playing down the 
negative impact of the Rash Advance Mao said, "These problems can be solved by 
organising a temporary committee of demotion. But the Communists' aim should be to 
promote (collectivisation) and advance forward, not to demote." (Bo, 1993, 2: 636) 
Following Mao's comment, Renmin ribao published two Mao-revised editorials. The 
article with the topic 'Mobilise the Whole Nation to discuss the -10 Articles and Push for 
the High Tide of Agricultural Development' claimed that, "some conservative rightists 
61 For explanation of Hundred Flower, see note 31 of Chapter 3 
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believed that National Agricultural Development Plan is Rash Advance~ they accuse the 
Leap Forward of being Rash Advance." (Renmin ribao, 13th November 1957, 
BNSBWH, 5: 2002,2141-2142) Note the use of the word 'Leap Forward' to contrast 
with the conservatism they opposed. The other editorial, with the topic' We must Insist 
on Proceeding with the Development Plan of More, Faster, Better, and More 
Economical' accused "somebody" of "preferring to make a rightist mistake rather than 
a leftist mistake." (Renmin ribao, lih of December 1957, BNSBWH, 2002, 5: 2145-
2146) Apparently, it was targeting the statement Liu made at the Second Plenum. 
Moreover, under Mao's instruction, the 20th June 1956 Renmin ribao editorial that 
promoted anti- Rash Advance (with Liu's approval), was circulated at the Plenum as 
material of criticism (evidence of wrongdoing). Mao condemned the editorial for being 
"vulgar dialectic" and containing "vulgar Marxism", saying that the editorial "tries to 
oppose conservatism and Rash Advance at the same time, so as to look reasonable 
under either banner .. .in fact it only opposes Rash Advance." Mao believed the article 
was "against him" (Bo, 1993,2: 637-638) It is obvious that Liu was not in the same 
camp as Mao. Liu's approach was implicit, but his message was clear-the Rash 
Advance must be suppressed. Hence it is correct to state that until the Third Plenum, 
Liu was, politically, an ally in Zhou's camp opposing the collectivisation plan. 
The use of the words "Leap Forward" by the Renmin ribao editorial III 
November 1957 marked an abrupt end to the Anti-Rash Advance campaign. The reason 
Mao could easily end the force of Anti-Rash Advance within the party so rapidly was 
that the Anti-Rightist rectification campaign resulting from the Hundred Flower 
Movement had been expediently paralleled with Anti-Rash Advance as 'the struggle 
against conservatism'. But some believe that it was Mao's plot to create a 'Chinese 
version of the Hungarian uprising' in the Hundred Flower Movement so that the 
application of extreme measures of suppression could be justified. Nevertheless, the 
general respect for Mao by Politburo members played a major role in Mao's victory, as 
everybody was stunned by the Chairman's fury. As Huang points out, it was a common 
situation of Chinese politics in the Maoist era that "political loyalty prevailed over 
policy preferences based on the objective evaluation of issues in decision making." 
(Feng, 1998,299-300; Huang, 2000, 226; Teiwes & Sun, 1999, 67) 
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However, Huang believes that Liu's defection from Zhou~s Camp was one of 
the major reasons why the economic planners62, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun and 
Li Xiannian, were defeated so easily. He reveals that Liu switched to Mao's side during 
the Third Plenum after Mao's furious showdown, and the drafting of the editorial 
'Mobilise the Whole Nation to discuss the 40 Articles and Push for the High Tide of 
Agricultural Development' published on 13th November 1957 was not carried out by 
the editors of Renmin ribao, but actually by the propaganda head, Lu Dingyi, on Liu~s 
instructions. This was confirmed by Wu Lengxi, the then Chief Editor of the Renmin 
ribao (Huang, 2000, 222-223; Wu, 1995, 47). But there are interpretations from an 
alternative angle, as some assert that in view of Liu's opposition to Mao's economic 
policy during 1956-7, Liu's renewed support for Mao reflected a compromise 
between the party leaders by which Mao "was backed in his plan for organisational 
changes in the countryside in as much as his General Line continued to give investment 
priority to the development of heavy industries," which was Liu's preference (Solomon, 
1971,359). However, it is highly controversial to state that the point of division was the 
priority of capital investment instead of the pace of development. Though Mao was no 
doubt in favour of institutional change in rural China, Liu's priority had always been to 
stabilise the foundation of agricultural development before moving the focus to heavy 
industries. 
Subsequent to the Third Plenum, Mao convened three more conferences, which 
were significant to the launch of the Leap. The Hangzhou Conference on 2nd January 
1958, the Nanning Conference in Guangxi Province on 11 th January 1958, and the 
Chengdu Conference on 8th March 1958. In these three conferences, Mao restated the 
importance of the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, named and 
shamed the intellectuals whom he coined as 'rightists', and attacked the policy of Anti-
Rash Advance (BNSBWH, 2002, 6: 2154-2166). In Nanning, Mao confronted Zhou, 
"Aren't you Anti-Rash Advance? I am opposing Anti-Rash Advance!'~ Some 
committee members wondered who else, besides Zhou, Mao would identify as 
members of Zhou's camp for rectification purposes. Liu seemed to answer the doubt on 
Mao's behalf in his speech, as he said, "Chairman Mao is referring to the economic 
planners." (Bo, 1993, 2: 639) This revelation by Bo Yibo could have to a certain extent 
62 These four Politburo leaders were referred to by MacFarquhar as the economic planners who were in 
charge of the economic planning and advocating anti -rash advances. 
Sources: MacFarquhar, 1974,59-74 
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vindicated Jing Huang's assertion (see above), that Liu had already defected to Mao's 
camp and assumed the role of Mao's spokesman in the Nanning Conference. However, 
it must be noted that he could have been making such clarifications on the grounds that 
he was the second in command, let alone that he had never taken a bold stance like 
Zhou's and had always acted as Mao's spokesman. As a result of Mao's accusation, 
Zhou was deprived of the right to speak on the economic question, and he and Chen 
Yun were forced to make self-criticisms (Teiwes & Sun, 1999, photo 3e; Bo, 1993, 2: 
639). 
The discriminative treatment of Liu and Zhou by Mao was obvious. It could be 
due to Liu's shift in stance. But Liu's support within the Politburo might be the major 
reason Mao did not attack him directly. Some Chinese sources also confirm Liu's shift 
in stance, but stating that Liu did so only after Mao's furious attack on Anti-Rash-
Advances. In other words, Liu acted thus to avoid annoying Mao. They stressed that 
under Mao's criticism, Liu was convinced that he was wrong and attempted to rectify 
his mistake (Zhen, 2004, 46; Du, 2002, 69). In fact, Liu's speech at the Chengdu 
Conference seemed to draw a clear line between his and Mao's ideologies, "I just 
realised that there is huge gap between my idea and the Chairman's idea (in terms of 
economic construction) ... the pace of construction of socialism, and the construction of 
industries and agriculture do matter, and I think there is something wrong with my 
mind, I thought it did not matter whether the pace is faster or slower, I did not realise 
that it is a matter of policy ... " the speech indeed sounded more like a statement of 
clarification than self-criticism. Then Liu concluded that "Compared with the chairman, 
we are really far behind." (Huang, 1995, 331-332; Li, 1998, 23) Apparently, Liu had 
made concessions in the face of Mao's advancement. 
The Leap was officially launched at the Second Session of the Eighth Congress, 
in May 1958. But such an inauguration was rather the approval of a political slogan 
than the passing of a resolution, for as Meisner points out, ~'there were no detailed 
blueprints for the Great Leap. It was more the product of social vision than an 
economic plan in the order of a five year plan." (Meisner, 1986, 205) As the 
representative of the party, Liu delivered the famous Leap-launching speech . The 
Present Situation, the Party's General Line Jor Socialist Construction and its Future 
Tasks: He reported to the cadres on the direction of the party in years to come. and 
gave a detailed elaboration of Mao's line of 'building socialism with the method of 
/non.', Jaster. better and more economical'. He echoed Mao's assertion, stressed that the 
existing contradiction was still the contradiction between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie. Liu also condemned the Anti-Rash Advance, asserted that the problems of 
overspending in 1956 were just some minor problems, but "some comrades 
exaggerated the problems and believed that the Leap Forward in 1956 was Rash 
Advance, opposing good policies like 'more, faster, better, more economical' and 
'Article 40' ... this would undermine the initiative of the masses." Finally Liu made an 
appeal in his speech for China to "overtake Britain in terms of industrial production 
within 15 years or an even shorter period." (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 830; ZYWXYJS. 
1996,2: 423--424; Gu, 1996, 584-585) Hence it is understandable how this report 
had put Liu in the limelight as many believe that as a Deputy Chairman, Liu' s 
involvement in the Great Leap was genuine and wholehearted. The perception that 
Liu's hands were behind the Great Leap has been generally based on his role in this 
meeting as well as his performance at the Nanning Conference. Therefore some even 
believe that "it was Liu rather than Mao who must be regarded as the main sponsor of 
the Great Leap." (Hinton, 1960, 515) Dittmer also agrees that Liu's role in delivering 
the speech had portrayed him as the front man of the Great Leap, although he believes 
that Liu, Zhou, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun were all basically holding an oppositional 
stance to Mao (Dittmer, 1998, 32). 
Schurmann points out that there are two significant time points in pushing 
forward the Great Leap for which Liu was responsible-his speech on 6th November 
1957 titled 'The Significance of October Revolution' and his speech at the Second 
Session of the Eighth Congress on 5th May 1958, which we have discussed (Schurmann, 
1968, 465n). However, Schurmann does not take note of the fact that Liu applied his 
common trick of delivering his own ideology under the skin of a Maoist statement in 
the speech 'The Significance of the October Revolution'. At first Liu echoed Mao's 
favourite statement, "There are two ways to accomplish this task, one way is to do 
things quicker and better, the other to do things slower ... The Central Committee of the 
Party considers the former way should be adopted and the latter rejected," apparently. 
Liu hinted that it was not his idea but the idea of 'Central Committee'. Then he 
continued, "of course, this slogan must be carried out in a practical way in the light of 
the actual conditions. but not in a subjective way that neglects the reality .. .it is wrong 
to seek quality and speed at the expense of quality and economy (Liu, 1969, 2: 454-
455). Li Rui, Mao' s former secretary who has kept the meeting minutes intact until the 
present day, concludes that '"Liu's report at the Second Session had more conclusiyely 
reflected Mao's ideologies by then, especially as the report had summarised Mao's 
ideas raised at the Nanning and Chengdu Conferences." Li's accounts also show that 
while Liu had just made one speech at the Second Session, Mao had made four (Li, 
1996, 284, 286-367). So Liu was to a certain extent only acting as a spokesman of 
Mao, though he might have drafted the speech (or report) himself. 
Huang Lingjun from Wuhan University of Technology believes Liu was 
definitely responsible for the Great Leap. "In fact," Huang says, "Liu had been giving 
his endorsement to the construction of public kitchens, people communes, and the 
backyard steel furnace, as well as showing great enthusiasm in the development of the 
Great Leap." Liu had indeed defended the Great Leap during the Lushan conference in 
July 1959 (this will be discussed in the next section). Moreover, he advanced the 
propaganda of the Maoist cult for the second time in China's history at the conference, 
thus making it impossible for any subsequent rectification to succeed (Huang, 2003, 
120-121; for Liu's speech promoting Maoist cult in Lushan see Chapter 4, Li, 1993, 
368-369). As for evidence of Liu supporting the Leap, Liu did show signs of 
enthusiasm for the Leap: 
His chat with Zhou, Lu Dingyi, and Deng Yingchao (Zhou's wife) on the train 
to Guangzhou in April 1958, where they enthusiastically talked about the prospects of 
collectivisation and the bright future of the people's commune has been the popular 
evidence that Liu was supportive of the Leap. At the Zhengzhou Conference 
(November 1958), Liu admitted that he envisaged a socialist utopia in their 
conversation during the trip, "where four of us talked about generalisation of rural 
education, the expansion of communes, and the construction of nurseries ... " (Bo, 1993, 
2: 731-732) It was generally regarded as a fact that Liu and Zhou had finally accepted 
the Leap wholeheartedly; though it was more likely they did it as a political showcase, 
particularly in view of the recent defeat of the Anti-Rash Advance camp and the 
curtailment of Zhou' s political power. 
After the Second Session of the Eighth Congress, Liu toured the country to 
motivate the domestic cadres for their courageous attempts towards higher output in 
agricultural production (Dittmer, 1998, 22; Macfarquhar, 1983. 91). He promoted the 
concept of public kitchens during his meeting with the women's division of the party in 
June 1958, quoting an example in Henan that "before the construction of public 
kitchens there were 200 people doing the cooking for the whole village, now they need 
only 40. They eat better food and eat more." (Huang, 2003. 120) 
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In September 1958, when he was visiting Jiangsu Province, the local cadres 
reported to him that the grain production per mu (Chinese acre) will reach 10,000 jin 
(catty), which was apparently an unachievable figure. Liu responded with this 
endorsement, "Can the production be higher than 10,000 catties? You have good 
facilities and I believe you can definitely push it further." (Renmin ribao, 30th 
September 1958; BNSBWH, 2002, 6: 2213) 
In Xushui County of Hebei Province, Liu was told that the peasants fertilised 
the cultivated land with dog-meat soup and glucose. He reacted triumphantly, "really? 
Then you can rear some dogs, dogs breed quickly." (Renmin ribao, 18th September 
1958; BNSBWH, 2002,6: 2210) 
He passed similar comments to a cooperative in Shandong when he was told the 
grain production per mu would reach 30,000 to 50,000 catties, as he said, "you have 
outperformed the scientists, what they dare not even dream of, you have made a 
reality!" (Zhao, 1997,467) 
Interestingly, Liu showed sIgns of enthusiasm too, when he seemed to be 
convinced by the slogan that China will surpass the Western developed nation in the 
near future, "I don't think we need 15 years to overtake Britain, but only 2 to 3 years. 
15 years is the time required to overtake the US, or may be we just need 7 to 8 years to 
do so." (Ye in Lti ed., 1991,367) 
The irrational comments showing Liu's endorsement of the Great Leap quoted 
above are popular evidence commonly quoted by Chinese sources (particularly official 
sources) to show the 'overheated' situation in China when the Leap was launched, and 
how the major leadership had 'lost their mind'. This could be true to a certain extent, as 
at the beginning of the Great Leap, the Central leadership was generally impressed by 
the reports they received from the cadres. Deng Xiaoping was reported to have been 
deceived by a model peasant into thinking that he had produced 35 metric tons of rice 
on one-sixth of an acre of land (Macfarquhar, 1983, 127). Some Chinese sources would 
point out that Liu, a staunch believer in the primacy of productive forces, saw the Great 
Leap as the improvisation of the production relations, which would have a positive 
impact on the development of productive forces (Ye in Lti ed., 1991,367). 
But I believe that some Chinese sources, particularly the official sources, tend to 
highlight these references as 'official proof' of Liu and Zhou's agreement with the 
Great Leap, so that responsibility borne by Mao, who is still supposedly not subject to 
unrestricted criticism in China, will be lessened. On the other hand, these sources also 
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pluck some decent and rational comments by Mao from his original statements or 
speeches, so as to blur the divisions between Mao and Liu. I do not question the 
validity of the evidence, because Liu indeed made those statements during the Great 
Leap, just as Mao did give his support to a more moderate economic policy at the 
Eighth Congress. This research only attempts to locate the missing parts of the jigsaw 
puzzle: Did Liu support Mao and the Leap wholeheartedly, or was his involvement in 
the Leap merely 'a reflection of common mistakes' since 'every leader believed in the 
Leap, as did Liu'? 
The CCP strategy seemed to be confirmed by Deng Xiaoping's defence of the 
Party when he was interviewed by the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1980, as he 
stressed that the responsibility (for the Leap) should be shared, "You think only the 
Chairman was out of his mind and we kept our cool? No, Comrade Liu, Comrade Zhou 
(Enlai) and I did not oppose it. Chen Yun kept quiet. It is only fair that we do not create 
a sort of illusion that only one person had made mistakes while others had not. That is 
not the truth." However, due to his special status, Deng was still the boldest in 
clarifying the responsibility for the Leap. He told Fallaci later that, "it was still Mao 
who should be held primarily responsible for the Great Leap." But Deng continued to 
say that "it did not take him long to recognise the problems." Then tactfully Deng 
blurred the impact of the Lushan conference by pushing the responsibility for the 
subsequent events to the Gang of Four, " ... but the lesson was not fully learned, and as 
a result, the Cultural Revolution erupted." (Deng, 1983, 260-261) A resolution called 
'The Central Committee Resolution Regarding Some Historical Issues since the 
Construction of the Republic' was passed at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh 
Committee in June 1981. It outlined the boundaries for criticism of Mao. The meeting 
was conducted by Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, and the resolution was planned to 
standardise the public's perception of Mao, the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. 
So Mao was 'right' and 'a great man' for the first half of his life and 'made mistakes' 
during the second half of his life (Yang in Li et al ed., 2005, 253-254). As a result the 
Great Leap was one of his 'mistakes' and many leaders supported Mao during the Leap, 
so it was a 'common mistake'. 
This assertion is shared by Dittmer, who sees the selection of materials 
published in Liu' s Selected Works (1981) as apparently designed to rectify a "Cultural 
Revolution-vintage impression of a divergence of opinion (between Mao and Liu) on 
specific points." (Dittmer. 1984. 128) Moreover, Liu did speak his mind on some 
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occasions, contradicting his role as Mao's spokesman. Compared to the evidence ofLiu 
endorsing the Leap, there is even more evidence of Liu keeping his thinking rational, 
being aware of the practical situation and not being carried away by the slogans of the 
Great Leap. 
Just 10 days before his visit to Jiangsu Province (where he asked whether the 
grain production can be more than 10,000 ton per mu, see above) Liu visited Xushui 
County of Hebei Province. The local cadres told him that 700 to 1000 catties of grain 
seeds were poured into every mu of cultivated land. Immediately, Liu told the cadres 
off, "Are you sure? 1000 catties of seeds means 15 million oat plants. I think you can't 
even grow grass in such a tiny space!" Interestingly, he told the cadres of Xushui, 
"public ownership is not communism, but only socialism; it is not wise to call it 
communism if we have not reached there. Socialism is the preliminary stage of 
communism, which has very high standards." This statement has brought back the more 
familiar face of Liu Shaoqi, whom we have discussed in the previous chapter. Liu could 
not defy the peasant projection for grain production, but he said, "Can you please do 
some calculations to review the cost, to see whether it is more cost effective to produce 
10,000 catties per mu or 1000 catties per mu for 10 mu. But bear in mind that you have 
to take into account the cost of fertiliser and labour." When Liu toured the provinces of 
Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang from October to November 1958, he was confused 
by the statistics published in the local press. He told one cadre of Ningbo during his 
Zhejiang tour that, "we should make substantial deductions from some statistics 
published, in order to obtain the correct figures. The press published the exaggerated 
figures, but you should not blame the press, as county cadres like you provide the 
statistics ... our feet must always be on the ground." (Renmin ribao, 18th September 
1958; ZYWXYJS, 1998a. 2: 833-834) These comments by Liu in 1958 had cast doubt 
over his genuine willingness to go with Mao for the Leap. So it is very possible that the 
tours of Liu were just campaign trails where he and his colleagues had to show up to 
demonstrate their compliance with Mao's agenda. 
In his memoir, Liu's former secretary, Liu Zhende, recalls the meeting Liu had 
with his office assistants when he was back from the 'national tour' in the autumn of 
1958. Liu's comments on his tours were not only the revelations of Liu's real thought, 
they also exposed the lying attitude of the CCP' s top leadership in the face of Mao' s 
overwhelming influence. When his secretary reported to him that Anhui Province had 
produced 5000 catties of rice per Mu, Liu said, "5000 catties per mu? They must be 
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bluffing. Do you believe that? I am not familiar with rice production, but in the north, 
we have never had more than 1000 catties (of oats) per mu!" Liu was said to be anxious 
on his return from the Hebei trip. He grumbled to Liu Zhende and others, "their 
projections are all exaggerated and flawed .. .in the cornfield, they said they will 
produce 30,000 catties per mu, and look forward to producing 50,000 catties in the 
future, what were their projections based on? They told me 6000 com plants will be 
planted in every mu of field, each plant will bear 3 cobs, each cob weighs 2 catties .. .I 
think that is meaningless .. .it is impossible to get 2 catties of com per plant. 63 The 
potato farm is even more amazing, they project 200,000 to 300,000 catties per mu. I 
think it would have become a potato store, not a farm." Remarkably, Liu told his office 
staff why he gave encouragement to the peasants most of the time, '"we should 
appreciate the masses' initiatives and we should not demoralise them, the root of the 
problem was the leadership, not the masses. Sometimes we suffer some setbacks 
because of our inexperience and inadequate studies of the issues. But the current trend 
of 'shallow boasting attitude' (fukuafeng) was not caused by inexperience. We should 
not let it go on in this way. Sometimes my head was overheated as well, and I did make 
some unrealistic statements. So you can regard this as my self-criticism." (Liu, 1994, 
76-79) 
Though it is obvious that Liu did not support the Leap wholeheartedly, his shift 
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in stance during the Great Leap from Zhou's camp has been confirmed and evidenced, 
and the reason behind it has attracted discussion from various perspectives. Some point 
out that both Deng and Liu had much to gain from the Great Leap, in view of their 
political careers. While Deng was managing the Great Leap via his position as the Head 
of the CCP Secretariat, he had also played a prominent role in the Anti-Rightist 
campaign in 1957. Liu Shaoqi himself, refrained from opposing Mao for the sake of 
his security and the legitimacy of his succession to Mao, though he was regarded as 
being more independent of Mao (Lieberthal in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 307) Short 
has no doubt in Liu's willingness to be involved in the Leap, '"if Liu had doubts about 
the Great Leap-and there is no evidence he did-the prospect of making his 
assumption of the highest office of state with a dramatic upsurge of economic growth 
was evidently enough to make him close his eyes to them." (Short. 1999,483) 
63 On the other hand, the report of Renmin ribao on 18th September 1958 read: "the peasant shov\ed 
Comrade Liu the plantation of 'multi-com plants', he was very impressed." (Renmin ribao. 18th 
September, 1958) The Memoir of Liu's former assistant might have revealed the difference between 
Liu's public faces and his true self. 
An interesting view is given by Jing Huang, who analysed the issue from the 
perspective of the political structure and believes that the involvement of Liu in the 
Great Leap was a political game of choices and 'structure-induced'. According to 
Huang's 'analysis of choices', Liu's first choice was to carry out the Leap, as he had 
been one of Mao's most zealous supporters. So if Mao insisted on carrying out the Leap 
Liu would definitely follow, as "Liu could claim credit had the Leap been successful, 
and he would have little responsibility had the Leap failed-because he just followed 
Mao." However, Mao's retreat to the second front, where Liu took over as the nation's 
Chairman, had put Liu in a dilemma, which in Huang's belief, helped to shape Liu's 
opportunistic behaviour. As the leader in charge of the first front, Liu's political 
prospects depended eventually on an objective policy outcome. Liu had to play a 
balancing game, by dodging confrontation with a suspicious Mao on one hand, and 
winning cooperation from other leaders on the other (Huang, 2000, 218-220). 
Macfarquhar sees it from the angle of political struggle, as he believes that one 
of the reasons Liu shifted his stance and condemned the Anti-Rash Advance in 1957 
was due to his power struggle with Zhou He did it to strengthen his position. 
(Macfarquhar, 1983, 55-59). However, this seems highly implausible; as discussed in 
the previous section, not only did Liu not show his opposition when Zhou and Chen 
Yun pushed for the imposition of the Anti-Rash Advance, but instead gave implicit 
support and endorsement. Liu shifted sides only after Mao showed his resentment 
against Zhou openly. If Liu were to struggle against Zhou he would have done that 
much earlier. 
Some believe Liu's ambition to succeed as Chairman could be the main reason 
he worked hard to please Mao. Mao had expressed his intentions to retire to the 'second 
front' in 1956, and had officially announced that Liu would succeed him during the 
Seventh Plenum in 1959 (Lieberthal in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987,307; MacFarquhar, 
1983,173). Therefore the period of 1958-59 might have been the time Liu tried as 
hard as he could to retain Mao's trust. Huang's evidence seems to reflect this line of 
thought, as he sees the succession to Mao's chairmanship had reached a consensus 
since the Yanan roundtable agreement in the 1940s, when the pro-Soviet faction was 
defeated. Huang believes that the 'line-up' for succession was "determined by loyalty 
(to Mao) rather than institutional arrangements". So although Liu was the 'heir 
apparent' the security of his status was still subject to his performance and his loyalty to 
Mao, the only one who had full control of the party and the military (Huang, 2000, 8-
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9,136-137). It is not new that some believe Liu's political life was entirely dependent 
on Mao's presumption of the level of respect he received, as "Mao's dignity was 
preserved even to the extent of suggesting to the public that Liu Shaoqi' s position 
depended on Mao's favour." (Rice, 1972, 167) 
However, Dittmer disputes this view, as he points out that when members of the 
Central Committee were elected in the 1940s, Liu received the third highest number of 
votes and had thus become the third ranking CC and Politburo member after Mao and 
Zhu De, and "yet it is likely that Liu was already second to Mao in actual authority." 
(Dittmer, 1998, 22-23) Furthermore, even after his announcement of relinquishing his 
governmental responsibilities, Mao kept quiet at the nomination for the Chairman in the 
Second National People's Congress on 20th April 1959, as he did not officially propose 
anybody. It was Deng Xiaoping who broke the ice with "I nominate Comrade Liu 
Shaoqi for the position" and the Congress accepted. It was believed that Zhu De, the 
then Deputy Chairman, wrote to Deng Xiaoping after Mao announced his intention to 
retire, suggesting Liu be the next Chairman, as Zhu believed Liu was "well respected 
by both party and non-party members." Therefore Liu was, according to Dittmer, not 
only officially elected as the leader of the Republic, but well accepted by a majority of 
the Politburo (Dittmer, 1998, 22-23; Hei, 1988, 50; ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 837). 
On the other hand, another popular view is that there is no proof of a serious rift 
between Mao and his major lieutenants, including Liu. The launch of the Great Leap 
suggested a consensus among the leadership enthusiastically endorsed by Liu, Peng 
Dehuai and Deng Xiaoping. The research in the 1960s or early 1970s in particular. 
tends to position Liti in line with Mao where Great Leap is concerned, " ... in October 
1957, a radical group headed by Mao Zedong & Liu Shaoqi finally succeeded in 
imposing (its) policy of social mobilisation on the Politburo, in opposition to the more 
cautious advocates of gradual economic development." (Robinson, 1971, 3; Schurmann, 
1968, 360) The other common perspective sees Liu and Deng as genuine supporters of 
the Great Leap as well as the' Three Red Flags'. They parted company with Mao only 
after disastrous consequences of the Leap had surfaced. The Party was then split into 
two groups, of which Mao, Ke Qingshi and Chen Boda were the group that were pro-
GLF. and Liu, Deng Xiaoping, Deng Zihui, Peng Zhen, Peng Dehuai. Li Fuchun, Li 
Xi anni an, and Zhang Wentian, supported the retreat (Ding. 1970, 24). Howeyer, 
Macfaquhar believes that the major rift between Mao and Liu had already surfaced 
during the Second Session. For Liu it would be ideal that the energies of the masses be 
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harnessed and organised, and the party leadership's role in guiding the Leap was crucial. 
"Liu envisaged the Leap being achieved by a combination of party leadership and the 
energies of the masses." (Macfarquhar, 1983, 53-54) This view was in line with the 
hypothesis of this research-Liu advocated a limited multiplicity under the centralism 
of authority. Therefore, although Liu stood by Mao for the Great Leap, he still 
interpreted the imposition of the Leap in his own way. 
In fact, this line of thought of Liu's had even been reflected in Liu's speech at 
the Second Session, which officially launched the Great Leap. A detailed study of the 
'Leap-launching speech' would have revealed Liu's characteristics, which ironical1y~ 
contradicted the concept of the Leap, "We should mobilise all possible resources, to 
deal with the contradiction among people (note: not 'contradiction between classes', as 
emphasised by Mao), and to consolidate public ownership and state ownership of 
socialism ... with the construction of heavy industries as the priority, we must also 
construct light industries and agriculture; under the central authority, detailed central 
planning, and segregation of duties, the development of core national industries and 
domestic industries, big enterprises, small and medium enterprises should be carried out 
concurrently." (ZYWXYJS, 1998, 2: 829-830) Note that the Leap was indeed a 
process of decentralisation where Mao placed his hope on peasant initiative, organising 
skills and creativity to boost production. The speech actually once again unveiled Liu's 
distrust of the masses and any unorganised movement. 
Contrastingly, Mao complained in February 1958 that "the Centre has too much 
power; this will restrict the expansion of production." Even in his celebrated speech of 
'The Ten Major Relationships', which have been regarded as the closest to Liu's ideas, 
Mao still advocated decentralisation, "the local governments should be given more 
authority, they should be more independent of the Centre, so that they can get things 
done." So while it is easy to jump to conclusions that "both of them are the same," 
many fail to spot the difference between them. In the imposition of the Leap, Mao's '60 
Articles of Working Method' contrasted sharply with Liu's preference for a 'Central-
organised Great Leap.' The '60 Articles' encouraged the domestic authority to keep 
three sets of accounts (sanbenzhang), which meant three development projections set at 
three different levels of authority. The first account was the central projection that set 
the basic required output to be achieved at a specific location (county or city); the 
second account was also a central projection, but subject to periodical review by local 
cadres to see if increment of the required output target was possible; the third projection 
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was the domestic guideline set and reviewed by the local cadres, which aimed to 
'improve' the second guideline (which had normally been very ambitious), and this was 
also subject to the discretion of the local cadres. Mao even stressed that the second and 
third accounts did not need periodical inspection (by the Central authority) (Bo, 1993. 2: 
682; Gu, 1996, 589-590). The policy to permit the regular unsupervised revision of 
the projections was the root of the exaggerated output reports. 
Some Chinese sources insist that Liu had been keeping his mind focused and 
had never ceased applying his philosophy of 'seeking truth from facts' even during the 
Great Leap. They believe Liu had opposed the Leap since 1958 (Li, 1996, 16; Tan, 
2000, 47). This could be an overstatement, though in the face of economic reform. 
today's China has never been short of academic pieces that portray Liu as an 
inspirational figure to Deng. A more plausible assertion is that though Liu did not 
oppose the Leap, he had always been aware of events that unfolded around him during 
the period of the Great Leap, and he had never stopped examining the results of the 
Leap with rational analysis (Du, 2002, 69). But some Western sources believe that Liu, 
though he had never taken a clear stance, did not support the Leap wholeheartedly. 
Some see Liu being forced to revoke his initial script of the second five year plan and 
rewrite it in accordance with Mao's plan-an extremely optimistic growth projection, 
which he read out in the Second Session of the Eighth Congress. They even point out 
that Liu's speech at the Second Session of the Eighth Congress "had been vetted by 
Mao." So it was obvious that power politics prevailed, as "whenever Mao forcefully 
expressed a preference he prevailed, regardless of the forces arrayed behind contrary 
views, and extremely few actors ever contemplated opposing the chairman in such 
circumstances" (Teiwes & Sun, 1999,83; Rice, 1972, 161) Becker, who makes a fierce 
criticism of the Chinese leadership for the millions of deaths during the Great Leap 
believes that "Liu was just dragged into Mao's campaign," as Mao should be solely 
responsible for the Leap (Becker, 1996, 80-81). 
Actually, Mao's power politics were so overwhelming that Deng Zihui, one of 
the few brave enough to be opposing Mao in the argument over the collectivisation in 
1955, had to be restrained by his colleagues for fear that he would risk "bringing 
disaster" by continuing to argue with the leader. Furthermore, in the drafting of Mao's 
'60 Articles of Working Methods', the unofficial guidelines in conducting the Leap, 
Liu's participation was restricted and insignificant, as Mao favoured the input from 
lower ranking cadres like the provincial or county leadership. But Liu's role of drafting 
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the rules and regulations (as assigned by Mao), though not significant to the impact of 
the 60 Articles, had inevitably gained him the reputation of active involvement in the 
Great Leap (Teiwes & Sun, 1993, 13-15; 1999, 86). Like Li Rui, Mao's former 
personal secretary, both Teiwes and Schoenhals stress Mao's absolute dominance of the 
Second Session, where the internal party communication, as Schoenhals sees it focused 
almost exclusively on Mao's speech. It was Mao who envisaged 'overtaking Britain in 
15 years' before the slogan was formally stated in Liu's speech (Schoenhals, 1987,52, 
54-56; Teiwes & Sun, 1999,96). In fact, this was a slogan first mentioned in Mao's 
speech at the Representative Meeting of Communist and Workers held in Moscow on 
18th November 1957. Since then it had become a Party objective and had been regularly 
quoted. For instance, Liu mentioned it in his speech at the Chinese Workers' Union 
Representative Meeting (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 830). Hence, it was not right to regard 
this as evidence of Liu's enthusiasm towards the Leap, as he was the leader who 
delivered the speech. 
Along with the emergence of new evidence, some comprehensive and 
established studies of Liu, Mao and the Great Leap from the 1970s and early 1980s, 
have now revised their views. Teiwes overturns his old verdict of the 1970s, which saw 
Mao and Liu as being virtually in the same camp as Liu gave Mao "vigorous support" 
in launching the Great Leap. Teiwes' new conclusion regarding Liu's responsibility in 
launching the Great Leap is that "new evidence suggests he was less a driving force 
behind the Leap than someone trying to catch up with the development unfolding 
around him." (Teiwes, 1979,335,343; Teiwes & Sun; 1999, 112) But Jing Huang takes 
the perspective from the CCP as a whole, where he saw the whole party rally behind 
Mao in the launch of the GLF, that "not only was Mao put in a position of 
accountability, but the party's fate was also linked with the outcome of the Leap. Thus, 
the GLF was transformed from an economic policy into a political line that supports the 
legitimacy of the Party's rule as well as Mao's leadership." (Huang, 2000, 227) This 
change had finally enabled Mao to resume the absolute authority that he lost at the 
Eighth Congress, and there was little Liu could do about it 
6.4 Lushan Conference and the Aftermath 
The Chinese Leadership had taken some inspection trips during the autumn of 
1958 to monitor the developments in the Leap, and discovered that problems \V('rC 
popping up like mushrooms. Peasant stories of food shortages contradicted official 
statistics that showed abundance. The steel sector had also indicated that the expected 
production of 30 millions tons of steel for 1959 (in comparison with 5.35 million tons 
in 1957) was unachievable (Teiwes in Macfarquhar et al ed., 1987, 309). In fact, the 
first harvest in the summer of 1958 was a success, so peasant enthusiasm was 
widespread. However, the joy was short-lived as the problem of food shortages 
surfaced during the second harvest in the autumn, which brought chaos to the peasantry. 
Feelings of discontent amongst the rich peasantry who deeply resented the practice of 
egalitarianism was destabilising the commune. In protest against the socialisation of 
their possessions, the livestock owners slaughtered their livestock before giving them 
up in the collectivisation process (Meisner, 1999, 228). By November 1958, strain and 
signs of exhaustion began to appear amongst the masses resulting from frenetic work 
and constant meetings (Rice, 1972, 166). Serious food shortages became apparent in the 
cities during the autumn, something unexpected for Mao in a 'prosperous year'. The 
concentration of investment in the construction of heavy industries had drained the 
limited resources of a poor and backward country, where capital, raw materials, 
electricity, and transportation had all been channelled into industrial building. Light and 
craft industries had almost disappeared, so that groceries such as toothbrushes, clothes, 
and cooking utensils were hardly available in markets. The Great Leap had also caused 
mayhem to foreign trade, as most of the factories were forced to stop production due to 
material shortages. One third of coal exports to Switzerland in 1958 was stones, while 
the trade deficit for that year was 700 million Yuan (Feng, 1998, 338). As a result of 
the inspection trips, the Central leadership realised that the picture was not as rosy as it 
was portrayed by the local cadres. A series of meetings was thus held from November 
1958 to April 1959 to find a remedy for the looming problems caused by the Leap. 
These meetings included the Zhengzhou Conference in Henan Province (2-10 
November 1958), Wuchang Conference (21-27 November 1958), the Second 
Zhengzhou Conference (2ih February to 5th March 1959) and the Lushan Conference 
(22nd July to 16th August 1959). 
These conferences sought to plan a 'cooling down' process so as to introduce 
more realism to economic projections. The most significant contribution of these 
conferences to the economy was the recognition of pervasive exaggerations of output 
reported. and unrealistic projection figures. Mao admitted at the Zhengzhou Conference 
that the transitional time frame of 5 to 6 years (to communism) was unrealistic, as it 
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was "'too short." He also overturned his previous assertion, and stressed that group 
ownership still existed in the People's Commune, not public ownership, as China 
needed a longer period of transition before public ownership could be imposed. ··Before 
we could realise the full collectivisation in rural China, peasants being still peasants. 
they are quite uncertain on the road to socialism," Mao said, "we have to guide them 
through the process, step by step." At the Wuchang Conference, Mao agreed to regard 
production tools and materials as commercial products, and reminded the committees 
that the target set must be in line with the capability of the peasants. However. these 
conferences were unable to tackle the root of the problem-the ideology underlining 
the Great Leap. Mao still stressed that People's Communes and the General Line were 
the correct paths for the transition to socialism, as their functionalities were only 
undermined by unrealistic reporting and 'shallow boasting' attitudes (jukuafeng) (Mao, 
1974,247; BNSBWH, 2002, 6: 2219-2222; Gu, 1996,835-. 836). 
Mao's announcement of his retirement at the Seventh Plenum of the Eighth 
Committee, held in April 1959, was regarded by some as his offer to step down 
following the failure of the Great Leap (Hsiung, 1970, 191). However, some saw Mao's 
retirement as a tactful retreat. While the Leap went ahead, Mao could still claim credit 
if the Leap succeeded, as it was originally his plan and his idea. But if the Leap failed, . 
Mao could save face because he was no longer in charge (Huang, 2000, 218-219). But 
some doubt the reality of Mao's retirement, as he remained the chairman of the Party, 
who was presumably, more powerful in the Politburo than the Chairman of the 
Republic. And Mao's grumblings that he was "deprived of his major powers" after 
Liu's succession simply indicated his reluctance to let go of his authority (Rice, 1972, 
167; Meisner, 1999, 231; for Mao's statement, see Schram, 1974, 266-267). From the 
statement of the Red Guard's accusation during the Great Leap, one could sense that 
Mao did lose some of his power after Liu's taking over. Mao's attack on Liu during the 
inauguration of the Cultural Revolution via the Red Guard's 'Big Character Press' 
(dazibao) had clearly stated that he was "forced to step down as the Chairman" by Liu 
and his supporters, and since then Liu had treated him like a "deceased parent" and had 
never consulted him on policy making. This reflects Mao' s grievance of not being 
treated respectfully after his 'retirement.' (Ding, 1970, 5) 
The Lushan Conference actually comprised two conferences. the Enlarged 
Meeting of the Politburo (2nd July to 15t August 1959) and the Eighth Plenum of the 
Eighth Committee (2nd to 16th August 1959). They were held at Lushan, a mountain 
resort, to review economic development under the Great Leap (BNSBWH, 2002. 6: 
2248). The conference marked a crucial moment in the Leap, and a turning point of the 
retreat. Not only did the conference fail to curb excesses, but it instead boosted the 
second wave of adventurism and launched a more radical Leap. Besides his role in 
launching the Leap and his switch in political camp during the pre-GLF Nanning 
Conference, Liu's consistency in asserting his political and economic ideologies had 
been put into question again at the Lushan conference, where he supported Mao in 
attacking Peng Dehuai, and delivered speeches to defend the Leap and re-launch 
another wave of the Maoist cult promotion. However, at the beginning of the 
conference, Liu talked about 'cooling down' in the small group discussions, that, "the 
nation's economic development is about balancing .. .it (the economic rule) will not 
make concessions, but you have to succumb to it. What is the meaning of detailed 
planning of the economy? It means organised and well phased production ... we cannot 
expect the result to be a great leap every year, some years the growth will slow 
down ... " (ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 840) So Liu was apparently leaning towards the 
retreat policy, and he believed Mao was sharing his view. However, when Mao accused 
Marshal Peng Dehuai of being a rightist opportunist for Peng's criticism of the Great 
Leap via his Letter of Opinion, the wind of the conference suddenly blew the other way. 
Peng, who was the Minister of Defence and Deputy Premier, wrote a lengthy 
letter to Mao privately. He criticised the Great Leap campaign and highlighted the 
disastrous legacy of Mao. Peng believed that the pace of the Leap should be slowed 
down, as he stated in his Letter of Opinion, "some people do not have sufficient food 
and clothing ... wastage of food and materials is pervasive ... the quality of autumn 
harvest was bad, and the cost of cultivation was too high ... " (Ding, 1969a, 6) Mao's 
reaction was a shock to every leader in Lushan. He framed Peng for treason, accusing 
him of forming a 'military clique' within the party to overthrow the government and 
organised a conference to criticise Peng, who was then purged while Marshal Lin Biao 
took over as Defence Minister. The precise reason behind Mao's reaction remains 
unclear. Some believe that Mao related Peng's accusation to Khrushchev's criticism of 
China's People's Communes on 8th July 1959, six days before Peng submitted his letter. 
Mao had been sensitive to Soviet interference and influence since Khrushchev. whom 
he accused as a revisionist, came into power. The pulling out of Russian military and 
economic experts in 1957 had only exacerbated the situation. Khrushchev's description 
of the people's commune as "the product of utopianism" seemed to collaborate with 
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Peng's "petty bourgeois fanaticism," the label Peng put on the Great Leap (Teiwes in 
Macfarquhar, 1987,313; Macfarquhar, 1983,225-228; Ding, 1969a, 7). There is also 
a belief that the Great Leap had not only undermined industrial and technological 
development, but also the Sino-Soviet military alliance. Hence, Peng saw his ambition 
of building a professional army with Russian assistance being threatened by the Great 
Leap, not least by Mao's preference for self-reliance in military strategy and the 
creation of a popular militia (Meisner, 1999,231; Hsiung, 1970, 193). Another 
interesting alternative view saw Peng's fall as Mao's revenge over his eldest son's 
death during the Korean War. Mao's son, Mao Anying, was under Peng's command 
during the Korean War and was assigned by Peng to the front line, where he was killed 
(Rice, 1972, 172). This could be true to some extent in view of Mao's speech on 23 rd 
July 1959 in response to Peng's letter, where at some point he became emotional, "one 
of my sons is dead, the other is mad ... for the Chinese, a daughter does not matter, so I 
am basically without descendant. .. " (Mao, 1974,303; Li, 1993, 158) 
Whatever the reason behind the purge of Peng, Mao's ferocious attack on Peng 
was beyond everyone's expectation. Peng's fate was doomed because of a strongly held 
belief by the Politburo that "Mao could have been wrong, but the Party had to be 
forever right." Mao played the case tactfully, as he stressed that Peng's letter was "to 
the Party" and the aim of the 'military clique' was to overthrow the CCP (Huang, 2000, 
228-229). Mao then circulated a short statement entitled 'One Comment' on loth 
August 1959 at the conference stating that "there are rightist opportunists in the 
Politburo. I am referring to the members of the 'military clique' ... these opportunists in 
our Party plan to sabotage the dictatorship of the proletariat during the transition from 
capitalism to socialism." Mao even warned that the CCP could be split if Peng's idea 
prevailed, " ... they are organising another group within the Party in order to spread their 
influence and finally form another Party. The major members of this clique are allies of 
Gao Gang's reactionary group (for the Gao Gang affair, see Chapter 4)." Hence, 
although Peng's letter of opinion was meant to be a private letter to Mao, it had become 
a challenge against the "party line." The elimination of Peng's influence in the army 
was essential if the integrity of the Party was to be maintained (Huang, 2000,228-229; 
for Mao's letter, see Mao, 1974,306-307). Macfarquhar too, believes that defending 
the Party's integrity and consolidating the Party's unity had become the priorities for 
the leaders in Lushan, that a victory for Peng would have posed a grave threat to the 
legitimacy of the Party leadership within the state structure and to Party cohesion 
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(Macfarquhar, 1983, 230-232). This notion seemed to be confirmed by Peng himself. 
In his short memoir published after his death, Peng said that, "In fact, after the Lushan 
Conference, I really intended to uproot my influence in the military force; I really 
intended to tarnish my personal reputation in the military; then only can we consolidate 
and unite the military force under the central Party leadership. But I can never plead 
guilty, nor could I admit anything about a military clique, which does not exist at all. If 
I do that the consequence will be severe. I would rather destroy myself, as I cannot do 
anything detrimental to the military." (Peng, 1981,279) 
Under Mao's organisation, every Politburo member then 'lined up' to criticise 
Pengo But Liu's attack on Peng was for some, the "most ferocious and groundless." 
(Huang, 2000, 229) Macfarquhar also believes that Liu's criticism ofPeng was genuine 
and wholehearted because should Peng's accusation stand, Liu's political life could be 
threatened, as he was in charge of the Great Leap. He also saw Liu as more vulnerable 
than it seemed: "Liu, an ardent supporter of the Leap, could have been made a 
scapegoat had Mao chosen to accept Peng's letter rather than denouncing it." 
(MacFarquhar, 1983, 230-231; 1997, 164) To verify Huang and MacFarquhar's 
statements, a look at Liu's speech is necessary. A study ofLiu's accusation does reveal 
some harsh lines, but it does not look like a desperate attempt to demolish a political 
opponent. Interestingly, Mao's interruptions throughout Liu's speech were obviously 
intrusive, and that leaves us to contemplate Mao's role in Liu's criticism ofPeng. Here 
are the extracts of Liu's speech on 1 st August 1959 (with Mao's comments in Italic 
font): 
"There was one incident where Peng made a very bad impression on me, he 
once criticised a military committee, this is very indisciplined ... once I wanted to send 
a telegram to convey a message by Peng, Peng refused to sign the telegram .. .I think 
this is not right ... since then, I think he is not simple (Mao: He is cunning) .. .it is hard 
to work with him and obtain his cooperation, it is difficult to be his friend, it is easy to 
get him offended (Mao: you can never be his goodfriend) ... We (Liu and Peng) went to 
visit the ill Guan Xiangying (an ex-PLA commander). Guan begged him, 'Marshal 
Peng, please do not oppose Chairman Mao ... ' He made several accusations of me 
during the Gao-Rao affair, and I have no idea what his statements were about. (Mao: 
Guan was right, this man is fond of creating factions) .. .I feel that Peng always has his 
own ideology, I agree with the Chairman that he is ambitious, he wants to change the 
world with his methods. I think this is the root of the problem." (Li, 1993,228-229) 
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On the next day (2nd August), Lin Biao and Mao led the accusation and attacked 
Peng ferociously. Liu was the last to speak, as he said, "He (Peng) tends to oppose 
others, and likes to argue. He is temperamental and is used to scolding people when he 
is upset. .. Chairman Mao has recognised his problem, and told him that 'you will create 
division.' When the Chairman talked about the division of the Party in May last year. 
he was actually talking about Comrade Pengo He was cooperative during the war 
against Guomindang in Jiangxi, he was also cooperative during the Long March and the 
war of liberation. Generally he was cooperative during the Korean War bar some minor 
issues ... Comrade Peng can be rectified, though he changes his mind easily." On 17th 
August, Liu attacked Peng again upon Mao's request to deliver a speech regarding the 
'issue of personal cult' (detail of this speech is outlined in Chapter 4), where he said, 
" ... regarding the issue of opposing personal cults, someone in our Party opposed 
personal cults after the Twentieth Conference of the Soviet Communist. One of them 
was Comrade Pengo During the Conference, Peng suggested not singing 'Eastern Red' 
(dongfanghong)64, and opposed chanting 'Long Live Chairman Mao' ... " (Li, 1993, 
248-249; 368-369) The so called condemnation was actually more like the 
. 
grumbling over old differences that were petty and insignificant. It did not sound like a 
fierce accusation of someone over major ideological differences or against a betrayer of 
the Party line. 
Huang's description of "ferocious and groundless" is indeed based on Liu's 
comments at the Enlarged Working Conference (a.k.a. 7000 Cadres Conference) in 
January 1962 when Liu was asked to rehabilitate Pengo Apparently Huang had made a 
mistake in how he perceived the comments made at Lushan (Huang, 2000, 229n85). 
Liu was believed to have said that, "everybody except Peng can be rehabilitated. 
(Mao's interruption: as long as he is not a traitor he can be rehabilitated)" Liu 
explained that there were reasons Peng could not be rehabilitated: First, Peng belonged 
to the reactionary group of Gao Gang and Rao Ruoshi (at this point both Mao and Zhou 
interrupted: "Peng is the principal member of the group"); second, both Peng and Gao 
had 'international background', or foreign connections; third, both Peng and Gao 
plotted to overthrow the Party's management by creating factions within the Party; and 
finally, Peng wrote the Letter of Opinion after his visit to Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union: solid proof that Peng acted on 'foreign' instruction. Astonishingly, Liu also 
64 Eastern Red, or Dong(anghong, is a song to praise Mao, describing him as like the sun rising from the 
East. 
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admitted that '"some points of Peng's letter were right. .. a Politburo member could not 
be wrong for giving suggestions to the Chairman, even if some of the views were 
incorrect." (Wang ed., 1998,771-773; Macfarquhar, 1997, 163-164) The 'offences' 
outlined by Liu were just a repetition of Mao's criticism at Lushan, as Mao had already 
framed Peng as a gang member of Gao Gang on 11th August 1959 at Lushan (Li, 1998, 
50), and Liu just repeated the Chairman's accusation and Peng's crime in 1962 (or in 
Macfarquhar's words, '"recycled explanation of the purge ... "). As the Chairman of the 
Republic, Liu was also the representative of the official line of thought. '"It was his job 
to assist Mao to purge Peng, to tarnish Peng's reputation, and to uproot Peng's 
influence in the military. Liu had no choice but to carry out his job." (Ding, 1991, 144) 
However, there is a missing part of this incident involving Liu and Peng in 1962 
during the 7000 cadre conference: Liu in fact intended to overturn the verdict against 
Peng, but changed his mind and opted to "shy away from the struggle this would have 
entailed," after he had learned that the Party decided to charge Peng with treason (Rice, 
1972, 188-189). This looks very plausible in view of Mao's interruptions of Liu's 
speech (see above). And the Red Guard accusation of Liu and Peng after Liu's fall 
could have confirmed this interpretation, '"In January 1962, at the Enlarged Working 
Committee Meeting, Liu tried to overturn the verdict on Pengo He defended Peng by 
saying that, 'some points of his letter could be right.' ... he attacked the struggle led by 
Chairman Mao against Peng, believed that it was wrong and exaggerated. With the 
encouragement of the Chinese Khrushchev (Liu), Peng appealed in his case in June 
1962 with a letter of 80,000 words ... " (Ding, 1969a, 417) Mao's account in 1967 had 
the same tune, '"it was Liu in 1962 at the Enlarged Working Conference who defended 
Peng by mentioning his 1959 Letter of Opinion." (Hongqi, 1967, 13: 18) The German 
biographer of Peng Dehuai, Jiirgen Domes, confirms this incident. Domes sees Liu and 
Deng Xiaoping protecting Peng, though in an implicit manner, "most properly under 
Liu and Deng's influence so that for the first time since 1959, Peng was allowed to 
leave the capital for an inspection tour of his home province, Hunan ... " Then with 
Peng's inspection results, Liu believed the time was ripe to appeal for Peng, " ... his 
message was taken by Liu, who now set out to attempt a full rehabilitation of Pengo Liu 
repeated most of the criticism Peng had voiced at the Lushan meeting, and he openly 
called for a reversal of verdict against the so called rightist deviationists (he did not 
mention Peng's name)." (Domes, 1984, 113-114) 
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The 7000 Cadres Conference is regarded by some as evidence of one of the very 
few rebellions by Liu against Mao. Chang believes that Liu's speech at the conference 
that advocated the retreat from the Great Leap took Mao by surprise, as it seemed like 
an ambush by Liu on Mao. "Liu dismissed the official explanation of the calamities, 
saying there is 'no serious bad weather' in the areas he had visited." Her account also 
confirms that Liu had the support of the lowly cadres who observed the impact of the 
Leap much clearer than the top leadership, "Liu clearly had the support of the 7000 
participants, and Mao could not afford to have a head-on collision with this vast body 
of officials." (Chang & Halliday, 2005, 495--496) It was in this meeting that Liu 
repeated his denouncement of Mao's formula that 'mistakes are only one finger 
whereas achievements are nine fingers,' as he believed that 30% were due to natural 
disaster while 70% were definitely human error (Huang, 2003, 123). This is the 
evidence that Liu made use of the opportunity he had to tum against the Leap. 
Apparently, Liu backed off at a later stage of the meeting after learning of 
Mao's intentions. Note the last line of Liu's speech (see page 246)-"a Politburo 
member could not be wrong for giving suggestions to the Chairman, even if some of 
the views were incorrect", as Liu seemed to suggest that while Peng could be right, he 
had to be purged (or sacrificed) for the integrity of the Party. This was not only a 
concession to Mao's political power, but also a reflection of Liu's character in that he 
believed the central authority of the Party should not be challenged. This is also 
coherent with his practice in the Four Clean rectification campaign, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, where Liu purged almost everyone who was wrong by the Party's standards. 
Unsurprisingly, this part of Liu's speech at the 7000 Cadres Meeting was entirely 
missing in his 'Selected Works (Liu Shaoqi xuanji)' published in 1981, which printed 
almost every word he said at the Enlarged Working Conference except his comments 
on Peng (Liu, 1981, 2: 349--443). MacFarquhar believes that the editor of the 
'Selected Works' thought the passage of Liu's accusation against Peng would not 
convince readers who had known much about Mao's mistake and Peng' s rehabilitation, 
so they deleted it from the print in the 'Selected Works'. However, he does believe that 
Mao and Liu "seemed to have an agreement ... that Peng could not be rehabilitated. as 
part of the massive campaign to 'reverse verdicts' on cadres and others innocently 
washed away in the tide of anti-right opportunism in the wake of the marshal's 
disgrace." (MacFarquhar, 1997a, 541n122, 179) 
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There are also sources who believe that Liu was not on Mao's side until Mao 
attempted to win him over before the purge of Pengo After Mao had launched the attack 
on Peng's letter, he called Liu to his residence at midnight while Liu was on sleeping 
pills. Liu was then carried to Mao's room on a stretcher as he could not stay awake 
properly. After several hours of meetings which involved only Liu and Mao, Liu was 
sent back to his Lushan residence at dawn. After the midnight meeting, Mao finally 
managed to persuade Liu to stand by him (Jia, 1989, 209; Su, 1989, 241). But it was 
more plausible that Liu was giving in for party unity. Before the mass criticism of Peng 
Dehuai began, the Politburo convened a meeting to discuss the possible punishment of 
Peng on 2ih July 1959. In the meeting Mao insisted on "assessing Peng's political 
history and drawing general conclusions on all his wrongdoing", while Zhou Enlai 
suggested that the party "should not deny everything Peng said, we should treat it as 3:7 
(means 30% of what Peng had said was right, while he was only accountable for 700/0 
of the alleged accusations)." Liu believed it was a good idea and voiced his support to 
Zhou. But Mao was furious with Zhou's suggestion and retorted, "It looks like I should 
pursue my aim through guerrilla warfare again!" Everybody was shocked with Mao's 
response as they realised that Mao had decided not only to punish Peng, but actually to 
purge him. Since then, nobody dared to oppose his opinion again (Jia, 1989, 209). 
Actually, Liu did not show his support for Mao immediately after Peng's letter 
had been exposed. Before he received any hint or instruction from Mao, Liu tried to put 
forward a question, that was actually coherent with Peng' s opinion, on 16th July at the 
Politburo to his colleagues. Liu said, "We must talk about the mistake honestly; just 
like we talk about our achievement. .. the projection (the estimation of production by 
local cadres) and motivation were two different issues, as a lower projection does not 
necessary demoralise the masses ... " On 19th July 1959, once again Liu said that, 
" ... from the lesson we learn from previous experience, we must acknowledge good 
results but at the same time admit our mistakes ... did we make any mistakes in the last 
three months? Is reducing the steel projection to 13 million tons 'rightist opportunism"? 
If we do not learn from the experience, we will make the same mistakes again." 
(ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 459; 1998a, 2: 841-842) After Mao attacked Peng openly on 
the 23rd July, Liu told Hu Qiaomu, Mao's secretary65, that the scope of criticism against 
65 Mao had three secretaries, Hu Qiaomu, Tian Jiaying and Li Rui, who was also purged at the Lushan 
Conference. Li was a 'part-time secretary' as he was also the Minister of Hydraulic and Electrical 
Engineering. 
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Peng should not be expanded, as the enlarged circle of criticism would be more 
embarrassing to Pengo Liu also asked Hu to draft another meeting agenda that 
suggested rectifying adventurism and the Leap, as he worried that the Conference could 
be derailed from its initial objective. Hu was too scared to oblige and said, "I think we 
had better consult the Chairman." Angered by Hu's response, Liu told him off, "you 
just write it, I will consult the Chairman later." Finally Peng Zhen managed to convince 
Liu that such an agenda was not proper at the time (Hu, 1994, 15; ZYWXYJS, 1996,2: 
458). 
Dittmer sees that Liu indeed played a "conciliatory role" at Lushan. In the 
showdown, one Politburo standing committee member (Zhu De) supported Peng, four 
(including Liu) opposed him, and Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were coincidentally 
absent. While showing firm support for Mao, Liu tried rallying support for leniency in 
dealing with Peng and his supporters. As a result of Liu' s effort, as Dittmer points out, 
the treatment of Peng and other members of the "military clique' (those who were 
framed for treason included Zhang Wentian, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Huang 
Kecheng, the Deputy Defence Minister, Zhou Xiaozhou, the First Secretary of Hunan 
Province and Li Rui, Mao's secretary) was quite lenient, as they were only dismissed 
from their executive posts and were allowed to retain their membership in the Politburo 
and the party66 (Dittmer, 1998, 33). The notion of Liu's "conciliatory role" at Lushan 
and 'party unity' as the priority of the conference has actually to a certain extent 
resembled the findings of Domes, who believed Mao was desperately looking for 
support after Peng's demonstration of resentment. Domes points out that Liu and Deng 
Xiaoping belonged to the same "interest group' among the Politburo members, and they 
agreed to support Mao in pursuit of two major interests: first, they wanted, "by 
whatever means, to preserve the outward unity of the Party and avoid the split which 
Mao had threatened to create". Secondly, and most importantly, Liu and Deng wanted 
to make further revisions to the "Policy of the Three Red Flags'; or in other words, Liu 
gave Mao support in return for amendments to the Great Leap's adventurism. As a 
result Liu, Zhou Enlai and Deng dropped Peng "like a hot brick in order to safeguard 
Party unity:' Eventually, Liu and Deng's support proved to be crucial to Mao. Domes 
believes that Deng, who was absent from the conference, sent his message to unveil his 
66 However, this was only true until the end of Lushan Conference. At Mao's insistence. Peng was later 
sacked from the Party. But Dittmer was right that Peng was safe until the end of the Conference due to 
Liu's effort. 
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support in exchange for economic reform. Zhou, who had just been criticised for his 
Anti-Rash Advance, opted to sit on the fence and follow the crowd (Domes, 1984, 96-
97). Peng's fate was thus sealed. 
On 1 st October 1959, the National Day of the Republic, a month and a half after 
the Lushan Conference, Liu told Deng Zihui that, "the People's Commune was too 
destructive (to the economy)." (Liu, 1999, 81) Some point out that Liu's view on the 
Great Leap had begun to change at this point (Zhen, 2004, 48). But I believe the truth is 
that Liu had never changed his views about the Great Leap, as he had been showing 
inclinations towards retreat even before the Lushan Conference. His statements that 
comprise contradictory comments from time to time have provided researchers from 
different schools with the valuable references they need to prove their hypotheses, 
hence the existence of the various interpretations of Liu's involvement in the Great 
Leap. For example, a month after National Day, Liu held a 20 day (2nd to 22nd 
November) seminar with his colleagues on Hainan Island to discuss his appreciation of 
the Russian economic textbooks that he had just studied. A critic commented, 
"obviously, Liu had not realised the Great Leap was a mistake," based on Liu's 
following statement during the seminar, "according to the textbook, our motivation to 
work is driven by material reward, but I believe it could be motivated by political 
realisation as well ... 'to each according to his work' is the remnant of 
capitalism ... people's communes practice food rationing, as a result we do not have 
more lazy people, but less." (Huang, 2003, 122) 
But what the source does not mention is that at the same seminar, Liu talked 
about balancing the construction of agriculture and heavy industries, warning that 
"some Eastern European countries" had over-expanded their heavy industries and 
suffered from unequal development. "We made similar mistakes in 1956 and 1958," 
Liu said, "We should not repeat the mistake." On 11th November, Liu said, "The Soviet 
Union had started with the (development of) heavy industries, and did not pay 
sufficient attention to the development of agriculture. So the sequence of our basic 
development should be agriculture, light industries, heavy industries. (nong, qing, 
zhong)" On 13th November, Liu reminded his colleagues that "the development of 
production relations should not be faster than the development of productive forces, or 
else the development of productive forces could be undermined:" On 1 i h November, 
Liu tactfully paralleled the period of transition with socialism. trying to eliminate the 
ambiguity oyer the definition of the transitional period, "socialism is an interim period 
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in the transition to communism ... we might be having socialism for a couple of decades. 
but after that communism will exist for hundreds of thousands of years. If we are able 
to view it this way, we could be emancipated from our old conceptions. At the stage of 
socialism, many elements of capitalism, namely commercial production, banks, 
currency, sales value, etc, still exist to serve the people, and to serve socialism as well:' 
This resembles Lenin's labelling of Marx's 'preliminary communism' as socialism (see 
Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). 
Liu even criticised Stalin over his reluctance to regard production tools as 
commercial products, "he (Stalin) dares not identify production tools as commercial 
products, he only recognises consumer goods as commercial products, he does not 
recognise labour forces as commercial products, does not recognise surplus working 
hours, does not talk about profit ... surplus value does exist, but it is not owned by 
individuals, but by society or collectively owned by the workers. We should not avoid 
such questions, if we do, the issue becomes ambiguous." And on 18th November, " ... as 
long as 'to each according to his work' exists, commercial activities would 
exist. .. commercial products exist in the period of transition as remnants (of the past), 
and this remnant is going to stay for a long period of time." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 
467-473) Apparently, Liu had been putting on two faces, one as the Party's 
spokesman who advocated the Great Leap and Maoist cult, and the other as the real Liu 
Shaoqi who talked to his allies about a retreat from the Leap and the expansion of 
productive forces. Sometimes he tried to combine the two tasks in that he had to hide 
his line beneath the mainstream ideologies, and this could sometimes be overlooked by 
researchers. As Liu's role in the Great Leap would appear to have undermined his 
consistency in advocating moderate economic policy in the post-1949 period, an 
advanced interpretation of Liu's interpretation of the Great Leap and the Lushan 
Conference should constitute a significant part of the conclusion of this thesis, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: The Conclusion 
The political reality in Maoist China must be filtered from the study of Liu' s 
theory of transition. Mao would not tolerate any difference of opinion within the 
leadership, so basically the CCP's policy was actually Mao's policy. As Liu was once 
one of Mao's most trusted lieutenants and the nation's Chairman, it was therefore not 
uncommon to see him taking the leading role in major political events, namely the 
inauguration of the Great Leap, and the condemnation of Marshall Peng at the Lushan 
Conference. It must also be noted that the economic policy emphasising gradual 
transformation and tolerating a limited market economy was not originally Liu's idea, 
but a group decision. Furthermore, Mao had indeed given the green light to the 
implementation of such poli~ies, particularly during the post-1949 period, when the 
New Democracy had become the central policy in developing China's economy. 
Confusion arose when Mao lost his patience and changed his stance in pursuit of a 
more radical and rapid economic development plan, Liu still, faithfully, acted as 
Mao's spokesman most of the time during his term of service. It creates a picture that 
has been familiar to many Western researchers-Mao was the original advocate of 
both the moderate and radical economic policies, and Liu was a faithful lieutenant to 
Mao and he should be regarded as part of mainstream politics in Maoist China. 
Politically, Liu had been involved in many of the major events that might have 
portrayed him as a hardliner, in contrast to his advocacy for a more tolerant policy 
towards the capitalist and a more market-based economic policy. 
An article written by Liu after the Lushan Conference could sum up Liu's 
attitudes and practice during the Great Leap. It shows how Liu tried to cope with the 
mainstream ideologies by trying to insert his own lines of thought into Maoist 
statements. In my opinion, this article somehow reflects Liu's inner struggle. It was 
published in Hongqi Magazine (the Red Flag) in September 1959 with the title 'The 
Victory of Marxist-Leninism in China'. At the beginning of the article, we see that Liu 
propagandised the Leap, " ... there is a notion that we are technically too backward to 
begin the mechanisation of industries and to collectivise the agricultural sector. it has 
now been proven wrong ... there is a notion that the collectivisation will undermine the 
agricultural production, that is also not true ... our agricultural production has 
increased tremendously (following the launch of the Leap) ... " Then, contrasting his 
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earlier statement, Liu made a sharp u-turn, "How do we transform the private sector 
of industries and commerce? We apply various forms of state capitalism to gradually 
transform the society to socialism ... so there is a notion that we should not 
compromise with the capitalists ... they suggest confiscating the capitalists' property, 
and depriving the capitalists of their electoral rights. I think these people have 
forgotten the fact that under certain historical circumstances, the policy of buying out 
the bourgeoisie by the proletariat is beneficial to the proletariat. Marx and Lenin had 
said that withdrawal of electoral rights from the bourgeoisie is not necessary ... " But 
then Liu spoke for the Leap again, " ... the transformation (of the nation's economy) 
has been quick and effective ... basically the ownership of the production materials is 
now in the hands of the public. We have carried out the (transformation) task 
smoothly, and almost no damage was done during the process. Agricultural and 
industrial production have been increasing." (Liu, 1959,6-7) 
Liu's interpretation of the issue of contradiction was tactful, as this was a very 
sensitive area where Mao had repeatedly stressed that the contradiction that existed 
was still a contradiction between classes, not a contradiction among people, which 
was Liu's belief. So Liu had to echo Mao, but at the same time stressed the 
importance of contradiction among people, "Some think that we do not need to clarify 
the contradiction with the enemy and the contradiction among people, I think they are 
wrong .. .In today's China, we do not only have the contradiction with the class enemy, 
we also have a lot of contradiction among the people ... those who think contradiction 
among people will be extinguished after the establishment of socialism are wrong .. .if 
we do not see the existence of contradiction among people, and if we simply 
exaggerate the contradiction with class enemies ... we will make mistakes." Liu 
continued by putting forward some strong pro-Leap statements, which he supported 
with the application of economic theory, "Is it good to organise the masses for 
economic construction? Of course, the building of socialist society is the 
responsibility of millions of people ... the movement of the masses will inevitably 
destroy parts of the old system, but what it destroys are those parts detrimental to 
economic development, and the movement will establish a new system for 
society ... some say the Great Leap is in contrast with the economic rules, but our 
Great Leap is the product of the time, as it emerged at the right time, according to the 
economic rules, due to the rapid economic development. We must bear in mind that 
the economic rules must be followed:' However. Liu's interpretation of the people's 
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commune did not seem to be in line with mainstream politics, "some think the 
people's commune is communist, and complies only with the principle of "to each 
according to his needs' .. . they do not understand that this sort of organisation has a 
high level of flexibility, it can accommodate various levels of productive force and 
various types of production relation, and it could be socialist or communist. It will suit 
the current system of 'to each according to his work' and the future system of "to 
each according to his needs.'" It is interesting to note that Liu actually hinted that 'to 
each according to his needs' was something for the "future." And [mally his attack on 
the party's enemies was just the echo of Mao's conclusion at Lushan, "Who are the 
ones attacking the Great Leap? Who are the rightist opportunists? They are the 
representatives of the capitalists in our Party ... The Eighth Plenum of the Eighth 
Committee (Lushan Conference) has already pointed out that rightist opportunism is 
the main threat to our nation" (Liu, 1959,9,11,12,14) 
The Lushan Conference marked a milestone in the development of the Great 
Leap. As in his attack on the Anti-Rash Advance, Mao once again defeated his 
opponents within the Party in his pursuit of collectivisation, and manoeuvred another 
about-tum in policy making. Under the banner of party unity, the Leap was re-
launched and the voices of retreat had been silenced. The theme of the Lushan 
conference had changed from Anti-Rash Advance to Anti-Rightist Opportunism. The 
impact of the post-1959 Leap was far more severe than the Leap of the period of 
1958-1959, as the forces used to restrain the masses had all been eliminated. By the 
time Liu called for a total retreat in 1962 at the 7000-cadre conference, millions had 
perished. At Lushan, Liu once again put himself in the limelight after the Second 
Session. Not only did he criticise Peng at the Conference and help to sustain the Leap, 
he actually started another wave of the Maoist cult at Mao's request during the latter 
part of the Conference. Moreover, two resolutions, 'The Struggle against the Rightists 
in order to Defend the Party Line' and 'The Resolution Regarding the Mistake of 
Peng-led Anti-Party Group', were passed in Liu's presence at the Lushan Conference 
(ZYWXYJS, 1998a, 2: 843). His involvement in these events had inevitably made 
him accountable for the re-Iaunch of the Leap. As a result, as far as economic theory 
is concerned, his consistency with the line of the Soviets' NEP as well as his image as 
an economic reformer had thus been seriously undermined. 
On the other hand, we must not overlook the fact that Liu's roles as Party 
spokesperson. Mao's second in command and the People's Republic Chairman had 
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put him in an unfavourable position. Evidence has shown that Liu had done his best to 
stick to his line of economic development amid Mao's ambitious advances. His effort 
to strike a balance between Mao's ideology and his own had not been successfuL as 
he had always been overshadowed by Mao's overwhelming political power while he 
looked more like a staunch supporter of Mao than a bold economic planner. Liu's 
compromise with Mao's adventurism did not bear the fruits he expected, as Mao did 
not show any intention of revising the Leap in return for Liu's unreserved support at 
Lushan. On the other hand, if the Great Leap was, as Deng Xiaoping said, an event 
that "everybody supported," and a time when "nobody had a clear mind;" then those 
who first felt the urgency to retreat after evidence of the Leap's failure had surfaced 
should be the ones with clearer minds than others. Liu's comments on the exaggerated 
projections during the Leap (see Chapter 6) had shown that he was one of them. In 
June 1960, when famine spread across China, the CCP held an Enlarged Politburo 
conference in Shanghai. Mao admitted that, "there was an enormous blindness" in 
policy making, and stressed that, "we have been talking about quantity, now we have 
to talk about quality." Strangely, Mao even admitted that "the development of 
ideology was not quite right since the launch of the Leap," as it was not practical and 
projections were too high (BNSBWH, 2002, 6: 2290). As a result, "retrenchment, not 
expansion, was in the air."(Macfarquahar, 1983, 323) It was at this time that Liu 
showed his true colours. The revival plan overseen by Liu and Deng during the 
aftermath of the Leap had stabilised China's economy for the period from 1962 to 
1964, until the rectification campaign of the Four Clean Movement made the situation 
chaotic again. His efforts in reviving China's economy, including the re-introduction 
of the 'banchandaohu' (contractual farming) and his involvement in the rectification 
campaign were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
At the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Committee, held on 2ih_29th June 1981, 
the CCP seemed to have clarified and outlined who should be responsible for the Leap 
by passing a resolution, 'The Central Committee Resolution Regarding Some 
Historical Issues Since the Construction of the Republic (1981)'. It stated that "the 
positive side of the Leap is the reflection of the desperation and willingness of the 
public to improve the situation of economic and cultural backwardness of our nation. 
The negative side (of the Leap) is the ignorance of relevant economic theory ... This 
was due to our inexperience in socialist construction and inadequate understanding of 
the laws of economic development and the basic economic conditions in 
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China ... More importantly, it was due to the fact that Comrade Mao Zedong and many 
leading comrades, both at the centre and in the localities, had become smug about 
their success, were impatient for quick results, and overestimated the role of man~ s 
subjective will and efforts." (Li, 1981, 10-11; BNSBWH, 2002,8: 3108-3109) So 
it summed up the responsibility for the Leap, as well as the constraints on accusing 
Mao in Mainland China. The use of the words "many leading comrades" means the 
burden has now been shared. The defence of the Leap is best summarised by Bo Yibo, 
who said that "the masses excused us for doing wrong because our intentions were 
good." (Bo, 1981, 67) Good intentions and a "combination of inexperience and 
arrogance" is now the common theme the Chinese Leadership uses to describe the 
responsibility for the Leap (Joseph, 1986, 424). 
This research does not attempt to defend Liu's involvement in the Leap and 
the Lushan Conference or to clear his name of any wrongdoing. Liu's support for the 
Great Leap and his attack on Peng at Lushan were undeniable. But he did not support 
Mao's programme wholeheartedly, though he was willing to give Mao his support 
even when he did not think Mao was right. His willingness could be due to the three 
possibilities we have discussed: firstly, he regarded Mao as the representation of the 
Party line, and in order to maintain the integrity and unity of the CCP, he showed 
vigorous support to Mao; secondly, he supported Mao in return for compromise in 
policy making, which he never really secured, as his respect for Mao prevented him 
from making any forceful advancement against Mao; and finally he might have taken 
into consideration his chances of succession to Mao. As Mao had yet to retire 
completely from politics, he could not afford to take any chances. As a conclusion, 
Liu's self-contradicting statements throughout the period of the Great Leap, his 
support to Deng Zihui and Zhou Enlai during the Anti-rash Advance campaign before 
the Leap, his effort to strike a balance between an adherence to Mao's line and the 
assertion of his ideologies, and his complete reversal to a more market-based 
economic programme after the Leap, were all indications of Liu's persistence in his 
pursuit of a market-based economic policy for China's transitional period. So Liu was 
ideologically consistent even during the period of the Great Leap, though he did make 
concessions for political gains. Nevertheless, his status as the nation's Chairman 
during the Leap had inevitably subjected him to more criticism. And as the key figure 
of the leadership, he was definitely partially responsible for the Great Leap. 
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The general understanding that Liu favoured a strict adherence to central 
authority is not incorrect. But what was central to Liu~s model of organisation was the 
existence of a set of central rules or regulations for the masses or the party members 
to follow. Under this frame of conception, the masses or the members of the Party 
would enjoy a certain amount of freedom as long as they acted or behaved in 
accordance with the scope of the regulations. In addition to that, class struggle had 
never been an integral part of Liu's theory of transition. Liu believed in cultivation 
and education as the measures which would transform the class enemies into good 
communists. Liu also regarded the contradiction among people as a common situation 
within an organisation, and believed that it would not affect the integrity of the Party 
as long as the Party's rules were adhered to. Liu had never believed in the initiative of 
the masses and never been fond of mass-mobilisation, as for Liu, any movement of 
the masses should follow central guidance. However, Liu's distrust of the masses did 
result in controversy. His ruthless handling of the corrupt cadres during the Four 
Clean Movement, which was rooted in his simplistic differentiation of right or 
wrong-sparing those who met the requirements of the Four Clean and punishing 
those who were declared 'unclean '- had led to the deaths of thousands of innocents 
(see Chapter 4). This contrasted sharply to Mao's handling of the Four Clean 
Movement, where he turned to accuse the leadership of failure in their guidance of the 
masses when he realised the corruption among the lowly cadres was so pervasive that 
the mass purges of the wrongdoers might undermine his grass roots support. As a 
politician, Liu was not as flexible as Mao, though he had always been the more honest 
of the two. 
Liu also believed in the transformation of the individual via education and 
social influence. The conception of the 'cultivation of a good communist' did not only 
reflect Liu's belief in turning the bourgeoisie into communists, but was actually the 
behavioural guideline Liu set for Party members to follow. Therefore Liu was less 
concerned over the class background of the members, while placing more emphasis 
on the adherence to a set of central rules. This is indeed the major difference between 
Mao and Liu. This idea ofLiu's resembled to a certain extent that of Nikolai Bukharin, 
who advocated the evolutionary model of 'growing in' for the period of transition. In 
his interpretation of the Marxist theory of transition, Bukharin believed that at every 
stage of the transformation of the society, a kind of balance or stability called 
'equilibrium' would exist. The transformation into another stage could only begin 
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when the old equilibrium was broken. Interestingly, Bukharin saw the adaptation to a 
new social formation and the transformation of individuals as an inevitable process as 
time passed. He believed that, as long as the proletariat stayed in power, the society 
would ultimately live to 'grow' into socialism after the revolution had been completed. 
Similarly, Liu pointed out that as long as the proletariat ruled and the revolution had 
been won, the contradiction with the enemies was over and everybody could, 
regardless of his class and background, become a good communist. The evolutionary 
process envisaged by Liu involved "resolving the differences via discussion and 
education," which he believed would change those of the opposition into socialists, 
though he stressed that "we should not fight each other on the grounds of different 
ideologies and principles." However, 'discussion' and 'education' aside, there are 
concessions that Liu would not make: the authority of the Party must not be 
challenged, and contradiction should be kept within the party (Liu, 1981, 1: 210-
211). 
Liu's ideology of economic construction during the period of transition was in 
line with his ideas about the Party and organisation. Although Liu' s economic model 
involved tolerance of private capital, he had never envisaged a market economy that 
was free of central guidance. He stressed the importance of the control of major 
industries by the state, and believed that as long as they were in the hands of the 
proletariat, economic development would not embark on the capitalist route. This 
reflects the ideology of Bukharin, who advocated the notion of 'commanding height' 
that he inherited from Lenin. Bukharin believed that as long as the major industries 
were in the hands of the proletariat, the existence of a limited market economy and 
private ownership would not undermine the development of a socialist economy. 
However, while Bukharin envisaged a kind of direct competition between the socialist 
conglomerate and the "remnants of the capitalists," in which he believed the socialist 
economic model would ultimately prevail, Liu saw the necessity to coordinate the two 
in the construction of rural economy. Liu's plan of using the Supply and Marketing 
Cooperative (SMC) as a medium to boost the commercial activities between rural and 
urban China as well as improving the living standards in the peasantry was unique and 
original. The retention of private property and private farming were well-served by 
the system of SMC as the produce of the small scale handicraft factories in the 
peasantry could be channelled to other parts of China. However, Liu's ideology of 
economic construction during the period of transition is not without controyersy from 
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a socialist perspective. As an advocate for the theory of the development of 
productive forces he viewed the possible exploitation of the working class as 
inevitable during the period of transition. His Tianjin speech in 1949 indicated his 
focus on building the productive forces, which theoretically meant the building of 
capitalist elements of economy that would surely lead to the exploitation of labourers, 
as he said on 28th September 1949, "The problem of today's China is not the 
dominance of the capitalists, but the shortage of capitalists." (ZYWXYJS, 1996, 2: 
201) Liu also believed that merging industries to form industrial conglomerates like 
'the Trust' would bring efficiency and effectiveness to the production and 
administration. This seems to resemble the notion of most of the socialist 
revolutionaries that collective organisations were always preferable to smaller 
industries. However, Liu's preference for business conglomerates was rooted in his 
intention to bring in professional management to the industries, which he believed had 
been bogged down by bureaucracy. This had never been successful, of course, as the 
management of huge business organisations requires highly skilled professionals, 
whilst Maoist China was short of industrial management expertise. But it shows that 
unlike Mao, Liu had actually seen the problems of China's socialist economy, and had 
tried to overcome them. 
Liu's true character could only be appreciated through a detailed study of his 
speeches and writings, the careful observation of his much disguised effort to put 
forward his line of thought in the face of the overwhelming Maoist ideology, and the 
analysis of the historical background of the events in which Liu was involved as a 
CCP leader. Liu's article in the Hongqi magazine, as discussed above, has reflected 
his struggle to assert his position in the political turmoil during the Great Leap. Liu's 
consistency in addressing his ideologies should not be overshadowed by his loyal 
assistance to Mao's leadership. Liu indeed had his own distinct set of theories of 
transition, and as repeatedly stated in almost all the chapters, the coherence of his 
theories has been vindicated by his persistence in imposing his ideology via 
compromising his political practice as Mao's faithful lieutenant. 
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